Kevin Aho

Existentialism: An Introduction

Acknowledgments

This book could not have been written without the teachers who first introduced me to existentialism. The initial exposure came from my parents, Jim and Margaret Aho, whose bookshelves were filled with the works of Camus, Kierkegaard, Kafka, Sartre, Dostoevsky, Tolstoy, Rilke, and Nietzsche (though strangely, nothing from Heidegger). For them, the only thing that mattered in life was ‘being true to oneself,’ and without their encouragement and dog-eared copy of The Brothers Karamazov — which I read during winter break of my freshman year in college — I may never have changed my major to philosophy and fallen so hard for existentialism. They have followed and supported my path from the ski slopes of Utah and Wyoming to the urban canyons of Manhattan to the sub-tropical swamps and beaches of south Florida. They have also read, commented on, and edited early drafts of this book, and their sharp and incisive feedback throughout the process has been invaluable. My brothers, Ken and Kyle, have also been my teachers, showing me what genuine acts of self-creation are through their music, art, and bold adventures in the mountains.

There were also a number of influential professors in college and graduate school who exposed me to different aspects of existentialist thought, including Carl Levenson and Paul Tate at Idaho State University; Agnes Heller and Bernard Flynn at the New School for Social Research; Bernard Harrison at the University of Utah; and Stephen Turner, Ofelia Schutte, and Joanne Waugh at the University of South Florida. But of all the teachers I've had over the years, the most important and enduring has been Charles Guignon. Indeed, this book was originally conceived as a co-authored project, and many of the ideas were developed over lengthy conversations with Charles over the past decade. His intellectual guidance and friendship have been a steady presence, and this book could not have been completed without him. Of course, with that said, any scholarly and interpretive errors in the book are mine alone.

I also have to acknowledge the consistent institutional support at Florida Gulf Coast University and my warm and supportive colleagues, especially Margaret Hambrick, Glenn Whitehouse, Jim Wohlpart, Sean Kelly, Mohamad Al-Hakim, and Donna Henry. They helped to create a pluralistic and open intellectual space where I could freely pursue my own research projects and integrate them into my teaching in existentialist-themed courses like ‘The Philosophy of Death and Dying,’ ‘The Tragedy of Technology,’ ‘Existential Psychotherapy,’ and ‘Phenomenology of the Body.’ I have also been blessed with wonderful students who have taken my courses over the years, including Ashley Levy, Ellie Levy, Jonathan Wurtz, Paul Smith, Jon Morheim, Adil Mughal, Jameson Yingling, and Natalie Worebel. I am especially thankful to Adil Mughal and Diana Ruiz for helping me to compose the selected bibliography for this volume. And I am indebted to Ariel Ruiz i Altaba for his generosity in once again allowing me to use his artwork for the cover of a book. This particular image is appropriately called ‘Choices’ from a powerful collection of his entitled Traces.

The editorial staff at Polity Press has been nothing less than superb throughout the process. Sarah Lambert, Pascal Porcheron, India Darsley, and Emma Hutchinson were consummate professionals; they were consistently supportive of the project and always timely and thoughtful in their responses to any questions I had. Emma, in particular, was especially helpful as the project neared completion. Eric Schramm's detailed and rigorous copyediting saved me from a number of stylistic and technical embarrassments. And three anonymous referees for Polity offered extensive and insightful comments for revisions that sharpened the manuscript.

Finally, there is an inexpressible debt of gratitude to Elena Ruíz. In many ways, our relationship reflects the enduring cross-cultural power of existentialist thought. A Latina born and raised in Mexico City and a small-town mountain boy from Idaho came together at the University of South Florida in Tampa, and our connection flourished and deepened over late-night discussions of Nietzsche, Camus, and Kierkegaard. She, more than anyone I know, is an incarnation of what matters in existentialism, living with sense of committed passion and intensity, accepting the inescapable frailty of the human situation, and attentive to the suffering of others. This book is dedicated to her.

Preface

What is existentialism?

One of the difficulties in writing a book about ‘existentialism’ is the word itself. It is an ‘ism’ that gives the misleading impression of a coherent and unified philosophical school. The word was officially coined by the French philosopher Gabriel Marcel in 1943 and quickly adopted by his compatriots Jean-Paul Sartre and Simone de Beauvoir. But many of the major twentieth-century figures, such as Martin Heidegger, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, and Albert Camus, rejected the label, and nineteenth-century pioneers like Søren Kierkegaard and Friedrich Nietzsche had never heard of it. Indeed, the representative figures are anything but unified in their views. There are secular existentialists like Sartre, Nietzsche, and Camus whose philosophies are informed by the ‘death of God,’ but there are also prominent theistic existentialists like Marcel, Paul Tillich, and Martin Buber. There are existentialists who claim that we are radically free and morally responsible for our actions, and others, like Nietzsche, who contend that the idea of free will is a fiction. There are some, like Kierkegaard, Beauvoir, and Sartre who maintain that existentialism is a form of subjectivism, while others, such as Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty, reject this equivocation and posit the centrality of intersubjectivity or being-in-the-world. And there are figures who argue that our relations with others are invariably mired in alienation, self-deception, and conflict, but there are also those who develop notions of mutual dependency, selfless love, and genuine communion with others.

Yet, given these conflicting views, there are clear indications of a new philosophical orientation emerging in modern Europe, centering specifically on the question of what it means to be human. As early as the seventeenth century, French philosopher and mathematician Blaise Pascal introduced the phrase ‘logic of the heart’ (logique du coeur) in an attempt to give an account of the affective mystery of human existence that traditional reason and logic could never access. In one of the first expressions of modern existentialism, Pascal writes:

Let man, returning to himself, consider what he is in comparison with what exists; let him regard himself as lost, and from this little dungeon, in which he finds himself lodged, I mean the universe, let him learn to take the earth, its realms, its cities, its houses and himself at their proper value. … Anyone who considers himself in this way will be terrified at himself. (1995, 199)

In the middle of the nineteenth century, Kierkegaard would take Pascal's experience of existential isolation and terror and develop an entire philosophy around it, stressing the importance of the singular and concrete passions of the ‘existing individual’ over any abstract or objective truth. A generation later, Nietzsche was promoting the ideals of ‘life philosophy’ (Lebensphilosophie) that emphasized the incalculability of human experience and the inchoate forces of life that could never be explained by appeals to reason. In the 1920s, Heidegger was introducing his own ‘existential analytic’ or ‘analytic of Dasein,’ and his contemporary Karl Jaspers was developing a ‘philosophy of existence’ (Existenzphilosophie), both of which engaged the inexpressible freedom of the individual and the human conditions of anxiety and death that defy rational apprehension. Thus, long before the word ‘existentialism’ was officially introduced in 1943 and the uniform of black sweaters, black pants, and cigarettes populated the cafés of the boulevard St. Germain in Paris, the core ideas of the movement had already been articulated. This helps to explain David Cooper's remark that “none of the great existentialist tomes contain the word ‘existentialism’ ” (1999, 1).

Although it cannot be reduced to a unified school of thought, and the major figures vary widely in their views, the common thread that ties these thinkers together is their concern for the human situation as it is lived. This is a situation that cannot be reasoned about or captured in an abstract system; it can only be felt and made meaningful by the concrete choices and actions of the existing individual. From this shared concern, there are a number of overlapping themes that emerge in the writings that make it possible for us to group them together under a common heading.

Existence precedes Essence: Existentialists forward the idea that humans exist in a way that is different from other things — such as trees, cultural artifacts, and animals. We cannot be understood as mere things that are objectively present because we exist, that is, we make choices and take action throughout our lives. This means there is no pre-given ‘essence’ that determines who and what we are. We are self-making beings that become who we are on the basis of the choices and actions we make as our lives unfold. On this view, there is no definitive or complete account of being human because there is nothing that grounds or secures our existence; we are a ‘not yet,’ always in the process of realizing who we are as we press forward into future projects and possibilities.

The Self as a Tension: By interpreting existence as a process of self-making rather than as an object or thing, existentialists suggest that the structure of the self involves a tension or struggle between what can be called ‘facticity’ and ‘transcendence.’ On the one hand, we are determined by our facticity, where this is understood as the limitations of our factual nature such as our physiology, sexuality, and sociohistorical situation. On the other hand, insofar as we are self-conscious and aware of our limitations, we can transcend or surpass them by taking a stand on them, that is, by choosing to interpret them in certain ways, giving them meaning, and, thus, creating our own identities.

The Anguish of Freedom: As beings that can take a stand on our facticity, existentialists generally agree that we are free and responsible for who we are and what we do. But this realization is often accompanied by anguish because it reminds us that we alone are responsible for the choices and actions we make in our lives. Existentialists reject the idea that there are moral absolutes, utilitarian calculations, or natural laws that can explain or justify our actions. As Sartre writes, when it comes to human actions, “there are no excuses behind us nor justifications before us” (2001, 296).

The Insider's Perspective: Because human existence is not a thing that can be studied from a perspective of detached objectivity, existentialists hold the view that we can understand ourselves only by taking what might be called an ‘insider's perspective.’ That is, prior to any disinterested theorizing about who or what we are, we must first come to grips with the experience of being human as it is lived within the context of our own situation. For this reason, existentialists reject the idea that there can be objectivity when it comes to giving an account of human existence. Any account of what it means to be human is already mediated by the contextual interweaving of our social involvements, bodily orientation, emotions, and perceptual capacities.

Moods as Disclosive: For the existentialists, we do not gain knowledge of the human situation through detached thought or rational demonstration but through the affective experiences of the individual. We understand what counts or matters in our lives through our moods, through the ways in which we feel about things. Some moods, such as ‘anxiety’ (Heidegger), ‘nausea’ (Sartre), ‘guilt’ (Kierkegaard), and ‘absurdity’ (Camus), are especially important for the existentialists because they have the capacity to shake us out of our everyday complacency and self-deception by disclosing the fundamental freedom and finitude of our situation. This, in turn, allows us the opportunity to be honest with ourselves and own up to our lives with renewed passion, intensity, and focus.

The Possibility for Authenticity: Because we have a tendency to conform to the leveled-down roles and identities of the public world, the question of authenticity, of being true to oneself, is central to the existentialists. The idea is formulated in many different ways, in terms of being a ‘knight of faith’ (Kierkegaard), for example, an ‘overman’ (Nietzsche), a ‘rebel’ (Camus), or an ‘authentic individual’ (Heidegger). In this way, existentialists develop the possibility of living a meaningful, committed, and fulfilling life in the face of absurdity and death. The idea of authenticity serves as a powerful rejoinder to the criticism of existentialism as representing a kind of nihilistic, ‘anything goes’ philosophy.

Ethics and Responsibility: Existentialism does not require adherence to any normative moral principle. Yet the argument that existentialism is an amoral philosophy is undeserved. Existentialism centers around the most fundamental of moral questions: ‘What should I do?’ and ‘How should I live?’ Moreover, in acknowledging our fundamental freedom, existentialists recognize that we are not free from taking responsibility for our actions or from cultivating the ideal of freedom for others. To this end, existentialism offers a clear vision of what a valuable or praiseworthy way of life is. It is a life that faces up to the inescapable freedom and vulnerability of the human situation, and takes responsibility for the fact that our actions have consequences and impact the lives of others.

Why this book?

The justification for a new introduction to existentialism is difficult given the number of high-quality monographs published on the topic over the last six decades. Beginning with William Barrett's path-breaking Irrational Man: A Study in Existential Philosophy in 1958, a number of early secondary works in English stand out, notably Calvin O. Schrag's Existence and Freedom (1961), Robert Olson's An Introduction to Existentialism (1962), John Macquarrie's Existentialism (1972), and Robert Solomon's From Rationalism to Existentialism: The Existentialists and Their Nineteenth-Century Backgrounds (1972). Despite their significant contribution, these texts are now quite outdated. More recently, Thomas Flynn has written a crisp and engaging little book called Existentialism: A Very Short Introduction (2006), but, because of its brevity, it is unable to engage a wide range of thinkers or develop key issues in sufficient detail. Without question, it is David Cooper's Existentialism: A Reconstruction (1990; 2nd ed., 1999) that has set the standard in terms of comprehensiveness and bringing existentialism up to date and into conversation with core themes in mainstream Anglophone philosophy. My aim in this book is to follow Cooper's lead in emphasizing existentialism's enduring relevance to contemporary philosophy, but I try to draw on a wider range of philosophical and literary figures and address themes that are often neglected or underdeveloped in other introductory works.

There is a tendency in the secondary texts to focus narrowly on the ‘big four,’ Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Heidegger, and Sartre. This approach is understandable given the enormous philosophical and cultural impact of these figures, but it tends to overlook the significance of religious and literary existentialists such as Dostoevsky, Camus, Tolstoy, Marcel, Unamuno, and Buber, as well as feminist figures such as Beauvoir. In some introductions, the influence of Nietzsche's philosophy is minimized because he rejects one of the central tenets of existentialism, namely that human beings are radically free and, therefore, morally responsible for their actions. There are also crucial themes of embodiment and being-in-the-world that are often undeveloped, and there is sometimes a failure to situate existentialism within the historical context of modernity. Finally, there is the issue of the significant influence that existentialism has had in the applied fields of medicine, psychiatry, and psychotherapy, an impact that is often glossed over in introductory texts.

This book attempts to address these shortcomings. Although much attention is paid to the ‘big four,’ I try to cast a much larger net, drawing on a wide range of philosophical and literary figures as they become relevant to the issues. The first chapter, ‘Existentialism and Modernity,’ is devoted to the historical roots of the Western self as it emerges from the tension between Greek reason and Hebraic faith and how this tension is recast in modernity. To this end, Nietzsche's work is placed center-stage in framing the situation of nihilism and ‘the death of God’ that becomes crucial to twentieth-century existentialists. There is also a brief discussion of the broader cultural impact of existentialism outside of philosophy.

Chapter 2, ‘The Insider's Perspective,’ engages existentialism's critique of methodological detachment and objectivity by arguing that any account of human existence must begin from inside one's own finite and situated perspective. Here, different accounts of the insider's perspective are introduced, including Kierkegaard's conception of ‘subjective truth,’ Nietzsche's ‘perspectivism,’ and phenomenological accounts as they emerge in the work of Heidegger, Sartre, and Merleau-Ponty.

Chapter 3, ‘Being-in-the-World,’ addresses the ways in which existentialism undermines traditional philosophical dualisms by interpreting the human being not as an encapsulated thing or substance, but in terms of pre-reflective involvement in the world. Although the chapter draws largely on the seminal work of Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty to articulate how we already embody an understanding of intra-worldly things, it also engages the work of figures like Frantz Fanon and Iris Marion Young to show how this tacit understanding can break down on the basis of racial and sexual difference.

The remainder of the book deals with the key issues of selfhood, freedom, authenticity, and ethics. Chapter 4, ‘Self and Others,’ describes the existentialist configuration of the self as a struggle between ‘facticity’ and ‘transcendence.’ With wide-ranging references to Sartre, Heidegger, Kierkegaard, Tolstoy, and Ortega y Gasset, as well as to contemporary Anglophone philosophers such as Harry Frankfurt and Charles Taylor, the chapter illustrates how human beings are always making or creating themselves by interpreting and giving meaning to their factical situation. This chapter also addresses issues of embodiment and how the process of self-creation is often compromised by our calcified tendency to conform to the identities and roles of the public world.

Chapter 5 introduces freedom as the central idea of existentialism and identifies the ways in which existential freedom is distinct from more conventional views. Using Dostoevsky's Notes from the Underground to frame the idea, the chapter discusses ‘radical’ or ‘absolute’ forms of freedom promoted by Sartre as well as the ‘situated’ forms of freedom developed by Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, and Beauvoir. The chapter concludes with a discussion of Nietzsche's views on freedom. Although he breaks with other existentialists by criticizing the idea of free will and moral responsibility, Nietzsche can be viewed as offering his own version of situated freedom, one that is rooted in the polymorphous drives of the body but also reflects the goal of self-creation that is crucial to the existentialist program.

Chapter 6, ‘Authenticity,’ builds on the discussion of freedom by exploring what it means to be true to oneself. Here the significance of penetrating emotional experiences like anxiety, absurdity, and guilt is developed as having the power to pull us out of self-deception and bring us face-to-face with our own freedom and death. This discussion also explores how the existentialist account of emotions breaks decisively with the Romantic tradition. The second half of the chapter is framed around the core tension between being ethical (‘doing what is right’) and being authentic (‘being true to oneself’) and focuses on the influential accounts of authenticity offered by Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Heidegger, and Sartre.

Chapter 7, ‘Ethics,’ challenges the criticism that existentialism promotes a brand of ‘anything goes’ philosophy. The chapter begins by showing how existentialists like Sartre and Beauvoir support a notion of moral responsibility and of cultivating the value of freedom for others. The discussion then shifts to Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty, who argue that there are moral demands that are already placed on us through our involvement in a shared historical situation (Heidegger) and through our intercorporeality (Merleau-Ponty). The chapter concludes by showing how religious existentialists like Buber and Levinas challenge the modern attitudes of selfishness and individualism and develop a moral orientation rooted in the affective recognition of human vulnerability and suffering.

Chapter 8 engages existentialism's enormous contribution to psychiatry and psychotherapy. Drawing on the work of existential therapists such as R. D. Laing, Irvin Yalom, and Rollo May, the chapter explores the value of existentialism in psychiatry by showing how the patient's experience of psychopathology always needs to be situated and contextualized. On this view, the therapist does not regard the patient as an object of scientific investigation and does not necessarily interpret psychic suffering as a medical disease but as an existential given that has the power to disclose who we are as human beings. When anxiety overwhelms us by bringing us face-to-face with our own freedom and death, the therapist does not simply want to manage or control this feeling with medication or psychiatric techniques. The aim, rather, is to accept and integrate the unsettling experience into our lives. This acceptance can, in turn, free us from everyday forms of self-deception and open us up to deeper and more meaningful ways of living.

The final chapter, ‘Existentialism Today,’ addresses key aspects of existentialism that continue to shape the current intellectual landscape. The chapter begins with a discussion of existentialism's impact on recent political philosophy, focusing primarily on how it conceives of the experience of oppression and how this conception has profoundly influenced developments in feminist and postcolonial theory and critical philosophies of race. It then moves to existentialism's role in environmental philosophy. Drawing largely on the work of Heidegger, the discussion centers on the dangers of dualistic thinking when it comes to how we interpret nature and shows how the existentialist understanding of the self as being-in-the-world has helped environmental philosophers reconfigure our relationship to technology and to the earth itself. This discussion leads to an account of existentialism's impact on the emergence and legitimation of comparative philosophy in the West by illuminating affinities between Buddhist conceptions of ‘suffering’ (dukkha) and those found in the existentialist tradition. The discussion goes on to show how Buddhism addresses some potential shortcomings in existentialism by not romanticizing suffering but by offering specific practices to end it. The chapter concludes with an assessment of existentialism's legacy in contemporary medicine and its focus on the lived experience of illness rather the objective nature of disease. In questioning the viability of the scientific standpoint of detachment and objectivity, existentialism calls for healthcare professionals to not just ‘fix’ the diseased body but to help the patients give meaning to and make sense of their own experiences.

This brief summary provides an indication of the purpose of this book. It is not only meant to offer an accessible and scholarly introduction to the central themes of existentialism. With references to a broad range of thinkers and drawing on the work of leading Anglophone commentators, it is meant to show that existentialism is by no means a moribund or outdated mode of thinking. The ideas remain fresh and vital because they speak to the most pressing concerns that we face in the secular age: ‘Who am I?’ and ‘How should I live?’ In the following chapters, we will engage the core ideas of existentialism, all the while keeping in view the difficulty in demarcating the boundaries of the movement. It is important to remind the reader that, among the myriad thinkers traditionally included under the label ‘existentialist,’ only Sartre and Beauvoir explicitly identified themselves as such. The term, in the way I am using it, refers to a diverse group of philosophers and literary figures who were concerned about the question of what it means to be human. And although the range of thinkers can be traced back to the classical works of Epicurus and the Stoic philosophies of Seneca and Epictetus, and core ideas can be found germinating in the writings of Augustine, Shakespeare, Michel de Montaigne, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, and Pascal, my focus will be on the nineteenth and twentieth centuries and those figures that followed Kierkegaard.

In order to cast the net as widely as possible and to bring literary and religious figures into the discussion, I reject David Cooper's notion that existentialism refers to a “relatively systematic philosophy” (1999, 8) and agree with commentators like Jeff Malpas (2012) who suggest that such a view invariably excludes seminal literary figures like Camus, Tolstoy, Dostoevsky, and Kafka, and perhaps even Kierkegaard and Nietzsche themselves, whose indirect and aphoristic styles were anything but systematic. Indeed, I want to argue that these literary approaches are one of the major reasons why existentialism became the cultural phenomenon that it did. With little or no training in academic philosophy, readers were provided with vivid and accessible points of entry into the ultimate questions of ‘absurdity,’ ‘freedom,’ and ‘death.’ By broadening the term in this way, I can draw on a more comprehensive range of figures as they become relevant to particular topics, regardless of whether or not they were philosophers or literary figures and whether or not they were inclined to self-identify as ‘existentialists.’ For the purposes of this project, if the work engages the struggle of the human condition, the anguish at the loss of moral absolutes, and the vertiginous freedom of self-creation, it can be called existentialism.

1: Existentialism and Modernity

Roots of the Western self

In order to situate the movement of existentialism within the context of recent European thought, we first have to go back to the earliest philosophical and religious currents that shaped the Western worldview. Understanding that it is impossible to compress the complexities of the last three millennia into a few pages, we can make the broad claim that the conflicting traditions of Hebraic faith on the one hand and Greek reason on the other have informed our sense of who we are. Both traditions offer the idea of the human being as unique to the extent that we are self-conscious and have ‘higher’ potentialities that allow us to surpass or transcend our finite earthly existence (e.g., Dreyfus 2009, 2012). In the tradition of Greek philosophy, transcendence was achieved through the standpoint of rational detachment, allowing the philosopher to rise above the temporal particularities of existence in order to gain knowledge of the universal, that is, to timeless and abstract forms or essences. In the Hebraic tradition, the experience of transcendence is understood not in terms of detached reason but in terms of an intense faith and trust in an incomprehensible God. This kind of faith can lead to confusion and despair because the Hebrew God is beyond rational understanding and is often cruel and violent. This is why, as William Barrett points out, there is a certain “uneasiness” in the biblical interpretation of the human condition that is not found in Greek philosophy (1958, 71). The picture of the human condition is one that is frail, finite, and filled with sin, and that stands naked and exposed before an unknowable God. In this sense, Job is the paradigmatic biblical figure. He confronts the calamitous trials that God has put before him, not with detached reason, but with the involved fullness of his whole being and all of the confusion, rage, and despair that comes with it. But through it all, his commitment to God remains passionate and unwavering, and it is by means of his faith that he is transformed. His anguish turns to awe in the face of God's infinite and incomprehensible majesty. In this way, we are introduced to the idea that the infinite and eternal can be revealed in passionate commitments that are finite and temporal. Thus, there is little discussion of heaven, the immortality of the soul, or the afterlife in the Hebrew Bible. Transcendence is found not in an otherworldly realm but in the concrete commitments of the whole person, body and soul, who inhabits this world. This idea of transcendence conflicts radically with the views of Plato and the tradition of Greek philosophy.

For Plato (427–347 bce), transcendence was not attained by the passionate faith of the whole person. It was achieved when reason, the ‘higher’ or divine part of the soul, rises above the ‘lower’ animal part, from the fleeting perceptions and passions of the body. This rational detachment makes theoretical knowledge possible, where ‘theory’ (theoria) is understood as a kind of disembodied seeing or contemplation. For Plato, the essential truths that philosophy discovers have the same form as the immutable truths of geometry and arithmetic. In this way, the philosopher becomes a disinterested spectator who transcends the contingent sensations of the body and comes to occupy a ‘God's-eye view’ of reality. This view allows him access to abstract ‘ideas’ (eidos), to the timeless and eternal essence of things. With Plato's influence, the cognizing mind becomes the absolute authority by discovering an unchanging ‘reality’ that lies behind the transitory ‘appearances’ of the temporal body.

We see, then, that the tradition of Greek reason conflicts with the Judaic worldview in two important ways. First, Greek philosophy provides a kind of intellectual protection or salvation from the experience of anguish and dread so vital to the Hebrew interpretation of faith. By focusing on knowledge of abstract ideas, the philosopher rises above the horrifying predicament that biblical figures like Job had to face. Second, Greek reason privileges a conception of transcendence that is attained through a disembodied theoretical standpoint. Indeed, for Plato, what distinguishes us as human beings is not our impassioned faith in an unknowable and fearsome God but the soul's ability to rationally detach from these emotional upheavals. It is only then that we arrive at a domain of truth that is immutable and timeless. The consequence of these conflicting versions of transcendence is a tension between two conceptions of selfhood in the West, one where the God of Abraham tells us to live one way, and the God of Greek reason tells us to live another (Dreyfus 2012, 97). The self, in the words of the Spanish existentialist Miguel de Unamuno (1864–1936), emerges as a “conflict” or “contradiction,” pulled apart by an inner struggle between “the heart and the head,” between faith and reason (1954, 260). For figures like Unamuno, the tragedy of being human rests in part in the fact that this contradiction cannot be eradicated or overcome by separating the abstract truths of reason from the concrete commitments of faith. Such a separation is a denial of the wholeness of the human being and the anguished uncertainty and doubt at the core of our situation.

From its origins in Greece, Western philosophy has long perpetuated this separation by regarding the reasoning mind as the essential substance that gives us knowledge of eternal truths and, as a result, the mind itself is conceived as a substance that is eternal, providing an escape from the temporal vicissitudes of the body. As Plato says in the Phaedo: “If we are ever to have pure knowledge of anything, we must escape from the body, and contemplate things by themselves with the soul itself” (66e). On this view, reason comes to be viewed as the supreme and defining characteristic of the human being, and this philosophical assumption remained relatively unscathed until the nineteenth century when existential philosophers and literary figures began to exhume embodiment, emotion, and contingency as being central to the human situation. Indeed, even with the historical rise and spread of Christianity through the Middle Ages, the vision of the human as the ‘animal rationale’ endured.

Although early church fathers like St. Paul (5 bce–67 ad) and Tertullian (160–220 ad) were still deeply committed to the principle of Hebraic faith, the cultural and political impact of Hellenistic philosophy compelled Christians to come up with ‘apologetics,’ rational defenses of their own religious positions and beliefs. Whereas for the Jews and the Greeks, faith and reason occupied two incompatible domains, Christians were confronted with both sources of transcendence. And, beginning with St. Augustine (354–430 ad) and continuing for over a thousand years, Christian theologians engaged this tension with the Augustinian expression ‘faith seeking [rational] understanding’ (fides quaerens intellectum) by showing how the timeless, universal truths of reason work in relation to and in harmony with personal faith (Barrett 1958, 97).

Unfortunately, as the alleged father of existentialism Søren Kierkegaard (1813–1855) would make clear, the aim of bringing together the conflicting domains of faith and reason was absurd. How, for instance, can one make rational sense of God's command to Abraham that he kill his own son, or the senseless suffering of Job, or the intrinsic sinfulness of human beings, or the Incarnation of the God-man? “The problem,” as Kierkegaard writes, “is not to understand Christianity, but to understand that it cannot be understood” (1959, 146). Indeed, Kierkegaard can be viewed as a philosopher who attempts to resuscitate the Hebraic experience of vulnerability and dread and of transcendence as passionate commitment, by articulating the qualitative difference between the impersonal and objective truths of reason, on the one hand, and what Kierkegaard calls “the highest truth available for an existing individual,” on the other. These latter truths are subjective and are fundamentally uncertain and inaccessible to logic or reason. Subjective truths cannot be thought; they can only be felt with inward intensity in the course of living one's life.

We will explore how Kierkegaard engages the tension between ‘subjective’ and ‘objective’ truth in chapter 2, but at this point we want to make clear that at least one thing remained consistent in the historical transition from Hellenism to Christendom. This was the belief that human beings belong to and are dependent upon a divine, value-filled cosmos that provided an enduring moral order, a ‘great chain of being’ that determined the proper function and place of things and how humans ought to act. On this view, the people of Greco-Christian Europe inhabited an enchanted world filled with deities and supernatural meaning. This conception of a divine cosmos provided ready-made answers to existential questions such as ‘Who am I?’ ‘How should I live?’ and ‘What is the meaning of my life?’ The ability to answer these questions became increasingly difficult beginning in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries as the pre-modern orientation began to break down in the wake of a new Enlightenment worldview, and early modern philosophers such as Galileo Galilei (1564–1642), René Descartes (1596–1650), and Isaac Newton (1643–1727) began to lay the scientific groundwork that challenged the inherent divinity and meaningfulness of the world.

The emergence of the modern worldview

Although admittedly simplistic, it is generally agreed that there were three key events that contributed to the historical formation of the modern worldview (e.g., C. Taylor 1989, 2003; Guignon 2004a). The first and arguably most significant was the advent of modern science. From the perspective of the new science, the cosmos was no longer understood from a teleological view, as a moral order of absolute ends, but as a valueless aggregate of quantifiable objects colliding with one another. The cosmos becomes, in the words of German sociologist Max Weber (1864–1920), “disenchanted,” a vast, all-encompassing machine that operates on the basis of fixed, law-like formulas. The vision of the scientist, on this account, is that of a disinterested observer who impartially collects data and formulates theories. Crucial to this method is the ability to abstract out the subjective qualities that we give to things — such as beauty, meaning, purpose, and value — and focus only on the objective qualities of things, that is, those qualities that can be measured or quantified such as mass, velocity, and location in a spatial-temporal coordinate system. With this view, anything in the natural world can now be objectified, examined from a perspective of cool detachment as an object to be manipulated. This is an explicitly humanistic view insofar as it revolves around the human being as the knowing ‘subject’ who masters and controls ‘objects.’ Weber summed up the aims of the new science by claiming, “There are [now] no more mysterious incalculable forces that come into play, but rather that one can, in principle, master all things by calculation. This means that the world becomes disenchanted” (1948, 139, my emphasis). Of course, on this view, human beings too can be regarded as quantifiable objects to be manipulated for specific purposes. And human behavior is no longer explained in terms of incalculable meanings or divine ends but in instrumental terms of causality, where every action and event is necessarily determined by a set of antecedent conditions.

Many philosophers of the time regarded the scientific revolution positively. Not only did it liberate human beings from the superstitions and oppressive dogmas of the church; it also provided techniques for increasing our mastery over the natural world. But some philosophers expressed reservation. One of the earliest and most powerful expressions was provided by the proto-existentialist Blaise Pascal (1623–1662), who, although a brilliant physicist and mathematician in his own right, experienced this new mechanistic and de-animated world not with optimism, but with dread. In his Pensées, he offered a powerful description of a world stripped of any trace of divinity or overarching meaning:

This is what I see and what troubles me. I look around in every direction and all I see is darkness. Nature has nothing to offer me that does not give rise to doubt and anxiety. If I saw no sign there of a Divinity I should decide on a negative solution: if I saw signs of a Creator everywhere I should peacefully settle down in the faith. But, seeing too much to deny and not enough to affirm, I am in a pitiful state. … The eternal silence of these infinite spaces fills me with dread. (1995, 201, 429)

With Pascal we see the Janus face of modern science. On one hand, it frees human beings from the prejudices and superstitions of religion. On the other hand, this freedom means we are now abandoned and forlorn in a cold and meaningless universe.

A second important development in the formation of the modern worldview was the emergence of a new form of Christianity, Protestantism, that reconfigured the self by privileging the inner states of the soul. Although the emphasis on subjective inwardness is present in the Western tradition as early as Augustine's Confessions (397–398 ad), the cultural shift to religious individualism was officially inaugurated with Martin Luther's (1483–1546) famous protest against the Catholic Church in Wittenberg, Germany, in 1517. Luther rejected the Catholic notion of salvation by means of sacraments or rituals, buying indulgences, or by doing ‘good works,’ and focused exclusively on the moral content of one's intentions — one's inner feelings, desires, and thoughts. The Protestant turn inward revealed a sharp distinction between the ‘inner’ self that was genuine and true and the transient and corruptible ‘outer’ self that is engaged in superficial worldly affairs. This shift also made it possible to disown one's actions in the world, seeing them as separate and distinct from one's real self because it is one's intentions, not one's actions, that are essential to who one is. In this way, Protestantism fortified the Christian attitude of contemptus mundi or ‘contempt for the world’ that contributed to a growing sense that we do not belong to it (Guignon 2004a, 30). And, like the new science, this contempt played a key role in the demystification of nature, regarding it as a domain of hostile objects to be mastered through self-discipline and an industrious work ethic.

The third major development in the formation of the modern worldview was a new picture of society, where human beings no longer understood themselves in terms of their social roles, relationships, and functions that were preordained by the divine order of things. Society, rather, came to be viewed as something artificial, an aggregate of disconnected individuals that was held together by instrumental social contracts and monetary exchanges. Public life begins to emerge as something unnatural, where one is compelled to adopt a number of fake personae or social ‘masks’ that are foreign to one's real self (Guignon 2004a, 33–36). As a result, an older way of being that was rooted in close-knit feudal societies, where one's identity was shaped by a deep sense of belonging to one's place and to one's role within a community, gave way to an increasingly rationalistic, impersonal, and alienating social order, the birth of the centralized state. This new version of society reduced human beings to calculable resources or commodities that, in turn, required the creation of a class of technical bureaucrats and administrators to manage and control these resources in factories, schools, hospitals, and office buildings. The nightmarish experience of having one's public life monitored and regulated by a cadre of anonymous bureaucrats heightened the modern experience of alienation and confusion and became a central theme in existentialist literature, notably in the writings of Franz Kafka (1883–1924). In his posthumously published novel The Castle (1926), for instance, the main character, known only as ‘K,’ arrives at a village in the winter and spends his time desperately trying to understand and communicate with the inaccessible bureaucrats of the castle who have control over all aspects of life in the village. The castle is a symbol of bureaucratic authority that, through endless paperwork, permits, and administrative procedures, stifles any expression of individual freedom and undermines the possibility for genuine human interaction, leaving ‘K’ feeling forlorn and isolated. The castle destroys what Kafka sees as the most basic of human needs, which, in the words of Max Brod, was “the need to be rooted in a home and calling, and to become a member of a community” (cited in May 1950, 7).

The impersonal and dehumanizing characteristics of the bureaucratic state were magnified by the Industrial Revolution with its wrenching pace, numbing repetitiveness, and alienating working conditions that became commonplace in the massive factories of Western Europe and the United States. A number of existentialists engaged the problem of alienation rising from the standardization and collectivization of the human being in the machine age. In his Notes from the Underground (1864), for instance, Fyodor Dostoevsky (1821–1881) mockingly described this form of mechanized social engineering in terms of a ‘Crystal Palace,’ a reference to the huge glass and cast-iron building that housed the Great Exhibition in London and displayed the latest scientific and technological breakthroughs of the industrial age. For Dostoevsky, the Crystal Palace was not a sign of rational progress but a nightmare, symbolizing lifeless conformism, loneliness, excessive pride, and the mutilation of human existence. After personally vising the building in London in 1862, he wrote:

The Crystal Palace … you sense that here something has been achieved, that here there is victory and triumph. You even begin to fear something. However independent you may be, for some reason you become terrified. ‘For isn't this the achievement of perfection?’ you think. ‘Isn't this the ultimate?’ … People come with a single thought, quietly, relentlessly, mutely thronging into this colossal palace, and you feel that something has come to an end. It is like a Biblical picture, something out of Babylon, a prophecy from the Apocalypse coming to pass before your eyes. … In the presence of such hugeness, of the colossal pride of the sovereign spirit, of the triumphant finality of the creations of that spirit, even the hungry soul takes flight; it bows down, it submits, it seeks salvation in gin and debauchery and believes that everything is as it ought to be. The fact lies heavy; the masses become insensible and zombie-like. (2009, 92)

Given these wrenching social upheavals that characterized the modern age, it is no surprise that by the turn of the century, literary and philosophical references to inchoate feelings of anxiety, boredom, and suicide were becoming increasingly common. Indeed, in 1881, the American physician George M. Beard introduced the term ‘neurasthenia’ to the medical lexicon, referring to feelings of profound nervous exhaustion and anxiety that were becoming an epidemic in the industrialized cities of Germany, England, and the United States. According to Beard, “The chief and primary cause of this development and the very rapid increase of nervousness is modern civilization [itself]’ (1881, vi). With these conditions in place, the seeds of existentialism were sown.

No philosopher was more tuned into the upheavals of modernity than Friedrich Nietzsche (1844–1900). His words vividly convey the frightening sense of abandonment and forlornness in the modern age, where moral absolutes can no longer serve as a source of security and meaning for our lives. This experience is powerfully captured in The Gay Science with his famous account of the ‘madman’ who descends into the marketplace to announce to the world that ‘God is dead!’:

‘Where has God gone?’ [the madman] cried, ‘I'll tell you where! We've killed him — you and I! We are all his murderers! … Aren't we wandering as if through an endless nothing? Isn't empty space breathing upon us? Hasn't it gotten colder? Isn't night and more night continuously coming upon us? Don't lanterns have to be lit in the morning? Don't we yet hear the noise of the gravediggers who are burying God? Don't we yet smell the divine rot? — For gods rot too! God is dead! God remains dead! And we have killed him!’ (1995, 125)

For Nietzsche, the traditional idols of Greek reason and Judeo-Christian faith have been destroyed by the new science, exposing them as fleeting human constructs, ‘metaphysical comforts’ that have been employed for millennia to conceal our underlying frailty. But Nietzsche makes it clear that the new science is just one more idol that we construct and cling to for security. Regardless of its success at rationally ordering and subduing the natural world, the answer to the question of what it means to be human cannot be provided by means of any scientific proof. “We have arranged a world for ourselves in which we can live,” says Nietzsche, “by postulating bodies, lines, planes, causes and effects, motion and rest, form and content; without these articles of faith, nobody could stand to live now! But this still does not mean that they have been proved. Life is no argument” (121, my emphasis).

Existentialism as a cultural mood

Nietzsche's announcement of God's death set the stage for much darker events in the first half of the twentieth century that appeared to confirm his prophecy: the horrors of the Great War and World War II, the Nazi death camps, and the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. After 1950, there was the threat of global annihilation during the Cold War, regional explosions of racial and colonial violence, and increasing environmental devastation. All this contributed to a cultural mood in Europe and America: a feeling that life was fundamentally absurd; that we are estranged from each other and not at home in the world; and that because there are no moral absolutes, we are left alone, rudderless and adrift in a “terrifying infinity,” with nothing and no one to tell us how to live our lives (Nietzsche 1995, 124). Although Nietzsche offered the clearest and most powerful articulation of this predicament and laid the intellectual groundwork for understanding the modern experience of nihilism, there were other important fin de siècle literary figures that played a crucial role in giving voice to the anguished confrontation with modernity. Although offering an exhaustive account of these figures is beyond the scope of this book, a number of key works are worth mentioning in order to get a sense of the chronology and the cultural and geographical scope of the movement.

As we will see in proceeding chapters, a number of Russian writers were uniquely equipped to address the upheavals of modernization because the process happened so quickly in Russia. In the span of a few decades in the middle of the nineteenth century, Russia rapidly transitioned from a feudal economy that was historically rooted in the close-knit indigenous practices of the Eastern Church to one that embraced the ideals of the Enlightenment and the secular values of egoism and scientific materialism that constituted this new worldview. Literary works that critically engaged these wrenching social transformations include Ivan Turgenev's (1818–1883) Fathers and Sons (1862), Dostoevsky's Notes from the Underground, Crime and Punishment (1860), and The Brothers Karamazov (1880), and Leo Tolstoy's (1828–1910) The Death of Ivan Ilych (1886). The Russian essayist Lev Shertov (1866–1938) also played an important role by introducing and synthesizing the works of Nietzsche, Tolstoy, and Dostoevsky with two important books, Good in the Teaching of Tolstoy and Nietzsche (1900) and Dostoevsky and Nietzsche: The Philosophy of Tragedy (1903). There were also important works published by Norwegian contemporaries, like Henrik Ibsen's (1828–1906) A Doll's House (1879) and Knud Hamsun's (1859–1952) Hunger (1890), that addressed similar themes of social fragmentation and alienation. By the first decade of the twentieth century, existentialism's confrontation with modernity was beginning to gain broader appeal. In addition to the writings of Kafka, whom we previously mentioned, the great German-language poet Rainer Maria Rilke (1876–1926) published his hugely influential novel The Notebooks of Malte Laurids Brigge (1910) that engaged issues of human finitude and meaninglessness. In 1913, the Spanish poet and philosopher Miguel de Unamuno published his masterwork The Tragic Sense of Life, addressing the concrete concerns of “the man who is born, suffers, and dies” (1954, 1). And, in 1914, the Spanish philosopher José Ortega y Gasset (1883–1955) would publish Mediations on Quixote that developed the idea of the human being as free and self-creating. Meanwhile, in Germany, the philosopher Martin Heidegger (1889–1976) reflected the Zeitgeist with a series of legendary lecture courses at Freiburg University in the early 1920s where he developed Wilhelm Dilthey's (1883–1911) notion of historical ‘thrownness’ and Kierkegaard's ideas of anxiety, freedom, and death, culminating in the first systemic analysis of human existence, his magnum opus Being and Time (1927). And Heidegger's contemporary in Germany, Karl Jaspers, would establish an analogous ‘philosophy of existence’ (or Existenzphilosophie) that focused on the importance of ‘limit situations’ like anxiety in the face of death that have the power to awaken us to the frailty and impermanence of our lives.

But the movement didn't reach its cultural zenith until it arrived in France in the 1930s. The five central figures, Jean-Paul Sartre (1905–1980), Simone de Beauvoir (1908–1986), Albert Camus (1913–1960), Gabriel Marcel (1889–1973), and Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1908–1961), all played key roles in turning postwar Paris, especially the Latin Quarter around the Sorbonne, into the intellectual and artistic epicenter of existentialism in Europe. By the time Sartre gave his seminal 1945 lecture ‘Existentialism Is a Humanism’ to a packed house in Paris, existentialism had firmly established itself as one of history's most significant philosophical movements. What accelerated the cultural reception of existentialism in France is the way it was presented, not in the formal and dry prose of German professors like Heidegger and Jaspers, but in accessible literary works, short stories, novels, and plays that appealed to a much broader audience. Although Sartre certainly contributed a dense and technical treatise with his Being and Nothingness (1945), he was best known and most recognized for his literary works and plays such as Nausea (1938), The Wall (1939), and No Exit (1944) that engaged themes of freedom, responsibility, and the contingency of existence. Indeed, he was awarded the Nobel Prize for Literature in 1964 but refused to accept it. Similarly, Camus, another Nobel laureate for literature in 1957, wrote influential novels and essays such as The Stranger (1942), The Myth of Sisyphus (1942), and The Rebel (1951) that reflected modern feelings of absurdity and alienation. And Beauvoir won the prestigious Prix Goncourt for her novel The Mandarins (1954) that explored the predicament of nihilism through the prism of postwar Europe and the Cold War.

What made these literary works so culturally relevant is that they did not deal with abstract philosophical problems but were ‘committed’ or ‘engaged’ (engagée) not only to the struggles of the human situation but also to the concrete social and political realities of the day. These figures played active roles in the Resistance of the Nazi occupation and all wrote extensively on politics and contemporary social problems. And Sartre, Beauvoir, and Merleau-Ponty together helped launch the influential journal of cultural criticism Les Temps Modernes in 1945 that became a crucial outlet for writers who resonated to the existentialist creed of a ‘littérature engagée’ such as American ex-patriot Richard Wright (1908–1960), Jean Genet (1910–1986), and Samuel Beckett (1906–1989). Beckett and Genet would go on to become principal players in ‘The Theatre of the Absurd’ in the 1960s, referring to plays that expressed the Camusian themes of meaninglessness and the loss of religious faith. Meanwhile, in the United States, ‘The Lost Generation’ of writers like F. Scott Fitzgerald (1896–1940) and Ernest Hemingway (1899–1961) were capturing the experience of anguish and moral anomie in America after the Great War. And later the ‘Beat’ or ‘Hip’ writers of the 1950s, like Jack Kerouac (1922–1969), Allen Ginsberg (1926–1997), and William S. Burroughs (1914–1997), began echoing cultural sentiments in France, prompting Normal Mailer (1923–2007) to declare, “Hip is an American existentialism” (cited in Barnes 1967, 155). These American writers illuminated the feeling of being tired or ‘beaten down’ by postwar conformism and authoritarianism and articulated the need for self-creation through bold experimentation with drugs, sex, travel, and music, a revolt that would set the stage for a much wider counter-culture revolution in the 1960s.

The French existentialists certainly set the tone for a broader literary movement in Europe and America. But the reach of the movement extended far beyond works of literature (see McBride 2012). In film, for instance, the French ‘New Wave’ was launched in 1960 with the release of Jean-Luc Godard's (b. 1930) film Breathless (Á bout de souffle). At the same time, Swedish filmmaker Ingmar Bergman (1918–2007) was making movies like The Seventh Seal (1957) and Through a Glass Darkly (1961), and Italian filmmaker Michelangelo Antonioni (1912–2007) was making Eclipse (1962) and The Red Desert (1964), all of which explored themes of human finitude, anxiety, and the death of God, themes that would be taken up later and popularized by the American director Woody Allen (b. 1934) in darker films like Interiors (1978), Another Woman (1988), and Crimes and Misdemeanors (1989). And in the world of art, the overlapping movements of cubism, surrealism, and abstract expressionism keyed into the cultural mood. At the turn of the century, Norwegian painter Edvard Munch's (1863–1944) The Scream captured the sense of existential dread; French Modernist Marcel Duchamp's (1887–1968) controversial painting Nude Descending Staircase, No. 2 (1912) revealed a newly fragmented, dehumanized, and mechanistic portrait of the human body; Spanish painter Pablo Picasso (1881–1973) provided witness to the horror and absurdity of technological warfare with Guernica (1937); the attenuated forms of Swiss sculptor Alberto Giacometti (1901–1966) reflected the modern experience of alienation and loneliness; and the American painter Jackson Pollock (1912–1956) cited the influence of existentialism on his convention-defying ‘drip style’ in his effort to express the importance of individual freedom and self-expression.

Outside of Europe and the United States, existentialism also had a significant impact in Latin America. Without question, it was the Spanish philosopher Ortega y Gasset who had the most influential role in introducing existentialist thought to the subcontinent, especially in Argentina, where he periodically taught and attended conferences in Buenos Aires between 1916 and 1940 (Garrido 2010, 145). One of Gasset's influences in Argentina, Carlos Astrada (1894–1970), published two important early works in existentialism, El juego existencial in 1933 and Idealismo fenomenológico y metafisica existencial in 1936. Gasset's Spanish compatriot José Gaos (1900–1969) brought existentialism to Mexico after becoming a citizen in 1941. In addition to the works of Kierkegaard, Gaos provided the definitive Spanish translation of Heidegger's Being and Time in 1951, more than ten years before the work was officially translated into English or French. And in 1939, Peruvian philosopher Wagner de Reyna (1915–2006), who was a student of Heidegger at Freiburg in the 1920s, published La ontología fundamental de Heidegger, one of the first comprehensive studies on the German philosopher (Oliveira 2010). These early pioneers, and many others, drew on the work of existentialists to engage concerns that were unique to the Latin American situation including critiques of totalitarianism, the problem of freedom and self-identity under colonialism, and the possibilities for revolution. And they set the stage for broad institutional developments across Latin America in the form of influential philosophical organizations and research groups devoted to existentialism and phenomenology.

Beyond philosophy, literature, and the arts, existentialism also left its mark on the thought of the most influential theologians of the time. Although already present in the nineteenth-century writings of figures like Kierkegaard and Dostoevsky, the religious or theistic expression of existentialism had a powerful incarnation in the twentieth century, especially in Protestant Germany, where Karl Barth (1886–1968), Paul Tillich (1886–1965), Rudolf Bultmann (1884–1976), and Dietrich Bonhoeffer (1906–1945) engaged existential questions regarding the relationship between faith and freedom, the meaning of anxiety in the modern age, and the terrifying incomprehensibility of God. The Jewish philosophers Martin Buber (1878–1965) and Emmanuel Levinas (1906–1995) also made important contributions. Buber envisioned the possibility of authentic dialogue between human beings by synthesizing aspects of the Hasidic mystical tradition with existentialism. He was well known for critiquing the alienating ‘I–It’ relations of modernity and offered what he called the ‘I — Thou’ relation as an alternative, one that is open and attentive to the intrinsic vulnerability of the other. And Levinas forwarded a notion of ‘ethics as first philosophy’ that begins from the concrete experience of exposure and openness to ‘the face’ of the other, an experience of vulnerability and suffering that undercuts our ordinary egoistic and objectifying tendencies. Catholic existentialists such as Marcel echoed this call for non-objectifying human relations through acts of charity and the experience of ‘communion’ with others. And from the Eastern Church, figures like Nikolai Berdyaev (1874–1948) used Christianity to attack the increasingly rational and mechanistic structure of modern society for the sake of human freedom and self-expression.

Finally, existentialism made a deep and lasting impression on psychiatry and the developing practice of psychotherapy by challenging the reductive and mechanistic approach of Freudian analysis and biochemical accounts of psychopathology. Heidegger, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, and Jaspers all offered critiques of the psychiatric assumption that the human being could be treated as an ‘object’ of scientific investigation. Instead, they argued that the human being could only be understood within a particular social context that provides a background sense of what matters in life. In their view, it is only by being bound up in the world that we can make sense of who we are as persons, and when our sense of belongingness or integration with the world breaks down, psychiatric conditions begin to emerge. The only way for a psychiatrist to properly understand a patient, then, is to try to access, however incompletely, their way of ‘being-in-the-world.’ As Scottish psychiatrist R. D. Laing (1927–1989) explains: “One has to be able to orientate as a person in the other's scheme of things rather than only to see the other as an object in one's own world” (1960, 26). The existentialist view inspired a diverse group of prominent European and American psychiatrists, including Ludwig Binswanger (1881–1996), Medard Boss (1903–1990), Rollo May (1909–1994), Viktor Frankl (1905–1997), and Irvin Yalom (b. 1931). And it allowed clinicians to reenvision the meaning of psychic suffering. Rather than regarding anxiety and depression in terms of medical pathologies, existential therapists interpreted them as ‘givens,’ as constitutive of the human situation. The aim of therapy, in their view, is not to blunt these feelings through pharmacological intervention or to overcome them by gaining insight into their Oedipal sources, but to have the patient accept and integrate them into his or her life as disclosive of their essential frailty, vulnerability, and impermanence. By facing and owning up to their predicament in this way, the patient can be freed from everyday forms of self-deception and live a deeper and more fulfilling life.

Before concluding this discussion, it is important to say a few words about the institutional reception of existentialism in the United States. Needless to say, American philosophers did not enthusiastically embrace the movement. At worst, it was regarded as a dangerous incarnation of ‘irrationalism’ or ‘nihilism’ that glorified individual freedom as the ultimate value without any recognition of our moral obligation to others. In terms of methodology, it was criticized for its impenetrable rhetoric and for failing to meet the standards of argumentative rigor and conceptual clarity that typified the methods of so-called ‘analytic philosophy’ and the dominant trends of empiricist, logical positivist, and ordinary language philosophy. Given this hostile reception, existentialism was still able to make gradual inroads into the philosophical mainstream. The academic initiation officially began in the 1930s when Jewish émigré scholars who had studied with Heidegger at Freiburg fled to the United States seeking asylum from Nazism. Among these figures, dubbed ‘Heidegger's Children,’ were Hannah Arendt (1906–1975), Herbert Marcuse (1898–1979), Hans Jonas (1903–1993), and Karl Löwith (1897–1973). With the exception of Marcuse, all of them found a home at one time at the University in Exile, founded in 1933 as a graduate division of the New School for Social Research in New York City (Wolin 2001). Outside of the small leftist enclave of the New School and a handful of Catholic universities, existentialism began to play a more prominent role in academe in the 1950s when John Wild (1902–1972), at the time a professor at Harvard, decided to create a new professional society for interested students and colleagues that focused on recent trends in French and German philosophy. Wild moved from Harvard to become chair of the philosophy department at Northwestern University in 1961, and his plan came to fruition the following year when the university hosted the inaugural meeting of the Society for Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy (or SPEP), now the second largest philosophical society in the United States.

In addition to the institutional development of SPEP and the founding of prominent journals like Philosophy and Phenomenological Research in 1939 and Man and World (now Continental Philosophy Review) in 1968, a number of important works were published that introduced the movement and its major figures to an American audience. In 1949, Helmut Kuhn (1899–1991) published Encounter with Nothingness: An Essay on Existentialism offering one of the first comprehensive overviews of existentialist thinkers. Nietzsche scholar and translator Walter Kauffman (1921–1980) edited the anthology Existentialism from Dostoevsky to Sartre in 1956 that brought together primary texts from major figures, many of which had never been translated before. And in 1958, William Barrett (1913–1992) published Irrational Man: A Study in Existential Philosophy that has long been regarded as the definitive introduction to existentialism and widely praised for its historical scope, accessibility, and clarity. Meanwhile, a number of prominent American philosophers brought existentialist thought into conversation with core issues in Anglophone philosophy. Arthur Danto's (b. 1924) Nietzsche as Philosopher (1965) explored the relevance of Nietzsche's thought in relation to traditional problems in epistemology, philosophy of mind, and ethics. In 1972, Hubert Dreyfus (b. 1929), a former student of Wild's at Harvard, drew on the work of Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty to offer a pioneering critique of representational theories of knowledge and the scientific pretensions of Artificial Intelligence in his book What Computers Can't Do. (Dreyfus went on to train a whole generation of influential Heidegger scholars over a forty-year teaching career at the University of California, Berkeley.) And in his groundbreaking 1979 work Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Richard Rorty (1931–2007) appropriated the insights of existentialist thought to develop his own conception of ‘edifying philosophy’ to critically dismantle a number of assumptions that were fundamental to mainstream philosophy of mind and epistemology.

Although it was originally ghettoized, these historical developments all contributed to existentialism's legitimation and eventual acceptance as an important area of specialization in American philosophy. Today, it is strongly represented at the annual meetings of the American Philosophical Association (APA) with smaller professional research groups (or ‘Circles’) devoted to every major figure; there is scholarship published in prominent journals and book series devoted solely to existentialist thought at leading university presses; and it remains a steady presence in philosophy curricula at research and teaching institutions across the country. To be sure, traditional methodologies that emphasize logical rigor and argumentative clarity still dominate in the United States, but American philosophers have increasingly grown to appreciate William Barrett's pointed observation that “so far as he logicizes, man tends to forget existence. It happens, however, that he must first exist in order to logicize” (1958, 305).

From these reflections, we can begin to appreciate the enormous cultural impact that existentialism has had on the contemporary Western world in diverse areas of philosophy, literature, art, theology, and medicine. For this reason, it cannot be dismissed as a moribund, decade-long episode in postwar France. Rather, it represents a centuries-long engagement with the most fundamental of human questions: ‘Who am I?’ and ‘How should I live?’ These questions reverberate more powerfully than ever today as we struggle to find meaning and purpose in a secular world that is increasingly alienating, disjointed, and insecure. In order to address these questions, we have to first turn to the methodological issue of how to gain access to human existence. On the existentialist view, we cannot take the traditional standpoint of theoretical detachment and objectivity because, insofar as we exist, we are already caught up in the concrete situation that we find ourselves in. This means that existence can be accessed only from ‘inside,’ that is, from within one's own situated, affective, and embodied point of view. In chapter 2, we turn our attention to the various incarnations of what can be called the ‘insider's perspective’ as they are expressed in the works of Kierkegaard and Nietzsche, as well as in the phenomenological projects of Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, and Sartre.

Suggested reading

Barrett, W. (1958). Irrational man: A study in existential philosophy. Garden City, NY: Doubleday.

Cotkin, G. (2003). Existential America. Baltimore MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Dreyfus, H. (2009). The roots of existentialism. In H. Dreyfus and M. Wrathall (eds.), A companion to phenomenology and existentialism (pp. 137–161). Oxford: Blackwell.

McBride, W. (2012). Existentialism as a cultural movement. In S. Crowell (ed.), The Cambridge companion to existentialism (pp. 50–69). New York: Cambridge University Press.

2: The Insider's Perspective

The problem of detachment and objectivity

One of the enduring contributions of existentialism has been its critique of what Merleau-Ponty called “high-altitude thinking” (penseés de survol) (1968, 73). Beginning with Plato, this way of thinking has been associated with genuine truth and knowledge because it allows the philosopher to rise above the prejudices of history and the distorted flux of sense perceptions in order to gain access to the way things really are. The aim of philosophy, then, is to adopt a ‘God's-eye view’ or ‘view from nowhere,’ a dispassionate standpoint that gives us an objective and eternal perspective on reality, one that transcends our own temporal and historically situated view of things. The British philosopher Bertrand Russell (1872–1970) sums up this detached attitude in the following way:

Everything, in contemplation, that is personal or private, everything that depends upon habit, self-interest, desire, distorts the object, and hence impairs the union [with reality] which the intellect seeks. By thus making a barrier between subject and object, such personal and private things become a prison to the intellect. The free intellect will see as God might see, without a here and now, without hopes and fears, without the trammels of customary beliefs and traditional prejudices, calmly, dispassionately, in the sole and exclusive desire of knowledge — knowledge as impersonal, as purely contemplative, as it is possible to attain. (1969, 161–162)

For Plato, it is only by means of detached contemplation that we are able to comprehend the essential, unchanging form of things. In his famous ‘Allegory of the Cave,’ the philosopher is described as one whose intellect is freed from the worldly prison of fleeting images and shadows, who climbs up and out of the cave and is dazzled by the knowledge of abstract ideas that are immutable and timeless.

The model for this kind of philosophical knowledge has always been mathematics. Unlike the mutability of visible objects, the abstract objects of arithmetic and geometry are eternal and unchanging. This is why proper training in mathematics has been so important in the Western philosophical tradition. “It leads the soul forcibly upward,” as Plato says in the Republic, “and compels us to discuss the numbers themselves, never permitting anyone to propose for discussion numbers attached to visible or tangible bodies” (525d). On this account, when the sun appears to me through the situated perspective of my senses, as something warm, small, and yellow, I am not being provided with genuine knowledge. But when I detach myself from the contingencies of my physical body and my historical situation and employ the faculty of reason alone, I am able to encounter the essence of this particular object in terms of numbers that are timeless and universal. Instead of seeing a small circular thing, I see the unchanging essence of a circle expressed in the geometrical formula of, for example, πr^2. It is the faculty of reason or the intellect, then, that gives us a ‘perspective of eternity’ (sub specie aeternitatis), allowing us to transcend the world of particular things and enter a world of timeless ideas or essences. And, as we saw in the preceding chapter, because this faculty gives us knowledge of objects that are eternal, it follows that the faculty itself must also be eternal. Thus, reason not only gives us the classical configuration of the human being as the ‘rational animal,’ it also makes us immortal, providing an escape from death and the frailties of time (see Barrett 1958, 79–91; Olson 1962, 41–50).

The Greek focus on rational detachment, objectivity, and the enduring certainties of mathematics was formalized into a method in the modern era beginning with early Enlightenment philosophers like Descartes. Understanding that arithmetic and geometry provided ‘the certainty and self-evidence of its reasoning,’ Descartes sought to use the deductive methods of mathematics to gain genuine knowledge of all things, including those in the physical world. In his Discourse on Method (1637), he describes his aim this way:

This long chaos of utterly simple and easy reasoning that geometers commonly use to arrive at their most difficult demonstrations had given me occasion to imagine that all the things that can fall within human knowledge follow from one another in the same way, and that, provided only that one abstain from accepting any of them as true that is not true, and that one always adheres to the order one must follow in deducing the ones from the others, there cannot be any that are so remote that they are not eventually reached nor so hidden that they are not discovered. (1998, 11)

Descartes's method would provide knowledge that was ‘clear and distinct’ by creating an accurate picture of the external world that was represented in the intellect or mind. This could only be done by detaching ourselves from our normal way of experiencing things and abstracting out the contingent qualities of our senses and our historicity. It is through this logical, step-by-step method of abstraction that we begin to encounter nature in its mathematical form, where physical bodies are reduced to de-animated matter that is ‘extended, flexible, and mutable,’ whose qualities can be measured, and whose movement can be explained and predicted mathematically according to law-governed causal processes. And, to the extent that we too are physical bodies and part of the natural order, our decisions and actions can also be mathematized in terms of the same mechanistic laws. The French rationalist Paul Henri Holbach (1723–1789) describes how this method can be applied to human behavior when he writes, “Let [man] study nature, that he learn its laws, that he contemplate its energy and the immutable way it acts; let him apply his discoveries to his own felicity, and submit in silence to laws from whose binding force nothing can remove him” (cited in C. Taylor 1989, 326). With the rise of ‘methodologism,’ the classical conception of the human being as the ‘rational animal’ is recast. Reason is not simply the supreme faculty that gives us access to timeless truths and distinguishes us from other animals; there is now an underlying belief that in principle, every human decision and action is grounded in rational explanation (Williams 1985, 18).

It is this enduring philosophical assumption, that by adopting a standpoint of theoretical detachment and objectivity we can arrive at a rational explanation of human behavior, that informs much of the existentialist protest. For the existentialists, when it comes to the concrete concerns of the human situation, reason is inadequate. As beings who are self-conscious, our existence is always penetrated by feelings of uncertainty and doubt; we experience anguish in the face of our own death, in the radical contingency of our choices, and the sheer arbitrariness that anything, including ourselves, exists at all. The existentialists challenge the assumption that our actions are grounded in rational explanation, arguing that this creates the comforting illusion that there is a mechanism of stability, order, and control to the universe and to human existence. But, as Nietzsche says, this is nothing more than an invention, an intellectual “fable” we tell ourselves to deny how “transient, aimless and arbitrary” human existence actually is (1954b, 42).

On the existentialist view, the human situation cannot be grasped through detached reason. It is grasped primarily through penetrating emotions or moods that bring us face-to-face with our existence and the concrete choices and actions that define us. This is one of the reasons why existentialists reject the classical configuration of the human being as a rational animal. As Unamuno writes, “Man is said to be a reasoning animal. I do not know why he has not been defined as an affective or feeling animal. Perhaps that which differentiates him from other animals is feeling rather than reason” (1954, 3, my emphasis). It is in the unique way that we feel and suffer in confronting our own situation that distinguishes us as human beings, and the more intensely aware of our situation we become, that is, the more intensely we feel it, the more we suffer. To be sure, existentialists are still concerned with issues of truth and knowledge, but knowledge of what it means to be human. They reject the standpoint of methodological detachment because it is removed from the concrete feelings and concerns of the existing individual. On their view, knowledge of human existence begins from inside one's own situation and the affective commitments and values that matter to the individual. It is a truth that cannot be thought; it can only be felt with intensity and passion. We can get a sense of what this means by turning to Kierkegaard's conception of subjective truth.

Subjective truth

Kierkegaard's critique of rational detachment and objectivity is directed primarily at G. W. F. Hegel (1770–1831), whose aim was to construct a vast metaphysical system that would provide absolute knowledge of reality. In his first and most important systematic work The Phenomenology of Spirit (1807), Hegel offers a panoptic account of Western consciousness as a dialectical process shaped by opposing principles — such as subject/object, freedom/determinism, temporal/eternal, and particular/universal. The tension between these oppositions is resolved through the rational mediation of history itself. Hegel's system is understood as ‘Absolute Idealism’ because it holds that all of reality is shaped by ‘mind’ or ‘spirit’ (Geist), where spirit is not interpreted in terms of a singular individual but as a shared historical spirit. By describing earlier stages of spirit, Hegel shows how consciousness is evolving from non-conceptual knowledge derived from naïve sense perception, to more advanced conceptual forms of knowledge that are mediated through rational reflection and are, therefore, more universal and abstract. This dialectical process eventually culminates in the final stage of Absolute knowledge. At this stage consciousness becomes self-consciousness as we realize that all previous forms of knowledge are produced by and belong to the dialectic unfolding of consciousness itself. And the various modes of thought and experience that have emerged in the progressive stages of history are grasped as part of the long painful process of self-recognition. This rational culmination resolves the dichotomies and conceptual tensions that plague earlier developmental stages.

Although he was indebted to Hegel's interpretation of the human condition as a dialectical tension, Kierkegaard believed this tension could never be resolved through rational mediation but only through the passionate commitments of the existing individual. In his Concluding Unscientific Postscript, Kierkegaard describes how Hegel's universalizing system requires taking the ‘perspective of eternity,’ and how this detached standpoint invariably cuts the philosopher away from existence, from the finite and temporal needs of the individual. Referring to Hegel sarcastically as ‘Herr Professor,’ he writes:

Can the principle of mediation … help the existing individual while still remaining in existence himself to become the mediating principle, which is sub specie aeterni, whereas the poor existing individual is confined to the strait-jacket of existence? … How can it help to explain to a man how the eternal truth is to be understood eternally, when the supposed user of the explanation is prevented from so understanding it through being an existing individual, and merely becomes fantastic when he imagines himself to be sub specie aeternitatis? What such a man needs instead is precisely an explanation of how the eternal truth is to be understood in determinations of time by one, who is existing, is himself in time, which even the worshipful Herr Professor concedes, if not always, at least once a quarter when he draws his salary. (1941, 171–772)

Because it is detached from the flesh and blood particulars of individual existence for the sake of abstraction and objectivity, Kierkegaard describes Hegel's project as one that represents “an age [that] has forsaken the individual in order to take refuge in the Collective Idea” (318). He responds to Hegel and the entire Western philosophical tradition when he argues that dispassionate theorizing invariably “makes the subject accidental,” turning it into “something indifferent, something vanishing” (173).

For Kierkegaard, abstract philosophy never engages one's own subjective truth, that is, “the highest truth attainable for an existing individual” (182). Of course, subjective truth cannot give me absolute knowledge about the nature of reality, but it is more fundamental because it gives me knowledge about who I am and how I should live my life. In this sense, Kierkegaard's view echoes the ancient Greek aphorism: “One must know oneself before knowing anything else” (1959, 46). In this light, he offers what is perhaps the most definitive statement in all of existentialist philosophy.

What I really lack is to be clear in my mind what I am to do, not what I am to know. … The thing is to understand myself, to see what God really wishes me to do; the thing is to find a truth which is true for me, to find the idea for which I can live and die. (44)

With these lines, Kierkegaard illuminates how objective truths are not my own because, to the extent that they are universal and abstract, they ignore the concrete and particular concerns that matter to me, that tell me what I should do with my life. And for Kierkegaard, it is only by committing to my own subjective truth that I can “lead a complete human life” (45), and this commitment can never be grasped through appeals to disinterested reason because it is constituted by my own singular experiences, emotions, and needs.

Interpreting truth this way allows Kierkegaard to undermine the traditional view of the self as a disinterested mind or ‘cogito.’ This is because prior to detached reflection, I exist, that is, I am already choosing a particular kind of life and carrying the burden of responsibility in becoming the person that I am. Thus, “the real subject,” says Kierkegaard, “is not the cognitive subject … the real subject is the ethically existing subject” (1941, 281). Given this account, my existential commitments are always prior to thought or reason. After all, “I must [first] exist in order to think” (294). On this view, whether a belief is rational or objectively true is irrelevant. What matters is the intensity and passion of my commitments because they alone belong to my existence. But for Kierkegaard, this exposes the “paradoxical character” of subjective truth (183); it is a truth grounded in anguish because it is objectively uncertain and unintelligible to others.

In privileging subjective truth, Kierkegaard captures two of the central themes in existentialism. First, to follow one's own truth may require suspending one's universal duty to others. As we will see in more detail in chapter 6, we are all confronted with painful, life-defining moments when we have to choose between being true to objective moral laws or being true to oneself. For the existentialists, it is only the latter choice that manifests ‘the highest truth attainable.’ Second, Kierkegaard shows how theoretical detachment cannot give us access to our own truth. The truth of one's own existence is not thought but felt in penetrating emotional experiences of dread and anguish. These truths are dreadful because they have no objective or rational justification and are, therefore, incomprehensible to others. No one else can understand the commitments that matter to me as an individual. It is important to note, however, that this position does not make Kierkegaard an ‘irrationalist.’ It shows, rather, that rationality and objectivity are only a part of what it means to be human, but when it comes to one's own concrete concerns, it is of little or no use. Subjective truths cannot be reasoned about; they must be lived. This idea, that the ‘highest truths’ emerge out of the situated concerns of the individual, is further developed by Nietzsche, who radicalizes Kierkegaard by rejecting the notion of objective truth altogether and suggesting that all we have access to is our own finite and limited ‘perspective,’ and there is no way to detach or to step outside of it.

Perspectivism

Nietzsche, like Kierkegaard, was highly suspicious of systematic philosophy, largely because it was self-legitimating, that is, it uncritically assumes the truth of a set of principles and then uses these principles to construct the system. On Nietzsche's view, this kind of philosophy is ‘weak’ and ‘dishonest’ because it fails to rigorously question the principles that hold the system together. This is why he proclaims, “I mistrust all systematizers and avoid them. The will to a system is a lack of integrity” (1990, 35). For Nietzsche, metaphysical systems do not reveal the way the world really is because there is no ‘real’ world to begin with. “The ‘apparent’ world is the only one. The ‘real’ world has only been lyingly added …” (46). All systems, whether religious, philosophical, or scientific, are simply human constructions that express a psychological need for stability and control that protects us from the terrifying mutability and impermanence of existence. Indeed, to be human means to already inhabit and tacitly accept a socially constructed perspective that “we cannot see around” (Nietzsche 1995, 374).

Nietzsche's account of the interpretative or perspectival character of existence undermines the assumption that, through a method of rational detachment, the philosopher can attain ‘the perspective of eternity’ and gain knowledge of timeless truths or empirical ‘facts.’ From the point of view of perspectivism, “facts are precisely what there is not, only interpretations. We cannot establish any fact ‘in itself’. … [The world] has no meaning behind it, but countless meanings” (Nietzsche 1968, 481). The upshot of this account is that reality or truth is not discovered by means of reason; it is created. Throughout human history we invent different names for things and then call them true. Nietzsche calls this “the greatest difficulty … [that is] to recognize that unspeakably more depends on what things are called than on what they are” (1995, 58). Truths are viewed as “a mobile army of metaphors” that are invented and that continue to endure only insofar as they are “useful” (1954b, 46–47). They are passed down from generation to generation until they become “worn out” (47) and uncritically accepted as fact. Today, for instance, Euro-Americans generally accept the democratic ideals of equality, justice, and individual rights. But in Nietzsche's view, these are just calcified interpretations that have emerged historically from a contingent series of events that happened to take hold of the public imagination several centuries ago and over time came to be uncritically regarded as true. This is why Nietzsche says, “That you perceive something as [true] may be caused by the fact that you have never reflected on yourself, and are blindly accepting what has been designated as right to you since childhood” (1995, 335).

This means, of course, that consciousness itself is a social construction. All of our so-called inner beliefs, values, and thoughts are shaped by a particular sociohistorical perspective, and we can make sense of ourselves — and the social roles that we play — only in terms of this perspective. In this sense, our thoughts are not our own because consciousness does not belong to us. In order to have a thought, a need, or a desire we must have a word for it, because “all consciousness occurs in words” (354). Consciousness, therefore, is conditioned by a social world and the linguistic conventions that shape it. Nietzsche explains:

My thought is … that consciousness does not really belong to the individual existence of human beings, but rather to the social and herd nature in them; that, as a consequence, consciousness is subtly developed only in regard to social and herd usefulness, and consequently each of us, despite the best will to understand oneself as individually as possible, ‘to know oneself,’ will always just bring to one's consciousness precisely what is not individual in one. (354)

For Nietzsche, growing into social conventions in the way that we do has resulted in a standardized, leveled-down, and conformist consciousness, where “everything that becomes conscious becomes, by the same token, shallow, thin, relatively stupid, general … a signal of the herd” (354). With the conformity of herd consciousness, everything “strange, unusual, questionable, [and] disturbing” is explained and understood against the secure and stable backdrop of what is familiar and known. Nietzsche calls this the “instinct of fear” (355). It is flight from the horror that our perspectives are not secure and timeless but historically contingent and that there are innumerable ways of knowing the world, and this makes us afraid to question what we know, namely, the perspective that is most comforting and “familiar to us” (355).

To be sure, perspectivism serves important psychological and social functions because it allows us to arrange and make sense of an otherwise frightening and absurd existence. This is why Nietzsche says, “Truth is that sort of error without which a certain species of life could not live” (1968, 293). His critical aim, then, is not to deny the social utility of our belief in truth but to come to grips with the fact that the alleged stability and permanence of our truths is an “illusion” (1996, III, 24). Here, Nietzsche captures an important theme that will take center stage in twentieth-century incarnations of existential phenomenology: the idea that philosophy always begins from within the particular, embodied, sociohistorical context we grow into, a context that cannot be represented or explained by means of detachment and objectivity. This is because all rational explanations are parasitic on our own situated existence. As Heidegger will later write: “The existential nature of man is the reason why man can represent beings as such and why he can be conscious of them. All consciousness presupposes … existence as the essential of man” (1956, 205). And if an objective explanation of existence is impossible, then the best we can do is describe our experience as it ‘appears to us.’

Phenomenology

Inaugurated by Edmund Husserl (1859–1938) in 1900, the method of phenomenology was conceived as a return ‘to the things themselves.’ Rather than trying to systematically explain ‘what things are’ in terms of their material or psychic composition, phenomenology is a method that is concerned with describing ‘how things are,’ that is, how things reveal themselves or appear to us in ordinary experience. Phenomenology, then, is the science of phenomena, where ‘phenomena’ refers to that which appears, shows up, or is given to us in the immediacy of our everyday lives. This does not mean that appearances are somehow different from the way things really are. Phenomenology is not concerned with the traditional philosophical problem of discovering the enduring essence or reality that is hidden behind the flux of appearances. Indeed, the core epistemological distinction between ‘appearance’ and ‘reality’ is rejected altogether. Phenomenology is concerned simply with the phenomenon as it appears, as it “shows itself in itself” (Heidegger 1962, 51). The aim is to show that there is no reality or ‘thing-in-itself’ to be found behind the appearance. Indeed, the method of phenomenology demonstrates that appearances (or phenomena) are the things themselves. “This is why,” as Sartre explains, “we reject the dualism of appearance and essence. The appearance does not hide the essence, it reveals it; it is the essence” (1956, 4–5).

Phenomenology introduces two key points that reflect the existentialist project. First, phenomenologists contend that any theoretical demonstrations or proofs about the nature of reality are derived from and made possible by what is originally given in lived experience. Thus, in order to gain access to what is given, the phenomenologist can only describe what shows up and tries to suspend or ‘bracket out’ the theoretical frameworks of philosophy and the empirical sciences (e.g., psychology, biology, physics, etc.) in order to encounter what presents itself in experience as it presents itself. Second, phenomenologists agree that all experience has an intentional structure, that is, my experience is always about or of something; it is always directed toward an object. This is a rejection of the Cartesian view of the self as an encapsulated mental receptacle of ‘inner’ thoughts, desires, and beliefs that is somehow separate and distinct from ‘outer’ objects. In my everyday acts and practices, there is no ‘inner/outer’ distinction because I am already involved with and directed toward intra-worldly things. As Sartre says, when I am late for work and chasing the bus down the street I do not encounter myself as a bundle of desires and beliefs in a mental container; rather, I encounter my self as “running-toward-the-bus” (1957, 49). My being is found not in my head, but with the bus, and my experience is nothing apart from what it is directed toward. The self or ‘I,’ on this account, is not an object or thing but the ongoing activity of being directed toward things in the world.

It is important to note, however, that existentialists break with Husserl in terms of understanding how phenomena are encountered. Husserl contends that through a series of intellectual reductions (what he calls the ‘epoché’), the phenomenologist can bracket out or negate the worldly prejudices of the ‘natural attitude’ that tend to distort what is given in our conscious experience. By bracketing out these prejudices, the phenomenologist is able to arrive at a ‘presuppositionless starting point’ and attend to what is given to consciousness in a way that is pure and undistorted. Existential phenomenologists reject the possibility of a complete reduction, arguing that what is given in experience is always colored by a particular historical world, where ‘world’ is understood not as a spatial container or the sum total of objects but as a background of affective meanings that we are always already involved in. As we go to work, talk with friends, shop, and travel we are immersed in this background which allow the things that we deal with to show up and matter to us in the ways that they do. And it is impossible to bracket out or negate our involvement in this background because it constitutes what it means to be human. Against Husserl's conception of the reduction, then, existential phenomenologists argue that there is no pure, undistorted consciousness that constitutes the world after the natural attitude has been bracketed out. “The most important lesson which the reduction teaches us,” says Merleau-Ponty, “is the impossibility of a complete reduction” (1962, xiv). What appears to us in lived experience is always colored by the worldly significance we grow into and intentionally attribute to things. We are, for this reason, “condemned to meaning” (xix).

As we will see in proceeding chapters, interpreting existence in terms of our situated involvement in a world of meanings creates a new way of understanding the self. Whereas traditional philosophy has been largely concerned with ‘what we are’ as a particular kind of entity or substance — an autonomous mind, a causally determined body, or some combination of the two — existential phenomenologists are concerned with ‘how we are.’ Heidegger is helpful by referring to human existence in terms of the colloquial German expression ‘Dasein.’ For Heidegger, ‘Dasein’ is a term that expresses our unique way of being and avoids the usual interpretation of the self as an entity or substance with ‘what-like’ properties. “When we designate this entity with the term ‘Dasein,’” says Heidegger, “we are expressing not its ‘what’ (as if it were a table, house, or tree) but its being” (1962, 67). On this account, humans are distinct because we already embody a pre-reflective understanding of how to exist in the world, and this understanding can never be made theoretically explicit. It is a result of being ‘thrown’ into a shared social context that tacitly shapes how we make sense of things such as equipment, our social identities, and our relationships with others. This means Dasein can only be understood in terms of its concrete worldly involvements, and it helps explain why Heidegger refers to being-in-the-world as a “unitary phenomenon,” where “self and world belong together in the single entity, the Dasein” (1982, 297). Understanding existence this way means that phenomena are always given to us as ‘interpretations’ because they have already been colored by our own way of being-in-the-world. As Merleau-Ponty contends, it is “naïve” for philosophers to assume that we can adopt a completely detached and objective standpoint (1962, vii — ix). This is because any theoretical description or explanation of things presupposes one's own situated and embodied point of view.

The existentialist emphasis on situated and pre-reflective understanding not only breaks with the traditional idea of the cognizing mind as the source of genuine truth and knowledge; it also allows us to rethink the role of the body. As we will see in more detail later, existential philosophers like Heidegger, Marcel, Sartre, Beauvoir, and Merleau-Ponty all explore the ways in which the ‘lived body’ is itself the source of pre-reflective understanding or knowledge that endows things with meaning and value. On this account, the body is not regarded as a material object extended in space and set against the dispassionate gaze of the subject. The body is how I am, a relational way of being-in-the-world that dissolves the subject/object opposition altogether. This means I do not ‘have’ a body as if it were a thing or object I possess. Rather, as Marcel proclaims, “I am my body” (1950, 103). In the course of my everyday life, in seeing, hearing, touching, and sensing, the body is already entwined with worldly meanings, and this intra-worldly relation always underlies our theoretical understanding of things. We do not, for instance, interpret ourselves as a man or a woman because we are born with a particular anatomy. We identify ourselves in terms of sexual differences only on the basis of the sociocultural background and the embodied meanings that we grow into. This is why, in The Second Sex, Beauvoir says that “one is not born, but rather becomes a woman” (1952, 301, my emphasis). It is through being acculturated into the oppressive social patterns, institutions, and prejudices of Western culture that a woman learns how to interpret herself as an inferior and subordinate being. This does not mean that biology and anatomy are unimportant to questions of personal identity. It simply means that biological facts are always derived from the relational background of social norms and practices that we are immersed in as embodied ways of being. It is this situated relation that makes it possible for us to interpret ourselves as the particular persons that we are, as men or women, as sick or healthy, as charming or boorish and so on. We will discuss in more detail phenomenology's contribution to existentialism in later chapters, but we can conclude by summarizing the key points of the insider's perspective.

First, existentialists are in agreement that philosophy does not begin from a standpoint of detachment and objectivity because it can never address the concrete concerns of the existing individual. This means that any account of what it means to be human has to start from my own first-person experiences and the situated understanding that I have of myself. Indeed, as the phenomenologists have shown, I have no choice but to start out from the insider's perspective, from my sense of things as they initially appear to me from my own perspective and modes of apprehension.

Second, existentialists reject the configuration of the human being as a self-contained subject that is separate and distinct from objects. In my everyday life I am bound up with the meanings, values, and practices of the world. As an embedded way of being, I am limited and constrained by the world that I find myself in, and this influences how I interpret myself and make sense of who I am. This means that any attempt to address the question of human existence must also address how I am situated in a shared world.

Finally, the standpoint of detachment and objectivity cuts us off from the affective meaning and worth of things. When I adopt the standpoint of objectivity, I am often left in a dispassionate state, where I am alienated from what matters to me as an individual, and the world shows up as a “gray collage of facts” (Bergmann 1983, 41). Detached in this way, my choices and actions are stripped of their emotional significance. I may be able to know what is objectively true, but without feelings I cannot know what is true for me, because it is the passion, focus, and intensity, not the correctness, of my choices that determine their truth. As Kierkegaard says, “In making a choice, it is not so much a question of choosing the right way as of the energy, the earnestness, [and] the pathos with which one chooses” (1946a, 106).

But if intellectual detachment results in an emotionally desiccated and bleached-out view of the world, the insider's perspective presents its own problems. Specifically, if we are embedded in a world of meanings that invariably distorts and colors our view of things in ways that we are not explicitly aware, then how can we ever be true to ourselves and commit to an identity that is genuinely our own? In order to address this question, we have to first get a clearer sense of the ways in which existentialists contend that we are bound up in the world. In the next chapter we will explore a number of influential accounts of being-in-the-world and show how they not only undermine the view of the philosopher as a detached spectator but also challenge a number of entrenched dualisms that have been central to Western thought.

Suggested Reading

Cooper, D. (2012). Existentialism as a philosophical movement. In S. Crowell (ed.), The Cambridge companion to existentialism (pp. 27–49). New York: Cambridge University Press.

Joseph, F. and J. Reynolds (2011). Existentialism, phenomenology and philosophical method. In F. Joseph, J. Reynolds, and A. Woodward (eds.), The Continuum companion to existentialism (pp. 15–35). London: Continuum.

Moran, D. (2000). Introduction to phenomenology. New York: Routledge.

Richardson, J. (1986). Existential epistemology: A Heideggerian critique of the Cartesian project. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

3: Being-in-the-World

Being-in

Again, existentialists reject the standpoint of detachment and objectivity because it invariably overlooks the situated needs and commitments that matter to me as an individual. As Kierkegaard writes, “What would be the use of discovering so-called objective truth, of working through all the systems of philosophy … to construct a world in which I do not live but only hold it up for the view of others?” (1959, 78). The aim of rational detachment is to achieve the ‘perspective of eternity,’ but this results in the abandonment of the concrete meanings that shape our lives. To address this problem, existentialists often begin their projects with accounts of life as it is lived in ordinary contexts. What is revealed in these accounts is that we are already ‘being-in,’ that is, embedded and involved in a shared world. Understood this way, being-in is not a reference of spatial inclusion, of an object or thing that is inside a container (e.g., ‘The chicken is in the pot’). It is a reference to how we are concretely involved in the world in a particular way (e.g., ‘The professor is in class’). The latter example refers to how one is engaged in the practices of the academic world that constitute what it means to be a professor — lecturing to students, grading papers, holding office hours, replying to emails, etc. (see Dreyfus 1991, 40–43). ‘Being-in,’ then, is not an accidental property that we may or may not have; it is essential to and constitutive of what it means to be human. And ‘world’ is not to be understood in the usual sense as a spatial container or the sum total of objects. The world, rather, is that “wherein [we] live” (Heidegger 1962, 83). It is the meaningful public setting of our lives.

Insofar as it is constitutive of human existence, ‘being-in’ suggests that we are not disinterested minds looking down on the world. We are already caught up in a concrete situation as we handle various tools, try to accomplish certain tasks, and engage in the lives of others. This not only means that we encounter things from a limited physical perspective and orientation; it also implies that we are always woven into the meanings and values of our sociohistorical context, and this shapes the way we make sense of things, including ourselves. Interpreting existence from this standpoint allows existentialists to dismantle a number of dualisms that have dominated the Western philosophical tradition. To illustrate this, we can turn to the work of Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty, who offer the most robust and influential accounts of being-in-the-world.

Undoing dualisms

By giving primacy to being-in-the-world, existentialists challenge the subject-object model that characterizes much of modern philosophy. This model, expressed most famously in the work of Descartes, regards humans as self-contained subjects of experience trapped in their own minds and who are trying to discover whether or not their ‘inner’ perceptions and ideas accurately represent ‘outer’ objects in the world. This representational view creates skepticism or doubt about whether or not anything in the world — that is, outside the ‘I’ or consciousness — can be known with any certainty. The result is an explicit separation between mental and physical phenomena and creates two competing accounts in the modern epistemological tradition, ‘realism’ and ‘idealism.’ On the realist view, the world and material things are said to exist externally or independently of our minds; on the idealist view, the only things we know that exist are the ideas in our own minds. Underlying these two accounts is the problem of proving the existence of a mind-independent world if the only thing we can claim to know with any certainly is the contents of our own mind. After all, how could I possibly doubt that I perceive, desire, or feel something? The problem is whether or not what I perceive, desire, or feel actually represents or corresponds to things that exist in the world. In his Critique of Pure Reason (1787), Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) will famously refer to the fact that modern philosophers have still not proven whether or not an external world exists as a ‘scandal.’ Existentialists will go further than Kant by arguing that the whole ‘inner/outer’ question is nothing more than a tired pseudo-problem that has bogged down philosophers for three hundred years. As Heidegger says, what is truly “scandalous” is not that philosophers have failed to adequately demonstrate the existence of an external or mind-independent world, “but that such proofs are expected and attempted again and again” (1962, 249).

Existentialists reject both realist and idealist accounts by arguing that in our ordinary experiences there is no separation between ‘inner’ and ‘outer,’ between self and world. On their view, these accounts distort the fact that we are, first and foremost, “already out there,” already engaged in the world and “opened toward beings” (Heidegger 1992, 167). Indeed, interpreting existence in terms of being-in-the-world suggests that the debate between realism and idealism is not even worthy of philosophical consideration (e.g., Guignon 1983). This is because the whole problem is based on an error that assumes human beings are basically self-enclosed minds who are trying to get clear about their beliefs of mind-independent objects. Against this view, existentialists argue that we are already enmeshed in the world in our everyday practices and that we already understand things in terms of their practical uses and purposes. I do not, for instance, first stare at the computer and reflect on its objective properties before I use it. As a professor involved in the acts and practices of the academic world, I already inhabit an understanding of the computer in terms of its practical function and use. My hands simply begin to press the keys, with my eyes leveled at the screen and my elbows resting on the desk. This kind of oriented and purposive activity is performed pre-reflectively, without the accompaniment of mental representation.

Interpreting existence in terms of situated understanding also allows existentialists to challenge the ‘fact — value’ dualism central to modern philosophy. On this view, there is a fundamental distinction drawn between what is objective or real in the physical universe versus what is subjective or existing only in our own minds. The aim of the philosopher or scientist is to bracket out ‘values,’ that is, the subjective colorings that we impose on things based on our own idiosyncratic tastes, cultural backgrounds, and sensory apparatuses in order to discover mind-independent ‘facts.’ What is factual or true, as we saw earlier, is usually interpreted in terms of what is quantifiable, pertaining to the measurable qualities of mass, weight, movement, and spatial-temporal location. The upshot of the fact-value dichotomy is that there can be no such thing as a ‘moral fact’ and that the meaning, significance, and purpose of things comes to be regarded as merely subjective or a sociocultural projection rather than qualities that adhere to the things themselves. Existentialists reject this picture by arguing that in our everyday dealings we never encounter quantifiable objects in isolation. Rather, the things we encounter are already bound up in contexts of meaning, and their significance is disclosed not through inner acts of consciousness but through our purposive involvements within this context. “[We] do not, so to speak, throw a ‘signification’ over some naked thing which is present-at-hand,” says Heidegger, “we do not stick a value on it; but when something within-the-world is encountered as such, the thing in question already has an involvement which is disclosed in our understanding of the world” (1962, 190–191).

In other words, although it may be an objective fact that my computer weighs a certain number of pounds, this is not how I encounter it in everyday life. It is not a brute object ‘present-at-hand’ (vorhanden); it is ‘ready-to-hand’ (zuhanden), an available and functional tool that already means something to me because it is bound up with the purposive activities, projects, and equipment that constitute my identity as a professor. The computer matters to me, in this case, because I use it to communicate with students, to do research, to contact journal and book editors, and to compose manuscripts that I hope will be published one day, and these activities are ultimately performed in an effort to fill out my self-interpretation as a responsible, hard-working professor. What this reveals is that the fact — value distinction is itself derived from a more basic way of being in which we are bound up in shared contexts of meaning, and in these contexts fact and value are inseparable. We can unpack this account in more detail by turning to Heidegger's famous account of the ‘work-world’ (Werkwelt) in Being and Time.

The work-world

In section 15 of Being and Time, Heidegger offers an example of hammering in the workshop to show that the hammer makes sense only in relation to other things, to nails, boards, gloves, and to purposive human activities such as building a cabinet or framing a door. This means that the equipment that we use in ordinary situations is never understood in isolation. “Taken strictly,” says Heidegger, “there ‘is’ no such thing as an equipment” (1962, 97). Equipment is meaningful only in relation to a practical context, and it is because we are already familiar with the context as a whole that the hammer can reveal itself to me as a hammer. With the workshop analogy, Heidegger is suggesting that when we use things in ordinary situations, we already embody an understanding of equipment, and this understanding is constituted not by staring at it from a standpoint of detachment, but by “seizing hold of it” (98), that is, by manipulating, handling, and using it. Indeed, in these kinds of situations mental reflection actually gets in the way of how we use and handle things. It is for this reason that Heidegger uses the word ‘comportment’ (Verhalten) to refer to ordinary human practices, because the word does not carry with it any mentalistic undertones (Dreyfus 1991, 50–51).

I do not, for instance, first reflect on the physical properties of the doorknob before I open the door. In the flow of my daily life, I simply reach out and open the door. In doing so, the objective, thing-like properties of the door “withdraw” or disappear (Heidegger 1962, 99). In fact, it is usually only when there is a breakdown in the flow of my workaday activities — when, for instance, the door does not open when I turn the knob — that the door becomes ‘unworldly’ (enweltlich), that is, it is pulled out of its relational context and obtrudes as an object. In these experiences of breakdown, the unusable door “just sits there; it shows itself as an equipmental thing which looks so and so, and which, in its readiness-to-hand as looking that way, has constantly been present-at-hand” (103). To think, then, that the mind is forever mediating our ordinary dealings with things is, for Heidegger, “an absurdity which misconstrues the basic ontological structure of the being that we ourselves are” (1982, 64). When things are functioning smoothly, we are not explicitly conscious or aware of the equipment we are using because we are already absorbed in the activity and in the meaningful context as a whole, and it is through this activity that our understanding of equipment is revealed. The act of opening the door, then, requires a pre-reflective understanding of a whole ‘referential totality,’ the purposive interconnection of hallways, lights, knobs, stairs, and so on that allows the door to reveal itself as a door. The upshot of this view is that intra-worldly things are organized and structured by the ways in which they relate to other things, and it is our involvement in this context that reveals how they make sense and matter to us in the ways that they do.

Here we can see how Heidegger's interpretation of the world as a unified context of meanings not only challenges the scientific view of the world as a spatiotemporal container or the sum total of objects; it also undermines the naturalistic assumption that the value of things is merely the subjective projection of our own individual tastes. For Heidegger, things already matter to us because they are expressions of the shared meanings we are engaged in. When I sit down at the table, for example, I do not initially encounter a flat, rectangular, or box-shaped object, I encounter something that matters to me and is already embedded in a web of social meanings. It is “a writing table, a dining table… [The table where] the boys like to busy themselves … [The table where] that decision was made with a friend that time, where that work was written that time, where that holiday was celebrated that time” (Heidegger 1999a, 69). Merleau-Ponty will develop Heidegger's account of engaged and situated meaning, but instead of the equipmental relations of the work-world, he begins from the perceptions of the lived body.

The perceptual world

In Phenomenology of Perception, Merleau-Ponty describes his project as a “return to the world of actual experience that is prior to the objective world” (1962, 45). Like Heidegger, he is critical of the standpoint of theoretical detachment because it tends to reduce the world to a spatiotemporal container and regards things not in terms of their mutual interdependence but as “partes extra partes” (73), as objects in a purely mechanical and external relationship with other objects. The world, for Merleau-Ponty, is not a geometric space or the sum total of objects. It is, rather, a “phenomenal field” (57), understood as the concrete background or setting in which we exist. The use of the word ‘field’ is important because it conveys the sense of the region or space of concern that we are involved in — like the field that we play soccer on — rather than something that is spread out below us (Langer 1989, 19). For Merleau-Ponty, it is the primacy of our situated perceptual involvements that makes it possible for us to adopt a scientific view of things in the first place. This is why he refers to being-in-the-world as a return to that world “which precedes [scientific] knowledge, of which knowledge always speaks, and in relation to which every scientific schematization is an abstract and derivative sign language” (1962, ix).

Where Merleau-Ponty differs from Heidegger is in the way he accesses the phenomenon of being-in-the-world. Heidegger focuses largely on ‘handiness’ and the relational projects of the work-world, whereas Merleau-Ponty focuses on the world of perception as the unified background that situates and orients our projects (Wrathall 2009, 38). This is why there is a ‘primacy of perception,’ for Merleau-Ponty, because what we first experience and what underlies all theoretical reflection is the world — as it is perceived. He refers to the perceived world “as the always presupposed foundation of all rationality, all value and all existence” (1964a, 13). Here the word ‘perception’ is obviously not being used in the way that it is ordinarily understood. It is not an atomistic collection of sensations that are constituted or linked together by some mental process. What we perceive, rather, is a structured and unified whole, where “the perceptual ‘something’ is always in the middle of something else, it always forms part of a ‘field’ ” (1962, 4). This means that there is no such thing as an isolated or ‘pure impression.’ Sensations make sense only insofar as they relate to other sensations in this unified whole.

Here we see Merleau-Ponty's critique of perception from the perspective of the realism vs. idealism debate. The realists generally take the mind-independent world as given, which then causally stimulates the sense organs of the perceiver. The idealists generally take the mind as given and the rules and concepts therein constitute and organize the world of perception. For Merleau-Ponty, both views not only assume that perceptions are initially made up of discrete sensations, they also both adhere to the same detached scientific view of the world as a geometrical space composed of objects in causal interaction. It is because both views interpret experience through these ready-made frameworks that they are incapable of grasping what Merleau-Ponty calls “the living nucleus of perception” (1962, 38), which is always prior to any theoretical assumptions about the mechanisms of experience.

This is why Merleau-Ponty's project begins from one's own living perceptions, where I am “first of all surrounded by my body, involved in the world, [and] situated here and now” (37). Our limited perceptual orientation provides us with different aspects of a unified background or whole, which is the “horizon of horizons” (330) that underlies all of my experiences and, through my engagement with it, allows me to make sense of the things that I perceive. And this unity is not constituted or mediated by the mind or intellect. It is given in the immediacy of sense perception — in seeing, hearing, touching — itself. Thus, “I do not have one perception, then another, and between them a link brought about by the [mind].” Rather, “each perspective merges into the other” against this unified background (329–330; see Wrathall 2009, 38). On this account, things acquire meaning because they are internally related to each other and are perceived from a particular perspective within this unified context. The tree I see from my office window, for instance, immediately presents itself from a particular embodied perspective that is itself only one aspect of a structured and coherent whole. What I see is that particular oak tree I sit under for shade on warm days when I want to read outside. The meaning of the tree depends upon where it stands in a complex interrelation to other things, to the office window, the sidewalk, the seasons, the campus lawn, and my own situated identity as a middle-aged college professor.

Meaning, then, is not an idea or mental representation. The meaning or significance of things emerges spontaneously through our situated and involved perceptions, through how we are oriented in public space, and by using, manipulating, and holding things from within this fleshly orientation. Merleau-Ponty offers the example of a smoker using an ashtray to illustrate this point. The meaning or significance of the ashtray is not the idea of the ashtray in the smoker's mind, an idea that is accessible only to the intellect. The meaning, rather, is given “in person” or “in the flesh” (319–323), in the smooth bodily familiarity that the smoker exhibits as he or she skillfully uses, holds, and handles the ashtray. Against the traditional view, then, meaning is not the result of some causal ‘psycho-physiological mechanism’ that produces discrete sensations. It is, rather, already bound up in the structured and unified weave of body, consciousness, and world. The things we perceive and comport ourselves with every day are meaningful or significant to us because of their place in a referential context and the situated ways in which we use and handle things within this context.

The human being, then, cannot be understood as a combination of two substances, mind and body. It is a unitary phenomenon. Any conceptual relationship we have with things is itself grounded in and made possible by the seamless dialectical synergy between incarnate consciousness and the world. Merleau-Ponty will refer to this synergy in terms of a “bodily schema” (schéma corporel) (1964a, 5), a reference to the pre-reflective sensory motor grip that we have on the world. This is why Merleau-Ponty refers to his project as a ‘phenomenology of origins.’ It is one that returns us to the pre-conceptual experiences that underlie objective thought and brings to light the complex web of relations that endows things with the meanings that they have. The world, on this view, is not something separate from me. It is the ambiguous, pre-objective field that I am already woven into in my everyday perceptual acts; it is “where the paths of my various experiences intersect, and also where my own and other people's intersect and engage each other like gears” (Merleau-Ponty 1962, xx).

This conception of being-in-the-world has helped to undercut one of the more dominant paradigms in contemporary Anglophone philosophy, the paradigm of ‘naturalism.’ Due to tremendous advances in the empirical sciences in the nineteenth-century in areas such as zoology, physiology, and evolutionary theory, and, more recently, in the emerging field of neuroscience, naturalism has become more or less a default setting in contemporary philosophy. This view generally entails two assumptions, one epistemological and one metaphysical. The epistemological assumption contends that the detached theoretical standpoint and the procedures of empirical science constitute the best way to gain knowledge of intra-worldly things, including ourselves. The metaphysical assumption contends that the world — including our own thoughts, beliefs, and desires — is constituted by physical objects in causal interaction (Ratcliffe 2009, 330). On this account, as the German scientist Karl Vogt proclaimed at the end of the end of the nineteenth century, “Thoughts stand in roughly the same relation to the brain as gall to the liver or urine to the kidneys” (cited in Guignon 1983, 41). But this naturalistic interpretation uncritically assumes the standpoint of theoretical detachment. As a result, it overlooks the experiential world that we are engaged in every day. In this world of practical involvements, we do not encounter objects in a neutral or impartial way. Indeed, we do not encounter ‘objects’ at all because the term itself entails a view of entities as being separate and distinct from us (as ‘subjects’). As a being-in-the-world we are already involved with things that make sense, that are already rich with meaning, and this meaning is disclosed not through theoretical or conceptual analysis but in how we pre-reflectively handle, use, and manipulate things in our everyday practices.

In this way, Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty show that the primary relationship we have with things is not one of detachment and objectivity but of situated and skillful involvement in a referential context of meanings, and it is a contextual involvement that can never be made theoretically explicit. This is why Heidegger will refer to the standpoint of naturalism as one that is “unworlded” (1992, 217) because it abstracts out the situated and purposive meanings of being-in-the-world. But this does not mean that Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty are anti-science. In fact, Merleau-Ponty draws extensively on empirical science and neurological case studies in developing his own account of perception and embodied agency. What they are critiquing, rather, is the uncritical privileging of methodological detachment and objectivity, a view that has been largely uncontested in modern philosophy since Descartes. As Heidegger says, “What is messing up the real problematic is not just naturalism as some people think, but the overall dominance and primacy of the theoretical” (cited in Sheehan 2006, 78). Such a standpoint invariably overlooks and takes for granted our embodied familiarity with things and the situated meanings of the experiential world that underlie all scientific thought. Merleau-Ponty makes this point explicit when he claims scientific thinking “must return to the ‘there is’ which underlies it; to the site, the soil of the sensible and opened world such as it is in our life and for our body … that actual body I call mine” (1964a, 160–161; cited in Langer 1989, xi).

Aspects of alterity

One of the more significant contributions of the existentialist account of being-in-the-world is that it makes it possible to engage perspectives that have been historically marginalized in the Western tradition. If, as the existentialist argue, we can make sense of things only from within a situated and embodied orientation, then this orientation must also be shaped by aspects of alterity or ‘otherness’ such as madness, racial and sexual difference, and physical disability. These aspects not only inform our embodied ways of being but they can also disrupt the seamless weave between self and world. Psychiatrist and philosopher Frantz Fanon (1925–1961), for instance, drew on his own experiences of racism as a black man born and raised in the French colony of Martinique to expand on and critique Merleau-Ponty's conception of being-in-the-world. He argued that the ‘bodily schema,’ the pre-conscious sensory-motor grip on the world that we normally take for granted, is not present in the same way for colonized people (see Weate 2001). Fanon introduces what he calls the “historical-racial schema” that captures the black experience of confusion and alienation, a result of being forcibly “woven out” (1967, 111) of the shared meanings and practices that constitute the white European world. Because he does not belong to the European world, the colonized black man does not share the same pre-objective understanding that the European has. For Fanon, then, Merleau-Ponty's account of the bodily schema does not map onto the particularities of “the being of the black man” (110).

Fanon goes on to suggest that there is a deeper layer of alienation that he calls the “racial epidermal schema” (112). Drawing on Sartre's conception of ‘the look’ (le regard), Fanon describes how the black man's connection with the world can be disrupted when he is transformed into a brute object or thing by the judgmental gaze of the white European. In these situations, the black man feels immobilized and incapacitated, finding it difficult to stretch into the world, to handle equipment, and participate in public activities. The smooth, pre-conscious synergy that characterizes the European's existence is out of reach. He becomes imprisoned in a sphere of immanence, where his physical motility and sense of self are constrained by his skin color. He feels completely “dislocated [and] unable to be abroad with the other” (112). The result is a very different way of moving through the world and inhabiting lived space. The black man is inhibited; he embodies shame in the way he walks and carries his shoulders, in his lowered head and reluctance to make eye contact, and in his deferential way of speaking. Fanon refers to a feeling of “nausea” (116) to convey the sense of being trapped in the racial-epidermal schema that emerges from internalizing the objectifying and dehumanizing judgments of the European. He offers a personal example of how the racial-epidermal schema emerges in the simple statement of a white child pointing at him on a train and saying to his mother, “Look a Negro” (114). For Fanon, this statement already contains a host of sociocultural assumptions that transform him into an object, into a hostile, even bestial, thing. Fanon is suggesting that the bodily schema of those who are colonized is penetrated by a sense of alienation and objectification that culminates in the paralyzing experience of being “walled in” (117) by the color of their own skin.

The feminist philosopher Iris Marion Young (1949–2006), drawing on the work of Beauvoir and Merleau-Ponty, makes an analogous point regarding a woman's motility and sense of spatial orientation. Young argues that “there is a particular style of bodily comportment that is typical of feminine existence” that is often overlooked (2005, 31). These differences in comportment are not the result of any essential differences between man and woman in terms of biology or anatomy. Rather, they emerge from the oppressions of living in a patriarchal world, where the feminine is “defined as Other, as the inessential correlate to man, as mere object and immanence” (34). In such a world, men inhabit physical space with ease, confidently stretching into the world and reaching out to confront and overcome obstacles. Women, on the other hand, “often approach a physical engagement with things with timidity, uncertainty, and hesitancy” (34). For Young, this means that the unified and purposive flow that characterizes everyday being-in-the-world is embodied differently for women because they often experience themselves not as active expressions of existence but as “fragile things” or objects (39). Young makes her case by describing of how men and women inhabit space differently on the basis of physical movement and orientations.

There is a specific positive style of feminine body comportment and movement, which is learned as the girl comes to understand that she is a girl. The young girl acquires many subject habits of feminine body comportment — walking like a girl, tilting her head like a girl, standing and sitting like a girl, and so on. … The more a girl assumes her status as feminine, the more she takes herself to be fragile and immobile and the more she actively enacts her own body inhibition. (43)

The insights of Fanon and Young enrich the existentialist account of being-in-the-world in their attentiveness to how it can be disrupted or transformed by forms of social and political oppression related to race and gender. And their work has paved the way for other projects that have broadened and deepened our understanding of being-in-the-world. Philosophers such as Richard Zaner (1981), Drew Leder (1990), Fredrik Svenaeus (2001), and Kay Toombs (1992) have all addressed the breakdowns of being-in-the-world and the contraction of lived space from the perspectives of illness and physical disability. Judith Butler (1990), Henry Rubin (1998), and Jay Prosser (1998) have expanded on the work of Beauvoir and Young by developing accounts of how identity, embodiment, and performativity are shaped by a life-world that inhibits queer and transsexual ways of being. And the recent work of Thomas Fuchs (2005), Matthew Radcliffe (2009), and Kristen Jacobson (2006) have drawn on Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty to explore how mental disorders such as schizophrenia, depression, and anorexia nervosa can disrupt our sense of spatial orientation and motility and dim the affective meanings that we normally have when we are seamlessly enmeshed in the world.

From this discussion we can draw some general conclusions about what being-in-the-world means for existentialists. First, it is a reference to our concrete and situated existence that is always prior to detached theorizing. Against the disembodied ‘view from nowhere,’ existentialists argue that philosophy always begins from ‘somewhere,’ from within the particular embodied situation that we inhabit. Given this account, the world is not a geometrical space or the sum total of objects; it is the unified setting of our lives that we are already involved in. “We are [already] caught up in the world,” as Merleau-Ponty writes, “and we do not succeed in extricating ourselves from it in order to achieve consciousness of the world” (1962, 5).

Second, the meaning of things is not generated by means of cognitive associations but through their relations to other things in the structured and unified whole that we are already engaged in. The reason things matter to us in the ways that they do is because of the way we understand and actively inhabit this web of relations. This means we never encounter things in isolation. Things make sense to us only in terms of their connections to other things and to our practical projects in general. Meaning, then, is not like the fixed and determinate properties of an empirical object. It is ‘ambiguous’ to the extent that it is shaped by what we do and where we are in the contextual interweaving of body, consciousness, and world.

Finally, insofar as we are caught up in the world, we embody a pre-reflective understanding that enables us to handle things and move through the world in a smooth and seamless way. This means that in the flow of everyday life, our actions are usually unaccompanied by mental intentions. Any reflective awareness of our perceptions and actions always presupposes a non-reflective, non-self-referential way of being-in-the-world (Dreyfus 1991, 54–59). Existentialists are not denying that deliberate, self-referential actions take place; they are simply making it clear that every day and for the most part they do not. In our ordinary activities we are not thinking about what we are doing because we already embody an understanding of the relational context that we are involved in.

Here, it is important to note the impact existentialist accounts of being-in-the-world have had on recent research in cognitive science. Philosophers have long assumed that human behavior must somehow be represented or mirrored in the mind or brain, but existentialists have shown that our everyday practices are usually performed without mental representation. Beginning with the groundbreaking work of Hubert Dreyfus (1972) and continuing in the current research of philosophers such as Sean Gallagher (2005) and Michael Wheeler (2005), existentialism is experiencing a renaissance in contemporary philosophy by showing how traditional accounts of human behavior are unable to explain how we can be skillfully engaged in the world in a way that we are not thematically conscious of. The core insight of being-in-the-world is that much of our ordinary activity can be described and understood without appealing to a self-referential mind or consciousness. Indeed, it reveals that it is largely through these embodied, pre-reflective acts that our projects, roles, identities, and equipment make sense to us. If this is the case, then the standard account of the human being as a self-enclosed mind set over and against objects is mistaken because we are, first and foremost, a situated way of being that is already engaged in contexts of meaning, and it is this fluid engagement that allows things to matter to us in the ways that they do. What this shows is that existentialism is not only alive and well as a significant force in current debates in cognitive science and philosophy of mind, but, as an intellectual movement, it was also well ahead of its time.

Suggested reading

Dreyfus, H. (1991). Being-in-the-world: A commentary on Heidegger's Being and Time, division I. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Guignon, C. B. (1983). Heidegger and the problem of knowledge. Indianapolis: Hackett.

Weate, J. (2001). Fanon, Merleau-Ponty, and the difference of phenomenology. In R. Bernasconi (ed.), Race (pp. 169–183). Oxford: Blackwell.

Wrathall, M. (2009). Existential phenomenology. In H. Dreyfus and M. Wrathall (eds.), A companion to phenomenology and existentialism (pp. 31–41). Oxford: Blackwell.

4: Self and Others

The problem of substance

Beginning with the Greeks, philosophers have largely adopted what can be called ‘substance ontology,’ the view that beings — rocks, trees, animals, and humans — must be understood in terms of substance of some sort, where ‘substance’ refers to the enduring properties or essence that ‘stands under’ (i.e., sub-stand) and remains the same through any change (Frede 2006). Plato, for example, conceived of the essence of things in terms of immutable forms or ideas (eidos). Descartes regarded things as either one of two substances, immaterial minds (res cogitans) or material bodies (res extensa). And today, with the dominance of naturalism, we tend to see things as causally determined physical substances. As we saw in chapter 2, viewing human beings as entities with a pre-given ‘essence’ is problematic because it overlooks the fact that we make ourselves who we are on the basis of our meaning-giving choices and actions, and this activity of self-making underlies any account of our physical or psychical makeup. This is why existentialists are cautious about traditional designations of the human being such as ‘living creature,’ ‘rational animal,’ ‘ego cogito,’ or ‘organism’ and largely avoid discussing our zoological, anatomical, or spiritual makeup. As Heidegger says, “What is to be determined is not an outward appearance of this entity but … the how of its being and the characters of this how” (1985, 154). By focusing on ‘how we are’ rather than ‘what we are,’ existentialists develop a conception of selfhood that dissolves the substance-centered view of the self.

First, existentialists contend that humans exist in a way that is fundamentally different from other beings in the natural world. We cannot be interpreted as things or substances that are objectively present, because we exist, that is, we are always choosing and acting as our lives unfold. This means there is no pre-given nature that determines who we are. We are self-creating beings that become who we are on the basis of our life decisions. There is, then, no complete or definitive account of who we are. We are always a ‘not yet’ as we press forward, fashioning and re-fashioning our identities — as a loving husband, a loyal friend, or a responsible citizen — and there is no essential ground or foundation that underlies and secures the identity that we create. What distinguishes us from all other entities, as Ortega y Gasset writes, is that our “being consists not in what it is already, but in what it is not yet, a being that consists in not-yet-being. Everything else in the world is what it is. … Man is the entity that makes itself. … He has to determine what he is going to be” (1941, 112, 201–202, my emphasis).

Second, substance ontology tends to regard the self as an encapsulated mind or will that is separate and distinct from objects. As we saw in chapter 3, existentialists argue that this view betrays the fact that, in our everyday involvements, we are already bound up in meaningful situations. Given this account, the standard view of the self as a detached cogito is a mistake that uncritically assumes the existence of an independent mental sphere that is somehow detached from the outer world. For the existentialists, there is no ‘inner/outer’ distinction. “Truth does not ‘inhabit’ only the ‘inner man,’ ” says Merleau-Ponty, “or more accurately, there is no inner man; man is in the world, and only in the world does he know himself” (1962, xi).

Finally, the existentialist conception of the self dissolves the Cartesian idea that the human being is a composite of two substances, a mind (or soul) and a body, where the mind is viewed as the ‘subject of experience,’ the sovereign center of beliefs, thoughts, and perceptions, and the body is viewed as a physical organism governed by the causal laws of the natural world. On this view, one's own body is seen as something that we are only contingently connected to, a material shell that is just one more object that the mind can examine and represent from a detached standpoint. In terms of human agency, this material shell is regarded as a tool or instrument that the mind manipulates in order to realize desired ends. It is by means of forming a particular mental representation, for instance, that I cause my legs to move so I can walk out of my office and interact with colleagues at the end of the hall. This view suggests that we encounter our body (and other bodies) only indirectly, through the mediation of the mind.

Again, as we saw earlier, existentialists undercut this dualism by arguing that when we are absorbed in the acts and practices of everyday life, our body is not encountered objectively as a physical machine. As I drive to work, drink my coffee, type on the computer, or chat with friends, my physical body disappears and takes on a kind of mindless transparency. “It flows together,” says Heidegger, “[with everything else] in the situation” (2002, 174). Here ‘body’ refers to my pre-reflective ability to move through my surroundings, to be absorbed in the flow of a particular situation, and to be affectively attuned to others. Indeed, for the existentialists, the distinction between an immaterial mind and a physical body is derived from and made possible by our situated and embodied way of being. As Merleau-Ponty explains, “Our body provides us with a practical knowledge, which has to be recognized as original and perhaps primary. My body has its world or understands its world without having to make any ‘symbolic’ or ‘objectifying’ function” (1962, 140–141). This notion of embodiment is one of the definitive contributions of existentialism.

Embodiment

When it comes to accounts of embodiment, twentieth-century existentialists are largely indebted to Husserl's work in Ideas II (1912) and his seminal distinction between two senses of the body, the quantifiable “physical body” (Körper) and the “lived body” (Leib) (Husserl 1989, 151–169). The notion of Körper is derived largely from Cartesian and Newtonian science, where the body is defined as res extensa, as an object that has a material composition, a determinate shape and boundary, is causally determined, and occupies a specific spatial location. In his Meditations (1641), Descartes offers the classic description:

By body, I understand all that is capable of being bounded by some shape, of being enclosed in a place, and of filling up a space in such a way as to exclude any other body from it … of being moved in several ways, not, of course, by itself, but by whatever impinges upon it. (1998, 64)

On this account any physical object is an example of Körper, but this definition does not help us understand how the body is lived, felt, or experienced. With etymological roots in the German words for ‘life’ (Leben) and ‘lived experience’ (Erlebnis), the lived body is not a physical object that can be studied from a perspective of scientific detachment, and, therefore, it is not to be understood as a thing or possession that I have. It refers, rather, to the first-person experiences, perceptions, and feelings of my own body. In this sense, I do not ‘have’ a body; as Marcel writes, “I am my body” (1950, 100, my emphasis), and I can never gain objective knowledge of my body because I am already living through it; it is what I am experiencing and sensing immediately and spontaneously at this moment. This is why, as Sartre says, “the body is lived and not known” (1956, 427). I can certainly perceive and know my material body — my height, weight, spatial location, etc. — from a position of detachment, but I cannot perceive my living body in this way. The existentialists are suggesting that my experiences are never encapsulated or self-contained; they are always bound up in the concrete situation or ‘life-world’ (Lebenswelt) that I am engaged in and responding to. It is this experiential intertwining that makes it impossible for me to perceive my body as a discrete object because I am already pre-reflectively situated and oriented in the world on the basis of my body. Thus, I cannot get behind or “distance myself” from it; it always “stands in my way” as the “zero point” of all my perceptions and orientations (Husserl 1989, 166–167).

To say ‘I am my body,’ then, is to say that my thoughts, perceptions, feelings, and experiences are situated and perspectival; they are entwined in the world “through the medium of my body” (Merleau-Ponty 1962, 82). Things matter to me in the ways that they do because of the unique “mediation of [my] bodily experience” (203). On this account, there is no way to distinguish “the world” from my “experience of the world” (Moran 2000, 422). How I perceive and feel about things is already colored by my embodied situation, one that would include aspects such as sexual orientation, physical ability, temperament, upbringing, or any other aspect of my bodily being-in-the-world. The fact that I spontaneously perceive a mountain as climbable, a colleague as trustworthy, or a social gathering as something to be avoided is due to the fact that I am situated and incarnated in a way that is irreducibly complex and indeterminate. This means that the self-conscious choices and actions that define us and make us who we are always take place against the situated background of our embodiment. And, for the existentialists, it is the ongoing struggle we live through in choosing to interpret or take a stand on our embodied situation that constitutes what it means to be a self. The self, understood this way, is a tension between the limitations and constraints of our embodiment and how we choose to interpret and give meaning to these limitations.

The self as a tension

From the previous discussion we see that the self is not a thing but a kind of embodied agency shaped by our meaning-giving choices and actions. Here, the existentialist conception of selfhood is strongly influenced by Kant, who suggests that human behavior can be understood in one of two ways, either deterministically from the mechanistic perspective of natural science or from the perspective of moral agency that regards human behavior in terms of freedom and responsibility. The former view treats the human being as a theoretical object whose behavior is determined and, like that of any other entity in the natural world, can be predicted and explained on the basis of causal laws. The latter view regards the human being as a responsible agent and the creator of his or her own life (Korsgaard 1989, 119–120). Given this distinction, existentialists generally do not deny that there are determinate facts about being human. It is a fact, for instance, that I am equipped with anatomical body parts, that I have a particular weight and height and a specific skeletal structure, and that I was born in a particular time and place. But it is also a fact that I am a professor and a husband. Being a professor and a husband, however, cannot be captured by means of the same descriptions that we attribute to objects in nature. They are not objective states of affairs but ‘ways of existing’ or ‘being-in-the-world,’ a composite of actions and choices I make that are embedded in a situation where being a professor and a husband are possibilities that matter to me. Heidegger clarifies this by distinguishing between objective “facts” (Tatsachen) and the “Facts” (Fakta) that pertain exclusively to human existence (1962, 82; see Blattner 2006, 44). The latter, our ‘facticity’ (Faktizität), is a reference to the embodied situation that we are engaged in, a situation that limits and constrains us in certain ways. This situation would include such things as our sexuality, our physicality, and our genetic code, but also our sociocultural context, our geographical location, and our history. For the existentialists, humans are unique in terms of the factical determinations that limit us because we have the capacity to self-consciously reflect on these limits and make decisions regarding how to deal with them. The structure of existence, then, is understood in terms of a struggle or tension between ‘facticity’ (our situated givenness) on the one hand and ‘transcendence’ (our ability to surpass our givenness through our self-conscious actions and choices) on the other. It is for this reason that Ortega y Gasset describes the human being as “a kind of ontological centaur, half immersed in nature, half transcending it” (1941, 111). We are determined by our nature and embodiment but are simultaneously endowed with the freedom to interpret it and take action in the face of it. These interpretations endow our situation with meaning, and these meanings in turn shape the direction of the choices and interpretations we make in the future. In other words, I make myself who I am only on the basis of the concrete ways in which I engage this tension.

What this means is that human beings, unlike animals and infants, do not always act on the basis of causal necessity, mechanically responding to immediate needs and desires. We are self-conscious beings or ‘being-for-itself’ who have the ability to transcend these needs and desires by embodying an evaluative or self-reflective concern about them and coming to grips with how acting on these desires shapes our identity and sense of who we are. The American philosopher Harry Frankfurt explains this view by distinguishing between ‘first-order’ and ‘second-order’ desires. “Besides wanting and choosing and being moved to do this or that,” writes Frankfurt, “men may also want to have (or not to have) certain desires and motives. They are capable of wanting to be different, in their preferences and purposes, from what they are” (1971, 7). This is what distinguishes humans from other animals. Animals and infants have the capacity for ‘first-order desires’ or ‘desires of the first order,’ which are simply desires to do or not to do one thing or another. But only humans have ‘second-order desires,’ that is, we have the unique capacity to care about, reflect on, and evaluate our first-order desires in a way that shapes us in becoming the distinctive kinds of selves that we are. On this account, for instance, my strong first-order desire for alcohol or cigarettes can be moderated by a higher second-order desire to be a sober and healthy person for the sake of my self-interpretation as a healthy and responsible father who wants to be present for his children. And this second-order volition is not causally determined; it is free, an expression of will that orients me in the world in a particular way and guides me toward future projects and identities that I seek to realize in creating the person I want to be.

On Frankfurt's view, without the capacity for second-order volitions a human being cannot properly be called a ‘person’ or ‘self.’ He describes such a creature as a “wanton” (11), referring to someone who is pulled around by his or her desire for certain things without any evaluative recognition that he or she actually wants to do these things or may prefer to do other things. In this sense, the ‘wanton’ does not care about his or her will. But this does not mean that the ‘wanton’ is an unfeeling automaton or that he or she is irrational or not self-aware. It simply means that he or she is unconcerned about making evaluative judgments about the desirability of his or her first-order desires and whether or not these desires are worthy of being acted upon. He or she simply follows whatever factical desire is strongest and is wholly “indifferent” (13) to the act of evaluating them. But in not taking a stand, interpreting, or giving meaning to his or her desires, the ‘wanton’ does not manifest freedom of the will and, consequently, is not engaged in the struggle for self-creation. Indeed, the ‘wanton’ has no identity at all apart from his or her first-order desires.

The American philosopher Dean Zimmerman suggests that Camus may be offering a version of Frankfurt's ‘wanton’ with the character Mersault in his famous novel The Stranger (see Solomon 2012, 417–418). Although he is keenly self-aware, Mersault's actions seem to be entirely dictated by whatever sensual impulse is strongest without any indication of whether or not he actually wants to do these things. He is drawn to the ocean for a swim on a hot day, to the warm buzz of a glass of wine or a cigarette, to dozing off with an afternoon nap, to kissing his girlfriend, Marie, when the feeling arises. But he has no evaluative ‘second-order’ volitions about these impulses and appears completely callous and unconcerned with how acting on them affects others or gives shape to his identity. Even when he commits the act of murder, it is described in terms of the pull of a random impulse: “To stay, or to make a move,” says Mersault, “it came to much the same thing” (Camus, 1946, 73). What frustrates the reader is that there is no remorse in Camus's character; he appears trapped in the impulses of the present moment without the ability to interpret or give meaning to them. He fails to see how second-order interpretative acts constitute the self by orienting or guiding him toward goals and projects that he hopes to realize in the future. Indeed, when Mersault admits he has “always been too absorbed in the present moment” (127), this not only reveals an unwillingness or inability to engage in the struggle for self-realization; it also reveals the unique temporal structure of selfhood.

Existentialists tend to interpret the self as being constituted by time. But against the standard view of clock-time, where time is interpreted as something external to us that can be measured, saved, or lost (as in the expression, ‘I just don't have the time’), existentialists put forth the idea that time is not something we have; it is what we are. We live our time. In Heidegger's words, the self is a “thrown-project” (1962, 185), that is, we have been thrown into a past, into a factical situation that limits and constrains us, yet we simultaneously interpret and give meaning to this situation by projecting forward into possibilities that are always shaping and reshaping our identities. Understood this way, the self exists in the future to the extent that we understand or interpret who we are in terms of possibilities we project for ourselves. But in this forward-directed projection we are also circling back, bringing our factical situation (or past) with us. Heidegger refers to this aspect of existence in terms of the Greek expression ek-stasis, as “stepping beyond” or “standing outside” ourselves (1982, 267). In the course of our lives, we are continuously moving back and forth, stretching into the future as we reinterpret and redefine ourselves against the limitations and demands of our facticity. In this way, the temporal structure of ‘thrown projection’ provides an orienting framework or horizon for me; it shows me where I stand, what I care about, and what is valuable and worth pursuing as my life moves forward, and it is this horizon that is missing in the ‘wanton.’ A character like Mersault is trapped in the present. He is pulled around by whatever first-order desire or impulse is strongest and is indifferent to whether or not these desires are worthwhile or how acting on them constitutes a particular identity. Without second-order volitions, he is unable to take a stand on his existence or to evaluate and interpret his actions. In this regard, he is not a self because he is unable to realize or create the kind of person he wants to be in the future.

It is important to note here the extent to which the existentialist account of the self — as an ongoing, self-interpreting activity or process — has influenced recent Anglophone philosophy and the broader humanities and social sciences in general. It not only offers an alternative to overly reductive assumptions regarding selfhood and agency that modern philosophy has inherited from Descartes; it is also deeply attentive to the ways in which our choices and actions are both self-defining and socially embedded. By rejecting various versions of substance ontology, the existentialist self cannot be conceived of as a ‘thinking thing,’ the willing, desiring, and perceiving subject that exists prior to any experience. Nor can it be conceived physically, as the aftereffects of neurophysiological or brain states that can be observed from a perspective of scientific objectivity (Baynes 2010, 441). Indeed, there is no substantial self at all. The self exists only in its own self-interpretations. On this view, we are thrown into a social situation or world that shapes our identity. But we are not simply passive social constructions. We also have the ability to transcend our facticity, that is, to actively shape our own identity by interpreting the values and meanings of our situation and tying them together into a cohesive and unified story or narrative. The self, then, is constituted by the continuous, open-ended process of choosing and pulling together the social interpretations that we care about and that are made available by the situation we grow into. Thus, it is not the substantial or thing-like attributes that define us. Rather, what makes us who we are is the narrative unity and coherence of the self-interpretations we take over in composing our own life story (Guignon 2004a, 127).

Although there are a number of prominent Anglophone philosophers who have developed this narrative conception of selfhood, including Harry Frankfurt, Charles Guignon, Christine Korsgaard, Alasdair MacIntyre, Alexander Nehamas, and Bernard Williams, the figure that has arguably played the most decisive role in fleshing out the idea and introducing it to the philosophical mainstream is Charles Taylor (b. 1931). While acknowledging his debt to figures like Nietzsche, Heidegger, and Merleau-Ponty, Taylor pioneered the idea of the human being as a “self-interpreting animal” (1985). On his account, human beings make or create themselves by constructing stories about who we are and what matters in our lives out of the context of meanings that we grow into. This is, for Taylor, a “basic condition” of being human, “that we grasp our lives in a narrative” (1989, 47). Recognizing that there might be gaps or breakdowns in the unity and coherence of one's life story — perhaps the result of suffering through a psychological disturbance or experiencing a traumatic event — the general point is that when speaking about a person or self we are referring to what Taylor describes as “leading a life” (1997), referring to one's ability to construct a unified life story or narrative and to taking responsibility for its construction. This, of course, means that the process of self-creation is not a free-floating event where the individual creates him or herself ex nihilo. Self-creation is always social or ‘dialogical,’ that is, it takes place against a background of cultural meanings that are laid out in advance and that we continually take over and appropriate as our life moves forward. The problem is that if we are already immersed in a background of meanings that shape us and from which we actively construct our narrative, how do we know if our self-interpretations are genuinely our own? As Charles Guignon suggests, there appears to be no “real self” that exists below the stitched-together roles, projects, and identities that constitute my life story (2004a, 130).

Moreover, if it is true that we have the capacity to ‘lead a life’ by making evaluative choices and enacting self-interpretations that are significant or important to us, we have to recognize that these self-interpretations often conflict with our hardened tendency to conform to the everyday norms and expectations of the public. Rather than taking a stand on our situation and fashioning our own story, we all too often drift along with the crowd, living the life story that ‘they’ live. In this sense, as Heidegger says, “We take pleasure and enjoy ourselves as they take pleasure. We read, see, and judge about literature and art as they see and judge; likewise we shrink back from the ‘great mass’ as they shrink back; we find ‘shocking’ what they find shocking. The ‘they’ … prescribes the kind of being of everydayness” (1962, 164). This means in our everyday dealings, we are usually not self-creating individuals but herd animals, alienated from who we are and what matters to us. For this reason, any account of narrative self-constitution must be reconciled with our inveterate tendency of conforming to ‘the they.’

Conformism and self-deception

In his polemical essay ‘The Present Age,’ Kierkegaard captures the struggle that human beings face in creating themselves. To transcend or take a stand on one's own situation is difficult because we are already caught up in the comforting and stable norms of ‘the public.’ We are told what to do, what to believe in, and what to value, and this unburdens us from having to make our own self-defining commitments. We simply let others choose our lives for us. “No single person who belongs to the public makes a real commitment,” says Kierkegaard. “More and more individuals, owing to their bloodless indolence, will aspire to be nothing at all. … This indolent mass … understands nothing and does nothing itself” (1946b, 266–267). Drifting along with the ‘indolent mass’ creates the impression that I am living comfortably and well because I am doing what everyone else does, but this, of course, stifles the possibility of transcendence, of genuinely coming to grips with what really matters in my own life.

In The Death of Ivan Ilych, Tolstoy introduces a character that lives a life of shallow conformism. Ilych is the ‘everyman,’ a superficial society creature who does everything as ‘they’ do it. His decisions to pursue a particular career as a judge, to propose to his wife, to have children, even to furnish his house in the way that he does are all made because his social circle approved. But a life based entirely on the standardized and leveled-down values of ‘the they’ prevents Ilych from realizing who he is as an individual. He is unaware or unwilling to acknowledge his own capacity for transcendence. As a result, he is unable to take a committed stand on anything — a stand that might give his life a sense of focus, direction, and purpose — because nothing really matters to him. He flees from himself and lets the public decide the course of his life. When faced with his untimely death, he is confronted with the terror of not knowing who he is or what he stands for. In his last days, he laments:

‘Then what does it mean? Why? It can't be that life is so senseless and horrible. But if it really has been horrible and senseless, why must I die and die in agony? There is something wrong!’

‘Maybe I did not live as I ought to have done,’ it suddenly occurred to him. ‘But how could that be, when I did everything properly?’ (1960, 148)

Swallowed up by ‘the they’ and unaware of what matters to him as an individual, Tolstoy describes Ilych's life leading up to his death as one that was “most simple and most ordinary and therefore most horrible” (104).

The self-deceptive shallowness of public life is echoed in Nietzsche, who praises those who have the courage to create their own lives and live independently from ‘the herd.’ For Nietzsche, like Kierkegaard, the public reduces everything to the lowest common denominator and deadens our capacity for healthy and creative self-expression. And this, in turn, prevents us from becoming who we are. He describes this herd-like tendency in Beyond Good and Evil:

Today … it is only the herd animal who is honored and bestows honor. … And so these days, being noble, wanting to be for oneself, managing to be different, standing alone and needing to live independently are integral to the concept of “greatness”; and the philosophy will reveal something of his own idea when he asserts, The greatest person should be the one who can be most lonely, most hidden, most deviant, the man beyond good and evil, the master of his virtues, abundantly rich in will. (1998, 212)

For Nietzsche, those who live ‘beyond good and evil’ have an inborn capacity for self-creation and are naturally equipped to rise above the deadening tyranny of mass culture. This is why he rejects modern democratic values such as equality. The idea that ‘all human beings are created equal’ and have common interests and needs creates a mass ideology that stifles the idiosyncratic strengths and creative tastes unique to the individual. The emergence of modern egalitarianism, then, combined with the forces of mass media, advertising, and entertainment industries, mechanized mass production, and the culture of consumerism, creates what Ortega y Gasset will later call “the mass man,” where each human being “feels just like everybody [else] and nevertheless is not concerned about it; is in fact quite happy to feel itself as one with everybody else” (1932, 15).

Heidegger will develop this theme in Being and Time by suggesting that our absorption in the public world consoles or “tranquilizes” us, creating the comforting illusion that “everything is in the best order” because we are doing what “they” do (1962, 177). Tranquilization prevents us from facing the fact that there is nothing stable that secures or grounds our choices and that our being is always threatened by the possibility of non-being, of death. ‘The they’ conceals this existential threat from us, and as a result it alienates us from who we are. It “provides a constant tranquilization, [an] indifference [that] alienates Dasein from [itself]” (254–255). It is important to note, however, that being a ‘they-self’ is not to be understood as a morally inferior way of being. It is true that Heidegger is critical of our inveterate tendency to fall prey to the conformist fads and fashions of ‘the they,’ but he does not evaluate this negatively. It is, in fact, a positive structure or condition of being human, what Heidegger calls an ‘existentiale’ (Existentiale). “The ‘they’ is an existentiale,” he writes, “and as a primordial phenomenon, it belongs to Dasein's positive constitution” (129). This means existence is necessarily structured by ‘falling’ (Verfallen). Insofar as we exist, we ‘fall prey’ to the shared meanings and practices of the world we are thrown into. Given this account, ‘the they’ does not simply represent a source of tranquilized conformism; it is also the source of meaning and intelligibility for our lives. Without ‘the they’ we could not make sense of who we are or why things matter to us in the ways that they do. It is “the ‘they’ itself,” says Heidegger, “[that] articulates the referential context of significance” (129). The upshot is that, in our everyday lives, we are inauthentic, that is, “everyone is the other, and no one is himself” (128). And there is no way for us to completely rise above or extricate ourselves from the tyranny of ‘the they.’ Consequently, Heidegger's view of authenticity, as we will see later, cannot be viewed in terms of a solitary individual or subject who somehow rises above the superficial norms of the public world. Any attempt to free oneself from the crowd and take hold of one's life as an individual requires coming to grips with the publicly interpreted meanings that have already been laid out in advance by ‘the they.’

The existentialist account of alienation and self-deception takes a darker turn in Sartre's Being and Nothingness. According to Sartre, I can only become aware of who I am through ‘the look’ (le regard) of the Other. The look is a social judgment that defines me as a ‘being-in-itself,’ as an object or thing, and this, in turn, dehumanizes me, stripping me of the possibility of creating and fashioning my own identity. I am, as Sartre writes, “possessed by the Other; the Other's look fashions my body in its nakedness, causes it to be born, sculptures it, produces it as it is, sees it as I shall never see it. The Other holds a secret — the secret of what I am” (1956, 475, my emphasis). This means that when the Other judges me to be unattractive, cowardly, heroic, or successful, I tend to internalize this judgment and see myself as that kind of thing, as if it were a destiny. Being-with-others, then, becomes a ceaseless conflict, where I struggle to affirm or assert my subjectivity by turning the other into an object, while the other does the same to me. “While I attempt to free myself from the hold of the Other,” says Sartre, “the Other is trying to free himself from mine; while I seek to enslave the Other, the Other seeks to enslave me. … Conflict is the original meaning of being-for-others” (475). Sartre captures this struggle for self-assertion in the famous words of Garcin, a character in his play No Exit, who describes the experience of being-with-others as a living hell: “I'd have never believed it. You remember all we were told about the torture-chambers, the fire and brimstone, the ‘burning marl.’ Old wives’ tales! There's no need for red-hot pokers. Hell is — other people” (1989, 45, my emphasis).

As we will see in more detail in chapter 7, this struggle is complicated by the fact that we often participate in our own dehumanization, not only because it creates the consoling impression that there is something secure and thing-like about our identities, but also because it prevents us from having to take responsibility for our choices. In short, it keeps us from acknowledging the fact that we are free, self-making beings. Sartre will refer to this kind of self-deception as ‘bad faith’ (mauvaise foi), and it occurs when we deny “the double property of human being, who is at once a facticity and a transcendence” (1956, 98). I deceive myself, for instance, when I adopt the persona of a college professor and see myself solely in terms of the professor's peculiar habits. Thus, the fact I am bookish, absent-minded, and self-absorbed is just the way I am, “and society demands that [I] limit myself to [this] function” (102). In this way, I interpret myself as a professor-thing. But, as ‘being-for-itself,’ I am also not a professor because I have the ability to take a stand on these patterns of behavior and choose to do otherwise. Transcendence, then, is the ‘not’ or ‘nothing’ that always underlies my facticity. In bad faith, I usually cling to my socially constructed identity for security and deny the nothingness, the fact that my identity is always incomplete and that I alone am responsible for my existence. I try, in other words, to “hide” in my facticity “in an effort to flee the being which I am” (351). As a result I forget what Sartre calls “the first principle of existentialism,” namely that “man is nothing else but what he makes of himself” (2001, 293).

From this discussion, it appears existentialists offer only a negative account of human relations, one that is mired in conflict, alienation, and self-deception. However, a number of religious existentialists reject the claim that there can be no authentic communion or intimacy between self and other — that a “unity with the Other is … in fact unrealizable” (Sartre 1956, 476) — and suggest that there are deeper possibilities of being-with-others that modern society covers over.Marcel, for example, argues that it is the unique nature of today's technocratic society that compels us to see ourselves as atomistic individuals, where our relations with others are reduced to exercises in manipulation and control. This, in turn, robs us of the primordial experience of intersubjectivity, mutual dependence, and obligation to others. Buber draws on the Hasidic mystical tradition to make a similar claim with his critique of the ‘I–It’ relations that dominate modern society. In this relation, we see ourselves as isolated subjects that are separate from others (Its). This relation conceals a richer experience of community, where human beings encounter each other not as objects for manipulation but as enigmatic and vulnerable subjects to whom we are irrevocably bound in “a living, reciprocal relation” (Buber 1970, 94). Buber calls this experience of mutual vulnerability the ‘I — Thou’ relation: an experience that can shake us out of the alienation and forlornness of modern life. Dostoevsky's novels also reflect the communal values of the Eastern Church, offering powerful critiques of the modern cult of individualism for the sake of a more profound sense of spiritual solidarity, social responsibility, and ‘belongingness’ (sobernost) embodied in the close-knit practices of the Russian peasants, practices where “we are all responsible to all and for all” (Dostoevsky 1957, 278–279; see Guignon 1993, xli).

We see, then, that existentialists differ in their assessments of being-with-others, but they are generally in agreement that the conformity and self-deception of everyday life tends to conceal or cover over the struggle for self-creation. To the extent that we conform to the ready-made identities of the public world, we are alienated and inauthentic; we disown ourselves by simply going along with the crowd, never having to face up to the truth about who and what we really are. It is for this reason, as we will see in the proceeding chapters, that the questions of freedom and authenticity become central to the existentialists.

Suggested reading

Frankfurt, H. (1971). Freedom of the will and the concept of a person. Journal of philosophy 68 (1): 5–20.

Hatab, L. J. (2012). Nietzsche: selfhood, creativity, and philosophy. In S. Crowell (ed.), The Cambridge companion to existentialism (pp. 137–157). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Hoffman, P. (1983). The human self and the life and death struggle. Gainesville: University Press of Florida.

Taylor, C. (1997). Leading a life. In R. Chang (ed.), Incommensurability, incomparability, and practice reason (pp. 170–183). Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

5: Freedom

The core idea of existentialism

For the existentialists, no idea is more central than freedom. As Kierkegaard puts it, “The most tremendous thing which has been granted to man is choice [and] freedom” (1959, 189). A century later, Sartre will refer to freedom as the defining feature of existentialism. “At heart,” he writes, “what existentialism shows is the connection between the absolute character of [freedom], by virtue of which every man realizes himself” (2001, 303). As we have seen, the existentialist view of freedom implies that there is no pre-given nature or ‘essence’ to human existence because ‘existence precedes essence.’ That is, we make or create our own essence on the basis of our ongoing choices and actions. Who we are is not determined by any underlying trait or characteristic that we are born with. It is, rather, up to the individual to shape his or her own identity by choosing certain projects and taking action in the world. Only after we make these choices do we become someone, a responsible employee, a loving mother, or a caring friend. But these identities are never secure; they are always subject to future choices. I can, after all, always decide to quit my job, leave my family, or abandon my friends. This means that whatever our factical limitations — whether it is our genetic code, our socioeconomic backgrounds, our religious or family history — they do not ultimately determine who we are. We are self-making beings responsible for the meanings we give to things through our own choices, the totality of which make us who we are. This is why Sartre claims that “man is nothing else than a series of undertakings, that he is the sum, the organization, the ensemble of the relationships which make up these undertakings” (300). He offers the example of a coward to make his case. The coward is not the way he is because of his social upbringing or because of his physiological or genetic constitution. The coward, rather, “makes himself a coward” by means of his actions. It is what he does that defines him, not his “cowardly heart or lungs or brain” (301, my emphasis).

To properly understand the existentialist view of freedom, we have to distinguish it from more traditional conceptions. First, existentialists generally reject the psychological notion of freedom as having something to do with an inner faculty, namely, the ‘mind’ or ‘will.’ This results in an overly mentalistic picture of human agency and uncritically assumes that we have transparent access to the inner dynamics of our own minds (Danto 1965, 116). In response, existentialists generally argue that much of what we take to be willful and self-conscious actions are actually unconscious. We are, in other words, largely unaware of our choices and actions because they are motivated by involuntary instincts and habituated ways of being-in-the-world. Nietzsche illuminates this point in The Gay Science:

We could think, feel, will, and remember, and we could also ‘act’ in every sense of the word, and yet none of all this would have to ‘enter our consciousness’ (as one says figuratively). All of life would be possible without seeing itself, as it were, in a mirror, and in fact, even in us now, by far the greatest part of life still plays itself out without this mirroring — yes even our thinking, feeling, willing life, as offensive as this may sound to an older philosophy. What is consciousness for in the first place, if on the whole it is superfluous? (1995, 354)

Nietzsche's comments anticipate the views of twentieth-century figures like Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty by articulating the extent to which human beings are already acting in non-deliberate and pre-reflective ways, where conscious reflection plays only a small or derivative role in our everyday lives.

Second, existentialist freedom is not to be confused with ‘positive freedom’ or what Sartre in Being and Nothingness calls the freedom “to obtain what one has wished” (1956, 622). For the existentialists, if we can do whatever we want, then it turns out that we are not free at all; we are actually at the mercy of our wants, where we simply respond to passing whims and desires, moving in one direction or another based on whatever impulse is strongest. In The Brothers Karamazov, Dostoevsky describes such a conception of freedom in terms of a kind of self-destructive ‘bondage’:

The world has proclaimed the reign of freedom, especially of late, but what do we see in this freedom? Nothing but slavery and self-destruction! … Interpreting freedom as the multiplication and rapid satisfaction of desires, men distort their own natures, for many senseless and foolish desires and habits and ridiculous beliefs are thus fostered. … [How] can a man shake off his habits, what can become of him if he is in such bondage to the habit of satisfying the innumerable desires he has created for himself? (1957, 289)

For Dostoevsky, true freedom emerges only when we are freed from the bondage of our immediate desires and wants. When he claims that our capricious impulses “distort [our] own nature,” he is suggesting that we are being dishonest with ourselves by denying our uniquely human capacity for transcendence. Unlike infants and animals, we have the ability to surpass our brute needs and desires by taking a stand on them, interpreting them, and giving them meaning. Existentialist freedom, then, is best understood as freedom of “intention” (Solomon 1972, 280); it is our inescapable capacity to interpret the world, to give meaning and value to our situation on the basis of our own choosing. This is why Sartre says, “Every man who takes refuge behind the excuse of his passions … is a dishonest man” (2001, 305). Freedom is not a property that we may or may not have; it is an ontological or structural condition of being human. Thus, even when I choose not to choose and simply ‘go with the flow’ of my immediate desires, I am still making a choice by envisioning a certain kind of life, assigning meaning to a particular identity, and making myself who I am (Guignon 2004b, 497). “What is not possible,” says Sartre, “is not to choose. I can always choose, but I ought to know that if I do not choose, I am still choosing” (2001, 304).

Finally, existentialist freedom should not be regarded as a universal moral entity, the ultimate ‘value,’ ‘ideal,’ or ‘right’ that people struggle for, that politicians and religious leaders reify, and that needs to be preserved and protected against possible threats (Cooper 1999, 154). As a structure of being human, freedom cannot be preserved, diminished, or increased; it can only be accepted and faced as an existential given. And this acceptance is by no means a positive thing. Indeed, the sincere and clear-sighted acceptance of human freedom is usually accompanied by anguish and dread because we realize that we alone are responsible for the choices we make in our lives. There is no moral absolute, ethical calculus, or natural law that can justify our choices; there is no higher tribunal than the individual himself or herself. As Camus writes, “I continue to believe that this world has no higher meaning, but I know that something in it has meaning and that is man; for he is the one being to insist on having a meaning” (cited in Solomon 1972, 285). For the existentialists, then, the individual is always burdened with the “terrible freedom” of choosing his or her own meanings and values, and “there are no excuses behind us nor justifications before us” (Sartre 2001, 296). Even faith in God, as religious existentialists like Kierkegaard, Buber, Marcel, and Tillich make clear, is a terrifying choice, a ‘mysterium tremendum,’ because it is inexpressible to others and cannot be guided by any appeal to reason(Otto 1923, 12–23; Buber 1970, 127).

Freedom and determinism

From the preceding discussion, it is easy to see how the existentialist conception of freedom conflicts with prevailing views of scientific materialism and determinism. The brand of determinism that triumphs today is shaped by the paradigm of Enlightenment science and, in this sense, is different from older versions of determinism or ‘fatalism’ characteristic of Antiquity and the Middle Ages. Fatalism is a view that is not especially concerned with identifying and explaining specific causal chains that result in particular outcomes. Sophocles (496–406 bc), for example, makes it clear that Oedipus was fated to kill his father and marry his mother regardless of whatever causal chain he pursued (Solomon 2002, 66). By contrast, scientific determinism is specifically concerned with identifying efficient causes that bring about particular effects in fixed, law-like ways. To this end, it follows the Newtonian formula that “all events can in principle be fully explained by previous events and the laws of nature” (Fischer 1994, 6). As we have shown, this view is a rejection of older teleological accounts that saw the universe as a meaningful cosmic order where each entity had a particular function or purpose. With the rise of modern science, the universe comes to be regarded as a meaningless aggregate of causally interacting physical bodies. And human beings, as part of this system, are subject to the same mechanistic laws as other bodies. We are reduced to physical organisms that are determined by natural forces.

The determinist thesis generally results in the view that there can be no such thing as free will because all movements, including human actions, are fully caused or determined by preceding events, where some of those events are internal to the individual and some are external. On this account, in any particular case we could not have acted otherwise than we did and therefore we cannot be held morally responsible for our actions. Existentialists, with the crucial exception of Nietzsche, whom we will discuss at the end of the chapter, reject the determinist thesis and affirm the view that the human being is a moral agent who has free will, who can make choices, and be held morally responsible for his or her actions. Any other position would strip away the dignity of being human, reducing us to mere automata or machines that are at the mercy of causal laws. As Sartre puts it:

[The existentialist] theory is the only one that gives man dignity, the only one that does not reduce him to an object. The effect of all materialism is to treat all men, including the one philosophizing, as objects, that is, as an ensemble of determined reactions in no way distinguished from the ensemble of qualities and phenomena which constitute a table or a chair or a stone. We definitely wish to establish the human realm as an ensemble of values distinct from the material realm. (2001, 303)

But affirming free will in the face of the overwhelming scientific evidence for determinism is difficult, and no existentialist captures this tension better than Dostoevsky in his Notes from the Underground. Indeed, Walter Kaufmann refers to the story as “the best overture to existentialism ever written” (1956, 14) because of the way it addresses the problem of free will.

Dostoevsky's nameless underground man lives in mid-nineteenth century St. Petersburg, Russia, as it is going through a period of dramatic modernization, where an older way of life based around close-knit religious communities is being replaced with the newly imported secular values of scientific materialism. As someone who self-identifies with the ‘intelligentsia’ of Russia, the underground man understands the truth of scientific principles, which he refers to as ‘the Laws of Nature,’ but he is unwilling to accept them when it comes to human actions because they deny the possibility of free will and turn human beings into mechanical cogs whose behavior can be controlled and, ultimately, predicted on the basis of mathematical formulas. These principles imply that “[a human being never] really had any caprice or will of his own … that everything he does is not done by his willing it, but is done of itself, by the Laws of Nature” (Dostoevsky 2009, 18–19). But the underground man is equally critical of forms of coercion and control based on appeals to reason. Expressing the idea that ‘existence precedes essence,’ he argues that if we subject our decisions to how well they cohere with rational principles — such as Kant's categorical imperative or the happiness calculus of utilitarianism — we are assuming that we have a pre-given essence, namely that we are rational. The underground man rejects this idea, arguing that human motivations and purposes cannot be explained and justified by means of reason. On his account, existentialist freedom entails both freedom from the deterministic laws of nature and freedom from rational principles (Solomon 1972, 280; Guignon and Aho 2009, xxii — xxv).

The underground man makes his case by attacking Enlightenment social reformers who dream of creating a rationally ordered society, a ‘Crystal Palace’ based on principles of calculative reason and deterministic laws. He understands that these utopian ideals may very well result in a life of mechanized predictability, comfort, and security, but he believes human beings will eventually revolt against living life like a ‘piano-key’ because it violates the basic human need we have to choose and create our own lives:

[Even] if man really were nothing but a piano-key, even if this were proved to him by natural science and mathematics, even then he would not become reasonable, but would purposely do something perverse out of simple ingratitude, simply to win his point. And if he does not find means he will contrive destruction and chaos, will contrive sufferings of all sorts, only to win his point! He will launch a curse upon the world, and as only man can curse it may be by his curse alone he will attain his object — that is, convince himself that he is a man and not a piano-key! (Dostoevsky 2009, 23)

To be sure, the underground man acknowledges and appreciates the evidence for scientific determinism, but he simultaneously affirms the need for choice, even if these choices diminish overall happiness and result in acts of “destruction and chaos” (20) because without choice we are not human beings. This is why he says, “One's own free unfettered choice is [the] ‘most advantageous advantage.’ … What man wants is simply independent choice, whatever that independence may cost and wherever it may lead. And choice, of course, the devil only knows what choice” (20).

Dostoevsky's story captures the existentialist thesis that unlike other objects in nature, our essence is not fixed and determined; it is always in the process of being made. In this sense, we are not beings or things at all; we are nothing because we are continually negating ourselves through our moment-to-moment decisions. Yet, in affirming human freedom in this way, the underground man has to confront the anguish that there is no underlying justification for his actions. On the determinist view, every motivation for acting rests on some other cause, but the underground man realizes that the underlying cause in turn requires another cause, and another, and so on to infinity. Committed to free will, the underground man believes he is the ‘causa sui’ of his existence, and there are no limits or constraints that can hinder him. Limits emerge only if he chooses to interpret and accept them as limits (Guignon and Aho 2009, xxiv). Thus, if reason, social convention, or the laws of nature determine that he should act in a certain way, the underground man does the opposite. If he is sick, he refuses to see a doctor; if he is at a dinner party, he acts in outrageous and embarrassing ways; if someone reaches out to him with love and tenderness, he lashes out with rage. And he refuses to blame anyone or anything for his actions. He takes responsibility for his choices even though they are self-destructive and leave him feeling alienated and ashamed.

Here, it is important to note that the underground man does not represent Dostoevsky's own views on freedom. As a religious existentialist, Dostoevsky sees the reflexive rebellion of the underground man as a distortion of human nature. As we saw earlier, to impulsively act in contrarian ways is not actually freedom. True freedom, for Dostoevsky, is exhibited when the individual is freed from these impulses for the sake of something ‘higher’ in the world. This is why Father Zossima, who speaks for Dostoevsky in The Brothers Karamazov, says:

The way to real, true freedom: I cut off my superfluous and unnecessary desires, I subdue my proud and wanton will and chastise it with obedience, and with God's help I attain freedom of spirit with spiritual joy. Which is most capable of conceiving a great idea and serving it — the rich man in his isolation or the man who has freed himself from the tyranny of material things and habits? (1957, 290)

Dostoevsky sees a life ruled by impulsive rebellion as one that is ultimately self-defeating. Every time the underground man rebels against a limitation in order to assert his freedom, a new limitation emerges, resulting in a desperate cycle where he is enslaved by the need to lash out at anything that may limit or constrain him. True freedom, for Dostoevsky, emerges when we subordinate or let go of our egoistic need for self-assertion and humbly accept the mystery of God which is nothing more than an acceptance of the whole of life itself with all of its shared joys and suffering. Only this kind of freedom, a ‘freedom of spirit,’ can pull us out of the empty cycle of self-affirmation and open us up to the realization that salvation demands that we transcend our egoistic needs for the sake of others, to see that we are not willful subjects who are isolated and alone, but vulnerable beings who are mutually attached and dependent on each other (Guignon 1993).

Although it is not representative of his own views, Notes from the Underground offers a powerful, if ultimately tragic, testimony of the value of free will in the face of an increasingly rational and deterministic world. And no existentialist developed this theme more definitively than Sartre, who referred to human freedom as ‘radical’ and ‘absolute’ because it emerges ex nihilo from the contingent upsurge of choice itself.

Radical freedom

In order to understand Sartre's view of free will, we have to return to the phenomenological roots of his project. As we saw earlier, twentieth-century existentialists were indebted to Husserl's idea that human consciousness has an intentional structure, meaning that it always has an objective correlate; it is always of something. Consciousness is not, as Descartes had envisioned, an object or thing that is grasped in the reflective ‘I’ or cogito. Consciousness “is not [an] object,” as Sartre explains, “nor is it the ‘I’ of consciousness” (1957, 41). Indeed, consciousness is not a thing or substance at all. It is a relational activity or process, a no-thing that is always pointing away from itself, always directed toward objects outside it. “When I run after a streetcar,” for example, “there is no I. There is consciousness of the streetcar-having-to-be-overtaken” (49). Given this account, consciousness is intentionality, and it has no ‘inside.’ “It is just this being beyond itself, this absolute flight, this refusal to be substance which makes it a consciousness” (Sartre 2002, 383). On Sartre's view, consciousness is always “bursting toward” beings in the world, “tearing us out of ourselves” (382).

In addition to the idea of intentionality, Sartre also borrows Husserl's idea that consciousness is a meaning-giving activity. Acts of consciousness are not passive representations of objects in the world. They actively endow objects with the meaning and significance that they have. This means that when I perceive things, I perceive them as such. I don't just see the tree. “[I] see it just where it is: at the side of the road, in the midst of the dust, alone and writhing in the heat, eight miles from the Mediterranean coast” (Sartre 2002, 383). The fact that we see things as ‘this, and not that,’ means that our acts of consciousness inject a ‘not’ or ‘nothingness’ into the world. Consciousness allows us to pick things out, to make meaningful distinctions in the world by means of negation. Thus, to see the tree as a source of shade is to give meaning to it, and this requires seeing it as not something else (e.g., as a source of firewood). In this sense, our acts of consciousness carve up and order reality for us or ‘for-itself’ (pour soi), making it fit our own needs and concerns. Without consciousness, all we would encounter is formless being, the naked and disordered ‘in-itself’ (en soi) of things. Consciousness, then, is the free ‘upsurge’ of will that gives meaning to the inchoate plenum of being. On this account, I shape the world around me through my own meaning-giving activity, and therefore I alone am responsible for how the world matters to me.

Understanding this duality between ‘being’ and ‘nothingness’ allows us to better understand human existence as a tension between facticity and transcendence. Whatever limits or constrains us in terms of our facticity is something we can always transcend because we can reflect on it and give it meaning by choosing to interpret it in a particular way. If I am born into abject poverty, for instance, this may be seen as a limitation that restricts my possibilities in the future, and I may choose to resign myself to this situation. But I also have the capacity to reject the interpretation that my poverty is a limitation and embrace it as something that gives my life character, allowing me to appreciate my accomplishments more and enabling me to relate with compassion to others in similar circumstances. In either case, there is always a gap or a fissure — a ‘nothingness’ — between my being ‘in-itself’ and my being ‘for-itself’ (Guignon and Pereboom 2001, 265). Regardless of the path or identity I happen to choose, I am not that person. My identity is penetrated by a ‘not’ because I can always question myself and assign different meanings and interpretations in the future. Ortega y Gasset will refer to this aspect of our existence in terms of ‘plasticity.’ “Man is an infinitely plastic entity of which one may make what one will precisely because of itself it is nothing save only the mere potentiality to be ‘as you like’ ” (1941, 203–204). We are ‘plastic’ because we are always making ourselves who we are. And this process of self-making is itself nihilating.

This helps us to understand why the existentialists reject the idea that there is a pre-given essence to human being. “If man, as the existentialist conceives him, is indefinable,” says Sartre, “it is because at first he is nothing. Only afterward will he be something, and he himself will have made what he will be. Thus, there is no human nature” (2001, 293). There is no aspect of our facticity that absolutely determines or defines us because our being ‘in-itself’ is always being negated by our being ‘for-itself.’ Our facticity can reveal itself to us only by being imbued with meanings that are constituted by the projects and self-interpretations that we choose. This is why Sartre claims that “human reality is constituted as a being which is what it is not [for-itself] and which is not what it is [in-itself]” (1956, 107, my emphasis).

This, however, does not mean that Sartre is claiming that humans can do whatever they want. It would be absurd, for instance, to say that the slave in chains can do whatever the master does because the slave inhabits a situation that limits his actions in particular ways. But, for Sartre, the slave is just as free as the master in terms of the meanings and values that he can ascribe to his situation. He explains in the following passage:

When we declare that the slave in chains is as free as his master, we do not mean to speak of a freedom which would remain undetermined. The slave in chains is free to break them; this means that the very meaning of his chains will appear to him in the light of the end which he will have chosen: to remain a slave or to risk the worst in order to get rid of his slavery. Of course the slave will not be able to obtain the wealth and the standard of living of his master; but these are not the objects of his projects; he can only dream of the possession of these treasures. The slave's facticity is such that the world appears to him with another countenance and that he has to posit and to resolve different problems; in particular it is necessary fundamentally to choose himself on the ground of slavery and thereby to give meaning to this obscure constraint. (1956, 703)

From this, we can see that when Sartre speaks of ‘absolute’ or ‘radical’ freedom, he does not mean that there are no limits or constraints on the ways we can act, but that these limits gain their meaning from us. In addition, because there are an infinite number of meanings that any situation can have, there is nothing that ultimately compels me to interpret things in one way rather than another. It is up to me alone to determine how things are going to matter to me. For this reason freedom is invariably accompanied by “forlornness” and “anguish” (Cooper 1999, 154).

We are ‘forlorn’ when we realize that we have been abandoned to a world that is not of our choosing and that offers no underlying support or plan for our lives. And we are in ‘anguish’ when we recognize that we alone are responsible for who we are and what we do. On this account, anguish discloses the predicament of what Sartre calls being “left in the realm of possibility” (2001, 299), where we confront a dizzying array of possible meanings and that we alone are answerable for the meanings that we choose. Anguish, then, is not to be confused with fear because it is not directed at a specific object out there in the world; it is directed at oneself as an incarnation of our vertiginous freedom. “Anguish is distinguished from fear,” says Sartre, “in that fear is fear of being in the world whereas anguish is anguish before myself” (1956, 65, my emphasis).

Sartre's view of radical freedom is tempered by existentialists like Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty who argue that the meanings we choose to give to things cannot be constituted exclusively by the individual, and thus the individual can never be what Sartre calls the “the incontestable author of an event” (1956, 707). Rather, our choices are limited by our historical situation, a situation that makes it possible for things to mean something to us in the first place. On this view, our freedom is always already embedded in the meanings of an intersubjective world.

Situated freedom

In the final chapter of Phenomenology of Perception, Merleau-Ponty outlines his views on freedom. Like Sartre, he argues that there is no pre-given essence that determines us; that freedom is a structure of being human; and that our choices negate or ‘carve out’ the amorphous mass of being by giving meaning to things. Where Merleau-Ponty breaks with Sartre is in the idea that we can create ourselves through the sheer ‘upsurge’ of choice alone. For Merleau-Ponty, in order to make a choice we must first be familiar with the meanings and values of our historical situation (see Cooper 1999, 159–164). The idea, for instance, that an alienated factory worker could somehow nullify himself with an ‘initial choice’ and become a Marxist revolutionary would be impossible. This is because the choice is already a meaningful possibility in the world that the worker has been thrown into. The revolutionary, then, is not the ‘uncontested author’ of his identity who somehow reverses course and radically breaks with his proletarian history. The meanings that he chooses to take over are possibilities made available to him by a shared world, and these historical possibilities are laid out “before any personal decision has been made” (1962, 449). “I am situated in a social environment,” writes Merleau-Ponty, “and my freedom though it may have the power to commit me elsewhere has not the power to transform me instantaneously into what I decide to be” (447).

Here Merleau-Ponty is following Heidegger's interpretation of existence as ek-stasis, that humans have always already ‘stepped outside beyond’ themselves to the extent we are bound up in the meanings of our historical situation. “Nothing determines me from outside,” as Merleau-Ponty writes, “not because nothing acts upon me, but because I am from the start outside myself and open to the world” (456). On this account, we can never be the ‘uncontested author’ of our choices and actions because our choices and actions are already embedded in and open to the meanings of a particular history. Ortega y Gasset expresses a similar idea when he claims “man lives in view of the past. Man, in a word, has no nature; what he has is … history. Expressed differently: what nature is to things, history … is to man” (1941, 217). It is true, on this account, that we are self-making, but it is also true that we are already made. We create ourselves through our own meaning-giving choices and interpretations, but we are also already created because we inhabit a historical world that endows our choices and interpretations with the meaning that they have. “We exist in both ways at once,” says Merleau-Ponty. “We choose the world and the world chooses us” (1962, 453–454).

Beauvoir will make a related claim in The Second Sex when she develops the idea that the human being “is not a thing, [but] a situation” (1952, 38). Understood this way, Beauvoir suggests that women (and members of other marginalized or oppressed groups) cannot exhibit ‘radical’ or ‘absolute’ freedom because they are always constrained by their historical situation, one that, in this case, compels women to see themselves as mere things or passive objects. Of course, as an existentialist, Beauvoir rejects the idea that women are inferior to men because of pre-given biological differences. Beauvoir does not deny these differences but argues that they do not essentially define woman as inferior to man. Following Sartre, she claims that the human being “is defined as a being who is not fixed, who makes [herself] what [she] is. … Woman [then] is not a completed reality, but rather a becoming.” This means the anatomical “body is not enough to define her as a woman” (38). The woman, on this view, is not born but made through her own meaning-giving choices. But her choices are limited in a way that the man's is not because she inhabits a historical situation that is patriarchal. As a result, she tends to interpret herself as a powerless thing or object. She is self-making, but because of her oppressive situation she interprets herself as being already made.

What is missing from these accounts — and existentialist accounts of freedom in general — is an analysis of the fundamental role that biology and instinct plays in determining our choices. Nietzsche's reflections on freedom are especially important in this regard, not only because he acknowledges the significance of our biological nature and brings to light the complex ways in which instinctual forces work behind our backs to make decisions for us. He also offers a seminal critique of moralistic conceptions of free will and provides his own version of situated freedom, one that is rooted in the polymorphous drives of the body.

Creature and creator

Of all the so-called existentialists, Nietzsche is alone in emphasizing the importance of the biological body, where biology is understood in terms of the dynamic confluence of physiological drives and instincts that unconsciously guide our choices and actions. For existentialists like Nietzsche, the tendency in the West has been to “despise the body” (2006, I, 4) and to privilege the cognizing mind. But this disembodied standpoint is an illusion. We are, according to Nietzsche, nothing more than the “totality of [bodily] drives that constitute [our] being” (1997, 119, my emphasis), and the idea that we have transparent mastery over our thoughts and actions is a fiction. This is why Nietzsche writes, “Behind your thoughts and feelings stands a powerful commander, an unknown wise man — he is called a self. He lives in your body; he is your body” (2006, 1, 4). On Nietzsche's account, traditional talk about self-awareness, free will, and moral responsibility are forms of self-deception. “Our moral judgments and evaluations,” he writes, “are only images and fantasies based on a physiological process unknown to us, a kind of acquired language for designating certain nervous stimuli” (1997, 119). The self-consciousness that we commonly associate with acts of will is actually parasitic on a deeper kind of instinctive animal consciousness that is fundamentally unselfconscious. In this sense, we are continually thinking and acting without even knowing it because the “thinking that rises to consciousness is only the smallest part” of our agency (1995, 354). This means that the usual conception of the will as an autonomous faculty that serves as the primary cause of our thoughts and actions is an “error,” where we mistakenly “believe ourselves to be causal in the act of willing: [where] we at least thought that we were there, catching causality in the act” (1990, V, 3). We cannot be autonomous agents, according to Nietzsche, because we do not have control of our own thoughts. “A thought comes when ‘it’ will, not when ‘I’ want it to” (1998, I, 17). Indeed, the fact that we have historically assigned causal agency to the will is itself the product of instinct, what Nietzsche calls “the cause creating drive” (1990, V, 5) that emerges from a conditioned need to give reasons and attribute causes to events. This instinct serves a practical function in the preservation of the species because it “soothes” and “liberates” us (V, 5) from the horrifying fact that there is no underlying explanation, cause, or meaning to existence. But it is also an ‘instinct of weakness’ because it results in our standardized and herd-like tendencies.

This means, of course, that our inveterate tendency to conform, our ‘herd nature,’ is also an instinct, the result of a unique evolutionary unfolding, where we have, over tens of thousands of years, developed shared languages, beliefs, and communicative practices that are useful for our collective survival as the “most endangered animal” (1995, 354). Consciousness, on this view, does not refer to a self-directed mind that is the center of my thoughts and actions. It is, rather, a social and linguistic construction. “[Consciousness] is only a means of communication,” says Nietzsche; “it is evolved through social intercourse and with a view to the interests of social intercourse” (1968, 524). Seen in this light, my inner intentions, beliefs, and desires are already shaped in advance by the shared historical context that I have grown into unawares. It is this context that makes it possible for me to understand the world and make sense of my thoughts and actions. This is why Nietzsche suggests that “consciousness does not really belong to the individual existence of human beings, but rather to the social and herd nature in them; that, as a consequence, consciousness is subtly developed only in regard to social and herd usefulness” (1995, 354).

But simply because he rejects the notion of an autonomous mind or consciousness and regards “the body and physiology [as the] starting point” (1968, 492) of his philosophy does not mean that Nietzsche is a determinist who embraces a mechanistic account of human behavior. He makes it clear that human existence cannot be reduced to the law-like principles of Newtonian science. Indeed, Nietzsche sounds like Dostoevsky's underground man when he writes, “Do we really want to permit existence to be degraded for us like this — reduced to a mere exercise on a calculator and an indoor diversion for mathematicians?” If we did this, would we not “divest existence of its rich ambiguity” (1995, 373)? In this sense, Nietzsche is neither an advocate of freedom nor of determinism because there is no faculty (the ‘mind’ or ‘will’) or determinist calculus that can sustain the philosophical debate. They are both historical fictions that emerged out of our instinctual need to explain and simplify a reality that is irreducibly complex and ambiguous. This explains why Nietzsche says, “Freedom of the will or not freedom? — There is no such thing as ‘will’; it is only a simplifying conception of understanding, as is ‘matter’ ” (1968, 671; cited in Schacht 1983, 304).

Nietzsche is not denying that we, like all other creatures, act according to our natures, but that we are compelled to act on the basis of a multiplicity of forces and drives that we are not (and can never be) fully conscious of. But this does not make Nietzsche an ‘instinctualist’ when it comes to the question of human freedom. Such a view would reduce freedom to what he calls “laisser aller,” where we simply “let go” and “give in” (1990, IX, 41) to our animal instincts and act impulsively without any evaluative reflection (Schacht 1983, 307; Solomon 2002, 80). This creates an overly narrow and ‘decadent’ picture of human agency, where freedom would be equivalent to blindly submitting to whatever feeling or impulse that we had at a given moment. As we saw in our discussion of selfhood in chapter 4, a person cannot be reduced to a ‘wanton’ who acts impulsively on the basis of whatever causal stimulation is strongest. Nietzsche sees humans as occupying a “higher stage” (1968, 928) of evolutionary development because we can evaluate, control, and even overcome our impulses. This means we are free when we do not reflexively submit to our strongest desires or to dominant social conventions. Unlike other animals, we have what Nietzsche calls “the capacity for long-range decisions” (1998, VI, 212). We are capable of envisioning the kind of life we want to live and the kind of person we want to become and create ourselves on the basis of that vision.It is true that we cannot escape the limitations of our animal nature or the habits and prejudices of our tradition, but we can resist and struggle with them insofar as they prevent us from realizing the kind of person we want to be. Indeed, for Nietzsche, freedom is nothing other than the painful exertion and struggle that we endure in the process of making ourselves who we are. This is why Nietzsche refers to the human being as both “creature and creator” (225).

Robert Solomon (2002) explains this view by drawing on the distinction between ‘first-order’ and ‘second-order’ desires that we discussed earlier. As a gambler, for example, I may have a strong first-order desire to spend my weekly paycheck at the local casino for the sake of immediate gratification. But this creaturely impulse can be overcome by a higher, second-order volition to be a responsible father and provider for my family. Acting on the basis of this second-order desire and exercising control and restraint regarding my impulses reveals my unique capacity as a creator, embodying what Nietzsche calls “self-direction” (1968, 705), to envision a particular kind of life and to act on the basis of that vision (Schacht 1983, 307). Being a creator in this way makes me responsible for the person that I become insofar as I act on these higher aspirations. However, Nietzsche makes it clear that this capacity for transcendence and self-mastery is not absolute. Because I am nothing more than the ‘totality of drives that constitute my being,’ my capacity for transcendence is always mediated by the unique confluence of creaturely strengths and weaknesses that I am born with and that I inherit from my history. In this sense, Nietzsche is presenting a version of what we have been calling ‘situated freedom,’ arguing that the capacity for transcendence that I possess is always conditioned by the complex unity of physiological and historical forces that constitute who I am. Thus, when Nietzsche refers to “the highest types of free men [in whom] the highest resistance is constantly overcome” (1990, IX, 38), he is not referring to capacities that all human beings share. “Only a very few people can be independent,” says Nietzsche. “It is a prerogative of the strong” (1998, II, 29). The measure of freedom that I am capable of is the result of the “fortunate organization [of my nature]” (1968, 705). Indeed, most of us will be incapable of genuine self-creation. This is why Nietzsche says freedom is “for the very few” (1998, II, 29). It is reserved only for the highest type of human being who cannot help but struggle and fight to become who they are.

The conception of freedom as the struggle to create oneself in the face of factical limitations and constraints leads to another core idea in existentialism, authenticity. The existentialists recognize that everyday life is usually characterized by being inauthentic, that is, we deceive ourselves by conforming to the ready-made roles, meanings, and values of the public world and, therefore, refuse to take responsibility for our own being. Existentialists offer an alternative to this kind of self-deception by addressing what it means to ‘be true’ to oneself. Consistent with the existentialist conceptions of freedom and selfhood, authenticity is not given to us by some pre-given essence; it is something we earn or realize through our actions and choices. In the following chapter, we will examine the ways in which existentialists offer different views of self-realization and articulate how these views can lead to the criticism that, in privileging authenticity, existentialism may be undermining the possibility for ethics.

Suggested reading

Arp, K. (2001). The bonds of freedom: Simone de Beauvoir's existentialist ethics. Chicago: Open Court.

Grene, M. (1948). Dreadful freedom: A critique of existentialism. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Howells, C. (2009). Sartre: The necessity of freedom. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Solomon, R. (2002). Nietzsche on fatalism and “free will.” Journal of Nietzsche Studies 23: 63–87.

6: Authenticity

Moods and the problem of the real self

The word ‘authentic’ derives from the Greek authentikos, meaning ‘original’ or ‘genuine.’ To say that I am authentic, then, is to say that I do not simply imitate the socially prescribed roles and values of the public world. I am genuine or true to the concerns and commitments that matter to me as an individual. Authenticity, as Charles Taylor writes, “is a certain way of being human that is my way. I am called upon to live my life in this way, and not in imitation of anyone else's. But this gives a new importance to being true to myself. If I am not, I miss the point of my life, I miss what being human is for me” (1991, 28–29). Although Heidegger is the only one who liberally uses the word, employing the German Eigentlichkeit (from the stem eigen meaning ‘own’ or ‘proper’) that translates literally as ‘being one's own’ or ‘ownedness,’ existentialists are generally united in emphasizing the significance of authenticity, of being true to oneself. But, as we have seen, the commitment to one's own truth is difficult because our normal tendency is to drift along and conform to the average expectations and meanings of the public world. We are, for this reason, usually alienated from ourselves, living in a state of comfortable self-deception because we simply do what ‘they’ do. As a ‘they-self,’ we have no sense of who we really are or what really matters to us, and we are unable to see how exactly we are different from anyone else. Yet the existentialists make it clear that it is possible to be shaken out of self-deception, not by means of any kind of detached reasoning but through penetrating moods or emotional experiences that can shatter the routinized familiarity of everyday life, forcing us to confront ourselves as finite beings thrown into a world with no pre-given meaning that can justify our choices.

For Kierkegaard and Heidegger, this existential confrontation is disclosed to us primarily through ‘anxiety’ (Angst) or ‘dread.’ Unlike fear, which is always directed toward some external threat, anxiety is directed toward oneself as an unsettled existence penetrated by dizzying freedom and the possibility of death. “One may liken anxiety to dizziness,” writes Kierkegaard in The Concept of Dread. “He whose eye chances to look down into a yawning abyss becomes dizzy. … Anxiety is the dizziness of freedom which [when] freedom gazes down into its own possibility, grasping at finiteness to sustain itself” (1944, 55). Anxiety puts me face-to-face with my own freedom, exposing me to the fact that I am not a stable and enduring thing but a possibility. In this way, anxiety reveals existence as fundamentally insecure, that the public meanings I rely on to make sense of things are precarious, and that any sense I have of rational control and mastery of the world is an illusion. Coming from within, this feeling has the power to shake me out of the false security of everydayness and open me up to my own structural nothingness. Although Angst can certainly arise in the face of a profound crisis such as the death of a loved one, a terminal illness, or a divorce, the mood is largely autochthonous; it is a fundamental part of the human situation and can, therefore, arise spontaneously on its own, without an identifiable cause or reason.

Jaspers refers to these moments as ‘limit’ or ‘boundary’ situations, a reference to the experience “when everything that is said to be valuable and true collapses before my eyes” (1956, 117; cited in Wallraff 1970, 137). Nietzsche describes this feeling in terms of “the terror” (2000, 36) that overwhelms us when language and reason fail and our understanding of the world as a place of order and reliability dissolves, shattering our sense of who we are as secure, self-subsisting individuals. Sartre famously refers to the “nausea” that suddenly overtakes us when the veneer of public meanings collapses and we are confronted with the superfluous and unintelligible ‘is-ness’ of things. Speaking through his character Roquentin in his novella Nausea, he writes:

And then all of a sudden, there it was, clear as day: existence had suddenly unveiled itself. It had lost the harmless look of an abstract category: it was the very paste of things, this root was kneaded into existence. Or rather the root, the park gates, the bench, the sparse grass, all that had vanished: the diversity of things, their individuality, were only an appearance, a veneer. This veneer had melted, leaving soft, monstrous masses, all in disorder — naked, in a frightful, obscene nakedness. … This moment was extraordinary. I was there, motionless and icy, plunged in a horrible ecstasy; I understood the Nausea, I possessed it. (127)

For Sartre, nausea reveals the sheer contingency and “terrible freedom” (1956, 55–56) of existence, where we alone are responsible for deciding who we are and what our fate will be. Marcel develops this theme by describing the feeling of “mystery” that intrudes into our everyday lives and defies rational explanation. It is the uncanny sense that “there is nothing in the realm of reality to which I can give credit — no security, no guarantee” (1956, 27), and I am left alone with the burden to accept and create myself. These feelings expose us to the fact that there is no ground that can secure our lives and that any project or identity we commit ourselves to is, in the end, futile.

Camus explores the possibility of suicide in the face of these feelings. In The Myth of Sisyphus, he refers to the feeling of “absurdity” that strikes out of the blue when our need for reasons confronts the “unreasonable silence of the world” (1955, 28), destroying the comforting rhythm of our everyday lives.

It happens that the stage sets collapse. Rising, streetcar, four hours in the office or the factory, meal, streetcar, four hours of work, meal, sleep, and Monday Tuesday Wednesday Thursday Friday and Saturday according to the same rhythm — this path is easily followed most of the time. But one day the ‘why’ arises. (13, my emphasis)

Absurdity prompts ‘the why’ because it discloses reality as it is, as contingent, meaningless, and irrational, revealing that I am “a stranger to myself and to the world” (20–21), and the only certainty is freedom and the ever-present possibility of my own death. Comparing the empty repetitiveness of modern life to the futile struggles of Sisyphus — who was condemned by the Greek gods to forever push a rock up a mountain only to watch it roll back down — Camus introduces suicide for those who are unable to bear the truth of ‘the absurd.’ The temptation to kill ourselves, then, is similar to our temptation to flee into the metaphysical comforts of religion or the tranquilizing routines of the public; they are all incarnations of flight from who we are. For Camus, suicide is a rejection or “repudiation” of one's own freedom, a freedom that defiantly and passionately affirms the absurdity of life and which alone can be “enough to fill a man's heart” (198).

Guilt is another mood that provides insight into our own existence. For existentialists like Kierkegaard and Heidegger, ‘guilt’ is not to be interpreted in the religious or moralistic sense as a feeling that we have done something wrong on the basis of some set of moral absolutes. This view creates the illusion that there are binding ethical norms that we can appeal to. Existential guilt dissolves this illusion, revealing that there is nothing — no God, no reason, no moral principle — that can legitimize or justify our choices and actions. Guilt reveals that we have been thrown into a world that we did not choose, and it is a world that has abandoned us to the extent that it lacks any objective measure that can tell us what we should or should not do. Understood this way, guilt does not represent a moral failing; it represents the structural unsettledness of being human. The fact that we are thrown into a world that offers no guidance for our lives means that guilt is invariably accompanied by anxiety. “The relation of freedom to guilt is anxiety,” says Kierkegaard, “because freedom and guilt are still a possibility” (1944, 97). The human situation is one where we are faced with an indefinite range of possibilities that the world opens up for us but are provided with nothing in terms of guidance. Guilt, then, not only reveals our structural unsettledness; it also reveals that we are answerable only to ourselves.

These moods are important for the existentialists not only because they disclose basic truths about what it means to be human but because they have the power to pull us out of inauthenticity, out of our various modes of self-deception. But it is important not to confuse the transformative power that existentialists attribute to these emotions with the popular ideas of ‘getting in touch with one's feelings,’ ‘being true to one's inner self,’ or ‘finding the child within.’ These notions are largely holdovers of Romanticism, the sprawling and disjointed cultural reaction to Enlightenment rationality and the dehumanizing aspects of modern society. On the Romantic account, it is by attending to one's deepest and innermost feelings — rather than to disinterested reason — that the ‘real self’ can emerge and reclaim a primitive unity or oneness with the natural world, a unity that we once had and is still present in the simple spontaneous goodness of children (see Guignon 2004a, 49–77). This sentiment is perhaps most famously expressed in Rousseau's Emile (1762) when he writes: “To exist is to feel, our feeling is undoubtedly earlier than our intelligence, and we had feelings before we had ideas. … Let us be simpler and less pretentious; let us be content with the first feelings we experience in ourselves, since science always brings us back to these, unless it has led us astray” (1999, 210). This view suggests that beneath the instrumental and deforming conventions of rational society is a human nature that consists of spontaneous feelings that are fundamentally good.

Existentialists challenge this notion of innate human goodness. They, of course, do not deny the crucial role that feelings play in our lives or that humans are capable of spontaneous acts of tenderness and love, but they also acknowledge our darker side, for instance, the pleasure derived from senseless acts of violence and cruelty. In The Brothers Karamazov, Dostoevsky's character Ivan Karamazov describes the voluptuous experience of a “well-educated and intelligent” father beating his young daughter with a rod:

I know for certain that there are floggers who get more excited with every stroke, to the point of sensuality, literal sensuality, more and more, progressively, with each new stroke. They flog for one minute, they flog for five minutes, they flog for ten minutes — longer, harder, faster, sharper. The child is crying, the child finally cannot cry, she has no breath left: “Papa, papa, dear papa!” (1990, 241)

Dostoevsky concludes that these kinds of behaviors are not reserved for the sick and demented. They are sensual capacities that we all share, and it is naïve to think that they are not part of what it means to be human. “There is, of course, a beast hidden in every man,” writes Dostoevsky, “a beast of rage, a beast of sensual inflammability at the cries of the tormented victim, an unrestrained beast let off the chain” (241–242). And if we were to suggest that this kind of interpretation is irrational and absurd, Dostoevsky replies, “I tell you that absurdities are all too necessary on earth. The world stands on absurdities and without them perhaps nothing would happen” (243).

Nietzsche makes a similar point in acknowledging the human instinct for cruelty and violence, an aspect of our animal nature expressed most explicitly in the pleasure we derive in hurting others. Consider this passage from his On the Genealogy of Morals:

To witness suffering does one good, to inflict it even more so — that is a harsh proposition, but a fundamental one, an old-powerful human all-too-human proposition, one to which perhaps even the apes would subscribe: it is said that in devising bizarre cruelties they already to a large extent anticipate and at the same time ‘rehearse’ man. No festivity without cruelty: such is the lesson of the earliest, longest period in the history of mankind — and even in punishment there is so much that is festive. (1996, II, 6)

This interpretation suggests that the confluence of feeling that lurks below rational thought can be tender and cruel, creative and destructive and, therefore, transcends the simple binary between good and evil. In order to be true to ourselves, we have to acknowledge and accept the drives of the whole person, including those that are darkest and most dangerous. This is why, for existentialists like Nietzsche, traditional moralists get it wrong. They are not trying to sublimate or control our sensual natures; they are cultivating weakness and impotence by trying to deny them altogether. “Instead of employing the great sources of strength, those impetuous torrents of the soul that are so often dangerous and overwhelming, and economizing them, this most short-sighted and pernicious mode of thought, the moral code of thought, wants to make them dry up” (1968, 383).

In acknowledging our unconscious drives for destruction and cruelty, writers such as Dostoevsky and Nietzsche anticipate the insights of depth psychology, psychoanalysis, and Sigmund Freud's (1856–1939) seminal idea of the ‘Id.’ In fact, Freud famously remarked that Dostoevsky “cannot be understood without psychoanalysis — i.e., he isn't in need of it because he illustrates it himself in every character and every sentence” (cited in Frank 1976, 381). And Nietzsche had “more penetrating knowledge of himself than any man who ever lived or was likely to live” (cited in Jones 1955, 385). These existential insights informed the development of the modern novel, introducing primal and subversive anti-heroes such as Kurtz in Joseph Conrad's Heart of Darkness (1903), Jake Barnes in Ernest Hemingway's The Sun Also Rises (1926), and, more recently, Tyler Durden in Chuck Palahniuk's Fight Club (1996). These depictions suggest that if authenticity is the affective recovery of the ‘real you,’ then we ought to be worried about what we might uncover. Indeed, it could be that the self-deceptive and conformist routines of ‘the they’ are actually protecting us from who we really are.

The existentialist protest against the ideal of human goodness reveals that being authentic has little to do with being morally ‘good’ because there is no pre-given core of goodness inside of us to begin with, and, with the ‘death of God,’ there is no moral absolute that can determine what is, in fact, good. Indeed, as we turn to different conceptions of authenticity in the existentialist tradition, we see that the commitment to being true to oneself may require us to suspend our duty to universal moral principles. And it is precisely because we have to choose between being ethical (‘doing what is right’) and being an individual (‘being true to oneself’) that the prospect of authenticity can be so terrifying. This tension is powerfully expressed in Kierkegaard's conception of authenticity.

Becoming an individual

As we saw earlier, Kierkegaard pioneered the existentialist critique of philosophical detachment and objectivity by arguing that it has no connection to ‘the highest truth attainable,’ that is, to the concrete and particular concerns of the individual. By taking the standpoint of a disinterested spectator, philosophers cut themselves off from their own subjective truths. And it is these kinds of truths that are most important because they alone can tell me ‘what I am to do.’ For Kierkegaard, it is only when we live our lives on the basis of these passionate inward commitments that we actually succeed in becoming a ‘self’ or ‘individual.’ This process usually involves moving through three stages or spheres of existence, which he identifies as the ‘aesthetic,’ the ‘ethical,’ and the ‘religious’ stages.

The aesthetic sphere is the one that most of us live in as children, adolescents, and young adults. In this stage, we are caught up in the sensual pleasures and intoxications of the present moment. Using the character of Don Juan as an archetype, Kierkegaard portrays the aesthete as one who is unconcerned with moral obligations; he or she is focused only on the satisfaction of immediate pleasures, whether it is sex, food and drink, travel, or shopping. The life of the aesthete is reduced to the consumption of transitory pleasures and flight from the threat of pain and boredom. Kierkegaard sees the aesthetic life as one that ultimately leads to despair, not merely because temporal pleasures are short-lived and pull us into an empty cycle of searching for the next thrill, but because the aesthete is not yet an ‘individual’ or a ‘self.’ To be a self, for Kierkegaard, requires difficult, life-defining choices that synthesize and bind together the temporal moments of one's life into a coherent and lasting whole. “A human being is a synthesis of the infinite and the finite,” writes Kierkegaard, “of the temporal and the eternal. … Looked at in this way, [the aesthete] is not yet a self” (1989, 43, my emphasis). To the extent that the aesthete is unable to make a unifying commitment, he or she is fundamentally inauthentic, dispersed, and pulled apart by the finite pleasures of the moment and suffers from the despair of “not wanting to be itself, [of] wanting to be rid of itself” (43).

It is possible, however, through a transformative emotional crisis to become aware of the underlying emptiness of the aesthetic life and realize existence is more than a hedonistic masquerade. It is at these times that we begin to grasp the seriousness of our own existence, that life requires difficult commitments, and that these commitments have the power to pull the fragmented and disjointed moments of our lives together and constitute us as selves. In Either/Or, Kierkegaard's character Judge Wilhelm warns the pleasure-seeking aesthete:

One … wishes that some day the circumstances of your life may tighten upon you the screws in its rack and compel you to come out with what really dwells in you. … Life is a masquerade, you explain, and for you this is inexhaustible material for amusement; and so far, no one has succeeded in knowing you. … In fact you are nothing. … Do you not know that there comes a midnight hour when everyone has to throw off his mask? … I have seen men in real life who so long deceived others that at last their true nature could not reveal itself. … Or can you think of anything more frightful than that it might end with your nature being resolved into a multiplicity, that you really might become many, become, like those unhappy demoniacs, a legion and you thus would have lost the inmost and holiest of all in a man, the unifying power of personality? (1946a, 99)

In taking a deliberate and principled stand on one's life, one enters the ethical sphere by renouncing temporal pleasures and committing oneself to eternal moral principles. Here, Kierkegaard is drawing on Kant's ethics that regards the moral agent as duty-bound to a set of universal laws — such as the Ten Commandments or the Golden Rule — that apply to everyone and take priority over one's own selfish interests and inclinations. “The ethical as such is the universal,” writes Kierkegaard, “and as the universal it applies to everyone, which can be put from another point of view by saying that it applies at every moment” (1985, 83). With this commitment, the individual is ‘willing to be oneself’ because he or she has made the difficult ‘either/or’ choice that provides the coherence and unity necessary in being a self. Judge Wilhelm illustrates this distinction by articulating the moral duties of marriage. The ethical individual renounces the fleeting pleasures of sensual love or lust and instead chooses to be a self by making a life-defining commitment to an eternal principle, to the universal ideal of marriage. Thus, “the true eternity in love, as in true morality, delivers it, first of all from the sensual. But in order to produce this true eternity, a determination of the will [a choice] is called for” (Kierkegaard 1946a, 83).

The ethical sphere remains problematic, however, precisely because it sets the universal above the subjective needs of the individual. In stoically committing oneself to universal principles and renouncing one's own particular needs, the ethical individual is detached from the concrete realities of existence itself. The husband, for instance, who devotes himself to the ideal of marriage runs the risk of being cut off from the subjective upheavals of actually being in love. Again, for Kierkegaard, the highest form of truth is not objective and universal but subjective and particular. This means that objective moral principles are not universally binding. There may be times in one's life when one must suspend his or her obligations to the ethical and be guided by higher-order values that arise from one's own subjective passions. It is at this stage that one enters the religious sphere, the sphere of faith.

For Kierkegaard, being true to oneself requires passing into the religious sphere and ‘becoming a Christian,’ but this has nothing to do with being a member of a church and blindly accepting ‘Articles of Faith.’ Such a view creates the kind of self-satisfied conformism that existentialists reject. On Kierkegaard's view, becoming a Christian requires a passionate inward commitment precisely because of the absurdity and irrationality of its doctrines. It is not difficult to accept a set of plausible moral principles, but it is terrifying to be a Christian because of its implausibility. Indeed, it is the absurdity that makes the religious life possible. It requires the highest form of individuation, a ‘leap’ into a paradox that cannot be rationally justified and a willingness to suspend one's obligations to the ethical sphere.

In Fear and Trembling, Kierkegaard uses the biblical figure of Abraham to illustrate the experience of individuation that occurs as one moves from the ethical to the religious sphere. The ethical reveals to Abraham a universal commandment, that under any and all circumstances a father must protect and love his child. But he is told by God to break this moral code and kill his son. He is caught in a horrifying conflict where he must either disobey the word of God or violate a universal moral imperative. In his willingness to sacrifice his son, Abraham becomes a ‘knight of faith.’ He breaks his commitment to ethical principles and chooses a higher truth: the truth embodied in the solitary individual who stands in anguished freedom before himself and an absurd and incomprehensible God. With a religious conscience, Abraham makes the ‘leap of faith,’ accepting the maddening paradox that his own individual needs are of infinite importance and, therefore, higher than the universal and ethical. “Faith is just this paradox,” writes Kierkegaard, “that the single individual is higher than the universal, though in such a way, be it noted, that the movement is repeated, that is, that, having been in the universal, the single individual now sets himself apart as the particular above the universal” (1985, 84). As a paradox, Abraham's choice is incomprehensible to others. In making the leap he has “discover[ed] something that thought cannot think” (1936, 29). There are no reasons to explain his actions. By all appearances, “he is insane and cannot make himself understood to anyone” (1985, 103). This is because one's own subjective truth cannot be expressed objectively; it can only be felt with the intensity and passion of the individual who makes the choice.

The philosopher Bernard Williams offers a secularized version of Kierkegaard's ‘suspension of the ethical’ with an account based loosely on the life of the French painter Paul Gauguin. On Williams's reading, Gauguin, in pursuing the life-defining commitment to be an artist, abandons his wife and children to a desperate financial situation and moves to Tahiti, where he believes the tropical setting will allow him to develop more fully as a painter. Although he feels a strong sense of moral duty to his family, he is drawn by deeper values that conflict with universal principles and rational justifications. Williams describes the tension between the values of morality and the values of the individual, writing that “while we are sometimes guided by the notion that it would be the best of worlds in which morality were universally respected and all men were of a disposition to affirm it, we have, in fact, deep and persistent reasons that that is not the world we have” (1981, 23). Like Kierkegaard, Williams sees traditional conceptions of morality as generally following the Kantian formula that moral values are rational and universal. Yet in Gauguin's case we see that there are values — grounded in the idiosyncratic passions of the individual — that fall outside the purview of reason and morality, and this means that morality cannot be the sole source of value. Williams's underlying point is not to claim that moral considerations are unimportant, but that “each person has a life to lead” (1985, 186), and this means that, in being true to myself, I may have to make the painful choice of breaking these binding commitments because they do not adequately reflect the values that matter to me as an individual.

Similarly, when Kierkegaard claims that the ‘individual is higher than the universal,’ he is not suggesting that religious faith requires getting rid of the ethical. This is impossible. The point is that, in some cases, faith may supersede any moral obligation. But the ethical is still present in the anguished struggle that the individual endures in breaking this obligation. If the content of the ethical sphere were completely absent, then Abraham would not be overcome with ‘fear and trembling.’ The paradox that Kierkegaard is expressing is that the passionate, life-defining commitment required in being true to oneself cannot be expressed or made intelligible in ethical terms of right and wrong; it is a commitment that is beyond rational comprehension. Becoming a self, then, “remains in all eternity a paradox, inaccessible to thought” (1985, 85). This idea, that in order to be authentic we must be willing to go beyond universal moral principles, is developed further by Nietzsche, who claims that these principles breed conformism and weakness, preventing individuals from wholly accepting themselves and diminishing their ability to create their own lives.

Living with style

There is no way to access Nietzsche's conception of authenticity without placing it within the context of nihilism. For Nietzsche, nihilism means that the very idea of “truth is an error” (1968, 454, 540), and there is no objective or universal justification for our choices and actions. This, however, is not a cause for despair, but for celebration. It frees us from the bourgeois values of the Western tradition so we can create new values and meanings that reflect our own temperaments and styles of living. In this sense, Nietzsche's account of being true to oneself is unique in the canon of existentialism because it is not so preoccupied with gloomy themes of death and anxiety. For Nietzsche, the confrontation with nihilism is a cause for rejoicing, cheerfulness, and laughter because it opens up new and exciting possibilities for self-creation. In The Gay Science, he writes:

After all, these immediate consequences, its consequences for us, are, contrary to what one might expect, not at all sad and gloomy, but rather like a new kind of light that is hard to describe, a new kind of happiness, alleviation, cheering, encouragement, and dawn. When we hear the news that the ‘old God is dead,’ we philosophers and ‘free spirits’ feel as if we were struck by the rays of a new dawn; at this news, our heart overflows with thankfulness, wonder, presentiment, expectation. (1995, 343)

Initially, it may seem strange to talk about the possibility of being true to oneself in Nietzsche's philosophy because he rejects the notion of an independent and unified self. The self, as we saw in chapter 5, is nothing more than the dynamic “totality of drives that constitute our being” (1997, 119). This is why Nietzsche claims that “to become what one is, presupposes that one not have the faintest notion what one is” (1967, 9). But if there is no self, no way one ‘really is,’ then how can we ever be authentic? To answer this question, we have to first get clear about the underlying principle of Nietzsche's philosophy, the ‘will to power’ (Wille zur Macht).

When Nietzsche says, “The world is the will to power and nothing besides! And you yourselves are also this will to power and nothing besides!” (1968, 550), he is not referring to the traditional notion of the ‘will’ as a causal agent. As we saw in the previous chapter, Nietzsche rejects the idea of an immaterial substance or will that commands our bodies to act in certain ways. “Is ‘will to power’ a kind of ‘will’ or identical with the concept ‘will’?” he asks. “Is it the same thing as desiring? Or commanding? … My proposition is: that the will of psychology hitherto is an unjustified generalization, that this will does not exist at all. … [It is] a mere empty word” (692). For Nietzsche, will to power refers to the plurality of drives and forces behind all forms of life, revealing that every living thing is striving to grow, flourish, and dominate. Everything, he says, “want[s] to grow, to reach out around itself, pull towards itself, gain the upper hand — not out of some morality or immorality, but because it is alive, and because life simply is the will to power” (1998, IX, 259). It is important here not to confuse this notion with Charles Darwin's (1809–1882) evolutionary theory of ‘survival of the fittest.’ Nietzsche makes it clear that living things are not simply trying to preserve themselves in order to survive. If this were the case, then when a species evolved to a state where it could comfortably exist, the species would stop striving, growing, and developing. But this is not the case. “Every living thing,” says Nietzsche, “does everything it can not to preserve itself but to become more” (1968, 688). He repeatedly attacks the ‘English Darwinists’ because he believes the struggle for self-preservation is an exception in the natural world, not a rule, and he believes Darwinists miss this point. “Wanting to preserve oneself expresses a situation of emergency,” writes Nietzsche, “a constriction of the real, fundamental drive of life, which aims at extending its power, and in this willing, often enough puts self-preservation into question and sacrifices it” (1995, 349).

On Nietzsche's account, living things are not just trying to survive but to flourish and thrive and to realize greater possibilities of power and abundances of strength. The roots of the oak tree, for instance, do not just reach into the soil in order to keep the tree upright; the tree is always striving to become more than it is by expanding, overcoming, and dominating its surroundings until it reaches some resistance (Guignon and Pereboom 2001, 113). Indeed, the struggle entailed in overcoming resistances is crucial to the dynamic structure of power because without some resistance or counterforce power cannot be expressed. “Will to power,” as Nietzsche writes, “can manifest itself only against resistances therefore it seeks that which resists it” (1968, 656; see Hatab 2012). The result of such of view, for Nietzsche, is that life simply is “that which must always overcome itself” (2006, 11, 12).

As a manifestation of will to power, human beings, like all other forms of life, are driven by an instinct to overcome resistances and overflow with abundances of power. “What man wants,” says Nietzsche, “what every smallest part of the living organism wants, is an increase in power” (1968, 702). Yet critics have argued that this appears to be a justification for violence, domination, and cruelty, and there is ample textual evidence to support this (e.g., Schütte 1985). In On the Genealogy of Morals, for example, Nietzsche writes,

To talk of right and wrong as such is senseless; in themselves, injury, violation, exploitation, destruction can of course be nothing “wrong,” in so far as life operates essentially — that is, in terms of its basic functions — through injury, exploitation, and destruction, and cannot be conceived in any other way. (1996, II, 11)

But this literal or ‘hard’ interpretation fails to acknowledge the crucial distinction between ‘healthy’ and ‘unhealthy’ expressions of power. Will to power is healthy, for Nietzsche, when it is active and creative, when it is spontaneously discharged from within in a way that goes beyond one's own limitations for the sake of greater strength and expanded possibilities for living. By contrast, a manifestation of power is unhealthy when it is reactive. In these cases, the discharge of power is dependent on others, always coming from something external or outside itself. Nietzsche explains these two manifestations in terms of two different moralities, that of the ‘master’ and the ‘slave.’ “In order to exist at all,” writes Nietzsche, “slave morality … always needs an opposing, outer world; in physiological terms, it needs external stimuli in order to act; its action is fundamentally reaction” (I, 10). But the opposite is the case for the master morality. The master actively creates and affirms his or her own life based on the idiosyncratic needs and projects that matter to them as individuals. For Nietzsche, then, the highest form of power is not reactive and other-directed and has little to do with one's ability to dominate and brutalize others. The strongest and healthiest individuals are self-directed; they are the artists, poets, musicians, and philosophers who have power over themselves to create their own values and meanings. The power to ‘overcome oneself,’ then, is the highest value, and it is actualized by those who have the strength to control their base drives, and to sublimate or re-channel them in acts of — artistic and philosophical — creation. This is why, as commentators like Robert Solomon have suggested, the clearest incarnation of this kind of individual is not necessarily the great warriors that Nietzsche often praises, such as Napoleon or Caesar, but figures like “Socrates, Mozart, and even Christ” (1972, 135).

For Nietzsche, the pre-Platonic Greeks were the embodiment of this kind of active self-creation. Here was a culture that wholly accepted the cruel and tragic dimensions of the human situation but sublimated and released these dimensions in artistic and creative ways, balancing the conflicting elements of Dionysian passion with Apollonian self-discipline. “Oh, those Greeks!” says Nietzsche. “They knew how to live. … Adorers of forms, of tomes, of words! And therefore — artists” (1954a, 683). But with the spread of Christianity and the conversion of the Romans under Constantine, the master morality degenerated through what Nietzsche calls a “transvaluation of values” (1996, I, 10), a historical reversal or inversion of Greek and Roman values. With inborn feelings of repressed envy or ‘ressentiment,’ the early Christians expressed their power by determining that creative, self-assertive, and independent values were ‘evil’ and that the meek, obedient, and selfless values of Christianity were ‘good.’ For Nietzsche, it is this reversal that has created the tame bourgeois society that we inhabit today, one that is standardized and weak, incapable of exhibiting any style or originality. But Nietzsche is hopeful about the future. He understands that slave morality requires subservience to an absolute moral authority, and it for this reason that ‘God's death’ is a cause for celebration. It provides an opening for what Nietzsche calls the ‘overman’ (Übermensch).

The Übermensch is a reference to a human ideal in a post-Christian, post-nihilistic future. Nietzsche describes him as one who will redeem us as much from the previous ideal as from what was bound to grow out of it, from the great disgust, from the will to nothingness, from nihilism, this midday stroke of the bell, this toll of great decision, which once again liberates the will, which once again gives the earth its goal and man his hope, this Antichristian and Antinihilist, this conqueror of God and of nothingness — he must come one day. (1996, II, 24)

The Übermensch is a “Yes-sayer,” one who embodies the principle of “amor fati” by loving and affirming his life as a whole (1995, 276). He is true to himself because he accepts the world as it is without the support of moral absolutes and owns up to all of the unique and idiosyncratic qualities that make him the person that he is, all of his strengths and weaknesses, everything that has been and will be in his life. In The Gay Science, Nietzsche describes the kind of courage that is required for the total embrace of one's life with a powerful thought experiment that he calls the ‘doctrine of eternal recurrence’:

What if one day or one night a demon slinked after you into your loneliest loneliness and said to you: “This is life, as you live it now and as you have lived it, you will have to live it once more and countless times more. And there will be nothing new about it, but every pain and every pleasure, and every thought and sigh, and everything unspeakably small and great in your life must come back to you, and all in the same series and sequence. … The eternal hourglass of existence [is] turned over and over again — and you with it, you mote of dust.” If that thought took control of you, it would change you as you are, and maybe shatter you. (341)

On Nietzsche's account, most of us would be ‘shattered’ by this doctrine. The thought of living through the fears, disappointments, and monotony of our lives over and over for eternity is too much to bear. This is why we don't overcome ourselves. We are unwilling to accept and carry the weight of our own lives. We conform to the bourgeois norms of the crowd, doing what ‘they’ do. But the Übermensch does not recoil from the demon; he responds, “You are a god and I have never heard anything more godlike” (341).

For Nietzsche, by embracing the world and owning up to our fate in this way we are able to impart a unique aesthetic style to everything we do, creating our own identity and life story as if it were a work of art (e.g., Nehamas 1985). It is ‘giving style’ to life that is, for Nietzsche, the one thing that is needed in order to be true to oneself:

‘Giving style’ to one's character — a great and rare art! It is practiced by those who survey everything that their nature offers in the way of strengths and weaknesses, and then fit them all into an artistic plan, until each thing appears as art and reason, and even the weakness charms the eye. … In contrast, it is the weak characters, lacking power over themselves, who hate the constraint of style. (1995, 290)

Unlike members of the herd, those who live with style and embody the ideals of the Übermensch do not mourn the death of God and do not invent and cling to new idols. They see the truths that have been handed down from history as simply “a mobile army of metaphors” (1954b, 46) that are, in no way, universal or morally binding. And they overcome these truths by reinterpreting them in creative and original ways as a means of poetically expressing their own unique style of living. This ability to playfully and spontaneously reinterpret their own tradition is a sign of health emerging from “overflowing fullness and power” (1995, 382). Being true to oneself, then, entails a commitment to be open and expansive by embracing a plurality of different ways of seeing things, and to be ceaselessly driven to transform and revise the apparent truths of tradition. “Such spirits,” says Nietzsche, “are always out to fashion or explain themselves and their surroundings as free nature — wild, arbitrary, fantastic, disordered, and surprising. And this is good for them to do, for only thus can they do themselves good” (290).

Both Kierkegaard and Nietzsche offer versions of the authentic self as a solitary figure who transcends moral absolutes and the leveled-down conformity of the crowd by means of a passionate commitment to one's own values and styles of living. Against this individualistic version, existentialists like Heidegger suggest that any account of authenticity has to begin with the recognition of our fundamental intersubjectivity or being-with-others. The central idea is that in order to be true to oneself we have to first realize that we can be a self only in relation to others. To put it another way, our sense of who we are and of what matters to us as individuals is constituted by our involvement in a world that recognizes us as the kinds of individuals that we are.

Anxiety and resoluteness

Heidegger's account of authenticity in the second half of Being and Time is arguably the most influential in existentialist thought, but it is distinctive in rejecting the image of the isolated hero who rises above the shallow norms of the public. For Heidegger, as we saw in chapter 4, human existence is invariably structured by ‘falling’ (Verfallen). This means that we are never solitary subjects but are always embedded in social contexts that open up possible ways that we can interpret and understand ourselves. In falling, our choices, actions, and self-interpretations are limited by the regulative norms and expectations of ‘the they.’ In our everyday lives, then, we are essentially a ‘they-self.’ We drift along with the crowd, enacting the socially approved roles and identities that are prescribed for us. In this mode, we are inauthentic because the question ‘Who am I?’ is not a pressing issue for us. Absorbed in the social world we simply do what anyone else does, assuming that we are living well and that our choices and actions are justified. But, as we have seen, this complacency can be shattered by anxiety, a mood that brings us face-to-face with the human situation and that is usually so disturbing that we spend most of our lives running away from it.

In anxiety, the familiar social context that grounds my sense of who I am “collapses into itself” (Heidegger 1962, 231), and I can no longer understand my own being or identity. Without this context to orient me with a set of publicly interpreted roles and values, the world loses its significance. I am paralyzed and bewildered, unable to press forward into the future, because there is nothing that stands out as significant or meaningful anymore. This paralysis is characterized by what Heidegger calls ‘uncanniness’ (Unheimlichkeit), a word that captures the feeling of being abandoned, lost, or ‘not-at-home.’ In this sense, anxiety “individualizes” me, severing the familiar bond that I have with the world and leaving me exposed to confront my own “naked Dasein” (345). This exposure reveals my temporal constitution as a ‘thrown project.’ I find myself contingently thrown into a historical situation that I did not choose, as I project forward into future possibilities that terminate in my own death. This means that as long as I exist I am not a stable or secure thing but a ‘being possible’ because my identity remains fundamentally unfinished or incomplete. I can only be something when there are no more possibilities, when my life comes to an end. This is why anxiety is so crucial for the prospect of self-realization. By bringing me face-to-face with the fact that my existence comes to an end, anxiety “snatches [me] back” (435) from the tranquilized drift of everydayness, reminding me that my choices and actions are not to be taken lightly because they alone give my life the meaning and coherence that it has.

When Heidegger refers to our existence in terms of ‘being- toward-the-end’ or ‘being-toward-death,’ this has nothing to do with our physical demise, a heart attack, or dying of old age but to the idea that our existence gains its meaning from death as our temporal limit. Without an end, our lives have no shape or direction, and there would be no worldly episode or project that stands out as significant in any way. As Charles Guignon suggests, in the same way that events in a story are meaningful only insofar as they contribute to the outcome of the story, so the events in my own life are meaningful only in relation to the overarching goals and projects that define my “life story as a totality, right up to the end” (Guignon and Pereboom 2001, 201). With the anxious awareness of my own death, my decisions and commitments are made with a renewed sense of urgency and focus, with the recognition that the stand I take on my situation contributes to the realization of the kind of person that I am, and that I alone am responsible for the coherence, integrity, and direction of my life. The inauthentic response to anxiety is a flight back into the security of our public routines, becoming lost once again in ‘the they.’ The authentic response is what Heidegger calls ‘resoluteness’ (Entschlossenheit).

Resoluteness, for Heidegger, “means letting oneself be summoned out of one's lostness in ‘the they’ ” (1962, 345). It refers to the steady, clear-sighted, and focused stance toward life that can emerge only in confronting my own death. Such a confrontation shakes me out of the drift of everydayness and opens up the possibility to “pull [myself] together” (441, my emphasis) by taking a stand on an identity and values that matter to me. But resoluteness does not detach me from the world, turning me into an “isolated subject” (233) or “free-floating ‘I’ ” (344). It is true that I am individualized with anxiety, but individualized “as being-in-the-world” (233). This means that when I commit myself to a particular identity as a dutiful soldier, for instance, or a responsible father, it is not one that I create ex nihilo. These identities are already meaningful because they have been publicly interpreted by the world that I have been thrown into. It is true that I take them over, appropriate them in particular ways, and, in this sense, make them mine, but the cultural meaning and significance of these identities have already been established by my sociohistorical context.

The aim of Heidegger's account of authenticity is to show that when I make a commitment in the face of death, I not only inject my life with a dimension of intensity and seriousness that was missing; I am also providing a sense of cohesion and unity to my life as a whole. But there is always the temptation of being pulled back into the scattered shallows of ‘the they.’ This is why Heidegger, following Kierkegaard, argues that I need to continually ‘anticipate death’ and ‘repeat’ the commitment to who I am. But this does not mean I stubbornly cling to a particular identity. By anticipating death I realize there is no guarantee that this commitment will matter to me for the rest of my life. Thus, my commitment is always penetrated by a ‘not’ because I remain flexible and open to the possibility of “taking it back” (355) if it is no longer significant or meaningful to my own situation. This recognition, that whatever identity I commit myself to I am also not that person, is radicalized in Sartre's conception of authenticity.

Bad faith and nothingness

In a similar way that self-deceptive ‘falling’ is a structure of being human for Heidegger, so is ‘bad faith’ a structure for Sartre. Again, Sartre develops the existentialist configuration of the self as a relational tension or struggle between two distinct aspects, ‘facticity’ and ‘transcendence.’ Facticity refers to the facts about my situation that limit and constrain me such as my physical traits, my social circumstances, and my past patterns of conduct. Transcendence refers to the self-conscious way that I relate to these facts, how I choose to interpret them, make them meaningful, and transform them through my actions. Inauthenticity or bad faith emerges when I deny one of these two aspects of myself. I am in bad faith, for instance, when I deny the freedom I have to take a stand on my situation and see myself as not responsible because I am wholly determined by it. And I am also in bad faith when I deny that I am limited by my situation and see myself as wholly free, and my life as completely open-ended.

In Being and Nothingness, Sartre offers a number of vivid examples that capture various incarnations of bad faith. His description of the French waiter, for instance, reveals a man who denies his transcendence:

All his behavior seems to us a game. He applies himself to chaining his movements as if they were mechanisms, the one regulating the other; his gestures and his voice seem to be mechanisms; he gives himself the quickness and pitiless rapidity of things. He is playing; he is amusing himself. But what is he playing? We need not watch long before we can explain: he is playing at being a waiter in a café. (1956, 101–102)

The waiter sees himself as the public sees him. He is constrained by an occupational stereotype and is restricted to certain behaviors because of it. On Sartre's account, he gives in to ‘the look’ of the customers that reduces him to an object, to a ‘being-in-itself.’ By disappearing into this persona, the waiter appears to be deceiving himself by refusing to take responsibility for it and denying the fact that there are other choices and self-interpretations that are available to him. But the waiter is, at the same time, transcending his facticity by breaking the rules of being a waiter. He does this by performing his tasks in an exaggerated way. He overdoes things; his mannerisms are too mechanical; he moves too quickly; he is too much of a French waiter. He is playing the role of the waiter in such an exaggerated and overdone way that he actually escapes the role (Bernasconi 2007, 38). This is why Sartre says, “I am a waiter in the mode of being what I am not” (1956, 103). The waiter is also ‘not’ a waiter because his thing-like identity is always open to being negated.

In the case of denying one's facticity, Sartre offers an example of a woman on a first date with a man. As the man reaches out and takes her hand at the end of the evening, the woman pretends not to notice and denies the intimacy and sexually charged implications of the act. In “neither consenting nor resisting” (97), she acts in bad faith because she refuses to see that she has committed herself to a pattern of conduct, denying that the act of touching is bound up with the facticity of her body as an object of desire. She looks down on the event from a standpoint of intellectual detachment as if it were not her own body, as if she were simply a passive object. “She has disarmed the actions of her companion,” says Sartre, “by reducing them to being only what they are; that is, to existing in the mode of the in-itself” (98).

But neither the waiter nor the woman can become authentic by simply being ‘sincere’ with themselves and taking responsibility for their respective transcendence or facticity. This is because the self is fundamentally unstable; it is a “double property … that is at once a facticity and a transcendence” (98). Whatever role or identity I happen to commit myself to, I am also ‘not’ that person because I am constantly reversing back and forth, regarding myself solely in terms of facticity or solely in terms of transcendence. Sartre explains this instability with an example of the homosexual who refuses to be sincere and accept who he is. “The homosexual recognizes his faults,” writes Sartre, “but he struggles with all his strength against the crushing view that his mistakes constitute for him a destiny. He does not wish to let himself be considered as a thing. He has an obscure but strong feeling that a homosexual is not a homosexual as this table is a table or as this red-haired man is red-haired” (107). In his reluctance to accept that his desires and past patterns of conduct suggest ‘a destiny’ that constitutes him as certain kind of ‘being-in-itself,’ the homosexual is in bad faith by denying his facticity. But what if, asks Sartre, “in the name of sincerity [and] of freedom … the homosexual reflected on his situation and acknowledged himself as a homosexual” (108)? In this case, the homosexual would still be in bad faith because he would see himself as a thing, as a homosexual, in the way that ‘this table is a table.’ Being sincere, then, has nothing to do with authenticity because, in committing ourselves to a particular identity, we strip away the possibility of transcendence by reducing ourselves to a thing.

For Sartre, the ‘double property’ of selfhood means that we can never be anything. Being a homosexual, for example, is a matter of accepting a particular identity and maintaining this identity by means of certain choices and actions. A homosexual, then, is not something ‘I am’; it is something I create and constitute through my ongoing, moment-to-moment decisions. In this sense, it is an identity that is never stable and complete; it is something I can freely modify or reject at some point down the line. Again, this is why “[I am] what I am not” (103). Whatever I am as a complete and determined ‘being-in-itself’ is penetrated by the ‘not’ of choice and consciousness, of ‘being-for-itself.’ And there is no way to achieve a unity or synthesis between these two aspects, to become ‘in-and-for-itself.’ It is because of this structural instability that self-deception and bad faith are impossible to avoid. It is, as Sartre says, an “immediate [and] permanent threat to every project of the human being” (116). But where does that leave us with respect to authenticity? Being and Nothingness isn't very helpful. In this work, Sartre refers to ‘authenticity’ (authenticité) as a kind of “self-recovery of being which was previously corrupted” (116), but he does not explain what this self-recovery consists of. Yet from our previous discussion of bad faith and looking at his reflections on authenticity in other works, we can get a sense of what he has in mind.

In his War Diaries, Sartre describes the possibility of being shaken out of bad faith with an example of a young man being called up to war:

I can imagine someone being called up who was a highly inauthentic bourgeois, who used to live inauthentically in all the various social situations into which he was thrown — family, jobs, etc. I can grant that the shock of war may suddenly have induced him to a conversion towards the authentic, which leads him to be authentically in situation vis-à-vis the war. But this authenticity, if it is true, needs to conquer new territory. It first presents itself in the form of a desire to revise an old situation in the light of this change. It first gives itself as anxiety and critical desire. Here, this way of extending authenticity mustn't be confused in any sense with an increase in authenticity. The authenticity is already there. Only it must be consolidated and extended. (1996, 280)

In this transformation, the socially prescribed identities that create the illusion that the young man is a secure and complete thing, a being ‘in-itself,’ collapses. He is now “no longer a ‘family man,’ he's no longer practicing his profession, etc.” (280). These public personas cannot provide a ground or support for his being anymore. He now sees that any identity that he takes over can be called into question. But authenticity (or ‘good faith’) is not just a matter of questioning; it is acting in a new way, changing one's life in the face of the question. “The desire to call [oneself] into question, if it is sincere, can appear only against a background of authenticity. And it's not enough to call into question: it's necessary to change” (280, my emphasis). Sartre is suggesting that authenticity, as ‘self-recovery,’ is a twofold process. First, it requires a lucid awareness and acceptance of the structural instability or ambiguity at the core of the self. And second, it requires a willingness to act and “adapt one's life” (280) to this ambiguity. In good faith, the young man acknowledges his factical situation, that his past actions added up to being a particular kind of person, but he simultaneously acknowledges his transcendence, seeing that this pattern of conduct does not determine who he will be in the future, because he can freely choose to act from a range of possibilities that are open to him and that he alone is responsible for these choices. This is why Hazel Barnes writes that “the existentialist in good faith will recognize that at any moment, simultaneously, he is and is not his situation” (1967, 55). Sartre explains this position in Anti-Semite and Jew when he writes, “Authenticity, it is almost needless to say, consists in having a true and lucid consciousness of the situation, in assuming the responsibilities and risks it involves, in accepting it … sometimes in horror and hate” (1948a, 90). But authenticity is never secure; the man will always be tempted to flip back into self-deception. When the war ends, his wife and friends will call on him to take over his old identity and be the man that he used to be. This is the test. “Perhaps he'll yield,” says Sartre, “but he can't revert to this old error vis-à-vis [his wife] without, at a stroke, tumbling headlong into inauthenticity” (1996, 281).

Sartre's account seems especially bleak because whatever identity or project I happen to commit myself to in the attempt to be true to myself is ultimately arbitrary and futile because of the structural instability of the self. In her Ethics of Ambiguity, Beauvoir describes Sartre's position as one that encloses man in a sterile anguish, in an empty subjectivity. It is incapable of furnishing him with any principle for making choices. Let him do as he pleases. In any case, the game is lost. Does not Sartre declare, in effect, that man is a ‘useless passion,’ that he tries in vain to realize the synthesis of the for-oneself and the in-oneself, to make himself God? (1948, 10)

But Beauvoir goes on to point out that simply because our projects are ambiguous and futile does not mean they are meaningless. “The notion of ambiguity must not be confused with that of absurdity,” she writes. “To declare that existence is absurd is to deny that it can ever be given a meaning; to say that it is ambiguous is to assert that its meaning is never fixed” (129). What Beauvoir is suggesting is that when we accept our structural ambiguity rather than fleeing from it, we can begin to focus on what we actually do in the world rather than trying to be something, because we now realize we can't be anything. This is why, in Notebooks for an Ethics, Sartre writes, “Authenticity reveals that the only meaningful project is that of doing (not that of being). … So, originally, authenticity consists in refusing any quest for being, because I am always nothing” (Sartre 1992, 475; see Carman 2009, 239).

But in emphasizing how meanings are constituted through our actions in the world, existentialists now have to confront the ethical question: ‘How are we supposed to act?’ Without moral absolutes to guide us, can we do whatever we like as long as we are passionate, resolute, and clear-sighted about our ambiguity? Is it true, as Sartre asks, that “if God does not exist, [then] everything would be possible?” (2001, 296). From the preceding discussion, there appear to be no intimations of an ethics in existentialism. Kierkegaard calls for a ‘suspension of the ethical’; Nietzsche is committed to going ‘beyond good and evil’; Heidegger's account of ‘being-toward-death’ tells us nothing about what it means to be a good person; and Sartre makes it clear that there are “no values or commands to turn to which legitimize our conduct. … We are alone with no excuses” (2001, 296). Indeed, by privileging authenticity (‘being true to oneself’) over ethics (‘doing what is right’), it appears that the authentic individual could be a murderer just as easily as he or she could be a saint. And given Heidegger's own commitment to Nazism and Sartre's interests in Maoism, the question of whether or not existentialism has an ethics is a serious one for critics. The question of ethics also gives us an opportunity to explore heterodox conceptions of authenticity offered by some religious existentialists. For figures like Buber and Levinas, authenticity has little to do with being true to oneself because this puts too much emphasis on the individual. The aim, rather, is to see how we are morally responsible for and mutually dependent on others and bound up with something ‘higher’ than ourselves. We can now turn our attention to the relationship between existentialism and ethics as it framed by both secular and religious existentialists.

Suggested reading

Carman, T. (2009). The concept of authenticity. In H. Dreyfus and M. Wrathall (eds.), A companion to existentialism and phenomenology (pp. 229–239). Oxford: Blackwell.

Guignon, C. B. (2004a). On being authentic. London: Routledge.

Nehemas, A. (1985). Nietzsche: Life as literature. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Taylor, C. (1991). The ethics of authenticity. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

7: Ethics

Anything goes

Existentialists have long been criticized for their rejection of moral absolutes and emphasis on individual freedom because such a position appears to undermine the possibility for ethics. If ‘God is dead’ and there are no binding moral principles that we can turn to in order to guide and evaluate our actions, then existentialists seem to be espousing an ‘anything goes’ view of morality. Although there are many examples in existentialist literature, from Dostoevsky's ax-wielding Raskolnikov in Crime and Punishment to the vicious trio of Garcin, Estelle, and Inez in Sartre's No Exit, the work cited most often by critics as representative of existentialism's amorality is Camus's The Stranger. In this work, the reader is introduced to Mersault, the alienated anti-hero who appears to be the incarnation of moral nihilism. For him, “nothing, nothing had the least importance” (1946, 152). The story begins with the death of his mother, an event that Mersault is completely unaffected by. “It occurred to me,” he writes, “that somehow I'd got through another Sunday, that Mother now was buried, and tomorrow I'd be going back to work as usual. Really, nothing in my life had changed” (30). Later, his girlfriend asks if he loves her, and he replies with total indifference: “Much as before, her question meant nothing or next to nothing” (52). The story reaches its climax when he and some friends confront two men on the beach, a fight breaks out, and Mersault later shoots and kills one of them. What is brought into stark relief in the description of the event is how Mersault is completely free and disconnected from any moral principles. He knows he can turn around and walk away from the conflict, but there is nothing that tells him he ‘ought’ to do it. At his trial, the prosecutor tries to understand his reasons for killing the man, and Mersault makes it clear that there was no reason. “Why had I taken the revolver with me, and why go back precisely to that spot? … [It] was a matter of pure chance” (110, 116). What is especially irritating to the reader is Mersault's lack of contrition or remorse. The story ends with him facing execution by guillotine but accepting his situation and, in this acceptance, realizing “that [he'd] been happy, and … was happy still” (154).

The Stranger is criticized for its moral nihilism and for its apparent glorification of freedom over any considerations of moral conduct. But to use this story to characterize the ethical shortcomings of existentialism misses the mark. It is true that existentialists reject the idea of normative ethics that aim to provide universal prescriptions or norms for how we should act. In this sense, the standard Kantian view of ethics as rational self-legislation and duty to the ‘moral law’ and the utilitarian view of ethics based on the detached calculation of happiness are dismissed. There can be no normative ethics on the existentialist account because there is no justification, no ‘God's-eye view’ for these kinds of prescriptions. “My freedom,” says Sartre, “is the unique foundation of values, [and so] nothing, absolutely nothing justifies me in adopting this or that particular value [or] this or that particular scale of values” (1956, 38). Sartre goes on to claim that “one can choose anything” (2001, 307), that “man is a useless passion” (Sartre 1956, 784), and that “all human activities are equivalent. … It amounts to the same thing whether one gets drunk alone or is a leader of nations” (797). But such claims, taken in isolation, do not mean that existentialists are unconcerned with how we ought to live and treat others. The point is that human beings must own up to their freedom and, in doing so, take responsibility for what they do in the world. In this sense, freedom is not an abstract or formal concept; it is realized only through our concrete actions in the world. Beauvoir explains:

One of the chief objections leveled against existentialism is that the precept ‘to will freedom’ is only a hollow formula and offers no concrete content for action. But that is because one has begun by emptying the word freedom of its concrete meaning; we have already seen that freedom realizes itself only by engaging itself in the world: to such an extent that man's project toward freedom is embodied in him in definite acts of behavior. (1948, 78)

From these remarks, we can begin to see that existentialist freedom has nothing to do with Mersault's impulsive actions. As we saw in chapter 4, the distinctive attribute of being a person is self-consciousness, the ability to take a concrete stand on one's desires by interpreting them, giving them meaning, and seeing how they shape one's identity in the future as a law-abiding citizen, for example, or as a cold-blooded murderer. If Mersault is acting only on ‘first-order’ impulses, he is what Harry Frankfurt calls a ‘wanton’ and not a self; he is not yet free because his action is not mediated by the desire to be the person that he wants to be. As we have shown, it is only when we act on these higher ‘second-order’ volitions that we are truly free and responsible because these actions transcend the determinations of our impulses in a way that orients us in the world and gives shape and coherence to our identities as a whole.

Of course, we are still unable to judge whether or not Mersault's actions are objectively ‘good’ or ‘evil,’ but we can certainly determine whether or not he is being honest with himself to the extent that he makes no excuses and understands that his actions make him who he is. “One can still pass judgment,” writes Sartre, “one can judge … that certain choices are based on error and others on truth. If we have defined man's situation as free choice, with no excuses and no recourse … every man who takes refuge behind the excuse of his passions … is a dishonest man” (2001, 305). If you deny your freedom and responsibility, the existentialist can judge you as being dishonest because, on the basis of your actions and self-interpretation, “that's what you are” (306). If, however, you are willing to own up to your choices and actions, then the image of the existentialist as an ‘anything goes’ anarchist falls apart. We see that, as self-conscious beings, we are not free from the consequences of our actions or from being responsible for what we do. The inescapability of human freedom and responsibility becomes the basis for existentialist ethics. This is why Beauvoir says that “to will oneself moral and to will oneself free are one and the same decision” (1948, 24).

Sartre goes on to claim that the commitment to human freedom is not only for one's own sake. Indeed, his position takes a distinctively Kantian turn by emphasizing how owning up to and affirming the value of human freedom involves a kind of universalizability, because it entails affirming the value of freedom for all of humankind. In ‘Existentialism is a humanism,’ Sartre puts it this way:

We want freedom for freedom's sake and in every particular circumstance. And in wanting freedom we discover that it depends entirely on the freedom of others, and that freedom of others depends on ours. Of course, freedom as the definition of man does not depend on others, but as soon as there is involvement, I am obliged to want others to have freedom at the same time that I want my own freedom. (2001, 306)

Although it is difficult to square this position with his claim in Being and Nothingness that human relations are a ceaseless struggle for self-assertion — as I try to assert my freedom and objectify others and they try to do the same to me — we can see what Sartre is aiming at. We create ourselves through our choices but our choices don't just involve ourselves because they always take place in relation to others, creating a particular image or picture of the kind of person we think others should be. Sartre writes, “In creating the man that we want to be, there is not a single one of our acts which does not at the same time create an image of man as we think he ought to be” (293). In good faith, I acknowledge freedom as my essence, and, in doing so, I cannot help but acknowledge that it is the essence of others as well. And if the cultivation of my own free projects is the ultimate aim and good of my life, then my actions “involve all of mankind” (304) in the sense that they should in some way cultivate this possibility for others (Barnes 1967, 61–62). Sartre is unclear about how exactly I can move from an authentic recognition of my own freedom to the moral consideration of cultivating freedom for others, but we can look to Heidegger's conception of ‘solicitude’ (Fürsorge) for guidance.

In Being and Time, Heidegger describes two modes of what he calls “positive solicitude” (1962, 157), referring to the ways in which we are actively concerned for others. On the one hand, I can ‘leap in’ for the other. In this mode of concern, I decide for the other what they should do and how they should act and thus ‘disburden’ them of their freedom and from taking responsibility for their own lives. Here we can imagine the overprotective mother whose daughter is going off to college. The mother ‘leaps in’ for the daughter by telling her what discipline to major in, what kind of roommate she should have, and what neighborhood she should live in. She is preoccupied with her, constantly checking in with phone calls and text messages. She even gives her a living allowance and pays her tuition. The daughter interprets this behavior as a manifestation of a mother's love, but it is actually a kind of tacit “domination” (158). The mother's concern for her daughter is inauthentic because she is manipulating and controlling her as if she were a thing. As a result, the mother is ‘taking over’ her daughter's possibilities for her. The daughter is stripped of her freedom so that she is unable to choose and take responsibility for her own life.

Heidegger contrasts this inauthentic concern with what he calls authentic or ‘liberating solicitude.’ In this mode, the mother does not ‘leap in’ for the daughter but ‘leaps ahead’ of her. Leaping ahead signifies that the mother does not care for her daughter as if she were a dependent thing to be sheltered. She is concerned, rather, with granting her daughter freedom so that she can face herself as a ‘being possible’ who alone is responsible for creating her own identity. The mother does this “not in order to take away [her] ‘care’ but rather to give it back to [her daughter] authentically as such for the first time” (159). For Heidegger, “this kind of solicitude pertains essentially to authentic care. … It helps the Other to become transparent to [herself] in [her] care and to become free for it” (159, my brackets). In this way, the mother plays the role of “conscience” in the sense that she calls her daughter to “know [herself]” (159, my brackets), to anxiously confront her own self-responsibility. Being concerned for her daughter's freedom, then, is not the same as being concerned for her material welfare. The latter issue is best served by means of ‘leaping in’ and ‘taking over’ her possibilities for her. Although they are not mutually exclusive, the aim of liberating solicitude has nothing to do with her daughter's happiness, protection, or good health but with granting her the freedom to create and take responsibility for her own life. From this, we can say that there is a universal value espoused by existentialists when it comes to being-with-others. It is to care for the other by releasing them, by letting them ‘become free.’

In positing freedom as a universal value, existentialists are clearly indebted to Kant. The difference is in Kant's claim that freedom and reason are intimately connected, and that, insofar as we are moral agents, reason always serves as the ultimate authority and justification for our actions. As Kant says, “Free will is a kind of causality belonging to living things so far as they are rational” (1964, 114, my emphasis). The universality that is distinct to reason provides a binding necessity to act on the basis of duty to the ‘moral law’ rather than on one's own heteronomous inclinations. Freedom, on this account, has nothing to do with being allowed or permitted to choose and do what one wants but to be self-regulated and duty-bound to the law by means of reason. Existentialists make no such claim. Indeed, as we saw in chapter 5, existentialist freedom can be understood as freedom from the authority of reason and from universal laws; it is the freedom to be ‘irrational,’ ‘unnatural,’ and ‘irreverent’ if that is what matters and is of value to you as an existing individual. As Dostoevsky's underground man reminds us, “Reason is an excellent thing, there's no disputing that, but reason is nothing but reason and satisfies only the rational side of man's nature” (2009, 21). Freedom, on the other hand, may result in “destruction, chaos, [and] suffering” (23) because it involves the choices of the whole person, not just the rational part, and “even it goes wrong, it lives” (93).

But we see now that freedom from rationality does not mean that the actions of the existentialist are empty of moral content. They may not offer prescriptions that tell us how we ‘ought’ to act, but the existentialists do tell us something about what an authentic or choice-worthy way of life is. We are inauthentic when we deceive ourselves about who we are, deny our freedom, and refuse to take responsibility for our actions. We are authentic when we affirm our freedom and accept the fact that our actions have consequences and always involve others. In good faith, we affirm that we are not anything because we are always in the process of choosing, of making and remaking ourselves as we take stands on our situation. This means that whatever meanings or values I commit myself to I am always aware that they are not binding on me a priori, that I give things meaning only through my actions in the world, and I am always free to choose other meanings as my situation changes. But defending existentialism in this way is still problematic because it looks like pure ‘subjectivism,’ where it is up to the individual alone to invest the world with meaning, and whatever choice I make is acceptable insofar as I take responsibility for it. This raises the question of whether or not existentialists can identify some set of shared values that can place moral demands on us.

Subjectivism or historicism

Existentialists reject the possibility of moral absolutes because this puts universal principles above the concrete needs of the individual. In committing to these principles I am ‘disburdened’ of my primary responsibility, which is to be true to myself. This is why the acknowledgment of God's death is so distressing for existentialists; it reveals the extent to which I am totally abandoned and forlorn, that there is nothing binding that tells me to choose one way of life over another. Without God, our moral evaluations are completely ungrounded. There is no course of action that is right or wrong because all we have to go on is our own subjective commitments. This creates a bleak picture of morality, where it is up to the solitary subject alone to choose his or her own life without appeal to a background of meanings or values that can put evaluative limits or constraints on us. Existentialists, as Iris Murdoch writes, “no longer see man against a background of values, of realities, which transcend him. We picture man as a brave naked will” (1983, 46; cited in Vogel 1994, 41). This view is especially problematic for figures like Sartre who identify subjectivity as the starting point of existentialism and radical freedom as its supreme value. But for figures like Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty, who posit the centrality of being-in-the-world, the charge of subjectivism doesn't hold.

As we saw in chapter 5, Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty reject the conflation of existentialism with subjectivism because they understand that our choices and actions are already bound up in a world of shared meanings. On their view, I cannot be the sole source and measure of value because I am already thrown into a situation that is value-laden, thus I am already “condemned to meaning” (Merleau-Ponty 1962, xix). The most definitive expression of this critique is found in Heidegger's ‘Letter on Humanism.’ Here, Heidegger dismisses Sartre for labeling him an existentialist because such a view suggests that he supports “subjectivism” (1977a, 208–210). For Heidegger, meanings never emerge ex nihilo from the willful intentions of the subject because we are already “claimed” or “appropriated” by Being (199), where Being is understood as the disclosive movement of history. This means that there is an authority beyond the subject that guides our choices and actions, namely our historical situation, or what Heidegger in Being and Time calls ‘historicality’ (Geschichtlichkeit). On this account, we are not radically free to invest things with value “because historicality is a determining characteristic” of our existence (1962, 42). Any choice that we make as individuals is guided and mediated by our historical context. This is why Heidegger says “Dasein ‘is’ its past in the way of its own Being” (41).

Our predicament, then, is not one of subjectivism, because history invariably places moral demands on us. Thus, a person's acts can still be deemed immoral or praiseworthy insofar as they conflict or correspond with the evaluative measures of his or her community. Of course, this is not to suggest there are moral absolutes that exist independently of human projects. But it does mean that the individual is not a sovereign subject or ‘uncontested author’ of his or her actions, because history has already opened up a space of publicly interpreted values that tell me what I ‘ought’ to do. To be sure, I am still free and responsible in the sense that I have to choose which of these values I am going to commit my life to. But I am not a “free-floating ‘I’ ” (298) whose decisions emerge ex nihilo. Heidegger's account of being-in-the-world decenters the subject, making it clear that my decisions are always bound up in a wider historical framework, where I am invariably appropriating and being appropriated by the values of my historical community. But this view raises its own problems when it comes to ethics.

If moral demands are determined by the historical situation I am thrown into, then they are never fixed and stable. ‘Pride’ and ‘magnificence,’ for example, are honorable traits in Aristotle's ethics but are dishonorable in a Christian morality that emphasizes ‘self-effacement’ and ‘humility.’ And in the West today, it is not Protestant modesty in the face of God but ‘confidence’ and ‘personal magnetism’ that are praised as keys to success in a capitalist economy. All these values are part of our shared history and shape our sense of what is praiseworthy. But there is no way to determine which moral framework we should commit to. It appears that the issue of ‘anything goes’ persists; however, it is no longer rooted in the contingent decisions of the subject but in the contingent movement of history that has already claimed us. As Lawrence Vogel contends, Heidegger appears to have replaced the arbitrariness of ‘subjectivism’ with the arbitrariness of ‘historicism’ (1994, 54). Moreover, if we are embedded beings and there is no way to stand outside of the prejudices of our historical situation, this makes it difficult to subject our own values to moral scrutiny. According to Heidegger, my historical community is “the sole authority a free existing [individual] can have” (1962, 443), but what if my community values an ideology of racism or violence against minorities? How can I take a moral stand on these values if they already shape my self-understanding?

This criticism is especially pointed given Heidegger's own commitment to Nazism and his infamous inaugural address as rector of Freiburg University in 1933. Here, Heidegger speaks of being “truly and collectively rooted” (2009, 109) to a common German heritage, of protecting the “blood and soil” (112) of the German people, and of being “prepared for mutual struggle” (Kampf) (115) in the face of cultural threats. Heidegger's rhetoric opens up a hornet's nest of moral questions. If I am irrevocably bound to the values of my history, then how should I regard those who are outside it? Do I have an obligation to treat others as my moral equals even though they do not adhere to my community's values? If there is no ahistorical standpoint that I can take, can I ever judge whether or not my values are any better or worse than others? Heidegger himself was ‘thrown’ into a tradition of deeply rooted racism and antisemitism. But does this entanglement suggest that he is incapable of denouncing it? Other Germans took a critical stand in the face of Nazism; what historical currents made it possible for them (see Vogel 1994, 66–68)?

Merleau-Ponty offers an alternative to Heidegger's historicism, by arguing that being-in-the-world is grounded not only in the meanings and values of a particular historical tradition, but in a prior “visual, auditory, and tactile field” (1962, 353) that is already opened up by the perceptual activity of the lived body. On Merleau-Ponty's account, beneath the prejudices of our shared history, there is a dimension of bodily experience that is ‘pre-personal,’ that is prior to language, culture, and thought, revealing that I am “already in communication with others” (353) because I am bound up in an inter-human web of feelings, gestures, and affective expressions, and this relational web can provide its own moral orientation.

Intercorporeality

By interpreting the individual in terms of ‘intercorporeality,’ Merleau-Ponty not only unsettles the notion of the sovereign subject, he also invests being-in-the-world with a moral dimension by revealing how we can recognize and feel our way into the lives of others through shared bodily experience. Again, for Merleau-Ponty, the body is not an encapsulated object that exists mechanistically as ‘partes extra partes.’ It refers to the feelings, perceptions, and movements of ‘my own body’ (le corps propre), the body that I am enacting and living through in my everyday life. From this perspective, my being does not end with my own skin because it is already stretching into a shared world, weaving its way into familiar patterns of behavior and recognizing the intentions, gestures, and expressions of others, and the threads of this embodied weave form an interconnected system. In Phenomenology of Perception, he explains,

I experience my own body as the power of adopting certain forms of behavior and a certain world, and I am given to myself merely as a certain hold upon the world; now, it is precisely my body which perceives the body of another, and discovers in that other body a miraculous prolongation of my own intentions, a familiar way of dealing with that world. Henceforth, as the parts of my body together compromise a system, so my body and the other's are one whole, two sides of one and the same phenomenon, and the anonymous existence of which my body is the ever-renewed trace henceforth inhabits both bodies simultaneously. (1962, 353–354)

It is through this ‘prolongation of my own intentions’ that I am able to recognize the other, not as an object that is separate and distinct from me, but as a being whose intentions and experiences overlap with mine because we are both bound together in familiar ways of bodily being-in-the-world. This is because, as a sentient and corporeal being, I am already woven into the world and in dialogue with others through my senses before I ever encounter others from the perspective of ‘subject’ and ‘object.’ In this sense, we are part of the same elemental tissue, or what Merleau-Ponty will later call ‘flesh.’ “My body is made of the same flesh as the world (it is perceived),” he writes, “and moreover … this flesh of my body is shared by the world, the world reflects it, encroaches upon it, and it encroaches upon the world. … They are in a relation of … overlapping” (1968, 248).

The recovery of this affective, pre-personal way of being opens up the possibility for a moral orientation, one where we do not interpret ourselves as sovereign subjects but as beings whose bodily fields are sensibly intertwined with those of others (see Levin 1999; Low 1994). This experience of intertwining or ‘chiasm’ allows us to recognize the pain and vulnerability of others because we embody these feelings in similar ways. Experiencing myself from this standpoint makes it possible to move beyond the prejudices of my own community, because I am able to encounter the other not as an outsider, but as a concrete individual who embodies his or her experience in ways that resemble my own and who shares the same elemental flesh as me. In this way, Merleau-Ponty offers a response to Heidegger's historicism and alleged antisemitism. In ‘The War Has Taken Place,’ he writes,

An anti-Semite could not stand to see Jews tortured if he really saw them, if he perceived that suffering and agony in an individual life — but this is just the point: he does not see Jews suffering; he is blinded by the myth of the Jew. He tortures and murders the Jew through these concrete beings; he struggles with dream figures, and his blows strike living faces. Anti-Semitic passion is not triggered by, nor does it aim at, concrete individuals. (2007, 44–45; cited in Levin 1999, 232)

The suggestion here is that when we ‘really see’ the other in all of their embodied concreteness, when we witness the affective tension in their posture, the tears welling up in their eyes, the horror or the joy in their face, we also witness ourselves. But this emotional recognition is not a product of “reasoning by analogy” (Merleau-Ponty 1962, 352), not a conscious objectification of others as material bodies that move and act as I do. It is, rather, an immediate experience of bodily co-presence, one where we live in the expressions, gestures, and movements of others. Merleau-Ponty uses the example of an infant mirroring the gestures of an adult to show how this primitive experience occurs and how it is anterior to self-consciousness and history. “A baby of fifteen months,” he writes, “opens its mouth if I playfully take its fingers between my teeth and pretend to bite it. And yet it has scarcely looked at its face in a glass, and its teeth are not in any case like mine. … ‘Biting’ has immediately, for it, an intersubjective significance. It perceives its intentions in its body, and my body with its own, and thereby my intentions in its own body” (352). For Merleau-Ponty, the infant, as a sentient being, is already in affective dialogue with the other and has a sense of the meaning of the other's acts, not by means of intellectually grasping them, but because there is an overlapping of bodily fields (Welsh 2007). In this web of mutual presence, the infant relates to and recognizes my feelings long before it can put words to them.

Interpreters such as David Michael Levin (1999) have pointed out how Merleau-Ponty's account of being-in-the-world not only offers an opening for a radical critique of the ideologies of individualism that prevail in modernity; it also opens up the possibility of recovering the moral dimension of bodily co-presence that constitutes the child's way of seeing. In this opening, as Levin writes, “I recognize myself as another for an other, and I am obliged to acknowledge that there are other perspectives. … Looking into the eyes of others, I may see myself; but what I should see is that I am exposed, vulnerable, held in their beholding” (228). Martin Buber will develop this notion of moral vision, agreeing that there is a primitive ‘bodily reciprocity’ that undermines the idea of the self as an encapsulated sovereign subject, and that when it comes to the immediate, pre-linguistic recognition of the other, the child has “more complete information” than I do (1970, 76). For Buber, this kind of recognition is sacred and constitutes the heart of what he calls the ‘I — Thou’ relation.

I and Thou

One of the consistent threads that run through the writings of religious existentialists like Dostoevsky, Marcel, Buber, and Levinas is a concern for how we treat others. These thinkers are united in their critique of modern society that they see as increasingly rationalistic and objectivizing, fostering a selfish and instrumental existence. Buber will refer to this as the ‘I–It’ attitude. In this attitude we tend to interpret ourselves as self-contained subjects that are detached from others. In this sense, it “erects a crucial barrier between subject and object” (1970, 75), reducing the other to a utilitarian thing to be manipulated and used for our own ends. What rises to the surface in this attitude are the self-centered, purposive, and materialistic concerns of my own ego. In this way, “the person beholds [only] his self; the ego occupies himself with his My: my manner, my race, my works, my genius” (114). It is important to note, however, that Buber does not regard the ‘I–It’ attitude as evil, nor does he deny the importance of selfishness or instrumental dealings with others. Such an attitude is essential for our survival; it gives our lives a measure of predictability and control and is central to the practical worlds of economics, finance, and manufacturing. The problem is that in the modern age, this attitude has come to dominate and block out any other way of relating to others, and consequently it denies us our essential humanity. This is why Buber says, “Without It a human being cannot live. But whoever lives only with that is not human” (85). Today, we are caught up in what Buber calls the “spell of separation” (125), where we see ourselves as autonomous, self-reliant individuals, who are independent from the rest of humanity, and this undermines the possibility of genuine community and reciprocal concern for each other. Dostoevsky offers a powerful description of this spell in The Brothers Karamazov:

The isolation that prevails everywhere, above all in our age — has not yet fully developed, it has not reached its limit yet. For everyone strives to keep his individuality, everyone wants to secure the greatest possible fullness of life for himself. But meantime all his efforts result not in attaining fullness of life but self-destruction, for instead of self-realization he ends by arriving at complete solitude. All mankind in our own age is split up into units. Man keeps apart, each in his own groove; each one holds aloof, hides himself and hides what he has, from the rest. He ends by being repelled by others and repelling them. … He is accustomed to rely upon himself alone and to cut himself off from the whole; he has trained himself not to believe in the help of others, in men and in humanity, and only trembles for fear he should lose his money and the privileges that he was won for himself. Everywhere in these days men have ceased to understand that the true security is to be found in social solidarity rather than in isolated individual effort. But this terrible individualism must inevitably have an end, and all will suddenly understand how unnaturally they are separated from one another. (1957, 279)

In order to move beyond the individualism and isolation of the ‘I–It’ attitude, we have to move beyond instrumental reason to a layer of lived experience that cannot be captured in language or thought. Buber conceives of this experience as the ‘I — Thou’ relation.

As a ‘Thou’ or ‘You,’ the other is encountered as a ‘relation,’ not as an object or thing that is separate from me. The “You,” says Buber, is “no thing among things nor does he consist of things” (1970, 59). In relation, we encounter others in a non-purposeful, non-manipulative, and non-objectifying way. Unlike the ‘I–It’ relation, which is always mediated through rational concepts of productivity and usefulness, the ‘I — You’ relation is “unmediated” (62–63), that is, there is nothing conceptual that gets in the way or intervenes in the encounter. It is a mode of relating that is immediate and direct, one where we feel ourselves bound together in a reciprocal, inter-human relationship. Buber suggests that this relational way of knowing the other is already articulated in the Hebrew Bible. When the Bible speaks of knowing God, it is not referring to conceptual knowledge through a detached, subject-object model, but to the ‘I and Thou,’ to the immediate relational presence of God. This is why, as Walter Kaufmann explains, the Hebrew name for God as ‘YHVH’ is so instructive. The word literally means “He is present” (1970, 26). Relational knowledge pulls us out of the spell of separation, resurrecting our sense of “wholeness” as persons and co-presence with others (Buber 1970, 69–70). And it is a knowledge that can only be felt; it cannot be rationally explained or discovered. “The You encounters me by grace,” writes Buber; “it cannot be found by seeking” (62). In order to be open and ready for God's grace, we need to give up or release ourselves from the illusory security of the ‘It-world’ and from our selfish need to control and objectify others. “What has to be given up,” then, “is the false drive for self-affirmation” (126). Being ready for grace in this way is “a finding without seeking” (128).

Although it is difficult to describe, Buber believes we often have experiences of the ‘I — You’ relation in our ordinary lives. If I am walking down a busy sidewalk, for instance, and pass by a homeless man, I usually encounter him as an object. I notice various thing-like aspects, his ragged clothing, his dirty hands and hair, his lowered head and worn shoes. In these observations, I remain at a cool distance, separate and detached from him. But when he raises his head as I walk by, I happen to directly look into his eyes. In this moment, the objectifying ‘I–It’ relation collapses, and I encounter this man immediately and directly as a ‘whole person.’ In the blink of an eye, I am pulled out of my self-absorption and am present and open to him as a ‘You,’ and he is present and open to me as a ‘You.’ In this experience of mutual recognition and openness we are exposed and vulnerable to one another. This experience is ambiguous; it is both threatening and consoling. The presence of the ‘You’ is threatening because it exposes the fact that I am not a self-affirming ego but a frail being who is attached to and dependent on others. But the ‘You’ is also profoundly consoling because it reveals that I am not isolated and alone, that my experience is bound up with others like me who are also suffering and vulnerable, where “all is spun with a single thread” (121). Buber offers a moving description of this tension between horror and consolation in his masterwork I and Thou:

At times when man is for once overcome by the horror of alienation between I and world, it occurs to him that something might be done. Imagine that at some dreadful midnight you lie there tormented by a waking dream: the bulwarks have crumbled and the abysses scream, and you realize in the midst of this agony that life is still there and I must merely get through to it — but how? How? Thus feels man in the hours when he collects himself: overcome by horror, pondering without direction. And yet … Henceforth, when man is for once overcome by the horror of alienation and the world fills him with anxiety that the I is contained in the world, and that there really is no I, and thus the world cannot harm the I, and he calms down; or he sees that the world is contained in the I, and that there really is no world and thus the world cannot harm the I, and he calms down. (120–121)

Buber's theistic existentialism is strikingly different from Kierkegaard's, where belief in God involves the isolated subject who, in ‘fear and trembling,’ makes a leap of faith toward his own subjective truth. On Buber's account, Kierkegaard's focus on the inner life of the individual betrays the idea that we can never fully realize and understand ourselves from a solitary vantage point. It is only by the grace of inter-human relations that I can be true to myself and genuinely realize who I am. “The individual,” writes Buber, “is a fact of existence insofar as he steps into living relation with other individuals. … The fundamental fact of human existence is man with man” (Buber 1965, 203, cited in Silberstein 1990, 127). Interpreting existence in terms of mutual dependency introduces a moral component to the act of self-creation, one that requires us to be open, caring, and non-judgmental toward others. Marcel envisions this intersubjective openness in Catholic terms of “agape (charity) or philia (attachment)” (2005, 181) that can serve as a corrective to the selfishness and greed of modern life. This stance is not to be understood in a Kantian sense, of a ‘moral formalism’ that brings all human acts under a set of rational and universal commands. This is impossible because “no two [human] beings, and no two situations are really commensurable with each other” (181). It is not necessarily a moral but an ontological recognition of who we are as intersubjective beings that are vulnerable and mutually exposed. This recognition, as Unamuno writes, “may serve as the basis for an ethic” (1954, 261) because it has the power to shake us out of our everyday self-absorption and awaken us to the fact that we are already involved in the lives of others and affectively bound together in our shared joy and suffering. Levinas will develop this idea, referring to ‘ethics as first philosophy,’ one that is already rooted in our intersubjective life, that is, in our concrete and situated relations with others and is, in this sense, always prior to any form of detached or abstract philosophizing.

Levinas suggests that the essential aspect of our intersubjective relations cannot be accessed by thought. It is, rather, felt in the pre-reflective immediacy of the face-to-face encounter, where I sense the other person addressing me and I am called to respond to that particular person. In Totality and Infinity, Levinas describes ‘the face’ (le visage) of the other not as a thing or object to be conceptualized, but as a pure expression of “defenselessness,” “nudity,” and “vulnerability” (1969, 199) that is largely hidden from me under the veil of everyday propriety and social convention. In this sense, the face-to-face encounter is a rupture or breach in the flow of ordinary life that reveals a layer of interpersonal relation that demands something of me, burdening me with responsibility for the other. It is a fundamental ethical-religious event that affects me, calling me to the other in a way that is prior to any conscious reflection about who or what the other is. This is why Levinas says, “The face resists possession, resists my powers,” but it nonetheless “speaks to me” (197–198). Encountering the other in terms of this raw defenselessness and vulnerability, as a “relation without relation,” is what Levinas calls “religion” (80). Of course, ‘religion’ here does not refer to institutional practices or obeying ‘Articles of Faith.’ It refers to a relation, where I am, in my ordinary life, called to respond to and accept the other as a particular person who is vulnerable and dependent on me, and it is this relation that underlies all that is fundamental and genuine to religious or ethical life (Morgan 2011, 62).

Levinas's use of the term ‘face’ helps illuminate his allegiance to existentialism. Instead of the approaching the other from a standpoint of detachment and objectivity, the face-to-face encounter puts us squarely in the experiential world, where the other is not an abstraction but a concrete and particular person. And of all the aspects of the other's embodied presence, none is more vividly expressive than the face. Through the face, and especially the eyes, we witness the other's needs, his or her anguish, sorrow, and joy, and this witnessing underlies all of our everyday social interactions. In this regard, the face of the other has the power to draw me out of my own egoistic concerns, saying ‘no’ to my self-interests by revealing the other person as defenseless, dependent, and vulnerable. “The absolute nakedness of a face, the absolute defenseless face, without covering clothing or mask,” writes Levinas, “[that] is what opposes my power over it. … The being that expresses itself, that faces me, says no to me by his very expression. … The face is the fact that a being affects us not in an indicative, but in an imperative” (1998, 21). The face, then, represents an expressive imperative, an affective command or plea to be responsible to the other, a plea that is prior to any moral law or utilitarian calculus. What this reveals is that our everyday being-in-the-world is already rooted in the pre-reflective ethical discourse of the face-to-face, a discourse that is largely covered over by the masks of social convention and is taken for granted or “presupposed” (18) by the impersonal ethical systems of traditional philosophy. This is why ethics, for Levinas, is to be regarded as ‘first philosophy.’ Hidden in the most ordinary and mundane of human interactions is the face of the other, a layer of experience that calls us to acknowledge and be held accountable to the suffering and vulnerability of that person.

From this discussion we can conclude that the criticism of existentialism as an amoral, ‘anything goes’ philosophy is unfounded. With religious existentialists, we see the development of an ethics that challenges the modern attitudes of selfishness and individualism, one that is rooted in the affective recognition of human vulnerability and suffering and that calls for an orientation of mutual responsibility, where, in the words of Dostoevsky, “we are all responsible to all and for all” (1957, 278). With existentialists like Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty, who advocate a form of situated freedom, we see that values are not created ex nihilo by the sovereign subject because there are moral demands that are already placed on us, whether these demands come from the historical tradition that we are thrown into or from the affective meanings of our intercorporeality. Even existentialists like Sartre, who promotes a form of ‘absolute’ or ‘radical’ freedom, recognize that we are not free from taking responsibility for our actions or from cultivating the ideal of freedom for others. To this end, critics have to acknowledge that existentialism offers a clear vision of what a valuable or praiseworthy way of life is. It is a life that is free from self-deception, that owns up to the finitude and vulnerability of the human situation and accepts that our individual actions always impact the lives of others.

Because it consistently engages moral questions of human vulnerability and suffering, it is not unsurprising that existentialism has had a profound impact on the healing professions, especially psychiatry and psychotherapy. In the proceeding chapter, we will draw on the work of influential psychiatrists such as R. D. Laing, Irvin Yalom, Rollo May, and Ludwig Binswanger to see how the insights of existentialism serve to both challenge uncritical assumptions in mainstream biomedicine and inspire new approaches to therapy. We will see that, from the existentialist perspective, the therapist does not interpret psychic suffering as a medical disease but as an existential ‘given’ that has the power to disclose who we are as human beings. When suffering brings us before our own freedom and death, the therapist does not simply want to manage or control these feelings with medications or psychiatric techniques. The aim, rather, is to accept and integrate the feelings into our lives because they are part of what it means to be human. As we will see, it is only then that we can be freed from everyday forms of fear and self-deception and be opened up to deeper and more meaningful ways of living.

Suggested reading

Barnes, H. E. (1967). An existentialist ethics. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Demeter, D. (1986). Freedom as a value: A critique of the ethical theory of Sartre. Chicago: Open Court.

Low, D. (1994). The foundations of Merleau-Ponty's ethical theory. Human Studies 17 (2): 173–187.

Vogel, L. (1994). The fragile “we”: Ethical implications of Heidegger's Being and Time. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press.

8: Contributions to Psychiatry and Psychotherapy

The problem of medicalization

One of the more controversial trends in contemporary psychiatry is the ‘medicalization’ of an increasingly broad range of human emotions and behavior. Today, for instance, a person who appears to be overly shy and withdrawn can now be diagnosed with a genuine medical condition, ‘social phobia,’ that can be effectively managed and controlled with psychiatric medications. On the medical model, mental dysfunction is interpreted as a discrete entity, an organic ‘disease’ of the brain, and it is by observing the behavior of the patient that the psychiatrist can identify the disease and apply a diagnostic label. As medicalization has grown, so have the number of psychiatric disorders and drugs to treat them. The latest incarnation of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, considered ‘the bible’ of psychiatric diagnosis, now contains over three hundred different disorders, three times more than the number in the first edition (DSM-I, 1952). An example of this explosion of disorders can be seen in how the broad classification of ‘anxiety neurosis,’ so central to earlier psychoanalytic models, has now been broken into seven distinct disorders: agoraphobia, panic disorder, post-traumatic stress disorder, obsessive compulsive disorder, generalized anxiety disorder, simple phobia, and social phobia. With this new diagnostic classification, the behavior of a person who is shy and introverted can now be interpreted in terms of comorbidity, where the person exhibits not just social phobia, but signs of panic disorder and agoraphobia, and requires a psychiatric cocktail of three separate medications to treat each of these discrete illnesses. Critics have argued that this pattern has created the ‘Prozac Nation’ we live in today, where we are all in search of a quick fix for every aberrant feeling or behavior without ever engaging the existential situation from which these feelings and behaviors emerge (Chodoff 2002; Lane 2007; Aho 2008). This phenomenon should not be surprising given the historical roots of psychiatry.

Modern psychology and the medical specialty of psychiatry emerged against the backdrop of the scientific revolution in the seventeenth century and developed into their own distinct disciplines in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Informed by the perspective of natural science, psychologists and psychiatrists tend to view the patient from a particular paradigm. First, because scientists adhere to a technical procedure or ‘method’ based on the subject-object model, the patient is usually regarded dispassionately as an object of investigation, and emotional and behavioral dysfunctions are viewed as discrete entities that are, like all other things in the natural world, the result of mechanistic causal interactions that can be quantified and controlled. Second, by taking a position of methodological detachment, little effort is made to contextualize the patient's experience, to understand his or her life-world. The therapist views the patient through the lens of a set of fixed determinations, restricted to the objectively observable behavior and looking for the causal mechanisms of disease (Laing 1960, 31–33). Although Freud and a number of different psychoanalytic models certainly recognize the importance of inter-human relations, they still abide largely by a mechanistic conception of human behavior and the techniques of objectification that, in the words of Heidegger, “transfer scientific causality to the psychical” (2001, 20). Psychoanalysis, as Freud confirms, “must accept the scientific Weltanschauung. … The intellect and the mind are objects for scientific research in exactly the same way as non-human things” (Freud 1964, 171; cited in Askey 2001, 309).

To be sure, the attitude of scientific detachment allows the therapist to maintain a position of alleged neutrality and objectivity and also serves as a buffer of self-protection from the exposure and vulnerability that can manifest in the therapeutic encounter. But in defending from this emotional threat, the therapist is often cut off and dissociated from the patient, making it difficult to recognize him or her as a person. “If the technical view is used dominantly in the relating to the other person,” writes existential therapist Rollo May, “the price [is] not only the isolation of himself from the other but also of radical distortion of reality [because] one does not really see the other person” (1958b, 39). R. D. Laing will go so far as to suggest that psychiatry's reduction of the human being to a complex organism and its failure to situate the patient in his or her life-world is not only dehumanizing; it's pathological. “[Psychiatry is] concerned specifically with people who experience themselves as automata, as robots, as bits of machinery,” he writes. “Yet why do we not regard a theory that seeks to transmute persons into automata or animals as equally crazy?” (1960, 23). Against the mechanistic account, existential therapists suggest that the primary aim of treatment is to relate to the patient's own lived situation. The therapist, says Laing, “must have the plasticity to transpose himself into another strange and even alien view of the world … without forgoing his sanity. Only thus can he arrive at an understanding of the patient's existential position” (34).

As we have seen, existentialists interpret human beings not in terms of psychosomatic mechanisms but in terms of existence, that is, in terms of the situated activity or way of being that is already bound up in a world. On this view, we understand ourselves only in relation to our involvement with others and the shared meanings of the public world. Thus, in order to relate to the patient, the therapist must first relate to the patient's way of being-in-the-world. Swiss psychiatrist Ludwig Binswanger describes the therapeutic aim as one that does not try to ‘explain’ the causal mechanisms of a disorder or divide the patient into distinct categories of mental and physical but, rather, attempts to ‘understand’ the patient by entering into his or her life-world.

A psychotherapy on existential-analytic bases investigates the life-history of the patient to be treated, … but it does not explain this life-history and its pathologic idiosyncrasies according to the teachings of any school of psychotherapy, or by means of its preferred categories. Instead, it understands this life-history as modification of the total structure of the patient's being-in-the-world. (1956, 145)

From the existential perspective, understanding the patient has nothing to do with a scientific explanation of the causes of emotional or behavioral dysfunction. Accumulating data on hereditary or familial incidence, assessing speech or behavioral abnormalities, measuring heart rate, and examining brain scans do not help us relate to the patient's experience. The existential therapist recognizes that in coming into treatment, the patient does not just bring in a set of observable psychosomatic symptoms. He or she brings an entire existential situation, with all of the regrets, fears, traumas, and desires that accompany this existence. By attempting “to articulate what the other's world is and his [or her] way of being in it” (Laing, 1960, 25), the therapeutic encounter opens up the possibility of understanding of ‘what it means’ and ‘what it feels like’ for this particular person to suffer. Bracketing out scientific assumptions in this way, the existential therapist is able to gain insight into the patient's being, not as a diseased thing, but as an embodied existence whose pre-reflective bond with the world has been profoundly disrupted.

Anxiety, embodiment, and psychotherapy

As we saw earlier, the human body shows up differently for existentialists. It is not a causally determined physical body but a ‘lived body,’ where this is understood as the first-person experiences, feelings, and perceptions of my own body. The body, in this sense, is not a discrete object that I can examine from a perspective of scientific detachment because I am already living through it; it already belongs to me. “What I feel,” writes Marcel, “is indissolubly linked to the fact that my body is my body, not just one body among others. … Nobody who is not inside my skin can know what I feel” (1950, 104). But, from the perspective of being-in-the-world, it is a mistake to think that these feelings reside somewhere inside me as if I were a self-contained subject. As Heidegger says, “There is no longer any question about subjectivity. [Being-in-the-world] is not the ‘structure of subjectivity,’ but its abolition” (1988, 220). To be sure, my feelings are mine, but as a situated and embodied way of being, there is no clear distinction between ‘inner’ and ‘outer,’ because my emotional life is already embedded in shared contexts of meaning. Indeed, it is only on the basis of being bound up in these public contexts that I can find myself in moods — in situations that emotionally affect me in particular ways. As someone absorbed in the meanings of the academic world, for instance, things like books, classrooms, and lectures already matter to me in a way that is fundamentally different from a salesman, a banker, or anyone else unfamiliar with this world. In this way, the moods of the academy are always working behind my back to orient me in the world, already directing me toward the things that matter and providing a background sense of what counts in specific situations. They are, as Heidegger writes, “like an atmosphere in which we first immerse ourselves in each case and which then attunes us through and through” (1995, 67, my emphasis).

When I am mentally healthy, I am integrated and woven into the world to such an extent that my body and my feelings remain largely hidden from me. They disappear in the practical flow of my daily life because I am already geared to my situation, seamlessly living through the medium of my body without explicitly reflecting on it. In this state of everydayness, there is no separation between self and world; the world appears spontaneously to me as something that I understand, that I belong to, and am ‘at home’ in. It shows up as real, secure, and reliable, and others show up for me as equally real, secure, and reliable. In this state, I have what Laing calls “ontological security” (1960, 39, 42). Secure in my being, I can pre-reflectively move through the world, handle various situations, and affectively involve myself in the lives of others. From the perspective of existential therapy, psychopathology begins to emerge when this embodied connection breaks down, shattering my sense of self. Without the unified bond of being-in-the-world to integrate and hold my identity together, I feel as if I am losing myself, as if I am becoming nothing. Existentialists usually refer to this uncanny dissolution of the self in terms of ‘anxiety’ or Angst.

Again, anxiety is not to be reduced to a bio-chemical reaction to a perceived threat. It is not a medical condition but a structure of being human, a basic experience that discloses the nothingness that underlies my everyday being-in-the-world. Existentialists make it clear that anxiety is not to be confused with fear. Fears can be located, understood, and managed because they are always of something; they relate to external objects or things. Anxiety is a fear of nothing, and this why it is so terrifying. I have the unsettling feeling that the meaningful structure of being-in-the-world that holds my identity together is slipping away, but I cannot point to or explain what it is I am anxious about because I am the source of it. Anxiety discloses the fact that it is my identity or being itself that is nothing, that I am not a stable, substantial, and enduring thing, but a ‘being-possible,’ a ‘being-toward-death.’ This is why Heidegger says, “So if the ‘nothing’ exhibits itself as that in the face of which one has anxiety, this means that [human existence] itself is that in the face of which anxiety is anxious” (1962, 187–188). Anxiety, in other words, emerges out of my own structural nothingness, and this I why I cannot point to what is that I am anxious about; it “threatens [from] nowhere” (186).

The fact that I cannot explain or locate the source of my anxiety makes the feeling all the more horrible, creating a sense of profound helplessness that begets even more anxiety. To defend against this, most of us are able to displace it, turning the overwhelming fear of nothing into a fear of something. In this way, as Kierkegaard puts it, “the nothing which is the object of anxiety becomes, as it were, more and more a something” (1944, 55). Through this displacement, the fear of my own nothingness becomes something ordinary and manageable, transposed into a much less threatening fear of flying, fear of heights, or fear of public speaking. Such displacement allows me to be reabsorbed into the flow of the world, solidifying the illusion of my own being as something enduring and real. But for those with a diminished sense of ontological security, transforming anxiety into fear is not so easy. For such people, anxiety continually “attacks from all directions at once” (May 1950, 2256), and the self is under a constant threat of annihilation.

This experience is characterized by a collapse in the fluid synergy between my body and the world, where even the most basic tasks of everyday life — standing up and moving, reaching out and taking hold of things, and interacting with others — become difficult. Overwhelmed by anxiety, my body loses its transparent grip on the world and begins to obtrude as a brute thing or object, as something clumsy and foreign that inhibits my engagement with the world. Laing describes this experience in terms of ‘the unembodied self.’ “In this position,” he writes, “the individual experiences his self as being more or less divorced and detached from his body. The body is felt more as one object among other objects in the world than as the core of the individual's own being” (1960, 69). Dissociated from my own body and from the world in this way, I am unable to meaningfully participate in the lives of others. Their gestures, words, and actions appear as lifeless and unreal to me as my own body does. This experience can result in feelings of ‘depersonalization’ where I feel as if I am not actually there and the world is not real (see Fuchs 2005). In this state, I know there is a world out there, but I can no longer feel it. It doesn't resonate emotionally as something substantial, meaningful, or significant to me. For clinicians, patient descriptions of this experience include statements like: “This seems unreal,” “This is like a dream,” “Nothing seems to be touching me,” and “This is not happening” (Laing 1960, 78).

When the world collapses in this way, not only does my identity slip away, but also others now appear to me as a threat because they expose the frailty and uncertainty of my being. When I interact with people who seem to be integrated, substantial, and whole, I am reminded of my own fragile and vulnerable state, that I have to put on a mask when I'm in public in order to “play at being sane” (148). To protect against this, the tendency is to withdraw and isolate oneself from others. But isolation further diminishes my sense of self, exacerbating the feeling of unreality. This is because, on the existentialist view, my identity exists only insofar as it is publicly acknowledged. I can understand myself as the person that I am — as a teacher, a husband, or a father — only in relation to how others see me. In other words, who I am and how I interpret myself is constituted by my being-with-others. This is why Sartre writes, “The Other holds a secret — the secret of what I am. He makes me be and thereby possesses me” (1956, 475). Without this inter-human relation, I am cut off from the world and my publicly interpreted identity begins to die. One of the goals of existential therapy, then, is to reestablish a sense of relation with others, to reintegrate the patient back into the public world so that a stable sense of identity can emerge and ontological security can be reestablished. But the primary aim is much more than this. The existential therapist wants the patient to learn from the experience, to recognize that anxiety is not necessarily a sign of insanity or a bio-chemical disorder. It is a teacher that reveals a painful but inescapable truth about the human situation, namely, that we are nothing, that we are “not real” (see Loy 1996). This is a radical way to rethink psychopathology. From the existential perspective, the individual who is overwhelmed with anxiety and experiences the collapse of the world may not be deluded; he or she may actually be glimpsing the truth of the human situation. As Laing writes:

If a man tells us he is “an unreal man,” and if he is not lying, or joking, or equivocating in some subtle way, there is no doubt that he will be regarded as deluded. But, existentially, what does this delusion mean? Indeed, he is not joking or pretending. On the contrary, he goes on to say that he has been pretending for years to have been a real person but can maintain the deception no longer. (1960, 36)

This interpretation exposes the limitations of the medical model. The existential therapist knows that psychiatric techniques may help the patient function, sleep better, and cope with the various stresses of life, but they can never fill the void lying at the core of the human condition. Social psychiatrist Dan Blazer offers his patient Tom as a case in point.

Tom, a law student at a local university, felt the bottom had dropped out of his life three months prior to consulting a psychiatrist. He could not sleep, he had difficulty eating, and his energy was ‘just gone.’ Everything seemed meaningless. Going on seemed useless. … Tom took an antidepressant medication for about six weeks. The antidepressant helped him sleep better and maintain his weight. … When asked in therapy what situations led him to experience [his] symptoms, he answered he felt anxious, lonely, and dislocated when he thought about his life. When asked, ‘What about your life led to these feelings?’ he answered, ‘Everything yet nothing in particular.’ (2005, 136–137)

In addition to medication, Tom began sessions of cognitive behavioral therapy with a psychologist to learn how to better manage his distorted thoughts. The pills and cognitive techniques helped him ‘feel better,’ but they could not get at the root of the problem. He continued to describe his experience as “empty” and “meaningless,” as if “the bottom dropped out” of his life, and that “maybe there never was a bottom” (137). This case presents a serious problem for the psychiatrist, because what Tom is going through is not a medical episode, but an ‘existential crisis,’ the all-too-human experience that occurs when “the defenses used to forestall existential anxiety are breached, allowing one to become truly aware of one's basic situation” (138; Yalom 1980, 207). This is where existential therapy breaks with the medical model because it does not seek to diminish or eradicate anxiety, but to confront it, dwell in it, and even increase it.

Because existence itself is the source of the crisis, existential anxiety should not be displaced or repressed. It should be fully experienced and accepted so that the patient can learn from it and become aware of who he or she is. Psychiatrists, of course, generally avoid this kind of exercise in self-awareness not only because it is discomfiting to them but also because it would aggravate the patient's already unstable condition. Their aim as medical professionals is to turn the inchoate experience of anxiety into something objective that can be managed and controlled, if not eliminated altogether. But the existential therapist knows that this is impossible because anxiety belongs to the human situation. As Paul Tillich writes, all “attempts to transform anxiety into fear are in vain. The basic anxiety, the anxiety of a finite being about the threat of nonbeing, cannot be eliminated. It belongs to existence itself” (2005, 333). Unless there is a genuine confrontation with one's own nothingness, anxiety will continue to emerge again and again, often with greater degrees of intensity. So, instead of defensively recoiling from the experience or trying to blunt it with medication, the aim of therapy is to “plunge into the roots of one's anxiety, for a period of time, experiencing heightened anxiousness” (Yalom 1980, 206). In the safety of a clinical setting, the therapist would encourage the patient to invite anxiety to come forth and dwell in it so that he or she can feel it, recognize it, and come to grips with its sources. It is only then that anxiety begins to lose its terrible power because the patient learns how to confront and integrate anxiety and death into everyday life. This is why Kierkegaard claims that “only that man who has gone through the anxiety of possibility is educated to have no anxiety” (1944, 141, my emphasis). In this case, the patient becomes aware that the world is fundamentally insecure and that he or she is not and has never been an enduring and substantial thing. With this acceptance the patient can be opened up to ways of living that are no longer mired in the neurotic and self-deceptive need for control and certainty, and life takes on a transformative sense of urgency, poignancy, and depth that was missing before the confrontation. Tolstoy's The Death of Ivan Ilych offers the classic example of this kind of transformation.

Absorbed in the trivialities of everyday life, Ivan has a strong sense of ontological security. He has normal fears about money, vocational success, and social appearance, but because these fears are of something they can be easily managed. It is not until he is stricken with the possibility of his own annihilation from a terminal illness that his world begins to collapse. Initially, Ivan can't face the fact that he himself is the source of his anxiety, referring to his impending death as ‘It,’ as if it were an object that was separate and distinct from him. “It would come and stand before him and look at him,” writes Tolstoy, “and he would be petrified and the light would die out of his eyes, and he would again begin asking himself whether It alone was true” (1960, 133). But his anxiety persists, and the more he denies and represses it the more intense it becomes, eventually swallowing him completely. “From that moment the screaming began that continued for three days and was so terrible that one could not hear it … without horror” (154). Experiencing the full force of anxiety, Ivan's identity as a judge, a husband, and a father is destroyed, yet in this dissolution he suddenly realizes, “Maybe I did not live as I ought to have done” (148). This is the power of the existential crisis. It shakes us out of the false security of everyday life and makes us stand before the ultimate questions: ‘Who am I?’ and ‘How should I live?’ In his last moments, Ivan finally accepts his death and is transformed. He is flooded with an awareness of the poignancy and fleetingness of life and of the depth of his feelings for his wife and children. Tolstoy's story reveals that anxiety is a threat to existence because it shatters the meanings that hold our identity together. But it also opens up possibilities for existential growth and change by revealing who we are as vulnerable and finite beings and by forcing us to confront the self-defining choices and actions that made us who we are.

From this discussion, we see that existential therapy is not a scientific or technical procedure that seeks to eradicate anxiety. The aim, rather, is to understand the human situation, to bring to the surface fundamental experiences and questions of being human, and to free the patient from self-deception by accepting and integrating anxiety and death into life. The scientific framework of medical psychiatry cannot address these kinds of concerns because it fails to see the patient from the perspective of existence. This raises the question of whether or not existential therapy is opposed to any kind of medical intervention that objectifies and dehumanizes the patient, even if these interventions would protect the patient from self-harm or from hurting others. From a clinician's standpoint, is it naïve or even dangerous to encourage existential anxiety to come forth?

Is existentialism anti-psychiatry?

Although its philosophical roots can be traced back to Kierkegaard and Nietzsche in the nineteenth century, the acceptance of an existential approach as an alternative to the medical model in psychiatry is a more recent development. Austrian psychoanalyst Otto Rank (1884–1939) first began to incorporate existential interpretations of selfhood and anxiety in his clinical practice after breaking with Freud in the late 1920s. And Rank's contemporaries in Switzerland, Ludwig Binswanger and Medard Boss, drew on Heidegger's conception of Dasein to pioneer new forms of treatment in the 1940s and 1950s by framing the nature of psychopathology, not in terms of biological dysfunctions or unconscious Oedipal conflicts, but in terms of the structural breakdown of being-in-the-world (May 1958a). And, in the United States, clinicians such as Rollo May and Irvin Yalom played a similar role in applying the insights of existentialism to psychotherapy. But it was in Britain in 1960s and 1970s that existential therapy gained the most widespread acceptance among mental health professionals, largely through the work of psychiatrists such as David Cooper (1931–1986) and R. D. Laing. The reenvisioning of psychiatry offered by Cooper and Laing resonated with the anti-authoritarian ideals of the 1960s by challenging prevailing psychiatric practices, where the patient was diagnosed and labeled as ‘insane,’ controlled with drugs and/or electroconvulsive therapy, or hospitalized against his or her will. These practices, famously satirized in Ken Kesey's One Flew over the Cuckoo's Nest (1962), were criticized for representing the attitudes of an overly rationalized and repressive society, where any behavior that broke with the status quo was considered a threat to the social order, and psychiatrists were viewed as enforcers of the order in the same way police or prison guards were. Indeed, on their view, mental illness was seen as a ‘healthy’ reaction to these dehumanizing social conditions (Kennard 1998, 104).

In response to these conditions, Cooper and Laing established a new kind of therapeutic community where the aim was not to label, objectify, and control patients, but to understand them as people, relating to their existential situation and giving them a safe space to confront their anxiety and discover who they were. In these communities, residents were not diagnosed as ‘mentally ill’ but given freedom to participate in community activities as they saw fit. Staff and residents were regarded as equals, and medications were largely unavailable. Although a number of communities were established in the 1960s, the most famous and controversial was Kingsley Hall in London. A psychiatrist who lived and worked there described the conditions in the following way:

People who were psychotic were given space, they were given company if they wished, or not, and they were given a great deal of physical support if necessary. It was a feature about life at Kingsley Hall that as people were not considered ill, they did not have to be treated. No drugs were to be given to anybody. There were no staff and no patients, and there was no formal structure of doing things around the Hall, yet things got done. There were people who were “up” and people who were “down.” The people who were “up” or capable of functioning in a more usual social sense look after the Hall. (106)

Following Heidegger's notion of ‘liberating solicitude,’ the aim of treatment at Kingsley Hall was to release or free the patients from dehumanizing interventions so that they could face anxiety on their own terms and create their own identity without the reflexive need to conform to what society deemed ‘normal.’ On this view, medication and hospitalization were rejected because they would deny the patient the freedom for this authentic confrontation, to break through the anxiety and ‘become who they are.’

The obvious problem with this approach is that it runs the risk of romanticizing or glorifying anxiety as a “healing experience” and a necessary path to self-realization and personal growth (Barnes and Berke 1971, 86). This is a recurring theme in existentialism, one suggesting that those who suffer the most are the most self-aware and live with increased intensity and passion. They are more artistic, creative, and authentic than others because they fully experience the chaotic anguish of the human situation. Nietzsche famously expresses this romantic sentiment in an oft-quoted line from Thus Spoke Zarathustra: “I tell you: one must still have chaos within oneself, to give birth to a dancing star. I tell you: you still have chaos within you” (2006, I, 5). Or, consider this compelling passage from the Russian existentialist Nikolai Berdyaev:

Not the worst but the best of mankind suffer the most. The intensity with which suffering is felt may be considered an index of a man's depth. The more the intellect is developed and the soul refined … the more sensitive does one become to pain, not only the pains of the soul but physical pains as well. … But for pain and suffering the animal in man would be victorious. (cited in Olson 1962, 28)

There is certainly therapeutic value in recognizing the inescapable pain of being human. But it is questionable whether or not this pain is a sign of a person's creative depth and sensitivity, and whether or not it is always transformative. There are clearly instances of psychic suffering that are so overwhelming, so dangerous, that a medical intervention is necessary. Indeed, Mary Barnes, arguably the most famous patient at Kingsley Hall, nearly died because of the therapeutic attitude of non-interference. In the process of ‘going down’ to confront her anxiety, she would repeatedly cover herself with her own feces, attack her doctors, and eventually stopped eating altogether. Her own psychiatrist, Joseph Berke, “was horrified to see how thin she was, almost like one of those half-alive cadavers the army liberated from Auschwitz” (Barnes and Berke 1971, 228). But Berke and Laing, believing that this was her choice and part of her own process of personal growth, let it go on for some time. The situation eventually reached a point of crisis, where Barnes became “so thin that [they] felt she couldn't even be sent to a hospital, [and that they] might be prosecuted for keeping [her] like that” (Kennard 1998, 107). The staff was forced to intervene and feed her like a baby with milk from a bottle. Barnes survived but her experience exposed the danger of the non-interference aspect of existential therapy.

We can appreciate this problem by going back to the existentialist configuration of the self as a tension between facticity and transcendence. Laing and his colleagues do not deny that there are determinate ‘facts’ about being human, that I am, for instance, a living organism with a unique biochemical signature that shapes my emotional vulnerability. But what distinguishes us from non-human organisms is that we do not simply react to biochemical impulses; we can transcend them by choosing to interpret them in particular ways. I can, for instance, choose to flee from anxiety by taking tranquilizers or by trying to displace it with some objective fear, or I can face it, accept it, and try to integrate it into my life. In either case, the existentialist position makes it clear that I make myself who I am through my free, meaning-giving choices. But the case of Mary Barnes suggests that existential therapists may be overplaying their hand when it comes to transcendence. Indeed, in instances of extreme psychosis, the ability to self-consciously reflect on and give meaning to my emotional state is diminished to such an extent that the very notion of selfhood can be called into question. Consider William Styron's famous description of his own depressive breakdown in his memoir Darkness Visible:

I had reached a phase of the disorder where all sense of hope had vanished, along with the idea of futurity; my brain, in the thrall to its outlaw hormones, had become less an organ of thought than an instrument of registering minute by minute, varying degrees of suffering. … I would lie for as long as six hours, stuporous and virtually paralyzed, gazing at the ceiling and waiting for that moment of evening when, mysteriously, the crucifixion would ease up just enough to allow me to force down some food and then, like an automaton, seek an hour or two of sleep again. (1990, 58)

Styron's words are important because they reveal how out of reach the possibility of self-realization was. By referring to himself as an ‘automaton’ in ‘thrall to its outlaw hormones,’ Styron is clearly suggesting that he was in no way free to take a stand on his condition, that he was actually trapped in facticity. Whereas the existential approach insists that by confronting and accepting anxiety we can eventually break through and realize who we are, in Styron's case this interpretation seems implausible. Indeed, it could be argued that he is no longer a self at all because he does not exhibit the capacity for transcendence (see Aho 2013). And it is at these times when a medical intervention would seem most appropriate. But would this not undermine the therapeutic aim of non-interference, of freeing the patient so they can confront their own nothingness? Not necessarily.

Binswanger writes that the “existential orientation in psychiatry arose from dissatisfaction with the prevailing efforts to gain scientific understanding in psychiatry” (1956, 144). But ‘dissatisfaction’ does not entail the wholesale rejection of scientific approaches. It should entail a rejection of ‘scientism,’ a view that Heidegger describes as one where “science alone provides the objective truth. [Where] science is the new religion” (2001, 18). In his own series of seminars with psychiatrists and psychotherapists toward the end of his career, Heidegger makes it clear that mental health professionals are overly influenced by the dogmas of natural science, and this invariably makes them “blind” (59, 75) to their own prejudices as well as to the situated experience of the patient. “Science,” he writes, “is dogmatic to an almost unbelievable degree everywhere, i.e. it operates with preconceptions and prejudices [which have] not been reflected upon. There is the highest need for doctors who think and who do not wish to leave the field entirely to scientific techniques” (103). But for Heidegger, science itself is not the problem. It is the hegemony of the scientific method as the only way to interpret the human situation that is at issue because it reduces the human being to “something chemical and as something which can be affected [only] by chemical interventions” (155). Heidegger's goal in speaking to medical professionals is to liberate them from this reductive assumption so that they can encounter the patient as an existing person, not as a thing. But liberating doctors from reductivism should not preclude the use of psychiatric techniques. If a patient can be pulled out of a state of paralyzing anxiety by means of medication, electroconvulsive therapy, or hospitalization, then medical interventions do not necessarily have to be viewed as dehumanizing and repressive, but as a way of recovering the patient's capacity for transcendence. In spite of the instrumental intervention, the primary aim of existential therapy can remain intact. No longer engulfed in the ‘outlaw hormones’ of facticity, the patient can now begin the hard work of self-realization, of facing anxiety as an existential given, and of integrating an awareness of their own freedom and death into everyday life.

Of all the existentialists, Nietzsche is the most sensitive to how the determinations of one's own physiology limit the possibilities for self-realization. He insists that man “know himself physiologically,” and that “to know, e.g., that one has a nervous system (—but no ‘soul’—) is still the privilege of the best informed” (1968, 229). The suggestion, here, is that our capacity for transcendence is always mediated by the polymorphous drives and affects of the biological body. Whether I am able to freely accept anxiety and death into my life is not necessarily up to me; it is the result of the “fortunate organization” of my nature (705). This is why Nietzsche says: “[Freedom] is for the very few” (1998, 29). It is “a privilege of the strong” (1990, IX 38) who cannot help but confront themselves and accept who they are. Nietzsche understands that some of us are not so strong because we are born with a complex of inherited genes and neurochemistry that sabotages the authentic confrontation with anxiety. “It is simply impossible,” he writes, “that a person would not have his parents’ and forefathers’ qualities and preferences in his body. … If we know something about the parents, then we are allowed a stab at the child. … These things will be passed onto the child as surely as corrupted blood” (1998, 264). Our own genetic vulnerabilities or ‘corrupted blood’ invariably shape our affective response to anxiety and death. Fortified with a particular neurochemistry, confronting the experience may very well be healing, freeing us from neurotic self-deception, and opening up new possibilities for existential growth. But existential therapists need to guard against the tendency to romanticize anxiety. For some patients, there is no breakthrough or transformation. The experience can be so overwhelming that, without some medical intervention, they are destroyed. This helps us to better understand Styron's words when, in the darkest phase of his collapse, he simply asks: “Why wasn't I in a hospital?” (1990, 59).

These cautionary comments are in no way meant to diminish the importance of existential approaches to mental health. In the age of medicalization, there is more need than ever to both situate and understand the patient within his or her own context and to recognize and accept the inescapable pain of being human. By taking a position of scientific detachment and reducing the patient to an object, the therapist invariably overlooks the patient's lived experience and fails to see that ‘maladaptive’ or ‘abnormal’ behavior is, first and foremost, an expression of the patient's way of being-in-the-world. From the existential perspective, the patient does not merely want to be measured and tested for outward signs of a ‘disease.’ More than anything, he or she wants their experience “to be heard” (Laing 1960, 31). In this sense, the existential perspective offers a number of important correctives to the prevailing medical model. First, it allows the therapist to suspend objectifying judgments about the patient and the causal nature of mental illness so that they can listen to the patient as a person and enter into their experience as they feel and understand it. Second, it opens up a space for self-criticism in the ‘psy’ professions by critically engaging ‘the world,’ that is, the sociohistorical situation that has made scientific objectification and technique the default setting in modern medicine in the first place. Indeed, there are encouraging signs in recent psychiatric and psychotherapeutic theory that reflect this attitude of self-criticism by drawing directly on the insights of existentialism. They can be found, among other places, in the emergence of the ‘post-psychiatry’ movement inaugurated by Bradley Lewis (2006) and Patrick Bracken and Philip Thomas (2005), in the relational or intersubjective psychoanalysis of Robert Stolorow and George Atwood (1992), and in the social psychiatry of Dan Blazer (2005). Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the existential approach allows for a mutual recognition between therapist and patient; that the deepest forms of psychic suffering do not originate in faulty biochemistry, but emerge out of the structural frailty and insecurity of the human condition itself. In this sense, both therapist and patient are walking the same ground, both having to confront their own anxiety and death on their own terms.

We will return to the role of the therapist and the problem of medicalization in the final chapter as we shift our discussion to existentialism's relevance today. As we will see, approaching the phenomena of health and illness from the perspective of one's own embodied and situated experience rather than from the perspective of scientific detachment has had a deep and wide-ranging impact on healthcare practitioners and has opened up exciting avenues of research in areas such as bioethics, narrative medicine, nursing, gerontology, and palliative care. This, along with other recent developments in feminist and post-colonial theory and critical philosophies of race, as well as in environmental philosophy and comparative thought, demonstrate that existentialism is not a moribund relic from mid-twentieth-century France. It is, rather, a way of thinking that is flourishing in some of the most important areas of contemporary philosophy and social science. It is to these recent developments that we can now turn our attention.

Suggested reading

Binswanger, L. (1956). Existential analysis and psychotherapy. In F. Fromm-Reichmann and J. L. Moreno (eds.), Progress in psychotherapy (pp. 144–168). New York: Grune and Stratton.

Laing, R. D. (1960). The divided self: A study of sanity and madness. New York: Penguin Books.

May, R. (1958a). The origins and significance of the existential movement in psychology. In R. May, E. Angel, and H. F. Ellenberger (eds.), Existence: A new dimension in psychiatry and psychology (pp. 3–36). New York: Simon and Schuster.

Yalom, I. (1980). Existential psychotherapy. New York: Basic Books.

9: Existentialism Today

Samuel Beckett

There is no denying that the Golden Age of existentialism has long passed. In the 1950s and 1960s, smoke-filled apartments, cafes, and jazz clubs in France and the United States were buzzing with late-night discussions of ‘la condition humaine,’ and an entire generation of young writers, musicians, and intellectuals could be seen carrying around tattered copies of works by Camus, Sartre, and Beauvoir. Articles on the movement appeared regularly in mainstream magazines such as Life, Time, Newsweek, Harper's Bazaar, and the Atlantic Monthly, giving a popular voice to themes of ‘alienation,’ ‘absurdity,’ and ‘death.’ Indeed, the movement became so fetishized that the American fashion magazine Vogue would publish full spreads on Sartre and Beauvoir detailing both their radical ideas and the stylized look of the “French existentialist” (Cotkin 2003, 95). But if the cultural phenomenon has faded, does this mean the core ideas of existentialism are also passé? Was the French postmodernist Jean Baudrillard correct when he said, “We have thrown off that old existential garb. … Who cares about freedom, bad faith, and authenticity today?” (2001, 3; cited in Reynolds and Woodward 2011, 261). In this concluding chapter, I want to challenge this suggestion and argue that the legacy of existentialism is alive and well in current research in the humanities and social sciences.

We have already touched on existentialism's impact on contemporary trends in the philosophy of mind and cognitive science (chapter 3), in dialogical and narrative conceptions of the self in recent Anglophone philosophy (chapter 4), and in current theories and practices in psychiatry and psychotherapy (chapter 8). But there are also new areas in political theory, feminist and post-colonial thought, and critical philosophies of race that are shaped by the ideas of existentialism. And many of the cutting-edge debates in environmental philosophy are informed by existentialism's critique of modern dualisms and the articulation of the self as relational and already bound up in the natural world. This relational ontology has also influenced key developments in comparative philosophy, revealing deep affinities between the existentialist conceptions of suffering, finitude, and selfhood and those found in the Eastern traditions. Finally, existentialism has made a profound and lasting impact on contemporary approaches to healthcare by reframing our interpretations of health and illness, engaging them from the perspective of lived experience rather than from the standpoint of scientific detachment and objectivity. The proceeding discussion will display existentialism's relevance by highlighting some of these contributions and how they have shaped the current intellectual landscape. We begin with an area for which existentialism has long been criticized, namely, politics.

Oppression and recognition

One of the most important critiques of existentialism comes from the Marxist tradition, one suggesting that the existentialist's narrow focus on the individual and subjective freedom in the face of meaninglessness and death tends to overlook concrete forms of social and political oppression that invariably inhibit the possibility for authentic self-creation. On this view, existentialism represents the perspective of a small, privileged, and affluent class of people who are often writing behind the secure walls of the academy and whose living conditions are not already fraught with daily struggles for food, healthcare, and shelter. For the vast majority of people, then, the existentialist call to heroically confront the possibility of death is eclipsed by more basic material needs for physical survival in order to avoid actual death. Indeed, although the ideas may have informed the slogans of the student and labor revolts in France in May 1968 and the activist politics of the New Left in England and the United States, existentialism's emphasis on the solitary individual, the extensive criticisms of the bureaucratic state and mass society, and the rejection of the possibility of moral absolutes and the viability of normative ethics suggests a deep ambivalence toward politics. But this criticism only skims the service.

It is true that existentialists tend to neglect traditional political questions concerning human ‘rights,’ ‘justice,’ and ‘equality.’ These values are largely dismissed as ‘metaphysical comforts’ or manifestations of bourgeois conformism that get in the way of the individual's confrontation with freedom and death. But the careful reader understands that there is a deeper aim for the existentialists, one focused on a radical reconfiguration of the way we interpret ‘the human,’ one that challenges the modern liberal tradition and the view of the self as a rational, masterful, and atomistic subject. And this reconfiguration has opened up a more nuanced sensitivity to the particularities of human suffering and aspects of oppression and exploitation that have been largely covered over by the abstract universal values of liberal democracies. Thus, even though many held political positions that were at times questionable and in Heidegger's case despicable, their philosophies nonetheless laid the groundwork for new ways to theorize oppression by dismantling the assumptions of the modern self.

From a political perspective, to universalize ‘the human’ as a rational and sovereign subject is problematic, if not dangerous, precisely because it tends to exclude ‘the Other,’ those groups — women, colonized peoples, migrants, deviants, racial minorities, the mentally ill and disabled — who have historically existed outside of the dominant cultural discourse of reason and power. As Judith Butler notes regarding Islamic populations after 9/11: “[They] are considered less than human or ‘outside’ the cultural conditions for the emergence of the human … [and] they are regarded as not yet having arrived at the rational human. … It follows from such a viewpoint that the destruction of such populations … constitutes the destruction of what threatens the human, but not of the human itself” (2009, 125; cited in Kruks 2012, 27). One of the more significant contributions of existentialism, in this regard, is the recognition that reason is not a foundational or necessary given when it comes to conceptualizing ‘the human.’ It is, rather, a contingent historical construct that happens to take hold in the West with the dawn of Greek philosophy. Indeed, the existentialists show that reason plays only a small role in our everyday agency. As figures like Dostoevsky and Nietzsche made clear, our actions are all too often motivated by irrational drives, desires, and affects that we are never explicitly conscious of, and there is no political system that can fully contain them. It is a mistake, then, to regard the realm of politics as a neutral domain occupied by rational agents because unconscious drives and forces are already influencing our actions behind our backs. By challenging the notion of ‘the human’ in this way, existentialists have been able to create a discursive opening for those who exist on the margins, whose experiences fall outside the normative space of reason and who have, as a result, interpreted themselves as ‘invisible,’ ‘absent,’ or ‘unreal.’ Fanon offers an example as a colonized black man when he writes:

I was hated, despised, detested, not by the neighbor across the street or my cousin on my mother's side, but by an entire race. I was up against something unreasoned. … I would personally say that for a man whose only weapon is reason there is nothing more neurotic than contact with unreason. … When I was present, it [reason] was not; when it [reason] was there, I was no longer. (1967, 118–120)

Here, we see existentialism's critique of the rational subject and its recognition of the oppressive power of reason as a normative construct. But, more importantly, Fanon's words provide us with a positive acknowledgment of the concrete particularities lived out by individuals as situated, affective, and embodied ways of being and the forms of oppression unique to each situation. Of all of the major figures in existentialism, perhaps none engaged the theme of situated oppression more rigorously than Beauvoir.

In three important works, Beauvoir addresses different manifestations of oppression, exploring the situation of women in her masterwork The Second Sex (1949), indigenous and African Americans in America Day by Day (1954), and the elderly in The Coming of Age (1970) (see Kruks 2012). Following the existentialist credo, ‘existence precedes essence,’ Beauvoir recognizes there is no pre-given essence or nature — no disembodied reason or will — that makes us who we are. We are, rather, self-making beings that become who we are on the basis of the self-conscious choices and actions we make as our lives unfold. But, as we saw earlier, Beauvoir's project is unique in the way it articulates the extent to which these choices and possibilities are always constrained by the embodied situation we find ourselves in. The human is not a detached, free-floating consciousness surpassing the fleshly limits of age, sex, skin color, and ethnicity. Our freedom (i.e., transcendence) is always in a state of ambiguous tension or conflict with the ‘givenness’ (i.e., facticity) of our embodiment. Thus, against Sartre's early conception of ‘radical’ or ‘absolute’ freedom in Being and Nothingness, Beauvoir emphasizes that we can never fully rise above the material limitations of our bodies or the situated meanings and values of our culture. This is because it is only against a horizon of cultural meanings that we can understand ourselves, and it is this horizon that opens up possibilities for existing and interpreting ourselves in particular ways. This helps to explains why Beauvoir says that “the body is not a thing; it is a situation … subject to taboos [and] laws. … It is a reference to certain values from which [she] evaluates [herself]” (1952, 38, 40–41, my emphasis).

In The Second Sex, Beauvoir describes how the woman's situation is shaped by the structures of domination in Western patriarchy. Through socioeconomic and political power structures, the woman's capacity for transcendence is restricted in ways that the man's is not. She is, all too often, reduced to an object or thing, confined to the subjugated identities of a masculine world — as virgin, whore, mother, or housewife — and this closes her off from the possibility of creating her own life. She is, as Beauvoir writes, “shut up in a kitchen or boudoir, and astonishment is expressed that her horizon is limited. Her wings are clipped, and it is found deplorable that she cannot fly” (672). This helps us to understand what Beauvoir means when she says that the woman is not ‘born’ subordinate by virtue of inferior anatomy and biology. Rather, she is ‘made’ subordinate by virtue of ‘being-in’ a masculine world. She is “shaped as in a mold by her situation. … Her convictions, her values, her wisdom, her morality, her tastes, her behavior — are to be explained by her situation” (664, 694). But the originality of Beauvoir's account is in how she articulates the ambiguity of oppression by showing how the woman is often complicit in her own objectification, willingly giving up her transcendence and embracing her identity as ‘the Other.’ For Beauvoir, interpreting oneself as a passive, inferior, even childish thing has its advantages because it allows the woman to flee from her own freedom and from taking responsibility for her existence. In the famous introduction to The Second Sex, she writes:

To decline to be the Other, to refuse to be a party to the deal — this would be for women to renounce all the advantages conferred upon them by her alliance with the superior caste. Man-the-sovereign will provide woman-the-liege with material protection and will undertake the moral justification for her existence; thus she can evade at once both economic risk and the metaphysical risk of a liberty in which ends and aims must be contrived without assistance. Indeed, along with the ethical urge of each individual to affirm her subjective existence, there is also the temptation to forgo liberty and become a thing. This is an inauspicious road, for she who takes it — passive, lost, ruined — becomes henceforth the creature of another's will, frustrated in her transcendence and deprived of every value. But it is an easy road; on it one avoids the strain involved in undertaking an authentic existence. When man makes of woman the Other, he may, then, expect her to manifest deep-seated tendencies toward complicity. (xxiv)

Beauvoir interprets this active complicity as especially prevalent among white upper-class women because they have the most to gain in preserving the masculine status quo both in terms of material comfort and, more importantly, in terms of being disburdened of the “terrible freedom” of self-creation. Mired in bad faith, “they are eager accomplices of their masters because they stand to profit from the benefits provided. … They repress all thought, all critical judgment, all genuineness is dead in their hearts and even in their faces” (697).

But the political oppression of privileged white woman is different from more extreme forms of oppression. As we saw earlier, existentialists generally regard the human situation as intersubjective or relational, that is, we can understand ourselves only through our public interactions with others. ‘The look,’ that is, the social judgment of others, is essential to the formation of our identities. Beauvoir takes this idea to show that the man — in order to understand himself as superior — needs to be seen and recognized by the woman as such. Following Hegel's notion of the ‘master — slave dialectic,’ Beauvoir argues that man's self-identification as ‘master’ is dependent on the ‘slave,’ in this case on the woman's recognition of him as a more powerful and noble being. Thus, if the woman is wholly reduced to a thing and stripped of her transcendence, she cannot freely give the man the recognition he needs to maintain his identity. Yet the politics of recognition do not extend to all aspects of alterity. If the woman is too old, for instance, mentally ill, poor, disabled, or black, she may be dehumanized to such an extent that she falls outside the sphere of inter-human relations. In these cases, her judgments are irrelevant to the master's self-interpretation. This brings up the problem of ‘total objectification,’ and it is here that we can begin to appreciate existentialism's impact on the development of critical race theory by providing a vocabulary and conceptual framework to articulate the black experience of oppression.

There are a number of black theorists and writers, including W. E. B. Du Bois (1868–1963), Alain Locke (1885–1954), Ralph Ellison (1914–1994), Richard Wright, and Frantz Fanon, whose works resonate to the core ideas of existentialism, especially those of Sartre and Beauvoir. In Ellison's novel Invisible Man (1952), for example, we are introduced to a black man whose existence is so diminished that he feels himself to be literally absent or invisible because white eyes do not see or recognize him as a human being. “I am an invisible man,” writes Ellison. “I am a man of substance, of flesh and bone, fiber and liquids — and I might even be said to possess a mind. I am invisible, understand, simply because people refuse to see me” (1995, 3). This total lack of recognition results in an experience of ‘total oppression,’ where every aspect of an individual's capacity for future self-creation is stripped away (Birt 1997). The individual is transformed into a brute thing, deprived of his or her ontological status as a human being. In Beauvoir's words, s/he is “reduced to pure facticity, congealed in his [or her] immanence, cut off from his [or her] future, deprived of his [or her] transcendence … no more than a thing among things” (1948, 100).

In Black Skin, White Masks, Fanon will refer to this phenomenon in terms of “overdetermination” (1967, 118), where the objectifying gaze of the white colonizer destroys the very struggle between facticity and transcendence that makes him human (Gordon 1997, 73). His identity becomes fixed or frozen; he is transformed into ‘a new genus,’ into something subhuman or bestial by the color of his skin:

I am given no chance. I am overdetermined from without. I am a slave … of my own appearance. … I progress by crawling. And already I am being dissected under white eyes, the only real eyes. I am fixed … I am laid bare. I feel, I see in those white faces that it is not a new man who has come in, but a new kind of man, a new genus. Why, it's a Negro! (Fanon 1967, 118)

Overdetermined in this way, the human ability to give meaning, to ‘take a stand’ on one's own facticity, becomes impossible. He is wholly contained and trapped in his blackness. And there is no way to transcend this predicament, to freely remake his identity. “Wherever he goes,” says Fanon, “the Negro remains a Negro” (173). Cornel West will later expand on Fanon's insight by articulating the extent to which the social forces of late modern capitalism fortify this dehumanizing situation, reinforcing the experience of hopelessness, paralyzing rage, and self-loathing that is so pervasive in poor black communities. The result is what he calls “a kind of walking nihilism” (1993, 90).

For West, the ‘walking nihilism’ of the black underclass is, in large part, the byproduct of our global market economy, where everything and everyone is transformed into an object or commodity for profit. In this kind of situation, the possibilities for individual self-creation are already extremely constrained because one's identity and sense of self-worth is limited to acts of crass consumerism and material excess, glorified daily on television, in magazines, movies, and pop music. But the black underclass cannot participate in these self-defining acts, and this only exacerbates their feelings of despair and worthlessness. Yet in his attentiveness to the particularities of market-driven poverty, West shows how the contemporary experience of nihilism transcends race, class, and gender, affecting huge swaths of the post-industrial population and leaving whole generations of the unemployed and underemployed adrift and unsupported, trapped in their facticity (Gates and West 1997, 107–112).

Like many critical race theorists, West makes it clear that his philosophy is indelibly shaped by existentialism and its focus on the concrete and particular concerns of being human rather than the traditional focus on intellectual detachment and abstraction that characterizes so much of “academic” or “university” philosophy (1993, 33). But it can be pointed out that existentialism's attentiveness to lived experience is not only neglected in mainstream Anglophone philosophy departments; it is also largely absent in the ‘postmodern’ philosophies that share many of the same theoretical commitments as existentialism in, for instance, their critiques of foundationalism and the authority of reason, their rejection of universalism and essentialism, and their focus on issues of ‘Otherness,’ heterogeneity, and difference. As bell hooks argues, postmodern discussions of alterity and difference often perpetuate the very political hierarchies they are trying to ‘deconstruct.’ First of all, the discussions generally take place in contexts that invariably exclude ‘the Other,’ specifically the privileged white halls of the academy. In these rarefied contexts, it is usually only those from a particular race and class, trained in the jargon-infused language of contemporary French theory that can participate in the discussion. Those who are most oppressed and exploited are not present, and if they were, they could not possibly understand what is being said. More importantly, the intellectual focus of postmodernism is largely on ‘Otherness’ as a theoretical abstraction. It is not on the concrete other, the impoverished minority who washes the dishes in the back of the restaurant or cleans my hotel room after I give my talk on ‘Otherness’ at the philosophy conference. “It is sadly ironic,” writes hooks, “that the contemporary discourse [of postmodernism] which talks about heterogeneity, the decentered subject, declaring breakthroughs that allow recognition of Otherness, still directs its critical voice primarily to a specialized audience that shares a common language rooted in the very master narratives it claims to challenge” (1993, 512).

Here, we see existentialism's unique contribution to political philosophy. The starting point does not come from a position of theoretical detachment but from the situated, flesh-and-blood struggles of everyday life. These concrete descriptions serve as testaments to what it means to be human and do not require privileged training in academic jargon and are not exclusive to the seminar room or lecture hall. They can be found in the writings of Charlotte Perkins Gilman, Virginia Woolf, and Doris Lessing, in the poetry and short stories of black, Latina, and indigenous writers, in the independent films and documentaries that capture the lived experience of the migrant worker, the mentally ill or disabled, in the blues and rap music that express the frustration and despair of life in the racialized South or in urban ghettos. By attending to the concrete and particular, these testimonials have the power to validate the experiences of those who have long been silenced. Instead of universalizing ‘the human’ around monolithic values conceived by a privileged white Western world, they disclose the exquisite differences in suffering and oppression unique to each individual situation.

Indeed, the existentialists make it clear that political values can never be universalized. There are no fixed and timeless truths that ground our moral commitments. Values are ambiguous and finite human constructs that emerge against the background of specific sociohistorical contexts. (It was the European Enlightenment, after all, which made it possible for philosophers to universalize the modern liberal values of ‘rights,’ ‘justice,’ and ‘equality’ in the first place. Such an egalitarian view would have been inconceivable in the hierarchical social arrangements of the Greco-Roman or Medieval worlds.) To this end, the political aims of existentialism may look modest. The primary goal is to remind us that our political projects are fragile and historically contingent and that these imperfections cannot be eradicated because they are constitutive of human existence itself. This is why Beauvoir calls for political philosophers to let go of the “dream of purity” (2004, 189; cited in Kruks 2012, 42). The best we can do is to create a discursive space so that the suffering individual can speak, be heard, and be recognized as such and to act, in the limited and incomplete way that we can, to free them from this situation. But when it comes to universal prescriptions for how all humans ‘ought’ to act when confronting oppression, the existentialist often remains silent.

By exploding the myth of the modern subject and forwarding an interpretation of the self as finite, vulnerable, and already bound up in potentially oppressive relations, existentialism has deeply influenced the way contemporary theorists conceptualize our relationship to the polis. But it has also broken new ground in how philosophers think about our relationship to the natural world, laying the conceptual groundwork for a ‘radical’ or ‘deep’ ecology that challenges the metaphysical assumptions of modern philosophy, assumptions that have proven to be so destructive in the technological age. In the next section, we turn to existentialism's contribution to recent developments in environmental philosophy.

Self and nature

As we saw in chapter 3, one of the great legacies of existentialism is its dismantling of the subject/object metaphysics that has been largely axiomatic to the Western worldview since the time of Descartes. On this account, there is an explicit separation between the ‘inner’ perceptions of my mind and what exists ‘out there’ in the real world, creating a situation of skepticism about whether anything in the world can be known with certainty. This position results in an epistemological gap or barrier between self (as encapsulated mind) and world (as objects), creating the impression that the world is somehow apart from us rather than part of us. Nature, from this perspective, is seen as being elsewhere; at best, it is the place we drive to on vacation or weekends, the National Parks, the beaches, the conservation areas or nature preserves. But more problematically, the scientific view tends to reduce the natural world to an aggregate of material objects. This is because, in order to gain genuine knowledge of things, the scientist focuses only on the objective ‘facts’ by following a method or procedure that abstracts out the ‘values’ that we bring to our experience of nature such as beauty, meaning, and purpose. The subject/object dualism, then, creates a more insidious fact/value dualism, one that interprets the natural world as a calculable domain of valueless matter that can be measured in terms of weight, mass, and volume. On this view, nature becomes in Heidegger's words a “resource” (Bestand) waiting to be “set upon” and mastered by technology. “The earth now reveals itself as a coal mining district. … Air is now set upon to yield nitrogen, the earth to yield ore, ore to yield uranium, uranium to yield atomic energy [etc.]” (1977b, 15).

But existentialists show that in my everyday life I do not experience myself as a detached mind or subject, nor do I encounter the world from a disinterested perspective as the sum total of objects that are separate and distinct from me. Rather, in my ordinary acts and practices I am ‘being-in-the-world,’ already bound up and involved with things that have meaning, that matter to me in particular ways based on my own embodied and situated perspective. For instance, unless I'm a hydrologist doing research, the river that runs through town does not reveal itself to me as a measurable mass of waterpower. It is, rather, the place that invites me for a swim on a hot day or the bittersweet memory of fishing with an old friend or the area that threatens to flood during rainy season. Camus's meditations in ‘Summer in Algiers’ illuminate how our own experience reveals a natural world vivid and rich with meanings and how these meanings are disclosed not through detached cognition but through penetrating emotions or moods. He writes of “the carob trees covering all of Algeria with a scent of love,” of the bay “opening to the sky like a mouth or a wound,” of the “flight of the black birds rising against the green horizon.” Struck by what he calls the “paralyzing excess of nature's bounty,” he asks:

How can one fail to participate in that dialogue of stone and flesh in tune with the sun and season? … In the evening or after the rain, the whole earth, its womb moist with a seed of bitter almond, rests after having given herself to the sun all summer long. And again the scent hallows the union of man and earth and awakens in us the only really virile love in this world: ephemeral and noble. (1955, 141, 144, 153–154)

Camus's description of the sensual ‘union of earth and man’ undermines the dualisms that are foundational to the modern worldview by showing how they uncritically assume a standpoint of theoretical detachment, a standpoint that is betrayed by our own experience.

Heidegger's work is especially helpful here because he makes it clear that the primary relationship we have with the world is based not on ‘knowing’ about it but on ‘caring’ about it and our place in it. Before we can know anything about present-at-hand objects, we already embody a felt sense of care or concern with things that arises from our situated frame of reference. This is why Heidegger says, “Care is ontologically earlier” than any detached reflection (1962, 194, my emphasis). This means that the objectifying view of modern science is not only parasitic on our everyday being-in-the-world; it also covers over and hides the layers of experiential meaning that allow the natural world to emotionally affect us. Environmental philosophers have recently taken up this point, highlighting the significance of Heidegger's alteration of the famous Cartesian dictum from “I think, therefore I am” to “I care, therefore, I am” (Evernden 1985, 70). On this view, we are not disinterested minds looking down on the natural world as a calculable grid of resources. We are already situated and involved in such a way that forests, animals, rivers, and mountains light up for us in meaningful ways.

Yet Heidegger shows that our objectifying worldview has become so habituated and ingrained in our everyday life that it is now difficult to see the natural world in any other way. This self-interpretation, says Heidegger, is “not only close to us — even that which is closest: we are it, each of us” (1962, 36, my emphasis). Heidegger will refer to this as the “totalizing” aspect of modern technology; it has become so dominant that it “drives out” (1977b, 27) any other way to understand or make sense of the natural world. One of the consequences of this view is an interpretation of nature as threatening and constantly in need of being subdued and controlled, resulting in a feeling of alienation, of not belonging or “being-at-home” on the earth, a feeling Heidegger associates with an anxiety that “has never been greater than today” (1999b, 97). The modern experience of ‘homelessness’ reveals the unique paradox of our ecological crisis. Scientific advances cannot solve our predicament because it is the scientific worldview itself that is the source of the problem. Replacing environmentally destructive fossil fuels, for example, with ecologically friendly energy sources like solar, wind, or geothermal does not create a ‘home’ because it does nothing to change the dualistic paradigm and our view of nature as a storehouse of resources. What is required instead is an ontological transformation in how we see ourselves, not as atomistic ‘subjects’ that master ‘objects’ but as situated and concerned ways of being that are inextricably bound to the earth. This is where the insights of existentialism play such an important role. By using our own lived experience as a starting point, we not only gain access to our own inherence in nature; we also allow the affective meaning and value inherent in nature to speak to us (Thomson 2004, 383).

For Heidegger, this Gestalt shift creates an opening for a radically new way of dwelling, one that is no longer mired in calculative attempts to control and manipulate the earth, but rather “lets (lassen) the earth be as earth” (1971, 224). Heidegger describes this kind of dwelling in terms of Gelassenheit, referring to a solicitous and attentive practice that “releases” or “lets go” of beings (1966, 55). Heidegger believes that in cultivating Gelassenheit we are able to free ourselves from our own objectifying tendencies and, as a result, free the earth from technological domination. It allows us to recognize that we are irrevocably woven to the transient and enigmatic interplay of nature and to see this interplay as our only home, one that needs to be preserved and cherished as such. This, however, does not mean Heidegger is espousing a kind of neo-Luddism that rejects modern technology in toto. He wants us to realize that the technological worldview serves an important function, but it is only one of many possible ways for us to interpret nature. The danger today is that this worldview has become totalizing and excludes all other interpretations; it “rules the whole earth” and turns it into a “gigantic gasoline station” (50). Heidegger will refer to this monolithic view as a “flight from mystery” because it covers over and destroys the possibility of recognizing our enigmatic interdependence with nature (1977a, 135). Thus, in contrast with the anxiety of ‘homelessness,’ Gelassenheit fosters a different mood, a sense of ‘wonder’ and ‘awe’ at our precarious enmeshment, and it opens up a way of dwelling that resonates to the original meaning of technology, a meaning captured in the ancient Greek word technê.

In ‘The Question Concerning Technology,’ an essay that has become a classic in environmental philosophy, Heidegger suggests that technê was originally understood in relation to nature or physis, which for the Greeks referred to the dynamic way in which beings are initially “brought-forth” (poiēsis) or come into being; it is “the bursting open of the blossom into bloom, in itself” (1977b, 10). Understood this way, technê refers to the human capacity to make or build things in a way that is in harmony or rapport with physis, that is, with how beings are naturally ‘brought-forth.’ The Greek craftsman, for instance, would build a bridge in a way that does not obstruct or destroy the natural flow of the river, but “lets the river run its course” (Heidegger 1977a, 330, my emphasis; see Young 2000, 37–38). Contrast this ancient interpretation with how technê is understood today, where the hydroelectric plant is built to force the river into a reservoir, into a resource waiting to be “challenged” and “set upon” by industry (Heidegger 1977b, 16). Gelassenheit allows us to recover the original sense of technê and the lost connection between building and dwelling. Indeed, Heidegger shows how the Old High German word for ‘building’ (bauen) is etymologically related to the word ‘dwelling’ (buan). But bauen is a word that “also means … to cherish and protect, to preserve and care for” (1977a, 325). Understood this way, to dwell is to build in a way that preserves and cares for nature as the primordial bringing forth of beings, a bringing forth whereby each thing is in a state of fragile and dynamic interplay with other things in a “primal oneness” (327). Dwelling protects this delicate web of relations by releasing it and letting it be.

Heidegger's idea of letting go of our anxious need to control and master the earth and the non-dualistic recognition of ourselves as bound up in the dynamic interplay of nature leads us to another aspect of existentialism's influence, namely, its impact on comparative philosophy and the legitimation of Asian thought within the mainstream philosophical tradition. In fact, it could be argued that Heidegger's work has been received more enthusiastically in the East than it has in the West. The first translation of Being and Time, after all, was in Japanese in 1951, over a decade before the book was ever officially translated into English or French. And in the subsequent years, Being and Time has been translated a full six times in Japanese, with another Asian language, Korean, offering three complete translations (Parkes 1990, 9; Ciocan 2005). And, in his later writings, Heidegger spoke explicitly of the need for “dialogue with the East Asian world” (1977b, 158) in order to combat the nihilism and destructiveness of modern technology. In the next section we will take a look at the affinities between existentialism and Eastern thought, focusing specifically on the tradition of Zen Buddhism, and how the two schools complement each other in fleshing out the nature of suffering and what it means to be human.

Self and dukkha

The most immediate and obvious connection between existentialism and Buddhism is the recognition of the anguish and despair at the heart of the human condition. This connection began to take shape in the early decades of the nineteenth century, primarily through the writings of Arthur Schopenhauer (1788–1860), who drew on the Buddhist notion of suffering to develop his own view of how the ‘Will’ torments us through its ceaseless cravings and that it is only by extinguishing or letting go of these cravings that we can achieve some kind of solace or liberation. In a famous line from the second volume of his masterwork, The World as Will and Representation, Schopenhauer wrote, “If I were to take the results of my philosophy as the standard of truth, I should concede to Buddhism pre-eminence over the others” (1966, 169). And, with a significant debt to Schopenhauer, Nietzsche also expressed his admiration of Buddhism as a religion that is “a hundred times more realistic than Christianity” for its rejection of moral absolutes and its recognition of the human condition as a fundamental “struggle against suffering” (1990, 20). But the question of what exactly the existentialists mean by suffering remains unclear, and it is here that the insights of Buddhism are especially profound.

The teachings of the Buddha are summarized in ‘four noble truths’: (i) life means suffering, (ii) the origin of suffering is attachment, (iii) the end of suffering is attainable, and (iv) the path to the end of suffering. The Sanskrit word for ‘suffering’ (dukkha) is a sweeping term that refers to all the physical pains, anxieties, dissatisfactions, frustrations, irritations, and stresses that are part of being human. Dukkha, then, is not something we have; it is something we are. It is a structural or constitutive aspect of the human condition (Loy 1996, 83). The Buddhist tradition generally distinguishes between three different kinds of dukkha. The first refers to all of the inescapable pains of living such as the trauma of birth, illnesses, everyday worries, anxieties of physical diminishment and impending death, and grief from the inevitable loss of loved ones. Existentialists have long described how life is fraught with this kind of meaningless suffering and how the clear-sighted realization of this often brings us face-to-face with the question of God's absence and the ultimate concerns regarding the meaning and purpose of life. Tolstoy, for instance, described how this realization nearly shattered him, pushing him to the edge of suicide:

I could not attribute a reasonable motive to any single act in my whole life. I was only astonished that I could not have realized this at the very beginning. All this had so long ago been known to me! Illness and death would come … to those whom I loved, to myself, and nothing remains but stench and worms. All my acts, whatever I did, would sooner or later be forgotten, and I myself [would] be nowhere. Why, then, busy oneself with anything. (1994, 16)

The Buddhist tradition goes on to suggest that when we are momentarily free from this first kind of suffering, we are able to examine a deeper and more subtle manifestation of dukkha, the suffering caused by the ceaseless change and impermanence of all things.

In this second state, we suffer in the way we cling to the things we desire but that are invariably fleeting and transitory. In an effort to deny or flee from the impermanence of things and from our own impermanence, we attach ourselves to our possessions, our physical health, our relationships, our professional accomplishments and social identities because they create the illusion that we are real and that there is something secure and thing-like about our existence. But Buddhism shows that clinging to attachments in this way is ultimately self-defeating. Each time we attain the thing we crave, a feeling of emptiness invariably follows it, and this creates a new craving. The result is an endless cycle of craving, revealing that we are never happy or content with where we are — right now — in our lives. Happiness is always around the next corner; it will come after the promotion at work, after the wedding, after the children are born, after retirement, etc. This insight teaches us the second of Buddhism's four noble truths, namely, that the origin or cause of our suffering is in our ceaseless craving for attachments. Stuck in this cycle, we are always diverted and distracted from the present moment by desiring the next thing. But filling ourselves with things cannot fill the void because the human situation is itself a void; it is no-thing. A number of existentialists have pointed out how this manifestation of suffering is exacerbated today because modern technology has created increasingly sophisticated ways to manufacture distractions and rapidly satisfy new cravings. Indeed, Heidegger will refer to this state of restless distraction as one of signature ‘symptoms’ of modernity, where we are “unable-to-bear the stillness” of our own lives and are always caught up in the “mania for what is surprising, for what immediately sweeps [us] away and impresses [us], again and again and in different ways” (1999b, 84).

This second kind of suffering is similar to what existentialists like Sartre and Beauvoir have called ‘bad faith’ insofar as it is a way of being that desires the thing-like security of ‘being-in-itself’ and flees from the structural contingency and impermanence of consciousness or ‘being-for-itself.’ By asserting ‘existence precedes essence,’ existentialists remind us that there is no pre-given essence that makes us who we are. Our identities, rather, are fundamentally transient and unstable; as long as we exist we are a ‘not yet,’ always in the process of becoming, of ceaselessly making and re-making ourselves. This is why Sartre says, ‘I am what I am not.’ But like the Buddhist, existentialists are also sensitive to the psychological need we have to deny our impermanence because denial protects us from the painful truth of our situation. Nietzsche, for instance, describes how we let ourselves be deceived so that we never have to confront the fact that there is no stable ground or foundation that can secure our existence. He refers to this historical mass deception in the West as the ‘will to truth.’ From Greek philosophy to Christendom, a story has been told regarding the truth about the way the world really is. It is, according to Nietzsche, our “longest lie” (1995, 344), and we cling to it because it tells us there is something real and enduring about us, that we have a ‘spirit,’ ‘soul,’ or ‘will’ that is not subject to the terrible vicissitudes of life. But the acculturated habit of clinging to the idea of the self in this way leads to the third and deepest form of dukkha.

In the Buddhist tradition, the consuming effort to secure our sense of self and cover over our own impermanence results in ‘conditioned states’ where self-centered craving becomes automatic and unconscious. Life simply becomes the ceaseless struggle against our own impermanence, where we endlessly try to order and arrange our lives in an effort to feel grounded and secure. This is an all-encompassing form of suffering because it permeates every aspect of our lives. But it is also the subtlest and most inconspicuous form of suffering because the patterns of socialization that constitute these conditioned states prevent us from realizing that we are suffering. In this sense, “Everyone collaborates in everyone else's forgetting” (Batchelor 1997, 22). The worst kind of suffering, then, is when we forget that we are suffering. Our lives are lived on autopilot, reflexively conditioned around our attachments to money, work, possessions, family, and friends, all in an unconscious effort to make ourselves real. But this conditioned way of living is ultimately futile. As the existentialists make clear, no matter how culturally entrenched and tightly wound the illusion of the enduring self becomes, we are always vulnerable to penetrating emotional experiences or ‘limit situations’ that have the power to jolt us out of this state, shattering the armor of the self and leaving us naked and exposed to life's overwhelming transience.

But this leads us to the third noble truth of Buddhism, the truth that there is an end to suffering. If the source of our suffering is rooted in the self's ceaseless desire to be permanent and real, then the end of suffering has something to do with dismantling our understanding of selfhood altogether. Buddhism does this with the idea of ‘dependent origination’ (pratītya-samutpāda), suggesting that all things, including the self, arise or come into being in mutual interdependence with all other things. On this view, there is no such thing as an independent, self-subsisting entity. Everything is in a state of dynamic interplay or ‘co-arising’ with everything else. It is a mistake, then, to talk in the way we usually do about principles of causality, of X causing Y, because this creates the impression that X and Y are separate entities. Dependent origination reveals that there are no subjects or objects, that things are always interdependent and in a state of mutual inter-causality (Loy 1996, 88–90). The Western idea of the self as an autonomous and stable consciousness or ego creates the impression that we are somehow separate and distinct from this transient, interrelational flux, and we spend our lives clinging to this illusion. But clinging to the self in this way is itself the source of our suffering. The end of suffering, then, involves letting-go of the illusion of the self, of undoing this conditioned state and realizing that we are ‘no-self’ (anatman). It is only then that we can be freed from the compulsive cycle of attachment and craving and begin to accept the poignant transiency of things in the present moment.

Reading existentialism through the lens of Buddhism is especially illuminating in this regard because, as we saw earlier, there is an obvious tendency in the existentialist tradition to romanticize suffering as if it signified a life lived with more self-awareness, intensity, and passion. The aim of Buddhism is not to simply recognize that the human condition is fraught with meaningless pain. Nor is it to show that there are deeper levels of suffering rooted in the fundamental impermanence of things and in our conditioned efforts to deny impermanence by clinging to things we hope will make us real. Existentialists have made similar points. The difference is that Buddhism attempts to offer a ‘path’ or ‘way’ to end suffering by showing us how we can decondition our reflexive need to secure ourselves from the threat of impermanence. By cultivating the meditative practices of the fourth noble truth, Buddhism teaches us how to free ourselves from attachments, to become centered and still in the flux of impermanence rather than compulsively recoiling from it. Such practices silence the din of habituated thoughts, feelings, memories, and desires that keep alive the illusion of the self, and in the stillness one is able to merge into the flux and become no-thing. In these moments, there is no suffering because there is no self.

Recent scholarly conversations between existentialism and Buddhism have helped to breathe life into the emerging field of comparative philosophy, helping to legitimize Eastern thought not only in the mainstream philosophical tradition, but also in new approaches to psychotherapy and psychiatry and to healthcare practices in general. With the issue of human suffering now fully in view, we can turn our attention to our final topic, a practical one that engages the question of what it means to be healthy or ill. In this concluding section, we will see how existentialism offers an important corrective to scientific medicine by challenging healthcare professionals to see their patients as more than biological bodies that need to be ‘fixed’ but as vulnerable, self-interpreting beings that, more than anything, need to be able to make sense of and give meaning to their condition.

Health and illness

Tolstoy's The Death of Ivan Ilych is arguably the most powerful account of an individual confronting death in world literature. But hidden within the story is a compelling indictment of modern medicine and the scientific worldview in general for being poorly equipped to address the experience of human suffering. After injuring himself in a banal home decorating accident — falling off a ladder while hanging curtains in his new house — Ivan is plagued by a persistent pain in his left side. The pain gradually becomes worse and is accompanied by a strange taste in his mouth and increasing irritability. Reluctantly, he goes to see the doctor. Tolstoy's description of Ivan's clinical encounter paints the classic picture of the modern doctor as a detached observer, dispassionately gazing at the suffering Ivan from the perspective of objectivity. For the doctor, Ivan doesn't show up as a frightened and vulnerable human being but as an interesting set of symptoms to be observed and categorized and that may lead to a diagnosis of a floating kidney, chronic catarrh, or perhaps appendicitis. For Ivan, the doctor's detachment is not only cold and impersonal; it is dehumanizing in its failure to address the gravity of his condition. Ivan doesn't want to know what disease he has and what pills to take; he wants to know if he is going to live or die. “ ‘Vermiform appendix! Kidney!’ he said to himself. ‘It's not a question of appendix or kidney, but of life and … death’ ” (Tolstoy 1960, 129–130, my emphasis).

Ivan's frustration with the doctor is symptomatic of a larger problem in modern medicine, where the aim of the healthcare professional is to fit the human being into preestablished diagnostic categories with little attention paid to the patient's own needs and feelings. The patient is reduced to a set of objective and testable facts, to heart rate and blood pressure, to cholesterol levels and kidney and liver functioning. From this perspective, the first-person reports of the patient's own experience often get in the way of a proper medical assessment. What is of primary importance for the doctor is the diseased body itself, not how the patient lives, feels, or interprets their dis-ease. The signature piece of equipment in modern medicine, the stethoscope, helps to illuminate this point.

The invention of the stethoscope in the early nineteenth century allowed the doctor to attend, with objectivity and precision, solely to the sounds emanating from the body, and it has became a symbol of the scientific distance that should exist between doctor and patient. Instead of attending to the voice of the person, the stethoscope made it possible to listen only to the palpitations and rumblings of the heart and lungs. With this technological breakthrough, doctors began to neglect, even distrust, the patient's own words, regarding them as unreliable and subjective. The patient came to be treated more as an object of scientific investigation than as a suffering person (Svenaeus 2001, 30–31). And with each new observational tool or ‘scope’ introduced in the clinic — from the ophthalmoscope and rhinoscope to the otoscope and gastroscope, to X-rays, CAT scans, and MRIs — the further medicine has moved away from attending to the lived experience of the patient and toward the objective facts that are read off the body from the instruments, resulting in an increasingly impersonal and instrumental approach to care (Aho and Aho 2008, 79).

But, as figures like Merleau-Ponty, Heidegger, Beauvoir, and Marcel have shown, the human being is not a ‘material body’ (Körper) whose biological functions can be controlled and measured. Such a view creates the impression that the body is somehow separate and distinct from me. But my body is not something external; it is what I am; it is a ‘lived body’ (Leib). In fleshing out the distinction between Körper and Leib, existentialists illuminate the extent to which self and body are bound together and that any experience, perception, or feeling we have is invariably embodied. In this sense, the body cannot be understood as a static thing in the world. It is, rather, the mediating activity or way of being through which the world comes into being for us. And when we are healthy and caught up in the flow of everyday life, our body actually recedes from our awareness, operating inconspicuously as we move about, handle equipment, and engage in various situations. When struck with a serious illness or injury, however, there is a breakdown in this seamless flow, and the body begins to obtrude as something foreign and clumsy (e.g., Fuchs 2005, Leder 1990, Svenaeus 2001, Toombs 1992). Indeed, we may only become aware of our body when it is dysfunctional, and this dysfunction can fundamentally alter our self-understanding and experience of the world (Nettleton 2001, 53). In Ivan's case, his taken-for-granted ability to walk, get dressed, bathe, and use the toilet begins to erode. His once manageable and well-ordered world eventually shatters, and he retreats to his room, shutting out his friends and family. His previously sociable and optimistic disposition is replaced with dark brooding and dread. Tolstoy makes it clear that living his body has dramatically transformed who Ivan is.

What irritates Ivan is the doctor's treatment of him as a mere Körper. The medical diagnosis of a ‘floating kidney, chronic catarrh, or appendicitis’ does not help Ivan make sense of his own experiences as he is living it. He does not see his condition as being separate from him; he is living his body and being forced to confront a collapsing world and the terrifying given of his own frailty and impermanence. Understood this way, healing has less to do with the objective metrics of the biological body than with how we choose to interpret and give meaning to our embodiment. Ivan wants the doctor to be honest with him, to listen to him and treat him humanely, and to help him come to grips with the possibility of his own death. Nietzsche calls this “a moral code for physicians” (1990, 36), where healthcare professionals should not just attend to the mechanistic functioning of the body but to help the patient express and give meaning to their experience. What matters is not the alleviation of the pain and suffering of being human, but the ability to make sense of it and to integrate it into our lives. Without this aspect of healing, we are left, in Nietzsche's words, “to vegetate on in cowardly dependence on physicians and medicaments after the meaning of life … has been lost” (36).

But, as we saw with Beauvoir's account of the ambiguity of oppression, we are often complicit in our own objectification. To interpret ourselves as biological things that can be managed and controlled with medical technology can disburden us from having to face ourselves. We are, then, often in bad faith, motivated toward ‘cowardly dependence on physicians’ in an effort to flee from who we are. Doctors, on this view, can be viewed as the new priests of the secular age to the extent that they symbolize power over the body and mastery over suffering and death. Indeed, as Irvin Yalom (1980) suggests, this power may be what motivates physicians and priests to choose their career path in the first place. He points to evidence suggesting that those who enter ‘death-related professions’ often do so because they suffer from higher levels of death anxiety, and the illusion of power that their profession provides helps to alleviate it (127). Existentialists unsettle this illusion altogether, making it clear that neither the physician nor the priest is an ‘ultimate rescuer’ and that suffering and death cannot be eradicated because they are constitutive of what it means to be human. In fact, as we saw in chapter 8, the more we deny or try to control our death anxiety, the more overwhelming it can become. Regardless of the sophistication of our medical technologies or the increasing precision of our diagnostic classifications, existentialism shows there is no escape from the frailty of the human situation. And, as Michel Foucault (1926–1984) demonstrates, the diagnostic authority of modern medicine is itself a fleeting historical construct.

Following Nietzsche's method of critical genealogy and influenced by his notion of ‘will to power,’ Foucault shows that the objectifying tendencies in modern medicine are simply a historical outgrowth of the scientific Enlightenment and its rational project of ordering knowledge by classifying living things into fixed categories (e.g., Foucault 1980, 1991, 1994). In this way, reason is able to stabilize and give order to the chaotic plurality, impermanence, and flux of life. For Foucault, this is why ‘knowledge’ is an expression of ‘power,’ because it transforms human beings into objects and regulates their behaviors and self-interpretations by placing them into ready-made categories. The idea is that power is constituted by accepted forms of knowledge or what Foucault calls ‘regimes of truth’ that we internalize and that are diffused ‘everywhere’: in our educational systems, in our workplaces and prisons, in the media, and in the healthcare complexes that we grow into. The medical establishment, for example, produces ‘knowledge/power’ in the form of professional documents and manuals like the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) that classify different kinds of behavior and emotional states as diseases, and these classifications are then reinforced in schools, offices, factories, and prisons and dispersed in magazines, television programs, and websites. The problem is that these classifications are treated with the authority of being timeless and fixed, rather than the contingent historical constructs that they are. In the nineteenth-century American South, for instance, we should not be shocked when the Louisiana physician Samuel Cartwright discovered the new disease of “drapetomania” that caused “Negroes to run away” from working the fields and that could be “cured” by amputating their big toes (Aho and Aho 2008, 59). Nor should we be surprised to learn that homosexuality was removed as a mental disorder from the DSM in 1974 in the wake of the Stonewall Riots in New York City and the emergence of the Gay Liberation Movement (Kutchins and Kirk 1997, 60–61). And, in our own overstimulated, distracted, and technologically obsessed culture, we are witnessing a childhood epidemic of Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD), a condition that did not even officially exist until 1994. Today, 20 percent of all high school — aged boys in the United States have received the diagnosis (Schwartz 2013).

These examples show that scientific medicine as a ‘regime of truth’ is, like all other forms of power, historically contingent and unstable, and that the advanced technologies and disease classifications we use to objectify and discipline the body can do little to disburden us of the anguish of being human. This is where the insights of the existentialists play such an important role. By recognizing that suffering and death are not biological problems that can be categorized and ‘fixed’ but inescapable givens that must be accepted and integrated into one's life, existentialism illuminates a deeper issue for healthcare professionals. It reminds us that being healthy is not so much a matter of proper biological functioning, of prolonging life, or of living pain-free, but of confronting and working through our fundamental frailty and impermanence. As Nietzsche says, to simply stay alive “is indecent.” The call of the physician is to regard the patient as a human being, to help us face our own vulnerability and give meaning to it while we are “still there” (1990, 99).

It is this reenvisioning of the idea of health that stands as one of existentialism's signature contributions. It has profoundly reshaped contemporary approaches to healthcare and opened up exciting new areas of research in bioethics, narrative medicine, and medical humanities, in nursing, gerontology, and palliative care, and in medical sociology and anthropology. It is interesting to note that in speaking to a group of Swiss physicians toward the end of his career, Heidegger said this was what he had hoped for all along, that “his thinking would escape the confines of the philosopher's study and become of benefit to wider circles, in particular to a large number of suffering human beings” (Boss 1988, cited in Guignon 2006, 268).

Conclusion

The previous discussion shows that existentialism is in no way an outdated or moribund philosophy. The legacy of the movement endures in important areas of contemporary research. It is visible in the explosion of scholarship that applies the idea of being-in-the-world to current debates in cognitive science and philosophy of mind; in new accounts of selfhood and embodiment and the forms of political oppression related to gender, race, class, disability, and sexual orientation; in cutting-edge approaches to environmental philosophy and comparative thought; and in innovative applications in medicine, psychotherapy, and psychiatry. To this end, countless books and articles on existentialism continue to be published every year, professional conferences and research circles are devoted to it, and its major figures are thriving. But the urgency of existential questioning is less clear. Sixty years after the poet W. H. Auden famously referred to ‘the age of anxiety,’ there is an undeniable sense of cynicism and indifference when it comes to the ultimate questions of human existence. The early aftershocks regarding the announcement of ‘God's death’ appear to have worn off.

Interestingly, just a few years after the publication of Being and Time, Heidegger began to speak of a new cultural mood. It was no longer ‘anxiety’ that disclosed the underlying meaninglessness of the human situation but an insidious feeling of ‘boredom.’ In our blasé state, we are no longer distressed or shocked by Nietzsche's announcement, and this for Heidegger was a much more “shocking” problem (1999b, 73). To be sure, Westerners are not facing the imminent threat of nuclear annihilation or recovering from the visceral horrors of the Holocaust and two world wars. These events forced philosophers and writers of the time to confront the existential givens of absurdity, freedom, and death. Yet we work and live in a turbo-capitalist marketplace that is riddled with economic insecurity, inequality, and stress; we confront the global threat of anthropogenic climate change, unprecedented environmental devastation, and species extinction; and our inter-human relations are increasingly vacuous and impersonal, mediated by the ubiquitous presence of Facebook, Instagram, and Twitter. Out of this disjointed and absurd situation, life's ultimate questions would seem to bubble to the surface and the words of the existentialists would resonate with renewed urgency to a new generation. But today it is our indifference, our lack of urgency that is so disconcerting.

The danger, for Heidegger, is that our boredom has become so ubiquitous and all-encompassing that it is now hidden, and this is why he is so concerned. The fact that we are bored with our existence but are unaware of our own boredom is what he calls “the greatest distress” (1999b, 87). But this brings us back to the enduring relevance of existentialism. By bringing us face-to-face with the ultimate questions ‘Who am I?’ and ‘How should I live?’ existentialism has the power to pull us out of our busy, listless drift, forcing us to confront the choices and actions that make us who we are. It reminds us that regardless of how distracted and consumed we may become in our day-to-day lives, we cannot escape the anguish at the heart of the human situation, and that only by facing this anguish can we identify what is truly at stake for us. To this end, existentialism always creates the possibility for a confrontation that allows me, in Kierkegaard's words, to find a truth ‘for which I can live and die.’

Suggested reading

Gordon, L. (1997). Existential dynamics of theorizing black invisibility. In L. Gordon (ed.), Existence in black: An anthology of black existential philosophy (pp. 69–80). New York: Routledge.

Kruks, S. (2012). Simone de Beauvoir and the politics of ambiguity. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Loy, D. (1996). Lack and transcendence: The problem of death and life in psychotherapy, existentialism, and Buddhism. New York: Prometheus.

Thomson, I. (2004). Ontology and ethics at the intersection of phenomenology and environmental philosophy. Inquiry 47 (4): 380–412.

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Index

Abraham. See Kierkegaard absurdity. See Camus alienation

Allen, Woody analytic philosophy

Angst. See anxiety animal rationale

Antonioni, Michelangelo anxiety; neurosis. See Kierkegaard, Heidegger

Arendt, Hannah

Astrada, Carlos

Atwood, George

Auden, W. H.

Augustine authenticity. See Kierkegaard, Heidegger, Nietzsche, Sartre bad faith. See Beauvoir, Sartre

Barrett, William

Barth, Karl

Baudrillard, Jean

Beard, George

Beauvoir, Simone de; ambiguity; America Day by Day; bad faith; body as situation; freedom; master — slave dialectic; oppression; otherness; recognition; The Coming of Age; The Ethics of Ambiguity; The Second Sex

Beckett, Samuel being-for-itself. See Sartre, transcendence being-in-itself. See Sartre, facticity being-in-the-world. See Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty

Berdyaev, Nikolai

Bergman, Ingmar

Binswanger, Ludwig

Blazer, Dan

Bonhoeffer, Dietrich

Boss, Medard

Bracken, Patrick

Brod, Max

Buber, Martin; I and Thou

Buddhism; dependent origination; dukkha

Bultmann, Rudolf bureaucracy

Burroughs, William S.

Butler, Judith

Camus, Albert; absurdity; “Summer in Algiers”; The Myth of Sisyphus; The Stranger

Christianity cognitive science

Conrad, Joseph contemptus mundi

Cooper, David crystal palace. See Dostoevsky

Danto, Arthur

Darwin, Charles

Dasein. See Heidegger death of God. See Nietzsche deep ecology depersonalization

Descartes, René; Discourse on Method; Meditations determinism

Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders

Dilthey, Wilhelm

Dostoevsky, Fyodor; Crime and Punishment; crystal palace; freedom; Notes from the Underground; The Brothers Karamazov

Dread. See anxiety

Du Bois, W. E. B.

Dreyfus, Hubert ek-stasis. See Heidegger

Ellison, Ralph embodiment. See Leib, lived-body, Beauvoir, Marcel, Merleau-Ponty, Sartre

Enlightenment science. See Descartes, Newton environmentalism epoché. See Husserl equipment. See Heidegger ethics. See Buber, Heidegger, Kierkegaard, Levinas, Merleau-Ponty, Sartre

Existenzphilosophie fact — value dualism facticity. See being-in-itself

Fanon, Frantz; Black Skin, White Masks; overdetermination fatalism feminist philosophy

Fitzgerald, F. Scott

Foucault, Michel

Frankfurt, Harry; wanton freedom; radical; situated. See Beauvoir, Dostoevsky, Kierkegaard, Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, Nietzsche, Sartre

Freud, Sigmund

Fuchs, Thomas

Galilei, Galileo

Gallagher, Sean

Gaos, José

Gasset, José Ortega y; Meditations on Quixote; plasticity

Genet, Jean

Giacometti, Alberto

Gilman, Charlotte Perkins

Ginsberg, Allen

Goddard, Jean-Luc

God's-eye view

Greek philosophy

Guignon, Charles guilt. See Kierkegaard, Heidegger

Hamsun, Knud

Hebraic faith. See Kierkegaard

Heidegger, Martin; anxiety; authenticity; Being and Time; being-in-the-world, being-toward-death; boredom; care; comportment; Dasein; ek-stasis; equipment; ethics; falling; freedom; Gelassenheit; guilt; historicality; inauthenticity; “Letter on Humanism”; nature; Nazism; present-at-hand; ready-to-hand; repetition; resoluteness; scientism; solicitude; technology; temporality; “The Question Concerning Technology”; they-self

Hegel, G. W. F.; Phenomenology of Spirit

Hemingway, Ernest historicism

Holbach, Paul Henri hooks, bell

Husserl, Edmund; epoché; Ideas II; natural attitude idealism

Ibsen, Henrik industrial revolution intentionality intercorporeality. See Merleau-Ponty

Jacobson, Kristen

Jaspers, Karl

Job

Jonas, Hans

Kafka, Franz; The Castle

Kant, Immanuel; Critique of Pure Reason

Kaufmann, Walter

Kerouac, Jack

Kesey, Ken

Kierkegaard, Søren; Abraham; aesthetic sphere; anxiety; authenticity; Concluding Unscientific Postscript; conformism; Either/Or; ethical sphere; Fear and Trembling; freedom; guilt; leap of faith; religious sphere; repetition; subjective truth; suspension of the ethical; The Concept of Dread

Körper

Korsgaard, Christine

Kuhn, Helmut

Laing, R. D.; ontological security

Leder, Drew

Leib. See embodiment, lived-body

Lessing, Doris

Levin, David Michael

Levinas, Emmanuel, ethics as first philosophy; the face, Totality and Infinity

Lewis, Bradley life-world littérature engagée lived body. See embodiment, Leib

Locke, Alain

Löwith, Karl

Luther, Martin

MacIntyre, Alasdair

Mailer, Norman

Marcel, Gabriel; embodiment

Marcuse, Herbert

Marxism

May, Rollo medicalization

Merleau-Ponty, Maurice; being-in-the-world; bodily schema; chiasm; embodiment; ethics; flesh; freedom; intercorporeality; le corps propre; Phenomenology of Perception; “The War has Taken Place”

methodologism

Munch, Edvard

Murdoch, Iris narrative self naturalism nature. See Heidegger

Nehamas, Alexander neurasthenia

Newton, Isaac

New School for Social Research

Nietzsche, Friedrich; amor fati; authenticity; body; death of God; doctrine of eternal recurrence; freedom; herd; Beyond Good and Evil; The Gay Science; master morality; nihilism; On the Genealogy of Morals; perspectivism; ressentiment; slave morality; Thus Spoke Zarathustra; Übermensch; will to power nihilism. See Nietzsche, West ontological security. See R. D. Laing oppression. See Beauvoir, Fanon otherness. See Beauvoir, Fanon, Levinas, Sartre

Palahniuk, Chuck

Pascal, Blaise

Picasso, Pablo phenomenology. See Husserl

Plato; Phaedo; Republic politics

Pollack, Jackson postmodernism

Prosser, Jay

Protestantism psychiatry; existential critique of race; critical philosophy of

Rank, Otto

Ratcliffe, Matthew realism representational view of knowledge

Reyna, Wagner de

Rilke, Rainer Maria romanticism

Rorty, Richard

Rousseau, Jean-Jacques

Rubin, Henry

Russell, Bertrand

Sartre, Jean-Paul; anguish; Anti-Semite and Jew; authenticity; bad faith; Being and Nothingness; being-for-itself; being-in-itself; being-with-others; embodiment; ethics; “Existentialism is a Humanism”; forlornness; freedom; Nausea; No Exit; Notes for an Ethics; otherness; responsibility; the look; War Diaries

Schopenhauer, Arthur scientism. See naturalism sexual difference

Shertov, Lev

Solomon, Robert

Sophocles

Stolorow, Robert

Styron, William; Darkness Visible sub specie aeternitatis subjectivism substance ontology

Svenaeus, Fredrik

Taylor, Charles technology; medical. See Heidegger temporality. See Heidegger

Thomas, Philip

Tillich, Paul

Tolstoy, Leo; The Death of Ivan Ilych

Toombs, Kay transcendence. See being-for-itself, freedom

Unamuno, Miguel de; The Tragic Sense of Life

Vogel, Lawrence wanton. See Frankfurt

Weber, Max

West, Cornel

Wheeler, Michael

Wild, John

Williams, Bernard

Woolf, Virginia

Wright, Richard

Yalom, Irvin

Young, Iris Marion

Zaner, Richard

Zimmerman, Dean

Content

Kevin Aho
Existentialism: An Introduction

Acknowledgments

Preface

What is existentialism?

Why this book?

1: Existentialism and Modernity

Roots of the Western self

The emergence of the modern worldview

Existentialism as a cultural mood

2: The Insider's Perspective

The problem of detachment and objectivity

Subjective truth

Perspectivism

Phenomenology

3: Being-in-the-World

Being-in

Undoing dualisms

The work-world

The perceptual world

Aspects of alterity

4: Self and Others

The problem of substance

Embodiment

The self as a tension

Conformism and self-deception

5: Freedom

The core idea of existentialism

Freedom and determinism

Radical freedom

Situated freedom

Creature and creator

6: Authenticity

Moods and the problem of the real self

Becoming an individual

Living with style

Anxiety and resoluteness

Bad faith and nothingness

7: Ethics

Anything goes

Subjectivism or historicism

Intercorporeality

I and Thou

8: Contributions to Psychiatry and Psychotherapy

The problem of medicalization

Anxiety, embodiment, and psychotherapy

Is existentialism anti-psychiatry?

9: Existentialism Today

Oppression and recognition

Self and nature

Self and dukkha

Health and illness

Conclusion

Selected Bibliography

Index