Peter Beale

AUSTRALIAN TANKS IN WORLD WAR II

PREFACE

The role of the tank in the First World War was clear. It was a recently developed weapon to crush barbed wire and knock out enemy strongpoints, particularly those containing machine-guns, and it achieved these two objectives successfully. By 1918 the performance of the heavy tanks had improved and was continuing to improve, and the lighter Whippet tank had also deployed successfully. The sudden end to the war on 11 November 1918 put tank development and the formulation of doctrine very much on hold.

This had two effects on the Tank Corps. The first was that resources to develop new tanks were very limited, and the second was that there was no opportunity to test changes to tank doctrine in real battles against hostile forces. Tank development went in all directions, and a large number of designs were proposed, many going no further than the drawing board. There were several views on the best way to use tanks, but evaluation was considerably hampered by uncertainty about the type of tank that would be available, a scarcity of resources to conduct exercises, and no opportunity for battle experience. Up to 1939 any formulation of tank doctrine by the Royal Tank Corps was purely theoretical.

Tank doctrine had to be learnt the hard way in World War II and, most of the time, it was unsuited to the reality of the war. Major General Pip Roberts served at many levels of armoured command after 1939. In 1944 he was commanding the 11th Armoured Division, and commented that it was not until the third battle in Normandy that they finally got the doctrine right. Illconsidered doctrine had resulted in the loss of many battles and the slaughter of tank crews and soldiers from the arms they were supposed to be supporting, particularly the infantry.

The Australian Army’s experiences with tanks in the First World War were mixed: very bad at Bullecourt and good at Hamel and some later battles. Between the wars, the Australian tank arm was a very small component of the Army, and there was no officer of sufficient rank or experience to advise Army Headquarters concerning what could or should be done in respect of tanks.

This book traces the development of the Australian Armoured Corps, the design and production of its own Armoured Cruiser tank◦— the Sentinel◦— and the employment of tank units. It examines the projects to create an armoured division and build the Sentinel, both of which were slow in starting, but once commenced proceeded with exceptional speed and skill. As with all projects, timing is vital. Delay in starting may mean that the project outcomes are achieved too late to be of value.

The 1st Australian Armoured Division never saw action, and the Sentinel tank project was abandoned, even after some brilliant design and production efforts. There were several reasons for its abandonment, including the outbreak of war with Japan, the slow start to both projects, and the baleful influence of British tank doctrine. The question remains as to whether anything could have been done to prevent this waste of time and resources. A second, more pertinent issue concerns what the Australian Army has learned from this experience that will assist in the conduct of future operations. Answers to these questions form the central theme of this book.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

On 5 May 2005 I was awarded a grant by the Australian Army History Unit (AHU) to produce a research paper ‘An evaluation of the use of armoured forces by the Australian Army in World War II’. My wife Shirley and I commenced research immediately and, later that year, presented a progress report to Roger Lee of the AHU. We were delighted when he offered us a contract to turn the research into a book to be published by the AHU.

We were able to concentrate almost full time on completion of the book, during which time we received help from many sources. These included the staff of the AHU and the staffs of the Australian War Memorial Research Centre and the National Archives of Australia. Christopher Dawkins at the Australian Defence Force Academy Library was a tower of strength, as was David Fletcher at the Tank Museum in Bovington. Lieutenant Colonel Todd Vail was particularly helpful in providing information about the procedures of the Australian Army, and Ric Pelvin and I journeyed along the lengthy process of editing together.

Above all, I want to thank my wife, Shirley, for the help she gave in our joint research at various archives, help that was given with patience, dedication and love.

Peter Beale

April 2011

Map

The Malay Barrier. This was the name given to the arc of islands beyond the northern coastline of Australia, and included the islands of Borneo, Celebes, Ambon, Timor, Java, the Solomons and many others.

Chapter 1:

NATIONAL SECURITY AND TANKS

In the late 1930s and early 1940s the governments of Australia faced grave threats to the nation’s security and were forced to make critical decisions concerning their national objectives. National objectives are the fundamental aims or goals of a nation towards which a policy is directed and the efforts and resources of the nation are applied. The security of the nation is among the most important of these national objectives and the armed forces of the nation are major instruments in achieving those security objectives.

In 1939 both Australia and Britain employed their armed forces as an instrument of defence policy in three priority areas. For both nations the first priority was the defence of their home territory, the British Isles and the mainland of Australia respectively. The second priority was the security of other countries, allies or colonies for which Australia and Britain were responsible. Australia’s dependencies comprised the islands to its north, primarily New Guinea. Britain, on the other hand, was responsible for the defence of its vast empire which required a considerable portion of its armed forces. The senior members of the empire were India, Canada, Australia, South Africa and New Zealand, all of which made substantial contributions to their own security and that of the empire, but still relied on Britain for support. The British Navy acted as a potent reserve and fortress Singapore contributed indirectly to the defence of India, Australia, and New Zealand.

The third priority for both Britain and Australia was to provide a force to fight alongside their allies against their common enemies. Britain had provided such an ‘expeditionary force’ for many years, as evidenced in the exploits of Marlborough in Europe, Wellington in Spain, Raglan in the Crimea, Roberts and Kitchener in South Africa, and the forces that fought outside the British Isles from 1914 to 1918.

Sydney, 3 March 1885. The first Australian force sent to fight overseas as an organised unit was the Sudan Contingent. They supported British troops sent to avenge the death of General Gordon at Khartoum (Melbourne Argus, 5 May 1885).

Australia’s first ‘expeditionary force’ took the form of a contingent sent to the Sudan in 1885 and was followed in 1899 by a much larger force that fought in the South African or Boer War from 1899 to 1902.1

In the 1914–18 war, a very large contingent of Australians fought overseas at Gallipoli, in northern France and Belgium and in Palestine. At that time there appeared to be no significant threat to the Australian mainland. China was hopelessly disorganised, Japan was an ally and all the other countries in the South-west Pacific were colonies of France, Holland, or Britain. The number of troops required for the defence of Australia was relatively small.

From 1919 to 1939 both Britain and Australia were confronted with the problem of maintaining armed forces capable of achieving the three tasks. While the Navy and Air Force had substantial roles to play, the focus of this book is the Army. What sort of army would be required to fulfil the three roles and how should it be employed? The answer to this question will necessarily involve analysis of the part to be played by a tank force in that army.

Because the Australian Army had no significant tank arm prior to 1939, the British Army’s tank doctrine formed the basis for Australian doctrine. British Army doctrine evolved gradually and continuously and was largely influenced by two significant events: the experiences of the Great War and the advances in technology in the period after 1919, particularly the mechanisation of transport and the development of radio communication.

The first element of British Army doctrine was, in the words of the Chief of the Imperial General Staff (CIGS), Sir George Milne, in 1933, ‘succeeding without incurring losses.’1 Following the horrendous loss of life in the Great War, the High Command pledged to do all it could to preserve soldiers’ lives in any future conflict. The best way to achieve this was to provide maximum firepower so that enemy fire would be suppressed during the final yards of an infantry assault on a position. Artillery could provide the indirect fire and tanks the direct.

The second element of Army doctrine was mobility. Tanks were naturally mobile over a variety of terrain and mechanisation would provide similar mobility for the infantry. They could have trucks for their supplies and armoured vehicles could be provided to take them close to the battlefield.

The third element was the combination of arms. The High Command came to realise in 1917 and 1918 that ‘success depended on the intelligent cooperation of all arms to overwhelm the defenders by weight of fire and enable the infantry to attack without incurring unacceptably high losses.’2 This doctrine was promulgated throughout all levels of the Army.

The combination of arms could have included the Air Force, as it did in Monash’s victory at Hamel in 1918. But having established itself as a separate service, the RAF was reluctant to provide any close support to the Army, claiming that its main role was strategic bombing.3 This presents an unfortunate contrast to the German Army’s devastating use of the Stuka in close support in 1939 and1940.4

A fourth element proved to be a major hindrance in implementing the other three. The British Army’s command and control system effectively impeded the full exploitation of mobility on the battlefield. Orders were issued in considerable detail and the process filtered down through all levels of the military hierarchy. The orders of a higher level of command were to be followed rigidly by the lower levels, and any deviation from the original plan had to be referred upwards for approval.

Such a process obviously took time and inhibited junior commanders from acting on their initiative. The delay in resuming action meant that tactical opportunities were often lost and subsequent advances met stronger opposition. The system was significantly inferior to the German aufträgstaktik system, in which a junior commander knew his superior’s mission and could take any action to achieve that mission.5

British Army doctrine also formed the basis for its tank doctrine. That doctrine was initiated in a primitive way as soon as tanks first went into action in 1916. It was progressively subjected to change, stemming from experience, improved equipment, and the personal views of those who could influence the formulation of doctrine.

Tanks in World War I

During the First World War the aeroplane and the tank were used for the first time as weapons of war and their performance developed and improved rapidly. The aeroplane had been produced prior to the First World War, but the tactics for its use as a military weapon had not been formulated in any detail and had to be developed as the war progressed. Its principal roles were reconnaissance, the support of ground forces, and bombing military and other objectives.

The tank was the second major new weapon of war. The concept of the tank was developed during 1915 and 1916, and was first used on 15th September 1916, two years after the beginning of the war.6 The tank was primarily employed during two distinct periods, the first from 15 September 1916 to 20 November 1917. uring this period it was used in piecemeal fashion and suffered a variety of setbacks.

These setbacks stemmed partly from the mechanical condition of the tanks, which resulted in frequent breakdowns and from the environment in which the tank crews had to operate. David Fletcher writes:

The conditions inside the tank were almost impossible to imagine. The noise and heat from the engine dominated and it was quite impossible to hear anything else while it was running. The big engine also tended to leak exhaust fumes from joints in the manifold and exhaust stacks. Although the air inside the tank was always on the move, the amount of carbon dioxide swirling about inside the hull was enough to choke on.

Bearing in mind that parts of the engine and adjacent plumbing were too hot to touch and that without springs every bump in the ground was transmitted through the tracks and rollers to the hull and thence the crew, you have a recipe for severe discomfort. To make matters worse the petrol supply placed the crew in extreme danger. Fuel was carried in tanks located in the frames on either side of the cab. Supply to the carburettor was by gravity and it could fail if the tank stalled nose down in a trench. The risk of fire was ever present and if the fuel ignited, either by accident or by an incoming shell, the chances of all eight men of the crew getting out unscathed were slim.7

These conditions created such a poisonous atmosphere within the tank that, after a day’s fighting, even the most ardent crews were almost incapable of further action for another twenty-four hours. There was also some uncertainty in the minds of senior Army officers as to exactly how the tanks should be used. Those hardy souls who manned the tanks were likewise unclear as to the tank’s most effective role.

One of the crews who took part in the first battle on 15 September 1916 described his experience: ‘My crew and I did not have a tank of our own the whole time we were in England. Ours went wrong the day it arrived. We had no reconnaissance or map reading, no practices or lectures on the compass, we had no signalling, and no practice in considering orders. We had no knowledge of where to look for information that would be necessary for us as tank commanders, nor did we know what information we should be likely to require.’8

It is surprising, in the light of this lack of training and instruction, that the tanks were able to perform at all. But in the period September 1916 to November 1917 they performed effectively on several occasions, although generally in small numbers. They also performed very ineffectively on a number of occasions, discouraging the infantry from gaining any confidence over the assistance that tanks might be able to lend them.9

The second period of tank use began on 20 November 1917 with the Battle of Cambrai.10 This battle demonstrated the effectiveness of tanks used en masse and in reasonable terrain. The lessons of Cambrai generated much greater confidence in the use of tanks, both in the soldiers they were supporting, and in the Army commanders. The result was to accelerate the flow of tanks to the armies in France.

Tanks performed well in the defensive battles of March, April and May 1918, and, at the Battle of Hamel on 4 July 1918, the 5th Tank Brigade supported the Australian infantry with great success. This battle, which was commanded on the Allied side by the Australian General John Monash, was very successful in that it was quick, resulted in few casualties to the Australians and the British, but inflicted substantial casualties on the Germans and captured the ground that was its objective.

On 8 August 1918, tanks were used in even larger numbers in the commencement of what was the final period of the war◦— referred to as the ‘Hundred Days’.11 During this period, tanks provided valuable support to the infantry and demonstrated both their advantages and disadvantages. The main battle tanks (primarily Mark Vs in 1918) crushed barbed-wire obstacles and provided close support to the infantry on the battlefield. The lighter tanks or ‘Whippets’ also proved very successful.

Medium A Whippet ‘Julian’s Baby’ belonging to J Battalion, Tank Corps, 1918. The Whippet tank was designed as a fast cavalry or pursuit tank to exploit breakthrough opportunities created by the heavy tanks (Tank Museum image).

One particular Whippet, commanded by Lieutenant C.D. Arnold, performed extremely well. Arnold was in action from 4.20 a.m. on 8 August until his tank Musical Box was knocked out and set on fire at 3.30 p.m.12 During this period, Arnold moved extensively through and behind the German lines and created chaos by shooting up field batteries, destroying transport and killing large numbers of German soldiers. Finally, his tank was set on fire, one of his crew was killed and he and his gunner were taken prisoner. After the war, when he returned from prison and recounted his tale◦— which was supported by his senior officer, Major Rycroft, and some of the Australian officers◦— he was awarded a well-deserved Distinguished Service Order (DSO).

One of the disadvantages of the use of tanks during the battles of 8 August and in subsequent days was their high casualty rate. While over 450 tanks advanced on the first day, by the second day this number had dropped to around 150 and, by the third day, a mere 85 joined the action. Tank casualties were due partly to mechanical breakdown, partly to enemy action and partly to the exhaustion and sickness of the crews◦— primarily a result of the appalling atmospheric conditions within the tanks.

There was no doubt that the use of tanks over the last two years of the First World War◦— in particular over the final year◦— contributed considerably to the Allied victory. But this was primarily a victory for the infantry and the artillery and any assessment that overplays the contribution of the tank must be treated with a degree of caution.

Tank doctrine 1916–1919

The first employment of tanks was at Flers-Courcelette on 15 September 1916. The commander of the British tank force in France was Lieutenant Colonel Hugh Elles, a Royal Engineer, who been wounded in the intense fighting at St Julien. He took no part in the first tank action and his headquarters at Bermicourt were not established until October 1916.

On 17 September, Lieutenant General Launcelot Kiggell, Haig’s Chief of Staff, wrote that ‘it has been established that the magnitude of the success on the 15th in certain localities was directly attributable to the use of tanks.’13 On 5 October, he issued a ‘Note on the use of tanks’ which acted as official tank doctrine for several months.14 Tanks were to act as an accessory to the advance of the infantry, in close cooperation with the artillery. Their roles were to draw enemy fire away from the infantry, crush barbed-wire obstacles and destroy enemy positions holding up the advance, particularly machine-gun posts.

The senior staff officer at Bermicourt was Major J.F.C. (John) Fuller. He was a man of superior intellect and ideas, although sometimes his thinking ran ahead of what was practicable at the time. In February 1917 he produced Training Note 16, a pamphlet on tank tactics which was the first ‘training manual’ of its kind.

Colonel (later Major General) J.F.C. ‘Boney’ Fuller, who played a significant role in the early development of tank tactics. His attitude and personality were two reasons many of his good ideas were not accepted.

In his manual, Fuller defined the tank as a mobile fortress designed to escort infantry in the attack, pre-eminently as an offensive weapon, to be used en masse and to achieve surprise. Part of this element of surprise would be gained by shortening the period of preliminary artillery bombardment.15

By March 1917, General Headquarters (GHQ) and the War Office had accepted the idea of a tank-infantry attack without the customary preliminary artillery bombardment. This would make it easier to achieve surprise, as long as the noise of the tanks moving to their start line could be minimised.

In the battle of Cambrai, on 20 November 1917, two principles of tank doctrine demonstrated their utility. Victory on the first day was achieved by using tanks en masse without a preliminary bombardment. The withdrawals of the next few days highlighted the need for reserves to follow up the initial success, for improved mechanical reliability and for better communication systems.

The next amendment to tank doctrine comprised an elaboration of the methods used at Cambrai. A proposal by Major Stephen Foot entitled ‘A Mobile Army’ and Fuller’s ‘Plan 1919’ both envisaged a breakthrough of the German line followed by a deep penetration by a mobile force.16 The penetration was to be through the flanks of the enemy position where it was likely to be weakest, and was intended to knock out the local enemy headquarters. The German troops in the area would lose their ‘brain’ and be incapable of concerted action. Both plans involved large numbers of tanks and Plan 1919 required the services of a tank of greater speed, armament and range of action than was available in existing tanks.

Had the Great War lasted into 1919, tanks would have been used in everincreasing numbers and the development of doctrine could have been based on battle experience. The unexpectedly sudden end of the war in November 1918 meant that the last British tank actions occurred during the Hundred Days. These actions commenced with the successful opening day of 8 August 1918 but, from that point on, the numbers of tanks available for battle declined daily. These were the real-life experiences on which theory had to be built.

Development of tank doctrine 1919 to 1939

The development of tank doctrine following World War I was governed by four major factors. The first was the role of the Army as a whole. Precisely where the Army would be required to fight in the future would determine what type of armoured force would be appropriate. The Army’s three primary roles were home defence, imperial defence and the provision of a continental force. Would an armoured component be required for each role? Would tactics differ according to the role? Would a range of different types of tanks be required?

The second factor concerned the tanks themselves: what tanks were currently available and what tanks might become available? The lines of development being considered in 1919 included an extension of the Mark V into a Mark VIII and Mark IX; the Whippet tanks and their development; and faster and heavier tanks than the Whippets, designated the Medium Cs and Medium Ds.

The third factor was the role of the tank. Potentially appropriate roles included close support for infantry, and providing direct shell and machine-gun fire to complement indirect fire support from artillery; providing a flank guard for infantry and other formations, assuming the role previously filled by cavalry; anti-tank defence against hostile tank forces; and exploitation, in the sense of a heavy force capable of creating disruption behind enemy lines but equally capable of defending itself should it be attacked by hostile tank forces.

The fourth factor was the integration of tanks with other arms. Tanks needed to work at different times with infantry, artillery, engineers and air support. They required satisfactory systems of logistical support, including in particular the provision of supplies and the maintenance of all equipment. The degree to which these different arms should be permanently integrated one with another had to be determined and the appropriate organisational structure established. It was obviously possible to have a separate tank brigade which operated purely as a tank brigade. But from time to time it would need the support of other arms, particularly infantry and artillery. Should the different arms be permanently or temporarily integrated?

The answer to this question would determine the organisational structure and the command and control system for eth employment of tanks. The two ends of the spectrum for a divisional-size formation incorporating tanks were an infantry division with a small tank unit for reconnaissance, and an all-tank division with a small infantry unit to provide protection while in laager.

The three parties who would decide how to use tanks in the provision of national security were the Government, the War Office and those with experience of or interest in the use of armour. Their decisions included the structure of organisations that would use tanks and the doctrine for their employment.

The Government represented the views of the nation and, for several years after 1919, there was a general unwillingness to maintain armed forces of any size. The Treasury in particular posed an obstacle to any significant work either on equipment or experimentation to create modern formations.

The War Office was responsible for ensuring that the Army played its part in providing national security. The War Office also determined how much emphasis to place and what level of resources to provide each arm. There was relatively little documented battle experience with tanks, although they appeared to satisfy the aims of mobility and substitution of firepower for men.

The War Office was more forward-thinking from 1919 to 1939 than is often appreciated. It realised the need for a modern army that could meet any major threat that might develop, although it was hamstrung by the lack of money and resources to experiment.

The third group consisted of members of the Tank Corps and others who believed that tanks had to form part of a modern army. Cavalry had been shown to be obsolescent in the face of machine-guns, despite fighting some splendid battles in Palestine. Tanks, especially the light tanks, could easily take over the cavalry roles of reconnaissance and flank protection. Tanks would also form a much stronger strike force than cavalry.

Members of this group included Hugh Elles, Fuller, George Lindsay,17 Basil Liddell-Hart,18 Charles Broad,19 and Percy Hobart.20 Their enthusiasm was such that other arms began to fear that their roles would be threatened by the emerging Tank Corps and, as a result, reacted defensively. The personal attitudes of some of the tank men also did not help their cause.

In 1924, while still at the Royal Tank Corps (RTC) Centre, Lindsay began advocating for the establishment of a properly organised mechanical force. This force would consist of aircraft, armoured cars, fast tanks, motorised artillery, motorised mortars and motorised machine-guns. A small force of this nature presented an innovative military structure at that time, particularly as the fundamental omission from the structure was any mention of infantry.

In 1924 the CIGS was Lord Cavan, a somewhat conservative officer.21 Cavan retired in 1926 and, in February of that year, was succeeded by General Sir George Milne. Milne had commanded the British force at Salonika during the last two years of the war. He was known to his troops as ‘Uncle George’ and was open to new ideas and well aware of the difficulties of running the Army with very little money. He was persuaded (or he decided) to appoint Fuller as his Military Assistant. While the position of Military Assistant is not a highly significant role, the incumbent enjoys constant contact with the CIGS and has every opportunity to present ideas to him. This was therefore an excellent chance to lobby the highest military person in the Army for the use of armoured forces.

On 15 May 1926 Lindsay submitted to Milne (through Fuller) some suggestions for shaping the Army◦— and the Tank Corps in particular◦— for the probable requirements of a future war. Because the Army was short of funds it was forced to choose between manpower and weapon power. Lindsay recommended that the General Staff establish a mechanical force and conduct experiments to determine its most effective organisational structure. Milne had some reservations but, on balance, considered Lindsay’s idea positively.

Among the members of the War Office at this time was a Colonel Lewin who commented on Lindsay’s plan with the principal suggestion that some additional arms should be added to the mechanical force, in particular infantry, artillery, engineers and a reconnaissance company on motorcycles.22 Lindsay was opposed to the transfer of any fighting vehicles to other units, particularly cavalry, and wanted no infantry in the mechanical force.

This attitude created a problem for other units of the Army. It seemed that Lindsay was advocating funding for the RTC at the expense of every other type of unit, in particular the cavalry. This was not an attitude which was politically sensible, although Milne did endorse the policy of the RTC by authorising the creation of the Experimental Mechanical Force (EMF) in June 1926.

The EMF was to be based at Tidworth and under administrative command of the 7th Infantry Brigade. Fuller was offered command of the brigade, but declined. The EMF was formally established on 1 May 1927 under the command of Colonel Jack Collins. It comprised a medium tank battalion, a battalion of armoured cars and tankettes, a machine-gun battalion, a field artillery brigade and a field engineering company.23 It included no infantry, but there was some provision for support from the RAF.

The EMF conducted collective training in the summer of 1927, culminating in a mock battle on 27 September in which it was narrowly defeated by a division comprising infantry and cavalry. The results of the exercises were watched with great interest, not only by British observers, but also by those from several foreign powers.

Training of the Armoured Force, as the EMF had become known, recommenced in the spring of 1928. There was less interest shown in the training than there had been in the previous year and, after the final exercise, the Armoured Force was disbanded. This was partly because the training was considered repetitive and partly so that the results could be analysed and documented. This analysis and documentation was completed by Charles Broad and, in 1929, he produced the handbook Mechanised and Armoured Formations, generally known as the ‘Purple Primer’ because of the colour of its cover.

The Purple Primer is an important document in the sense that it is the first official statement on the use of armoured troops. The handbook is divided into two main sections which cover organisation and operations. Various formations are considered, including a cavalry brigade, a light armoured brigade, an infantry brigade, a medium armoured brigade and divisional and other troops. When these are combined to form a composite force, however, the infantry are omitted from any higher organisation.

The primer’s approach to operations is prefaced by the statement that ‘it is not intended to lay down details of the employment of armoured brigades, since these can be worked out only in actual practice, but rather to indicate the general principles which should be followed. The main principle is that ground is of primary importance and open country is the country suitable for armoured forces whereas enclosed country is favourable to infantry.’ The primer adds that, in good tank country◦— described as open and undulating ground◦— antitank weapons ‘should be rapidly neutralised and then destroyed by a well coordinated and energetic attack by an armoured brigade.’ This is portrayed as a relatively simple task.

The primer moves on to discuss offensive operations, focusing principally on the armoured brigade in an independent attack. The objectives suitable for an armoured brigade acting independently are listed as: hostile cavalry formations; hostile infantry formations; lines of communication; and hostile armoured formations. Adds the handbook, ‘such formations do not exist at the moment [in 1929] and because the subject is therefore purely theoretical it will not be further discussed.’ A later section considers the attack in cooperation with other arms and offers the advice that: ‘in allotting tasks to formations, the Commander will bear in mind the special characteristics of each arm and use the ground accordingly.’

The information provided in this pamphlet is so general as to be of little value. It is unfortunate that this is the best set of conclusions that could have been drawn from the exercises of the Experimental Force in 1927 and 1928. Broad also commented in his conclusion on the sort of people who should be employed as armoured soldiers: ‘Morale depends mainly on the confidence a man has in his weapons. A good education is therefore essential if full use is to be made of tanks and their armament.’

The success of armoured formations would also depend to a greater extent on the technical knowledge of the various commanders from the highest to the lowest. That is to say, unless officers were fully competent mechanically, they would not be able to get the best out of their machines, to judge their limitations, to keep them in action, to prepare them again quickly for renewed effort, or to recommend technical improvements to those whose work it was constantly to improve design. These precepts would certainly have been of great value had they been learnt and executed by those who soldiered in armoured formations from that time on.

Salisbury Plain, 1931. Charles Broad (in beret, holding map board), explaining the purpose of an exercise to the CIGS, Sir George Milne. Broad was able to demonstrate the control of a brigade of tanks by radio, maintaining formation while passing through a dense fog (Tank Museum image).

The Purple Primer was updated in 1931 and republished as Modern Formations.24 While this second publication did include a little more discussion on the use of armour with other arms, once again, it was not specific enough to provide guidance for those who would actually have to fight with such formations.

In 1931 a tank brigade was established as an experimental formation with Broad in command, and exercises were conducted to determine an effective means of command using radio. The exercises were completed within a fortnight. The tank brigade staged a display of movement in formation which was controlled by Broad’s voice on the radio. His words were clearly received in the battalion and company commanders’ vehicles and the brigade was able to sustain formation even when passing through dense fog.

In February 1933, Sir George Milne retired as CIGS after seven years. He was succeeded by Sir Archibald Montgomery-Massingberd, who had served in the First World War as Chief of Staff to the Commander of the Fourth Army.25 Montgomery-Massingberd (frequently referred to as MM) was later given a particularly bad press by military writers such as Basil Liddell Hart. MM was, in some ways, a traditionalist, but as many of his actions and writings demonstrate, he did his best to modernise the British Army.

In autumn 1933, MM established the tank brigade as a permanent formation and gave command to Percy Hobart. Hobart subsequently held discussions with Lindsay on the tank brigade’s relationship with various other formations. On 17 November 1933 Lindsay wrote to Hobart and suggested that the tank brigade be incorporated into a mobile division which would consist of the tank brigade, the motorised cavalry brigade, the motorised infantry brigade, mechanised artillery and supporting forces.

This was simply an idea at this stage and neither Lindsay nor Hobart had the authority to create a mobile division. However, in January 1934, MM issued a directive for the training of the tank brigade. The directive suggested that the tank brigade could be employed on a strategic or semi-independent mission against some important objective in the enemy’s rearward organisation, avoiding strength and attacking weak points. The directive for the training outlined its main objectives, which were to ‘test the manoeuvrability of the brigade as a whole, to practise co-operation with the RAF, to try out methods of supply and maintenance, and aim at moving 70 miles a day or 150 miles in 3 days including an action in each case.’26

In spring 1934, the tank brigade assembled on Salisbury Plain. In May, a staff exercise was conducted to develop the techniques to be used in the deployments envisaged in the exercises. In preliminary manoeuvres, Hobart routinely insisted on a very widely spaced formation for his brigade, covering an area ten miles broad by ten miles deep. The opposing forces were generally unmechanised and were invariably defeated. This imbalance was to be reduced in the main exercises scheduled for November in which the opposing force would be somewhat stronger, although still a conventional force. The experimental force would comprise a tank brigade plus the 7th Infantry Brigade with a motorised field artillery brigade and other supporting units to form a small mechanised division known as the Mobile Force under the command of Lindsay. Opposing it would be a traditional force consisting of an unmechanised infantry division, a horsed cavalry brigade and two armoured car units. This force was commanded by Major General John Kennedy.

The Director of the exercise was John Burnett-Stuart, who was then General Officer Commanding (GOC) Southern Command. The GOC considered that the older arms, infantry and cavalry, needed a boost to their morale because of the way that they had been consistently out-manoeuvred by the mechanised forces. He therefore made the exercise particularly demanding for the mechanised forces. The result of the exercise was a win for the conventional forces, primarily because Lindsay was unwell at the time of the exercise; the opposing force was effectively commanded by Kennedy; and the umpiring throughout the exercise appeared to favour the traditional force.

While the outcome of this exercise was disappointing for the mechanised forces, its positive aspect was that, following its completion, MM decided to form a mobile division to replace the horsed cavalry division. The next year he issued a policy paper entitled ‘The future re-organisation of the British Army’. He resigned as CIGS around six months later and wrote what he called ‘Handing Over Notes’ for the guidance of his successor, Sir Cyril Deverell.27 These notes described the current problems of the British Army, including a number related to tanks. On tanks, MM wrote that intervention with the field army on the continent would be essential if a war were to break out with a continental power (the continental power was clearly Germany). He added that the field force, which could be sent to the continent and be ready to disembark overseas within a fortnight, was to consist of the mobile division, four infantry divisions and two air defence brigades. The infantry divisions were to be supported by one infantry tank battalion for each division. He also recommended that eight regiments of cavalry be mechanised, one in 1936 and the remainder by the end of 1938. Thus, his policies for the organisation and establishment of armoured forces were determined at the time of his resignation in April 1936.

Another event in 1936 which was to be significant in the development of British tanks and tank doctrine was a visit to Russia by Major General A.P. Wavell (later Field Marshal Lord Wavell) and the Assistant Director of Mechanisation, Giffard Martel, to observe manoeuvres. The number of tanks possessed by the Russians impressed them greatly, as did the tanks’ use of the suspension system developed by American J. Walter Christie.28

Indeed, Martel considered this system so important that he decided to import a model of this tank from the United States (US) to see how it could be used in the development of British tanks. This type of tank was to affect tactical doctrine in that it provided an additional type of tank known as a ‘cruiser’. At this time there were four different types of tanks in the British Army: light, medium, cruiser, and infantry. The tactical use of these different types of vehicles was something which had not been clearly developed.

In May 1937, Neville Chamberlain became Prime Minister. As Chancellor of the Exchequer he had actively constrained the development of weapons for the British Army. Chamberlain justified this with the assertion that he had to consider the economic stability of Britain as well as its security. However, he was not by nature a supporter of a strong defensive posture, believing that peace could be secured by diplomatic rather than military means.

Chamberlain appointed Leslie Hore-Belisha as Secretary of State for War.29 Hore-Belisha had performed well as the Minister for Transport and, although he had served in the military in World War I, he was not, nor did he pretend to be, a military thinker. It was suggested to him that he could benefit from the military advice of Basil Liddell Hart. The two men found that they could work together and, indeed, their relationship was sometimes referred to as ‘the Partnership’. This meant that Liddell Hart’s ideas on the use of the Army in general and the use of tanks in particular, were fed into the ear of the man who had the greatest influence◦— apart from the Prime Minister and the Treasury◦— on military doctrine and resources.

In September 1937 the mobile division was effectively established and there was considerable discussion over the appointment of its commander, with the recommended candidates including both a cavalry officer and a RTC officer. In the end, the command was given to Major General Alan Brooke, an artillery officer. He subsequently became CIGS and Field Marshal Lord Alan Brooke and proved a very effective commander, although his previous experience seemed unusual for the head of a new type of formation.

One of the major problems of Brooke’s command was the correct employment of his formation: ‘There was on the one hand the necessity to evolve correct doctrine for the employment of armoured forces in the field of battle, and on the other hand some bridge must be found to span the large gap that existed in the relations between the extremists of the Tank Corps and the Cavalry. There was no love lost between the two. The cavalry naturally resented deeply losing their horses, giving up their mounted role and becoming “dungaree mechanics”. Thus, at this point, there was no clear doctrine as to how armoured forces should be used.’30

In December 1937, Hore-Belisha sacked Sir Cyril Deverell and appointed Lord Gort as CIGS. In January 1938 the new Army policy emphasised home and imperial defence, leaving the continental force as the lowest priority. This was, in part, due to Liddell Hart’s conviction that the continental role was the least important task of the Army. This he conveyed to Hore-Belisha and the resulting economies from not having to provide a continental force were warmly welcomed by the Treasury.

In November 1938 the General Staff decided to form a second mobile division in Egypt with Hobart as its commander. The 1st Mobile Division was renamed the 1st Armoured Division in February 1939 and was somewhat reduced in size. In the same month, Cabinet acknowledged that the British Field Force must be brought up to continental standards.

All these changes in strategic policy made it difficult for the commanders at lower levels to determine exactly how they should employ the troops they commanded, which in turn made it difficult to establish appropriate training programs. Fortunately, the crew and collective training conducted by Hobart in Egypt ensured that the forces fighting there in later years were very capable of carrying out their operational duties.

Tank doctrine after 1939

Up to the outbreak of war there had been little opportunity for any tank forces to test their tactics in combat. There had been some opportunity for the forces that fought in the Spanish Civil War to scrutinise the way their tanks operated and decide how they should work both on their own and with other forces. However, the numbers employed and the difficulties of terrain made it impossible to draw useful lessons from those operations.

Tanks were also used by the Russians against the Japanese on the borders of Manchuria in 1938 and 1939, although details of these actions did not reach the European armies and had no effect on tank doctrine.31 In Britain, the only opportunity to test tactics was during exercises which were so restricted and infrequent that they were much too small a sample from which to draw valid conclusions.

Calais, June 1940. A close support A9 tank sits damaged and abandoned. It belonged to the British 1st Armoured Division, many of whose tanks were so badly prepared that they went into action without ammunition for the 3-in howitzer and without telescopic sights (Tank Museum image).

The first armoured troops to gain useful experience of combat, other than the Russians in Manchuria, were the Germans fighting in Poland. The campaign was a brief one, but it certainly allowed the Germans to test various techniques, in most cases extremely successfully. These involved the integrated use of tanks, mobile infantry and aircraft, and adopted the general principle of bypassing points of resistance and striking at rear areas to demoralise their opponents, thus demonstrating the virtues of the ‘indirect approach’. These operations were observed as far as possible by other military forces. Whether they learnt from them is difficult to say. The problem for Britain was that its tank forces remained very small and poorly armed. The rate of supply of weapons was also very slow.

The British armoured forces that faced the might of the Germans in France on 10 May 1940 comprised the reconnaissance cavalry units attached to the infantry divisions, the 1st Army Tank Brigade, and the 1st Armoured Division which was still in England. These were used in action in very piecemeal attacks. The only really organised attack was that on 21 May 1940 by the 1st Tank Brigade in conjunction with the 50th Infantry Division at Arras. This caused the German forces some concern, but the British were soon brought to a halt because of the very small numbers of tanks available to support the infantry.

The 1st Armoured Division landed in the west of France and advanced as quickly as possible towards the Germans; once again the tanks were thrown in piecemeal and were forced to retire at high speed. Almost all the British tanks were left behind in France. Fortunately, the bulk of the crews were able to find their way back to England and thus form the nucleus of the armoured forces that would now have to be recreated almost from scratch.

In terms of doctrine, what did they learn from the experience of these few weeks fighting in May and early June of 1940? One person who was able to draw lessons from the fighting in France in 1940 was Brigadier Vyvyan Pope, who acted as Armoured Advisor to the Commander-in-Chief, Lord Gort.32 Pope had been involved in most of the tank fighting in France and noted many deficiencies both in doctrine and in equipment.

Major General Vyvyan Pope in 1940, shortly after he had been appointed Director of Armoured Fighting Vehicles at the British War Office. He was killed in an air crash in October 1941 a few days after his promotion to command the British XXX Corps in North Africa.

Pope was asked to present his views to a committee which was reviewing the lessons to be learnt from the French campaign. He appeared before this committee on 17 June 1940 and was asked his opinion on the smallest number of tanks that he would consider decentralising under the command of another formation.33 He replied: ‘an armoured division’. There was some discussion which gave Pope the impression that the committee was abandoning the task of studying the lessons that could be learned and was devoting itself to the task of the defence of England.

Some members of the committee were anxious to form small packets of brigade groups containing all arms and tanks and to scatter them around England. Pope made it very clear that he could not subscribe to that doctrine, and that the experience in France had shown that the dissipation of armoured forces had led to its defeat. In defence, armoured troops should be concentrated in reserve ready to strike when required. Pope was also extremely critical of the quality and quantity of tanks supplied to Britain’s armoured forces in France.

The next time that British tank troops saw significant action was in the Western Desert in December 1940.34 After some preliminary pushes against the Italian forces opposed to them, the formation trained by Hobart, now named the 7th Armoured Division, decided to push westwards along the coast of North Africa. Using the open desert and the mobility of tanks and brilliantly commanded by Lieutenant General Richard O’Connor, they succeeded superbly.

Although they were subsequently pushed back by Rommel and the German forces, the 7th Armoured Division had achieved a very significant victory and one which heartened the politicians and the people of Britain. One unfortunate result of this victory, however, was that it appeared to suggest that tanks could achieve victories on their own. This, combined with the pre-war teaching of Hobart, led many observers to believe that tanks could generally secure victory without the assistance of other arms. This misconception was to cause many of the calamities that occurred in the Western Desert over the next two years.

Army Training Instruction No. 3, ‘Handling of an Armoured Division’, published in 1941, appears to be the first wartime document on tank doctrine. It outlined a structure for the armoured division which comprised an armoured car regiment, two armoured brigades, and a support group. The support group contained one lorried infantry battalion, three field batteries of artillery, three batteries of anti-tank guns and light anti-aircraft batteries.

Two interesting points are included in the details of this instruction. First, the tactics for the engagement of enemy armoured formations include the possible use of anti-tank guns supporting the armoured forces. Second, it makes a very clear statement that ‘fire from stationary positions will always be more accurate than from a moving platform.’ This second statement is in complete contradiction to the policies of firing on the move which were so strongly advocated and taught by Hobart and other tank officers before the war.

In July 1943, the War Office produced another document called ‘The tactical handling of armoured divisions’. This expressed a rather different doctrine and organisational structure to those advanced in 1941. The composition of the armoured division now comprised an armoured regiment, an armoured brigade, an infantry brigade, supporting engineers and artillery. The artillery consisted of two field regiments, one of them equipped with self-propelled guns, and one regiment each of anti-tank guns and anti-aircraft guns. Thus the emphasis had moved from armour to infantry, creating a more balanced division.

By July 1943, British forces had achieved significant successes in North Africa. One of the main policy items was that ‘an armoured division is a formation consisting of all arms. Tanks by themselves cannot win battles and the unarmoured units of the armoured division are indispensable while the administrative services play roles no less vital and equally dangerous in maintaining supplies of all kinds.’

The roles of an armoured division were listed in the July 1943 document as: cooperation with the main army and the air forces in effecting the complete destruction of the enemy, usually by envelopment or by deep penetration through his defences after a gap has been made in his main position by other formations; pursuit; cooperation with other arms in defence, usually by counter-attack; and threatening the enemy and forcing him to alter or disclose his dispositions.

Clearly the lessons of Alamein and subsequent desert battles were those which were documented in this training pamphlet. Whether these methods would be suited to other theatres of combat such as Sicily, Italy, Normandy and north-west Europe and the Pacific theatre remained to be seen.

The last document to be considered in establishing tank doctrine was that produced by Field Marshal Montgomery in December 1944.35 This is written in Monty’s customary brisk style and summarised clearly the lessons that had been learnt throughout the war to that point. The predominant theme is one of flexibility:

All commanders must be well versed in the employment of armour. This means that Army and Corps commanders should be capable of making the best use of armoured formations at their disposal.

The armoured division is particularly suited for employment in the fast-moving and fluid battle. The aim of planning should be to create opportunities to use the armoured division in this role: if suitable opportunities can be created, then the action of the armoured division is likely to be decisive.

An armoured division can also carry out many of the tasks that are normally given to an infantry division: but it is a different kind of weapon and the job has therefore to be tackled in a different way.

The main characteristics of an armoured division are its armour, firepower, and mobility. Plans for the employment of the division which do not exploit these characteristics to the full will not be sound.

Armour is most effective when employed concentrated: a mass of armour, particularly in the enemy’s rear, has a moral effect.

Monty adds that the armoured division can be grouped in a variety of different ways. The grouping adopted in any particular case must depend on the problem; there is no normal grouping, and any rigidity in this respect is to be deprecated. This is wholly borne out by the comments of Major General Pip Roberts:36

Throughout the war the tactics used within an armoured division and its organisation were continually changing. It was not until our third battle in Normandy that we got it right, and that was an organisation of complete flexibility. At the shortest notice the organisation could be altered from an armoured brigade and an infantry brigade to two mixed brigades, each of two armoured regiments and two infantry battalions and artillery as required. All units were entirely interchangeable.37

Roberts, who commanded the 11th Armoured (Charging Bull) Division, was probably the best armoured divisional commander in the north-west campaign. There seems at last to have been agreement at all levels of military command on the way in which armoured forces should be used. But those people who were participants in armoured battles in the five years up till then were certainly at the mercy of commanders who occasionally handled them in a manner that was less than optimal.

Alan Jolly’s comments form a useful postscript to this section. Jolly commanded the 144th Royal Armoured Corps (RAC) in the north-west Europe campaign. This unit was converted to the 4th Royal Tank Regiment before the end of the war to replace the unit captured in Tobruk. Jolly himself had a distinguished military career and was promoted general. In the epilogue to his book Blue Flash, he reflects on some of the observations he had made and lessons he had learned during the course of his military career. In discussing the use of tanks he notes:

There are two basic purposes for which tanks exist and for which at present [1952] there are no substitutes. The first of these is to provide direct fire support for infantry as opposed to the indirect fire of artillery. Artillery provides a greater weight of fire but can only deal with an area target and must therefore cease during the last 150 yards of the infantry’s advance to their objectives. This is where they usually suffer the bulk of their casualties from small arms fire, and it is here that the tank must fill in the gap by shooting with weapons of pin point accuracy up to the moment that the infantry close with their enemy.

The second basic purpose for which the tank exists is to provide the hard core of the mobile portion of an army. This faster portion which provides the decisive action in battle is composed of armoured divisions, the tanks of which provide a concentration of mobile fire power which can disrupt, disorganise and pursue an enemy whose front has been broken or cracked by the slower infantry divisions and their supporting armour and artillery. The tank has one other significant purpose and that is to fight other tanks. However, the two fundamental purposes are to provide direct fire support of a nature which cannot be produced by artillery and to form the hard core of the mobile portion of an army.

Chapter 2:

AUSTRALIANS AND TANKS IN WORLD WAR I

Despite the fact that there were no Australian tank units in World War I, the AIF in France gained considerable experience working with tanks. Three significant actions saw Australian infantry supported by British tanks: the First Battle of Bullecourt, 10–12 April 1917; the Battle of Hamel, 4 July 1918; and several battles during the Hundred Days towards the end of the war, particularly the action fought on 8 August 1918, the German Army’s ‘Black Day’.

First Bullecourt was a disaster for the 4th Australian Infantry Division, and a sorry showing for the British tanks. As a result, the Australians became very mistrustful of tanks in any form, and took more than a year to be persuaded to use them again in the attack on the village of Hamel. By this time tanks were far more reliable, and the Tank Corps as a whole had proven how effective it could be at the Battle of Cambrai on 20 November 1917.1

The Battle of Hamel was superbly planned and executed by the Commander of the 1st Australian Corps, Lieutenant General Sir John Monash. He integrated the use of infantry, artillery, tanks, aircraft, and other services so that all objectives were gained without excessive loss in just over an hour and a half.

The success of Hamel reinforced the Allied High Command’s new confidence in tanks and, one month after Hamel, the opening assault of the Battle of Amiens employed almost all the British tanks available. This chapter describes the three actions of First Bullecourt, Hamel, and Amiens, and illustrates that, by the end of the war, the Australians were enthusiastic and knowledgeable about the capabilities of tanks, even if there were no Australian tank units as yet.

Accounts of these battles were often written from the viewpoint of the infantryman, the tankman, or soldiers from the other arms. Quite often, an account by one arm of the service barely mentions the operations of the others, providing a one-sided impression of the action. However, all actions in which the Australians took part in France have been meticulously and objectively recorded by Charles Bean, Australia’s official correspondent during World War I and author of six of the twelve volumes of The Official History of Australia in the War of 1914 to 1918.2

First Bullecourt

The First Battle of Bullecourt^3 resulted from a decision to use the Fifth British Army, commanded by General Gough, on the right of a major thrust by the First and Third British Armies.4 Gough’s task was to advance to the Hindenburg Line just to the north of the village of Bullecourt capturing the village during the advance. The 4th Australian Infantry Division was part of the Fifth Army.

On 9 April 1917 the First and Third British Armies advanced towards Vimy and Arras. The relative ease of the push led Gough to believe that the Hindenburg Line was less strongly manned than previously considered. Gough ordered his Corps Commanders to send patrols forward to the Hindenburg Line, and if they could establish themselves in the line, to reinforce these with larger forces and advance further.

Tank in mud, Flanders. This scene is typical of the Flanders countryside after shelling and rain. It was the area where tanks were desperately needed but, because of their mechanical unreliability and the appalling terrain, they all too often let the infantry down (NAA image No. B4260, 3 Barcode 4167035).

General Gough had been allocated 11 Company of D Battalion Tank Corps (at that time known as the Heavy Branch of the Machine Gun Corps). The Company Commander, Major W.H.L. Watson, planned to use his tanks to assist the Fifth Army to overcome a shortage of artillery for destroying the wire defence works.5 His tanks would advance en masse without a barrage, steal up on the Hindenburg Line and enter the German trenches. Watson took this plan to his Commanding Officer (CO), Lieutenant Colonel Hardress Lloyd, who was sufficiently impressed to take the plan, with Watson in tow, to General Gough.

Gough approved the plan, and decided to attack with tanks supporting the Australian infantry the next morning. There were several problems with this attack: the Australians had not previously worked with tanks; D Battalion had been formed only at the beginning of 1917; the tank crews had trained in the back area in France, but with far too few tanks for adequate practice; their tanks were mainly Mark Is, which were still unreliable and whose armour was not bulletproof; Major Watson’s tank officers, with two exceptions, had neither experience nor skill; and there was very little time for preparation and reconnaissance.

Thus the 4th Australian Division was to be supported by a company of tanks whose men and officers were inexperienced and unskilful, and whose tanks were very slow and extremely unreliable. It was not surprising that, from the tanks’ perspective, the battle was a fiasco and, from the infantry’s point of view, it was a disaster.

On 10 April the tanks were so late in reaching the start line that the operation had to be postponed until the next day. On 11 April the tanks were again late, and not a single tank survived the opening attack. Dazzle painting had been abandoned as useless, and all were now the standard mud-brown. Against the snow, the tanks showed up admirably for the German gunners. As they moved slowly forward, nine were picked off almost at once, one of them having come to a halt with clutch trouble. The armour in which they had trusted proved useless. Even small arms fire riddled the hulls.

Two more tanks disappeared into the blue heading towards Hendecourt with a party of Australians trailing behind. Neither tanks nor diggers were seen again.6 Two tanks were trooped in slow time through Berlin shortly afterwards, and they may have been these. It is hardly surprising that the Germans were not inspired to build tanks for themselves on the evidence of this abysmal performance.

One tank, commanded by Lieutenant Money, seems to have reached the German wire before a direct hit from a field gun set it ablaze.7 The crew members, who had escaped relatively unscathed, took all the weapons they could find, including Lewis guns and revolvers, and joined whatever unit could make use of them. All the same, when an Australian Brigadier told Major Watson that ‘his tanks were bloody useless’, Watson could hardly argue.8

As Bean notes, ‘Throughout the 4th Australian Division the chief blame for the miscarriage and the very heavy casualties was naturally laid on the tanks, and the bitterness against them was intense… The performance of several of the tank crews reached the highest standards of British devotion… A proportion were quite unfit for the task, became badly shaken, and undoubtedly failed to rise to the exacting expectations of the Australian infantry.’9

An abandoned tank, late 1916, drawing by Sir William Orpen. The drawing portrays the desolation, abandonment and death of the war in 1916 (IWM ART 2391).

It was not only the Australians who thought tanks were close to useless at this point. The tank command and the crews themselves felt that they had been thrust into action piecemeal and much too soon given their level of training. The Mark I and Mark II tanks were, as demonstrated at Bullecourt, slow, unreliable, and vulnerable to a broad range of enemy fire.

By the middle of 1917, few people had much faith in tanks. Fortunately for the tanks and, in the long run, for the infantry, one person who had faith in them was the British Commander-in-Chief, Douglas Haig. He informed the War Office on 5 June 1917 that ‘events have proved the utility of tanks, both as a means of overcoming hostile resistance… and as a means of reducing casualties in the attacking troops and I consider that sufficient experience has now been gained to warrant the adoption of the tank as a recognised addition to the existing means of conducting offensive operations.’10

As well as benefitting from Haig’s faith, the Tank Corps was further encouraged by the improved performance of the Mark IV tank, which began to appear in tank battalions in mid-1917.11 The volume of tanks delivered also made possible the employment of tanks en masse, a policy which had been recommended by tank commanders and strategists from the outset. The policy produced a rousing success at Cambrai in November 1917, and inspired the belief that the ‘Cambrai key’ could well be the key to the future.

The German Spring Offensive of 1918 gave the tanks a role in defence, which regrettably left many tanks abandoned on the battlefield to be captured by the enemy. However, this period also saw the delivery of the improved Mark V tank.12 Thus, by the time the Australians were prepared to have a second go at using tanks, the Tank Corps was a much better instrument than it had been in the spring of 1917.

The tanks were more powerful, easier to manoeuvre, more reliable, and better armoured; the crews were experienced and skilful; and the commanders had developed procedures for making good use of tanks to support the infantry. Hamel was the next major battle, and it was to prove significant for the Australians, the Tank Corps, and for the conduct of the war on the Western Front as a whole.

Hamel, 4 July 1918: the plan^13

The German onslaught which began on 21 March 1918 created havoc, particularly on the front occupied by the British Fifth Army.14 As the German advance continued it threatened to drive a wedge between the British armies under Haig and the French armies under Petain. This was a crisis of command and, to meet the crisis, a conference was held at Doullens on 26 March. After some sharp exchanges, and largely on the initiative of Haig, a formula was agreed and signed: ‘General Foch is charged by the British and French Governments with the co-ordination of the action of the Allied Armies on the Western Front.’15

Foch’s powers were further increased at a second conference held at Beauvais on 3 April, where he was entrusted with ‘the strategic direction of military operations’.16 He was now the Supreme Allied Commander, and bore responsibility for both Britain and France.

By early June, the German offensive had been halted and Foch was convinced that the time had come for an Allied attack. Foch ordered a series of minor offensives which could take the form of substantial raids on a scale of 100 to 200 men or the capture of territory of tactical value to the enemy, as a means to destroy the enemy’s defensive organisation. The order was conveyed through Haig and then Rawlinson, commanding the British Fourth Army, who passed it to his Corps Commanders, including General Monash, Commander of the Australian Corps.

John Monash (sitting, centre) was promoted to Lieutenant General and appointed to command the Australian Corps in June 1918. His staff, behind him, from left to right: Brigadier Foott, Chief Engineer; Brigadier Carruthers, Deputy Army Quartermaster-General; Brigadier Thomas Blamey, Chief of Staff; Brigadier Fraser, Heavy Artillery; Brigadier Coxen, Royal Artillery.

General MacLagan, GOC 4th Division, positioned opposite Hamel, proposed the capture of Vaire Wood on his right front. He considered that this action ‘would need six battalions, and should not take place at present.’ There were sound tactical reasons for not immediately attacking Hamel and the ridge beyond it, all sufficiently compelling to avoid the casualties that would almost certainly result.

In the middle of June, the tanks of 5th Tank Brigade began to arrive by rail in an area just north of Amiens, only a few miles from the front opposite Hamel. The brigade consisted of the 2nd, 8th, and 13th Battalions of the Tank Corps, and a company of Whippets, the new light tanks.17 The three heavy battalions were armed with the new Mark V tanks.

Major General Hugh Elles was the first operational leader of the British Tank Corps. On the morning of the first use of tanks en masse, 20 November 1917 at Cambrai, he issued a stirring order to his troops, and then personally led the attack. As the tanks advanced he unfurled the newly designed Tank Corps flag (Tank Museum image).

The 5th Tank Brigade was commanded by Brigadier General Anthony Courage, and both he and Brigadier General Hugh Elles, commanding the Tank Corps as a whole, were anxious to prove the value of their new weapon.18 Elles invited Monash and his Chief of Staff, Brigadier General Thomas Blamey, to see the new tanks at work.

Monash and Blamey were impressed by the performance of the new tanks, and decided that the Hamel operation was feasible if the presence of tanks could reduce casualties. Monash drew up a plan which he described as ‘primarily a tank action’, and an outline was submitted to Rawlinson on 21 June. Rawlinson liked the plan and submitted it to Haig on 23 June with the comment, ‘If the operation is successful then the casualties should not be great, as it is intended to make the operation essentially a surprise tank attack. I consider that the advantages to be gained are well worth the cost.’

Haig gave his consent to the plan, and the date fixed for the attack was 4 July. Some changes were made, partly because the Australian senior commanders under Monash still wanted to maintain the customary creeping barrage, harbouring some doubts over the reliability of the tanks. The final plan, agreed by the infantry and tank commanders, would comprise an infantry assault with tank support to minimise losses.

Cutaway elevation of a Mark V tank. Mark Vs were issued to tank units in mid-1918 (Tank Museum image).

The attack was to be strengthened by the inclusion of American infantry and a substantial contribution from the Air Force. This was to consist of a squadron of Handley-Page bombers and other squadrons of smaller, low-flying craft to watch for German anti-tank guns during the attack, and strafe them as soon as they appeared.

It was of paramount importance to convince the Australians that the tanks could help them. The tanks were located in a quiet valley at Vaux-en-Amienois, a few miles north-west of Amiens. Parties of Australian infantry were taken to visit the tank park for demonstrations of what the tanks could do to help them. The Tank Corps history describes the demonstrations and joint training:

Directly the attack had been decided upon, tanks and Australians began their combined training in the area of the 5th Tank Brigade. Tank units were at once permanently affiliated to corresponding Australian infantry units with whom they were to fight, and by this means a very close comradeship was cultivated. It was most necessary that some special steps should be taken to ensure the confidence of the Australian infantry in the Tank Corps, for, in the absence of artillery preparation, upon the tanks would almost entirely depend the success and prestige of the Australians in this first Allied offensive since the March disaster.

Now the Australians, having a natural affinity for the activity and surprise of a tank as against a prepared artillery attack, were not inclined to bestow their approval on the tanks without due cause being given. They still had vivid memories of the tragedy of errors at Bullecourt. They were, however, very open-minded, and the battle partners had not long been training together before their relations were particularly cordial.

Coy and hard to please as were the Australians in the beginning, the triumphant success of their partnership in battle left them no memory of their earlier shyness, and made them vociferous in their praise of a combination that the Tank Corps had long felt would prove effective.19

General Monash also described the joint training in glowing terms:

Set-piece manoeuvre exercises on the scale of a battalion were designed and rehearsed over and over again; red flags marked enemy machine-gun posts; real wire entanglements were laid out to show how easily tanks could mow them down; real trenches were dug for the tanks to leap and straddle and search with fire; real rifle grenades were fired by the infantry to indicate to the tanks the enemy strong points which were molesting and impeding their advance. The tanks would throw themselves upon these places, and, pirouetting round and round, would blot them out, much as a man’s heel would crush a scorpion.20

In the intervals between the serious business of joint training, the bonding continued in other time-honoured ways. Monash continues:

The tanks kept open house; the infantry were taken over the field for joyrides, were allowed to clamber all over the monsters, inside and out, and even to help to drive them and put them through their paces. Platoon and Company leaders met dozens of tank officers face to face and argued each other to a standstill on every aspect that arose.

The fame of the tanks and all the wonderful things they could do spread rapidly throughout the Corps. The Australian took the tank to his heart, and each tank was given a pet name by the company of infantry which it served in battle, a name which was kept chalked on its iron sides together with a panegyric commenting on its prowess.21

Visits between the tanks and the Australian infantry were reciprocated, with the tank commanders invited to the infantry positions. There they discussed details of the plan and methods of operation, particularly methods of communicating with one another. They lived and messed with the junior officers, thus establishing friendship and mutual understanding.

Hamel: the battle

This mutual understanding paid substantial dividends during the battle itself. The description of the battle that follows is selective, in that it concentrates on those parts of the battle where there was interaction between the tanks and the infantry. Essentially, the battle took the form of an infantry assault with tank support.

Hamel, 5 July 1918. Australian soldiers beside tank H 52, one of three knocked out in the battle. The tank’s number shows that it belonged to 8 Battalion Tank Corps (AWM EO3843).

Hamel was a battle that was primarily won by the Australian infantry, but the presence of the tanks demoralised the Germans, and the actions of the tanks killed many German soldiers, wiped out machine-gun nests and other hostile weapons, and crushed wire defences. Hamel proved to be an excellent demonstration of successful cooperation between the two arms, and formed the blueprint for many subsequent operations.

The infantry and the tanks made their way to their respective start-lines for a zero hour of 3.10 a.m. on 4 July 1918. The tanks moved in low gear to minimise noise, and low-flying planes acted as an auditory mask. Later reports suggested that the Germans were unaware of the tanks’ approach.22 At 3.10 the massive artillery barrage crashed out, and the infantry moved forward.

The tanks followed four minutes later. It was dark, and the smoke and dust of the barrage severely restricted the tanks’ visibility. For this reason some of the early actions in the battle such as the capture of Pear Trench, were fought by unsupported infantry.

Before long, dawn broke, and almost every infantry company found a tank somewhere within sight and call. One tank, with the colours of the 13th Australian Infantry Battalion painted on it, was seen slowly advancing fifty yards to the rear of Captain Marper’s company, which had been forced to ground by machine-guns in a camouflaged trench.23

Marper ran in front of the tank, waving his arms in the direction of the trench. The machine-guns shot him through chest and arm, but the tank turned and made for the trench. It trampled one machine-gun position, and the Germans in the other gave up the fight, taken prisoner by the infantry.

On the northern flank, the attack by the 42nd Infantry Battalion went smoothly, precisely as had been planned. When the barrage made its second lift, the tanks caught up. The tanks’ CO, Lieutenant Colonel John Bingham, had ordered them to remain on the edge of the barrage, in spite of the danger.24 From this position they were able to move quickly to destroy German machinegun positions.

On the southern flank, two battalions of the 6th Infantry Brigade advanced. The leading tanks caught up with them at the first German trench, firing down the trench in both directions, completely demoralising the enemy. The tanks then pressed on into the fringe of the barrage, leading the infantry.

General Monash had planned the battle in two stages, separated by a tenminute halt. During the first stage the tanks had provided valuable assistance in many sectors, but not in all. During the second stage, however, which occurred once dawn had broken, all the tanks caught up, and they all played their full part in the action.

In capturing the village of Hamel itself, the 44th Battalion found strongly garrisoned trenches on the ridge beyond the village, from which the Germans were bringing down heavy machine-gun fire. The infantry called for help from their tanks. The right flank of the 44th was fired on from what turned out to be a German battalion headquarters. A tank officer was ‘walking about’ and, as soon as he was contacted, he directed his tank towards the enemy, who immediately stopped firing and bolted. The tanks then moved up and down the trench, from which the infantry captured fifty prisoners and twenty-seven machine-guns.

A supply tank being demonstrated to Queen Mary, July 1917. These tanks were used to ferry supplies forward to help the infantry consolidate on an objective, and thus preserve their energy for combat duty (Tank Museum image).

Once the final objectives had been taken, there was prompt action to consolidate the newly won positions. Another great advantage of the Tank Corps now became apparent. Four carrier/supply tanks delivered supplies that would have required the use of more than 1,200 men, and did so immediately to a position just behind the new front line.25

The infantry either occupied the old German trenches or dug new ones. This was achieved quickly with the assistance of the tanks, which now helped the digging infantry by destroying opposition that threatened to interfere with the digging.

Valuable as the tanks proved to be, however, their role has often been exaggerated in the later accounts of the Tank Corps historians:

The whole day was to be one long triumph for the new Mark V tank. The new tanks were possessed, the Germans found, of a deadly power on manoeuvre which they used to the full, expending little ammunition upon machine-gun nests, but, even when they had passed an emplacement in the first rush, swinging swiftly round on the wretched gunners and crushing guns and crews beneath their tracks. This method, they said, eliminated all chance of the enemy coming to life again after the attack had passed by.26

Conversely, tank historian Williams-Ellis also acknowledges the primary role of the infantry, commenting on the cooperation between the two arms:

But at first the most striking characteristic of the victory seemed the perfect co-operation between the tanks and the infantry. The tanks and the Australians were equally enthusiastic over one another’s performances. The Australians were surprised and delighted at the weight and solidity which the sixty tanks had lent their impact, and at the sense of support and comradeship which their men had experienced.

The tanks were equally impressed by the superb morale of the Australians, who never considered that the presence of tanks exonerated them from fighting, and who took instant advantage of any opportunity created by the tanks.

A generous and lasting friendship had been established. The 5th Tank Brigade and their Australians were destined throughout their coming partnership to be an almost invincible combination.27

Perhaps Williams-Ellis goes a little far in his final comment on the newfound friendships that followed the Battle of Hamel: ‘The 5th Tank Brigade and the Australians had sworn eternal friendship with a refreshing enthusiasm. They were like two schoolgirl friends, not to be separated, and at Vaux-en-Amienois, whither they had retired for combined training, metaphorically went about all day with their arms about each other’s waists.’28

While Bean was not so effusive in his commentary, he was nonetheless very positive:

Hitherto it had been a definite disadvantage to the Tank Corps that since Bullecourt the Australians had distrusted the tanks, and to a certain extent their crews. Comments from infantry commanders after the victory of Hamel included such statements as: ‘The tank saved us a great number of casualties at the final objective. It gave an ideal illustration of co-operation with infantry.’ [and] ‘I feel sure that tanks, when so ably used, could obviate the need for a final protective barrage and leave more scope for exploiting success. The tanks even appeared to anticipate the infantry’s desires.’ [and finally] ‘Having seen them in action the infantry have a very high opinion of their work.’29

One of the most interesting accounts of the battle is that contained in a letter from an Australian soldier, Private Sydney Huntingdon, to his wife.30 Huntingdon was a member of the 7th Company of the 2nd Australian Machine Gun Brigade. On 3 and 4 July, his company was on the hillside north of the Somme which allowed him a clear view of the action unfolding in front of him:

It was on the fourth of July that we started to hop over◦— you must remember that all this time we lay on the hillside waiting for the word to start. Most of the night we lay on the hillside absorbed in these things. It was one of the quietest we had ever seen on the front. Now and then a machine gun chattered a few halting sentences. Once or twice our guns carried out their nightly strafes on to some sensitive point behind the German lines.

At three o’clock when the sky way greying towards dawn, there broke out into the normal dawn bombardments a terrible strafe of a thousand shells from the enemy guns. Some minutes later our guns answered shot for shot and reflected upon the skyline and hillsides opposite what one American soldier described to us that morning as ‘some firework’.

In the waves of infantry which went over behind that barrage there were several companies of Americans◦— the first to enter any action on the British front. They had never been under fire before this position opened just ahead of them. They were at that moment moving towards it amongst the Australian infantry & the tanks, although of course we could not see them, nor they us at any distance.

Later in the day we were surprised to see higher slopes behind Hamel further back than this one. But at this moment there was only one gentle hill beyond Hamel, and then the even grey sky. It was the very moment when our men should be nearing that hill-top. Moving along the top of it was a low grey monster. It was like a knob on the nose of the hill — a pimple◦— a wart. It moved slowly along the crest sideways, like some legless insect◦— perhaps a woodlouse would be the best resemblance. There was another & another to right & left of it, and crowds of infantry between them. They were moving up towards that skyline along its whole length.

Some figures go up from the cornfield at its side, walk away a few yards, and then started to run & we lost sight of them. I think they must have been Germans. Now there was a sunken road leading up to the wood of Accroche. We looked straight up it at the wood. We fancied earlier that we saw a few men at the top end this road but now there was a tank at the bottom of it, and the road was empty. Not a sign of movement in the whole length of it, only the dark shadow spots which showed the entrances of small dugouts or shelters in the banks of it. The tank moved up it to the top and lay there for a moment with her nose turned in to the bank.

We thought that she had stuck there, but the next time we looked she had climbed on to the bank and was there seated on the top of it. Much later in the day we heard that as she went up the road, she found that there were Germans sniping from one of those dugouts which the infantry had passed. She climbed the opposite bank and fired her small gun straight in at the entrance.

We had not watched this tank continuously, for at this moment other tanks and the infantry around them had appeared at both the northern & southern corners of Accroche wood. We could see the men at the northern end very clearly in groups a little this side of the wood, clearly choosing their position for digging in.

About a hundred yards away from them the wood ended in a long point consisting of small scattered trees about ten or fifteen feet high. Suddenly the tank nearest to these made towards them. She glided very quickly up to the wood. We thought she was going through it, and wondered what would happen when she exposed herself to the direct view of the German guns which we knew were in that valley. A shell burst about thirty yards from the side of her◦— very likely it was one of our own for she was right up to the barrage line.

And then a wonderful thing happened. The tank which had been gliding forward suddenly stopped dead. We could scarcely believe our eyes when the next second she was gliding backwards as fast as she had slipped forward. She retreated for twenty yards like a shunting train. Then she instantly slid forward again to about the same position & stayed there.

We thought she must be dodging shells as we had seen one poor old tank try to do in an earlier battle; it was an old make, one of the first that were made, and it was far too slow & the guns simply played with it as a cat plays with a mouse. The modern ones are very fast to what the old tanks were & the newer ones have some chance we thought. But when she stopped & only one man got out of her and walked back from her it looked as if she too had been finished.

Ten minutes later we looked again and she was gone. Later we heard that the men we had seen here were a company of American infantry. As they were getting their bearings a machine gunner in the corner of the wood shot two of their officers dead. The tank at once made for this machine gun post & ran straight over it twice & then took up her position there to cover the Americans till they had dug in. She captured herself several prisoners so we were told.

By this time at least one tank and men also were not merely up to, but beyond the wood of Accroche. They had gone on through our own barrage, for our own shells were falling far behind them. There were many tanks visible at this period against the skyline or the smoke from our barrage. There were long lines of men digging around and along almost the whole front. Later the tanks withdrew.

Amiens and the Hundred Days

The Allied offensive that began on 8 August 1918 transformed the stagnation of trench warfare on the Western Front to a war of mobility and movement. The Germans had pre-empted this in their Spring Offensive of March 1918, but had met resolute defence, gradually augmented by an increasing American presence. In addition, lack of reserves prevented the Germans maintaining the momentum of their initial successes.

By August the American reinforcement had become significant, and was continuing to build. British tank forces were also expanding, and their units were now equipped with the Mark V tanks that had been so successful at Hamel.

One of the battles fought by Australians with tank support in the Hundred Days is of particular interest. Iven Mackay commanded the 1st Australian Infantry Brigade in the battle of Chuignolles on 23 August 1918. He later became one of the Army’s senior World War II commanders.

By the end of the battle, all the objectives, including areas beyond Chuignolles, had been captured. A significant factor in the success was the excellent cooperation between the Australian infantry and the British tanks. In the aftermath of the attack, Brigadier Mackay called his battalion commanders together to discuss their first acquaintance with the battle tank, in the course of which he made these points:

Although many became casualties, great help was given to the infantry, again proving that the tank when well supported by the infantry is an invention much dreaded by the enemy. Since some were knocked out and the country was open, the tanks did not participate in the second stage of the attack. Those that attempted to climb a ridge north-east of Chuignolles found it too steep.

Tanks are most useful at the beginning of an attack when they have a great moral effect. When the attack is well launched they have done their main work. The infantry, once landed at its objective, should be able to defend itself. Tanks patrolling in daylight will inevitably be hit. Too much should not be asked of them, and before they become casualties they should be withdrawn for future use.31

These comments form a realistic evaluation of the performance of the Mark V tank. Early in World War II, Mackay commanded the 6th Australian Infantry Division. In the division’s first major action, the capture of Bardia, Mackay made excellent use of the tanks under his command, the Matildas of the 7th Royal Tank Regiment.

Chapter 3:

A LONG SLEEP AND TWO WAKE-UP CALLS

The long sleep, 1918 to 1939

As soon as the 1914–18 war ended, the armed forces of the victorious nations were rapidly and drastically reduced in size. The Armistice of 11 November 1918 came more quickly than many had expected, and mechanisms for demobilisation and disposal of war materiel took some time to become fully effective. It was thus several months before attention could be given to the role, composition and equipment of the armies that would be needed in peacetime.

The British Army had been foremost in developing and implementing the use of tanks and, in the second half of 1918, had been planning a significant expansion of its tank forces. This expansion was not limited to size and also included broadening the role of the tank. The success of the few Whippets^1 that had been in action had led military thinkers such as Fuller to envisage tanks as the major component of a strong mobile strike force.2

The Armistice stymied these plans. When the British Army began to reorganise for peacetime there were many in the High Command who considered that tanks had fulfilled their wartime role and were no longer required. It was unlikely that there would be a recurrence of trench warfare and tanks had been produced primarily to help the infantry advance through wire defences and across trenches.

During the Hundred Days that marked the final stage of the war, tanks had supported the infantry very successfully in set-piece attacks, but were less successful in the mobile warfare that became more prevalent. The Mark Vs were geared to working at infantry pace and the faster tanks were in short supply or under development. Additionally, the strain of continual movement over the Hundred Days made it very difficult to keep the tanks and crews fit for action. A report from 5 Tank Brigade to Tank Corps HQ on crew endurance explained that:

[Crew endurance] depends entirely on the conditions of weather, ground, state of engine and intensity of fighting. When a tank is in good condition with a new engine, favourable weather, not exposed to intense hostile shelling or very severe fighting the crew may be counted on for 12 hours in action after leaving the line of deployment.

The average time is about 8 hours, but very hot weather, hard fighting, and engines requiring overhaul considerably lessen this period. In the action of 23 August some crews were physically ill after 2 hours’ fighting. The tanks had done a bit of running and it had been impossible to overhaul the engines. Consequently the exhaust had warped and joints became loose, and the tank was full of petrol fumes. Three men were sent to hospital, one of them in a critical condition.3

The view that tanks would not be needed again was forcefully put by Major General Sir Louis Jackson, Director of Trench Warfare and Supplies at the Ministry of Munitions from 1915 to 1918, in a paper given to the Royal United Services Institute on 17 December 1919. Jackson commented that ‘The tank proper was a freak, the circumstances which called it into existence were exceptional and not likely to recur. If they do they can be dealt with by other means.’4

General Jackson was not the only person to regard the tank as an ad hoc response to a unique set of circumstances that would not recur. This cast considerable doubt on the survival of the Tank Corps. But the Corps had two powerful supporters. King George V became Colonel-in-Chief on 17 October 1918 and provided a clear indication of his ongoing support by granting the ‘Royal’ prefix to the Corps on 18 September 1923.5

The other supporter was Field Marshal Douglas Haig. Haig is often portrayed by tank diehards as being reactionary and obstructive in his attitude to tanks, but he was impressed by the demonstration of their employment in early 1916 and, in spite of only moderate success in the first year of their use on the battlefield, he maintained his support, and demanded ever-increasing quantities of tanks.6

While the British Army made halting progress in the production of tanks and the doctrine for their use in the aftermath of World War I, it was even more difficult for the Australian Army to make a decision on the establishment and employment of tank units. The First Battle of Bullecourt would always return to haunt Australian soldiers in spite of subsequent successes at Hamel and in the Hundred Days. John Coates describes the enduring nature of the memory of First Bullecourt:

I graduated from Duntroon in 1955 and joined the 1st Armoured Regiment. It was not long before I realised that there was antipathy in the army at large towards tanks. I was accosted in the mess one night by an older officer from a different unit who proceeded to harangue me, not about the 1st Armoured Division’s failure to get overseas in World War II, but over the shortcomings of British tanks at Bullecourt in April 1917! 7

More importantly, there had been no Australian tank units in World War I, and thus no experience of the use of tanks except as a supporting arm. In addition, the Australian Army had no experience of the maintenance and logistics essential to keep tanks and crews fit for battle.

Formal planning for Australia’s post-war military forces began with a conference in Melbourne on 22 January 1920. The senior officers present all had significant wartime experience, and their task was to recommend the size, composition and equipment required for the peacetime forces. The recommendation for the Army was two cavalry and five infantry divisions to defend Australia. Infantry personnel would come mainly from the universal training provisions of the Defence Act, and the cavalry would be largely volunteers. The Conference made this statement concerning tanks:

The question of the employment of tanks and the formation of a Tank Corps is one which sooner or later must come up for practical consideration. Tanks have proved to be a highly effective reply to the tactical employment of automatic small arms fire and wire entanglements. Tank design has not reached its full development; present types are likely to improve in mechanism, armour, and armament. For these reasons immediate action on this matter is not considered prudent. Any organisation of tanks must, in like manner, be deferred, although the Conference recommends the acquisition of a few tanks for instructional and experimental purposes.8

The deferral of action on tanks lasted until 1926, when the Australian General Staff submitted a proposal^9 to send an officer to the RTC training school at Bovington.10 This was approved, as was the proposal for the purchase of four British tanks and the establishment of the Australian Tank Corps training cadre.11

Tokyo, 1946. From left, Brigadier Ronald Hopkins, Major General William Bridegeford, and US Major General W. Chase. Hopkins was the prime mover in establishing Australian armoured forces. In 1939 he was a major, and his influence on decision-making was very limited. This accounts in part for the delay in raising those forces (source: Hopkins, Australian Armour, p. 94).

The officer selected, Lieutenant E.W. Lamperd, went to England in 1926 and returned in August 1927. The Australian Tank Corps was gazetted in December 1927.12 The first tanks arrived in September 1929 and heralded the formation of the 1st Tank Section. The Section’s inaugural parade was held on 22 March 1930. In 1931, Major R.N.L. Hopkins, a Staff Officer at Army Headquarters, proposed the formation of an armoured car regiment which was eventually established in 1933.13 In early 1937 Hopkins and Warrant Officer K.A. Watts were sent to Bovington to undertake comprehensive training as armoured crew, followed by experience with British field tank units.

As the 1930s progressed there was gradual mechanisation of some of the horsed regiments. In February-March 1938 a scout troop (mounted in Austin 7s) took part in a 2nd Cavalry Division exercise near Seymour. By 1939 Australia could boast two light tank companies and two armoured car regiments. They had little equipment, negligible logistic support, but plenty of enthusiasm.14 In May of the same year, Hopkins and Watts returned from their attachment in the United Kingdom (UK). Any hopes Hopkins may have entertained for the future of Australian armour must have been dashed by his subsequent interview with the Chief of the General Staff (CGS), who told Hopkins: ‘We aren’t going to have any tanks.’15

First wake-up call: 3 September 1939

Hitler’s territorial expansion began with the reoccupation of the Rhineland in 1936, and continued in March 1938 with the unification of Germany and Austria and the occupation of Vienna. His demand that the Sudetenland should become part of Germany precipitated the Munich crisis of late September 1938, and the subsequent granting of the demand. In March 1939 German troops marched into Czechoslovakia and occupied Prague and, on 1 September 1939, Hitler invaded Poland, the act of aggression that precipitated the Second World War. The early seeds of the development of Australian armour in World War II were sown in the first few months after the declaration of war in September 1939.

Political will

Stanley Bruce, First Viscount Bruce of Melbourne, was educated in Australia and England, and served with distinction in World War I. He entered politics, and was Prime Minister from 1922 to 1929. In 1932 he was appointed Resident Minister in London, and was High Commissioner in London from 1942 to 1945. With his contacts in the British Government and his political ability he was of great service in promoting Australian interests (NAA image No A8947, 32 Barcode 803547).

The Commonwealth generally and Britain in particular had lacked the will to stand up to Hitler in the late 1930s, exemplified by Chamberlain’s ‘Peace in our time’ message. Even after the outbreak of war there were those who remained willing to negotiate with Germany.

1941, Winston Churchill watches a column of Mark I Churchill tanks. Churchills were, at this time, very unreliable, and it is not recorded whether they all made it past the point where Churchill himself was standing (IWM H 18498).

The views prevalent in Great Britain and in Australia are clearly expressed in a cablegram from Stanley Bruce, the Australian High Commissioner in London, to Prime Minister Menzies.16 The French Government had suggested an early exchange of views on the problem of Allied war aims. Bruce commented:

In it [the French request] are involved the questions of what are our war aims, and what form of peace settlement are we determined to achieve. On these questions there are two opposite schools of thought:

a) Those who visualise a world after the war very similar to that which existed before it, but with Germany disarmed and Europe freed from fear of further German aggression.

b) Those who visualise a new world resulting from a peace settlement which had faced the vital problems of disarmament, territorial adjustment, Colonies and the economic needs of all nations, in which Germany would play an appropriate part as a great nation.

Those who support (a) would argue that history shows Germans and not merely the Nazis stand for aggression, and that we must now once and for all put them in a position where they will not be able to trouble Europe again. This can only be done by defeating, disarming, and perhaps dismembering Germany. This view takes no account of the position of Italy or Japan.

Those who support (b) argue that if lasting peace is to be established all issues must be faced, reliance on force abandoned and new conceptions of international relations and obligations set up. They consider our war aims and the basis of the peace settlement should be announced as soon as possible before war passions take control, and so that they have an effective appeal to the German people.17

Winston Churchill and his supporters were strongly in favour of course (a), and viewed anyone with the opposite view as an appeaser. Bruce and Menzies, on the other hand, were instinctively in favour of course (b). On 18 August, Menzies cabled the British Prime Minister, Neville Chamberlain:

My Government has noted with deep interest the report of peace moves for the settlement of various European questions and knows that the British Government will use every endeavour to take advantage of such moves. In particular we consider that efforts should be made to ensure that Poland adopts a reasonable and restrained attitude and that no nation should ignore real efforts at settlement because of false notions of prestige.18

Menzies also made the point that such efforts for peace should not be misinterpreted by Hitler as signs of weakness. On 2 January 1940 Bruce sent Menzies a long letter in which he reiterated the desirability of following course (b), in particular making a clear statement of war aims which would not anger the German people generally.19 Menzies wrote to Bruce on 22 February:

In consequence of your letter of 2 January and related cables, I had some discussion about the whole matter, but found them quite unresponsive [i.e. opposed]. There is among them a growing feeling in favour of the hard-line approach, and an almost pathetic belief that the dismemberment of Germany would alter the German spirit and outlook.

My impression from your communications is that Chamberlain and Halifax are very largely in accord with your and my views, while Winston is opposed to them. I cannot tell you adequately how much I am convinced Winston is a menace. He is a publicity seeker; he stirs up hatreds in a world already seething with them, and he is lacking in judgement.20

Menzies clearly did not employ a ‘boots and all’ approach to preparing the nation for war. This is all too apparent during the first year of global conflict.

Resources

In 1939 the population of Australia totalled approximately seven million. The estimated Australian workforce in 1939, however, was a mere three million people.21 That workforce had to meet the requirements of at least the major employment categories of rural, including agriculture, forestry, and mining; manufacturing; services including health, retail, utilities, education; and the armed forces. The rural sector had to produce food for export as well as for internal consumption; manufacturing had to maintain supplies for normal civilian needs and also had to produce munitions of all kinds for the armed forces of Australia and her allies.

Civilian services had to maintain a reasonable standard of living in the country. At the same time there was massive demand for personnel for the three armed services. A rule of thumb suggested that an industrial nation such as Australia could spare one in ten of its population for the armed forces.22 David Horner explains the significance of resources:

A major element of Australian grand strategy was the problem of national resources, particularly the allocation of manpower and the provision of equipment for the forces raised. This problem persisted throughout the war. It affected Australia’s ability to send troops to Malaya and, as the war progressed, became the most important factor in determining the magnitude and hence the location of Australia’s military effort.23

The allocation of human resources was a matter that was constantly on the minds of the members of the War Cabinet who had to decide how the available human resources should be divided between the Army, the Navy and the Air Force. They had to estimate the relative values of a soldier, a sailor and an airman in the defence of Australia and allocate accordingly. The difficulty lay in calculating the optimum allocation for each service and each arm within the service to achieve the national defence objectives.

An extra degree of complication was added by changes in the global situation which altered the relative value of the arms and branches of the services. For example, the transfer of the principal theatre of Australian military operations to the Malay Barrier (a notional line running down the Malayan Peninsula through Singapore and the southernmost islands of Dutch East Indies) considerably reduced the opportunity to use armoured forces. The role of those tank forces also changed to one of close support to the infantry in jungle fighting.

Time

Time was grievously lost between 1919 and 1939 in preparing for and maintaining national security. The result for both Australia and Britain was that when war broke out in September 1939 they were ill-prepared to meet its challenges. Britain went through the ‘phoney war’ with a somewhat laid-back attitude until its illusions were shattered by the German invasion of Holland, France, and Belgium on 10 May 1940. This was a clear wake-up call and the British Government, now under the forceful leadership of Winston Churchill, responded with energy.24

In Australia, the most urgent wake-up call came eighteen months later with the bombing of Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941. During the period from September 1939 to December 1941, Australia’s armed forces had fought valiantly. The Army had fought in the Middle East, the Air Force in the skies over Britain, Germany and the Middle East, and the Navy in many oceans around the world.

But at home it was business as usual. Gavin Long comments on the attitude of Australians on the domestic front early in the war:

About one sixth of men of military age volunteered in the first uneventful seven months of the war. It is difficult to assess the sentiments of the remainder at this time, but there is evidence that the Government considered them to be unwilling to accept measures which would disturb normal business or pleasure. For example, no decisive step to reduce consumption of petrol was taken for eight months; on 6 May 1940 the Government imposed a small tax of 3d a gallon. And doubts whether all the people had their hearts in war may have seemed to receive confirmation when from March to May there was a 67-day strike on the New South Wales coalfields.25

While much was done to develop the armed forces and the supporting munitions industry, it was a case of too little, too late.

Melbourne, 27 September 1939. Inaugural meeting of the Australian War Cabinet. From left: Senator George McLeay, Sir Henry Gullett, Richard Casey, Robert Menzies, Geoffrey Street, and Cabinet Secretary Frederick Shedden. Billy Hughes, the remaining member, was absent ( source: Hasluck, The Government and the People, 1939-1941, p. 151).

The War Cabinet was established on 15 September 1939.26 It was responsible for the active conduct of the war, and was chaired by the Prime Minister with selected senior ministers as members. The minutes of the War Cabinet for its first two years deal with many topics relating to the prosecution of the war, but lack any real sense of urgency. This changes abruptly on 8 December 1941 and, while there is no panic, there is evidence of the Government’s very grave concern for Australia’s security.

In the latter half of 1940, the Australian War Cabinet began to consider the creation of a substantial tank arm for the Army. Cabinet’s decision-making process relied on the knowledge of its members and the recommendations of its military advisors on what tanks could do and how they should be employed.

At least two members of the Cabinet, Geoffrey Street and James Fairbairn, had distinguished service records from World War I, but their experience of tanks was either minimal or non-existent. Two senior soldiers, Blamey and Mackay, were very positive about the value of tanks, but in the early stages of discussions their opinions were evidently not sought.

State of Australian armour at the outbreak of war and after

With the outbreak of war with Germany, the possibility of a conflict with Japan also became more probable, and Hopkins began to investigate the strength of Japanese tank forces. He wrote that:27

The somewhat alarming Japanese armoured strength which research had uncovered led to discussion amongst the General Staff on the possibilities of tank production in Australia. Finally the Chief of the General Staff, Lieut-General EK Squires, signed a minute to the Master-General of Ordnance asking that early steps be taken to design a light cruiser tank to the stage of production and trial of pilot models.28

The CGS nominated two roles for the tanks: to meet and defeat Japanese tanks, and to support scout carriers. The tank was to be a light cruiser mounting a 2-pdr gun, capable of 30 mph, and armoured sufficiently to be proof against 13mm Japanese anti-tank machine-guns. There were no recommendations for any other roles, nor for an appropriate organisation for the tanks. It appears that the Master-General of Ordnance made no response to the request, almost certainly because there were so many other munitions whose supply was far more urgent.29

The German campaign that began on 10 May 1940 and overran Holland, Belgium and France in six weeks came as a very unpleasant shock to all the forces opposed to Germany. It also eliminated the three overrun countries as members of the anti-fascist coalition and, on 10 June, Mussolini declared war. At this point only Great Britain and the dominions remained as active players against the Axis. Russia had signed a non-aggression pact with Germany, the USA was on the sidelines, Denmark and Norway had been conquered, and Sweden was inclined to support Germany by sending raw material.

The evacuation from Dunkirk left the British Army in a very parlous state. Almost all the equipment belonging to the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) had been left in France, although the great majority of soldiers returned safely. British Home Forces, augmented by the survivors of Dunkirk, were faced with an immediate and very serious threat of invasion.

Rouen, June 1940. A knocked-out A13 of the British 1st Armoured Division sits in the ruins of central Rouen. Many of the division’s tanks were sent into action without essential equipment and ammunition and were able to achieve very little (Tank Museum image).

When the BEF struggled home in June 1940 they brought with them six light and seven cruiser tanks. They left behind another 691, not counting armoured cars and carriers.30 The thirteen survivors joined 340 tanks and armoured cars in the UK. These were being augmented by the production of A9 and A10 Cruisers, but only at the rate of sixteen per month. An expedited program was essential for the defence of Great Britain, and it was also necessary to produce better tanks to counter the strength of the expected opposition.

The chain of cruiser tanks went from the A9 and A10 to the A13, the Covenanter, and the Crusader. The first two were effective in their day but becoming obsolete. The next three were mechanical horrors, and had the major disadvantage of being incapable of mounting a more powerful gun or being augmented with thicker armour.31

A new generation of tanks with increased armour and more powerful guns was now required. This course was strongly advocated to the Tank Board^32 by Major General Vyvyan Pope in June 1940.33 He confronted the Board with a difficult choice: either halt production of existing tanks and design and build tanks to meet future challenges, or keep running with the existing programs and produce tanks incapable of standing up to their opposition.

The time required for the design and development of a new tank or series of tanks would be eighteen months at the very least.34 The Government decided that it could not be without armoured fighting vehicles (AFVs) for such a lengthy period given the immediacy of the threat. It understandably decided to continue the production of current models. The unfortunate consequence of this decision was to inhibit British tank performance until the end of the war. The only truly competitive British tanks built and issued to front-line units between 1939 and 1945 were 200 Comets which were not produced until early 1945.35

In June 1940, the British armoured forces were very short of tanks and had been committed to a program of production of inferior models. The conflict of views on the employment of tanks remained. The main conclusion to be drawn from the use of tanks in France in May and June 1940 was that they were not utilised effectively.

These two major deficiencies had an unfortunate effect on the Australian Army. At this stage the Australians naturally turned to Britain for guidance on the development and use of tanks and tank formations. They were thus seeking advice from those who were uncertain about what advice to give.

One step that had been taken was the establishment of a School of Mechanisation. A proposal for such a school was submitted to the Military Board by the CGS, Lieutenant General E.K. Squires, on 26 January 1940.36 The objectives of the School were to train instructors in driving and maintenance of tracked and wheeled vehicles and motorcycles; to train motor mechanics; to advise on performance standards for personnel and equipment; and to conduct performance tests on equipment.

The School was also to provide training for the members of armoured units on light tanks and carriers. The training required provision of four machine-gun carriers, two scout carriers, and a light tank, which would be ‘borrowed’. The School was established in Puckapunyal in 1941.37

Second wake-up call, 10 May 1940

The second wake-up call for Australian armoured forces was the German victory in north-west Europe◦— a much more serious wake-up than the first. The result of the German victory was extremely significant for British armoured forces, faced as they were with the possibility of having to play their part in repelling an invasion with very few tanks.

Australia was in no danger of a German invasion, but the Allied reversal prompted the Government to think seriously about its strategic implications. On 8 May 1940, at a meeting of the War Cabinet, concerns were raised about the implications of the Norwegian campaign and the possibility of war with Italy.38 If Italy entered the war, it could disrupt the supply of war materiel from the UK to Australian troops in Egypt.

On 11 May, Prime Minister Menzies held discussions in Melbourne with the Ministers responsible for the Navy, the Army, and the Air Force and the three Chiefs of Staff.39 Extraordinarily, they decided that ‘no military action was necessary at present in addition to that already in hand.’

On 13 May the War Cabinet held two meetings in Canberra. At the first meeting it was agreed that ‘it was of vital importance to accelerate the war measures already approved, and that the possibility should be examined of increasing those efforts.’40 The three services were given specific matters to examine, with the Army tasked to investigate ‘the possibility of raising and training forces greater than those at present authorised.’

In respect of supply of munitions and other war materiel, the Defence Committee and the Director-General of Munitions Supply were to consider the possibility of Italian intervention and its effect on seaborne supply; requests for supplies to the UK and New Zealand; and the requirement for local defence. They were to report on whether ‘anything more can be done to accelerate or expand the approved programme from Government and industrial resources. Particular reference is to be made to the possibility of any improvement in the small arms ammunition position submitted some time ago.’

A second War Cabinet meeting was held on the afternoon of 13 May and another on 14 May. At the meeting of 14 May the Cabinet, dealing with the supply of munitions other than small arms ammunition, directed that the Director-General of Munitions Supply ‘is to furnish a report at the earliest possible date on the practicability of accelerating deliveries to the United Kingdom, and the effect that would have on the requirements of the Australian Defence Services.’41 Further meetings of the full Cabinet or the War Cabinet were held on 15, 17, 21, 22, 23 May, and 4, 5, 6, 11, 12, 16, 17, 18, 19, and 25 June.

At the meeting of 16 June, which was a meeting of the full Cabinet, the Chiefs of Staff presented reports on the condition of their respective services. The report by the Army CGS provided the inventories for various classes of war materiel◦— it was a dismal state of affairs. The two significant items for Australian armoured forces were tanks, of which there were none, and carriers, of which there were very few.42 This is the first mention of tanks in the War Cabinet minutes.

Although the CGS report of 16 June 1940 noted that the Army possessed ‘very few’ carriers, much work had been done to produce an Australian-made machine-gun carrier. Some preliminary thought was given to production of a carrier as early as 1931. It was not until 1938, however, that a Vickers-Armstrong Light Dragon Mark III tractor arrived in Australia.43 This was designed as a guntractor, but its suspension and engine power were basically those of a machinegun carrier.

The Australian machine-gun carrier No. 1 (LP 1) was based on the British Bren Gun Carrier, and was manufactured at the Victorian Railway Workshops. It was steered by track brakes which caused excessive wear on the brake shoes. Its successor, the LP 2, used track displacement steering. AWM PO2951.001

In 1938 a Bren Carrier No. 2 Mark I was also obtained from the UK as a prototype for local production. This constituted the model for the Australian ‘Carrier, machine-gun, local pattern, No. 1’. The LP1s, as they were called, entered production at the Victorian Railway Workshops at Newport in March 1940.

The CGS commented in his report that very few carriers had been built by June 1940 although, as time passed, the LP1 carriers were superseded by the LP2 and this was produced in large numbers and in a range of variations. These variations included a 2-pdr anti-tank gun, a Wasp flame-thrower, a 3-inch mortar carrier and other types for wading or flotation.44 A total of around 4,500 Australian carriers were produced and they were used in training establishments and by many armoured regiments on active service.

The 2-pdr carrier was designed and built by the Metropolitan Gas Company of Fitzroy, Victoria. It was designed to provide a mobile anti-tank capability with the gun mounted on a fully rotatable turntable. It would have been a useful piece of equipment had the Japanese invaded Australia (RAAC Museum image).

The statement in the CGS report of 16 June that there were no tanks available implies that tanks were regarded as Army equipment. However, there is no reference to tanks in the War Cabinet minutes until June and early July of 1940. The catalyst for consideration of tank formations may have come from the War Cabinet requests of 13 May, or may have originated with the Military Board. There are two documents that mentioned the use and procurement of tanks: War Cabinet Agendum 141/1940, ‘Production of war material – Army’, and War Cabinet Agendum 150/1940, ‘Production order for AFVs’.45

Agendum 141 was submitted to Cabinet on 19 June with a covering letter from the Minister for Defence Coordination (Menzies) which reads in part:

In his report for the week ended 1 June 1940 the CGS stated that a survey of war material was required for the AIF and limited mobilisation of the AMF [Australian Military Forces]. This survey has been completed, and its findings are attached for the information of the War Cabinet.

The findings are set out in three categories. Category B covers ‘Equipment, ammunition etc required for AMF and AIF now produced in Australia.’ The requirements shown are initial plus war wastage, estimated at twelve months for the AIF and six months for the AMF. The two relevant items and their requirements are:

Serial 24 — Carriers Universal — 1772

Serial 25 — Tanks, medium, A13 Mark I — 199

A notation against Serial 25 reads: ‘Technical specification being investigated.’

This remark implies that there was already an intention to manufacture tanks in Australia, and that they would be similar to the British A13.46 The A13 was the first British cruiser tank to have the Christie suspension; it weighed between fourteen and fifteen tons, had a top speed of 30 mph and mounted a 2-pdr gun. The initial specification for armour was 14mm, but this was upgraded in 1939 to 30mm. The Australian tank that was eventually produced◦— the Sentinel◦— was nothing like the A13, so the notation could have been simply suggesting that Australia needed a cruiser as its main battle tank.

Agendum 141/1940 was considered at the War Cabinet meeting of 25 June 1940. Minute 363, ‘Review of production of war material – Army’, approved the agendum.47 It was noted that expenditure of approximately £65,000,000 additional to the current program would be involved.

At the same time as the Army was preparing its review of required war materiel, it was also preparing a submission to the War Cabinet on the production of AFVs. This was submitted by the Military Board to the Minister for the Army, Geoffrey Street. He, in turn, submitted it to the War Cabinet on 24 June 1940 as Agendum 150/1940, ‘Production orders for AFVs’. The main points of the submission were:

The success of enemy operations in Poland, Belgium and France has demonstrated that to be effective an army must possess a preponderance of armoured fighting vehicles.

It is the opinion of the Military Board that the most effective defence against the AFV is the AFV. Our immediate objective should be the provision of cruiser tanks and carriers from Australian sources to meet the requirements of:

• An armoured division for service in Australia or overseas

• 1st Australian Corps

• limited mobilisation of the Australian Military Forces

The minimum productive orders to provide initial equipment and for a reserve for war wastage to December 1941 is estimated as;

-

Carriers

Tanks

An armoured division

660

240

1 Aust Corps

164

838

AMF (limited mobilisation)

35

934

TOTAL

859

2012

The required delivery program is:

Tanks: 70 per month beginning Sept or Oct 1940

Carriers: 120 per month beginning July or August 1940

Tanks are not yet in production, but the present delivery rate of Universal Carriers is approximately 20 per month. A contributory factor to this comparatively low output is the limited orders that have been placed for bullet-proof steel and component parts such as tracks, suspension gear and sprockets.

To ensure deliveries of Armoured Fighting Vehicles in quantity, it is necessary that supplies of bullet-proof steel and components be readily available. Manufacturers would then be able to plan production over a period of at least 12 months. It is, therefore, essential that orders for the full requirements in materials and components be placed without delay.

Moreover, it is understood that the Director-General of Munitions desires that complete orders be placed for all requirements, so that manufacturing firms and factories may plan for the maximum productive effort.

Military Board’s recommendation

The Military Board is of the opinion that the early supply of Armoured Fighting Vehicles in quantity is essential, and recommends that approval be given to place orders at once for the full requirements of 850 Cruiser tanks and 2012 Carriers.

The submission included an appendix with an organisation chart for an armoured division and a detailed table listing the personnel, transport and weapons that the division would require. This Australian armoured division was described as being equivalent to the British armoured division of 1940. It had two armoured brigades, each of three armoured regiments and a motor battalion, a support group containing a regiment of field artillery and an antitank regiment and various ancillary troops.

It was, in fact, not quite equivalent, in that the British division had two infantry battalions in the support group, not in the armoured brigades, and two field regiments and one anti-tank regiment of artillery. The infantry/tank balance in these organisations was later regarded as rather too heavy in tanks and, as the war progressed, the infantry strength was increased until it reached the more efficient ratio of one to one.

In the proposed Australian division of 1940, the tank strength comprised:

Armoured Division HQ

8

Armoured Brigade HQ (x 2)

20

Armoured Regiment (x 6)

312

TOTAL

340

Each regiment comprised forty-six gun tanks armed with 2-pdrs, and six close support tanks armed with 3-inch mortars. In addition, there were 111 general purpose universal carriers and twenty-four universal carriers mounting a 2-pdr anti-tank gun.

The armoured division thus required 340 tanks and 135 universal carriers, to which were added the requirements for the 1st Australian Corps and the AMF, all figures augmented by an allowance for anticipated wastage. The resulting quantities were detailed in Agendum 150/1940. Supplement 1 to Agendum 150/1940 was submitted two weeks later, and asked for ‘armament other than AFVs’.

Both the initial submission and Supplement 1 were approved by Street, and were sent on by him to the War Cabinet. At the meeting of 2 July 1940, Cabinet granted conditional approval to the requests made in both documents, and recorded that approval in Minute 375, which stated:

MEETING OF WAR CABINET 2 July 1940

Minute 375; Agendum 150/1940; Production orders for AFVs

(Previous reference War Cabinet minute 363)

War Cabinet considered the opinion of the Military Board that the early supply of AFVs in quantities is essential, and its recommendations that:

a. approval be given to place orders for the full requirements of 859 cruiser tanks and 2012 universal carriers and

b. the additional amount of £14,270,000 be made available.

It was decided that:

i. a cablegram be sent to the UK Government

a. furnishing advice of the type of tank that the Commonwealth intends to produce, enquiring the type or types of tanks on which they are concentrating, in view of the recent statement by their Minister for supply on this subject, and asking for observations on our proposal

b. requesting the loan or exchange of a few officers, say up to the number of four, who have had recent experience with armoured divisions.

ii. The Director General of Munitions be asked to advise on how the proposal of the Military fits in with the munitions program for the army already approved on Agendum 141/1940 [see War Cabinet minute 363], in so far as the various considerations of allocation of productive resources, supplies of material and the time factor are concerned.48

This minute shows the interaction between Agenda 141/1940 and 150/1940. It is important to note that the production of tanks is not specifically approved. That approval is contingent on responses from the UK Government and the Director-General of Munitions. The minute makes no mention of the formation of an armoured division and there is no guidance as to how the tanks will be used. The two relevant statements in the introduction to 150/1940 are that ‘an army must possess a preponderance of tanks’ and that ‘the most effective defence against the AFV is the AFV’. However, nothing reflecting these two statements in contained in Minute 375.

The creation of an armoured division in 1940 would have meant the diversion of a considerable amount of manpower to the division itself and even more to the manufacture of the equipment it required. Cabinet had to weigh up the benefits of creating a strong, mobile and modern armoured force against its costs. The immediate costs would include a reduction in the number of infantry divisions that could be sent overseas or used for the defence of Australia; it could also mean a decrease in the number of people available for the Navy and Air Force.

The use of industrial resources for equipping the armoured division would divert manpower from production for the rest of the Army, for the production of aircraft and ships, for maintenance and the development of infrastructure such as railways and wharves. Was the Government of mid-1940 equipped with the knowledge or experience to make these decisions, or did it have sources from which it could obtain reliable advice? The second Menzies ministry lasted from 14 March to 28 October 1940, and contained only two members with direct military experience —Geoffrey Street and James Fairbairn. The use of tanks was a matter of military technology, and thus the Australian War Cabinet needed specialist advice◦— which it lacked. The various CGS from the beginning of World War II had all served with distinction, but their experience of the use of tanks was a matter of hearsay rather than direct involvement.

The only officer of any seniority who had training in the use of tanks was Lieutenant Colonel Ronald Hopkins. Hopkins had long been an advocate of an armoured component for the Australian Army, although the development of such a force in the 1930s was extremely slow.

Early in 1936, Colonel V.A.H. Sturdee, Director of Military Operations, pressed the case for establishing tank training.49 His proposal included the training of staff and instructors in Britain and the purchase of modern tanks for training tank crews. The problem with the latter item was that the British medium tanks were, at that time, prototypes and the Light Tank Mark VI was the only tank in production.

Hopkins had been sent to Britain in 1937 to undertake comprehensive training with the RTC. The program had included basic training in tank skills at Bovington and Lulworth, manoeuvres with the RTC Light Battalion, appointment as GSO (Training) to the Mobile Division formed in 1938, and then a posting to the AFV section of the War Office General Staff.

While Hopkins’ experience was undoubtedly valuable, there were caveats. The tanks used were almost all obsolescent and British tank doctrine was subject to change and swayed by varied opinions. In addition, the training conducted was primarily at the tactical level. None of this, useful though it was, provided any guidance that would answer the Australian Government’s fundamental questions concerning the use of tanks and their benefits to the country.

Thus the Government would have to rely on professional advice, with the recognition that ‘Professional soldiers may give a purely military opinion on what a Cabinet ought to do, but the leading outlines are always determined by the Cabinet; that is, by a political, not a military, organ.’50 However, there was no real guidance available to Cabinet on the use of armour.

The two main uses for tanks were the defence of Australia’s homeland and as an element of an expeditionary force. In June 1940 an armoured component for a continental force could have been used in North Africa or the Middle East. It was most unlikely that it could be used on the European mainland for the next two to three years following the German occupation of Western Europe.

The defence of Australia had to be planned in two sections: the defence of Australia itself and the defence of the island shield to its north. The central part of this shield was Papua New Guinea (PNG); to the west of PNG was the Dutch East Indies (today’s Indonesia); to the east, New Britain, New Ireland and the Solomon Islands.

The countries of the island shield contained large areas of jungle, and forces defending that shield would have to be able to fight in jungles. The defence of Australia’s mainland with its very long coastline would require a mobile force capable of rapid response. The armoured component of a continental force would need to fill the roles of infantry support and mobile strike force.

Alan Jolly argues that tanks exist to provide two basic functions, the first of which is direct fire support for infantry, as opposed to the indirect fire support of field artillery. The second function is to act as the hard core of the mobile portion of an army, which provides a concentration of mobile firepower to disrupt, disorganise and pursue an enemy whose front has been broken.51 He adds that the tank’s other significant role is to fight other tanks.

Combining the two objectives, Australia’s homeland defence and continental force, with the two purposes of tank formations, helps to define the contribution of tanks to Australia’s national security. There are two known environments in which tanks have to operate: the jungles of the island shield and the wide open spaces of Australia. The environment for the continental force can be determined only when the location of the campaign is known; but a force capable of fighting in jungles and in wide open spaces should have no trouble fighting in almost any other terrain.

The varied conditions of employment raise the question of the type of tanks to be used, and the composition of armoured formations. In the early years of World War II the British had six categories of tank: light, medium, cruiser, assault, infantry, and heavy.52 The assault tank reached only the drawing board stage, and the heavy tank was abandoned at the prototype stage. Cruiser and medium fulfilled what were effectively identical roles and, in 1944, Montgomery advocated two types only, a light tank and a capital tank.53 The light tank was used for reconnaissance and the capital tank for all other purposes.

A slow awakening, June to December 1940

Cabinet agreed to the submission made in Agendum 150/1940 on 2 July 1940 and the decision was recorded in Minute 375.54 The submission was in two sections: the first titled ‘Production orders for AFVs’ and the second ‘Proposals for an armoured division’. In terms of the type of tank required, the submission stated:

The type of armoured vehicle required is the Cruiser tank armed with one 2-pdr gun and one Vickers gun, with a minimum of 25mm of armour. The productive features involved are:

a. Preliminary enquiries indicate that a number of engines of a suitable type are immediately available and the balance can be obtained from Canada.

b. The accelerated production of 2-pdr anti-tank guns in Australia would be necessary to equip complete units. It is understood that the necessary volume of production is attainable without serious interference with other productive schedules. In any case, these requirements should have priority of production.

c. Initial enquiry indicates that the technical problems involved in the production of the bullet-proof armour plate within Australia can be solved, and that the fabrication of units will bring into war production engineering works not at present engaged in war work.

The group preparing the submission had given careful and detailed consideration to the organisation and equipment for the armoured division. Apart from the gun tanks and the close support tanks required for the tank units, they had included six armoured demolition vehicles, six armoured personnel vehicles, three armoured caterpillar tractors, six armoured minelayers, seven heavy transporters and twelve 6-wheeled breakdown tractors.

Agendum 150/1940 was detailed and analytical, although some of its assumptions were very optimistic. The load on industry would be substantial, and some of the technical problems were not easy to solve. But it certainly provided a detailed set of objectives for the creation of an armoured division and its equipment.

War Cabinet Minute 375 of 2 July 1940 asked the Director-General of Munitions for an estimate of the impact on war production, and asked the UK Government for advice on tank design, and for the loan of officers with recent tank battle experience. No specific action was authorised for the immediate production of tanks, nor for the formation of the armoured division.

Two weeks before this, on 16 June, the full Cabinet had approved the raising of a defence force of 230,000 men. The scope and reasons for this decision were set out in Cabinet Minute 24, which stated in part:

The military policy of the Government is to raise, train and equip a force of 230,000 men, which in round figures is the number contemplated under existing plans for general mobilisation. Of the number mentioned it may be assumed that between 30,000 and 40,000 will comprise the AIF under training in Australia.

It is the intention of the Government to proceed with the raising, organisation, training and equipment of the 1st Australian Corps, composed, as already approved, of Corps troops and three divisions. The 6th Division is to have priority of equipment. In effecting the policy of the Government, the intention is not to order a general mobilisation, but to mobilise and train by successive steps the numbers needed to complete a structure which already exists and is reasonably trained.55

No mention is made of troops for the armoured division in this decision, although the Military Board knew at this point that a request would very soon be made for more men than the 230,000 agreed upon.

Shortly after the approval of Agendum 150/1940 on 2 July, the Military Board submitted Supplement 1 to that Agendum, entitled ‘Provision of armament other than AFVs for an armoured division’. The proposals in the Supplement were approved at the War Cabinet meeting of 10 July and recorded in Minute 407.56

On 13 August 1940, a RAAF Lockheed Hudson crashed as it approached Canberra Airport, killing all on board. Among those killed were the Minister for the Army, Geoffrey Street; the Minister for Air, James Fairbairn; and the CGS, Lieutenant General Sir Cyril Brudenell White (NAA image No. A11666, 118).

Geoffrey Street, Minister for the Army, had military experience, knowledge, and enthusiasm. He was obviously very much in favour of the proposals in Agendum 150, and it was therefore a grave setback to the implementation of the proposals when he was killed in an air crash on 13 August 1940.57 It was a tragedy compounded by the loss in the same accident of Minister for Air James Fairbairn and the CGS, Lieutenant General Sir Cyril Brudenell White. At one stroke, the Cabinet lost its two ministers with service experience and the Army lost its senior soldier.

Street’s death may have been part of the reason for the slow progress made in producing tanks and forming the armoured division in the second half of 1940. During July and August, cablegrams passed between the Department of the Army and the Military Liaison Officer, London, on the type of tank to be manufactured. One factor in preparing a specification for the tank was the quality and weight of armour plate that could be made in Australia.

The design of any piece of military equipment requires consultation with a variety of stakeholders. The needs of the user are paramount, but these must be tempered by the manufacturing facilities available, the skills of the workforce, and the provision of materials and components. The various parties must jointly contribute their views and expertise to arrive at integrated solutions to the problems of the production of military materiel.

In July and August, the Munitions Department was confident that tank production could be successfully undertaken, and was eager to proceed, but felt that closer contact with the Army was required, particularly in the initial stages of the project. As a result, a joint committee was formed in September 1940 which was to be primarily concerned with specifications and preliminary planning for the supply of materials, the use of substitutes and certain problems of production.58

War Office advice as a result of the campaign in Belgium and France indicated that inadequately armoured tanks were considered death traps and they issued a revised and detailed general staff specification early in December 1940 which provided for armour of at least 50mm in thickness.59 Shortly before the War Office specification was issued, the Australian General Staff released a memorandum on the proposed Australian cruiser tank. This memorandum, dated 11 November 1940, is more a philosophical statement than a specification, but is important as an indication of what the Army wanted in a tank. An extract from the memorandum reads:

Tanks are required to operate in and disrupt the organisation of hostile rear areas, thus virtually isolating the troops in forward areas and severely reducing their powers of resistance. In order to achieve this object tanks may be forced to break through a defensive area which has been organised and prepared to meet such an eventuality. Whether this is necessary or not, it has become inevitable in modern war that deep penetration by armoured forces will be met, and counter-attacked, by the armoured forces of the defending army.

For their operations in rear areas, the attacking tanks must be prepared to engage unarmoured troops who may defend themselves with obstacles and anti-tank weapons. The tank must therefore possess considerable immunity from the fire of anti-tank weapons and from field artillery which is prepared to engage tanks in the vicinity. This partial immunity is achieved by a combination of speed and armour. The natural development, greatly accelerated since the outbreak of war, has been to increase the hitting power of anti-tank weapons, including those carried on tanks. This necessitates an increase in armour provided no reduction in performance is entailed; otherwise the slower moving vehicles will be outmanoeuvred in tank-versus-tank actions.

The tank must carry a weapon with which to engage hostile tanks and also weapons of the anti-personnel type. Thinly armoured tanks can receive their coup-de-grace so easily from those better protected that the whole basis of their tactics is destroyed. The pre-war concept of fast, lightly armoured tanks for reconnaissance has not withstood the rapid development of tank and anti-tank weapons.60

Expert practical advice was required to design the Australian cruiser and the services of Colonel W.D. Watson, OBE, MC, Vice-President of the UK Mechanisation Board, were provided to the Australian Army in September.61 Watson came via the USA, where he met Mr A. Chamberlain, an Australian ordnance production engineer who had been sent to the USA to collect information on tank production. Together they talked to the American experts on tank design before Watson left for Australia, finally arriving in December. Prior to his arrival, the Director-General of Munitions reported that ‘after negotiations with the Army Chief Staff officers it now appears possible to lay out a program and create facilities for the design and production of tanks.’62 The timing was fortuitous.

Lieutenant General Vernon Sturdee was CGS from 1940 to 1942 and from 1946 to 1950. He was also Head of the Australian Military Mission to Washington and commanded the First Australian Army in the final campaigns of the war (AWM ART27518).

By early November, the armoured division had gained support from at least two prominent military men. According to Hopkins,

Early in November the CGS, Lt-Gen Sturdee, saw me when I was in Melbourne. Sturdee spoke of Cabinet’s concern over our lack of armoured forces, and said that they wanted to know how long it would take to raise an armoured division. I told him it would take about six months from Cabinet approval until the first armoured units came into being, and the others would be formed progressively after that.63

At this point, Hopkins must have prepared a proposal with commendable dispatch, although the project to raise an armoured division had been entrenched in his mind for some time. He wrote a paper, ‘Formation of an armoured division’, in which he advanced a plan for creating the division, procuring the equipment, and recruiting and training the personnel.64 It is curious that he makes no reference to or acknowledgement of the proposal in Agendum 150/1940. Hopkins wrote:

A week later Sturdee told me that the project would go ahead as I had suggested, and I was to be appointed Deputy Director of Staff Duties (AFVs) at Army Headquarters. I was also given direct access to the Deputy CGS, Major-General Northcott, this making the AFV section more or less independent within the General Staff.

On 15 November, General Thomas Blamey, having heard Sturdee’s opinion that the AIF required a maximum strength of four infantry divisions, wrote from the Middle East to Menzies offering his opinion on the composition of the AIF:

I would stress that four divisions do not by any means represent Australia’s maximum. I would urge that consideration be given to building this force up by the addition of at least two armoured divisions as soon as practicable. We have stuck to the infantry divisions probably because the AIF of the last war was composed of infantry divisions. Is it not the effect of looking backward? Surely it is time for a little forward thinking!65

The views of these two powerful advocates of the armoured division were reinforced by a proposal to the Military Board by the Deputy Chief of the General Staff (DCGS), Major General Northcott, on 27 November 1940. The proposal, ‘Formation of an Armoured Division, AIF – Provision and training of personnel’ reads in part:

This proposal is for the formation of an Armoured Corps Training Organisation and the recruitment and training of personnel for armoured formations.

The Military Board has already represented the importance and urgency of this measure (War Cabinet Agendum 150/1940). Progress has been delayed for technical reasons, but these are now clarifying. It is therefore considered that immediate steps should be taken to raise and train personnel so that they are ready to receive AFVs when production commences. This project should be given first priority.

In summary, the Board recommends that:

• an Australian Armoured Corps be constituted

• the armoured portion of an armoured division be recruited and trained

• a Headquarters Armoured Corps Training Centre be established, together with the nucleus of two Armoured Corps Training Regiments and an Army AFV school

• a suitable area be acquired for AFV manoeuvre and for gunnery training.66

It is not clear whether the ‘technical reasons’ relate to the formation of the division or the production of tanks, but it clearly indicates a delay of almost five months before meaningful action was taken to form the division.

On 14 December Percy Spender, now the Minister for the Army and, presumably, acting on the Military Board’s recommendations arising from General Northcott’s proposal of 27 November, submitted Supplement 2 to Agendum 150/1940 to the War Cabinet.67 The title of the Supplement was the same as the DCGS’s proposal, but there were some additions to the content. The principal additions related to the production of tanks:

The matter of tank production has been the subject of several discussions with the War Office regarding the type of tank to be produced in Australia; and the General Staff specification for a cruiser tank has now been circulated. The manufacture of AFVs by the Ministry of Munitions has been the subject of correspondence and frequent conferences with the Director of Ordnance Production and the Director-General of Munitions.

Regarding the production of cruiser tanks in Australia, the Ministry of Munitions has advised that an organisation can be set up in Australia to carry out the design and production of prototype tanks. The production of carriers is proceeding, and to date 139 have been accepted from the contractors.

Colonel Watson has been in the USA investigating tank production, and is now on his way to Australia. Arrangements are also being made with the War Office for a senior officer of the Royal Armoured Corps to be made available for instructional duties in Australia.

On 28 December, Major R.A. Perkins, Australian Staff Corps, was appointed Acting Commandant of the AFV School, which had the initial function of training instructors who would then become the staff of the School.68

Status, 31 December 1940

At the end of 1940 Australia had been at war for fifteen months. There had been some stirrings to create a tank force in the early months of the war, but it was not until the second wake-up call, the German conquest of France, that the War Cabinet began to take action.

The Minister for the Army, Geoffrey Street, was the protagonist in this action and, on his recommendation, Agendum 150/1940 was presented to Cabinet. The original agendum was conditionally approved by Cabinet Minute 375 on 2 July 1940 and Supplement 1 on 10 July by Minute 407.

The impetus behind this thrust was lost when Street was tragically killed on 13 August and it was not regained until November. In that month Cabinet requested action on the armoured division which had been proposed in Agendum 150 in June. This request was reinforced by General Blamey’s view that the Australian Army needed two armoured divisions to complement its four infantry divisions, thus creating a balanced national force. A formal agendum (Supplement 2 to Agendum 150) was submitted to Cabinet on 14 December.

Steps were taken in December to create a training school for tank soldiers of all ranks and, by then, the feasibility of producing a cruiser tank in Australia had been confirmed. Colonel Watson, with his tank design expertise, had arrived by the end of the year.

Thus, when 1940 came to an end, the three strands of action, namely formation of the armoured division, production of cruiser tanks, and training of tank crews, had all reached the start line. It had been a leisurely process, but preliminary plans were now in place. There was still a long way to go, and the time-frames for most of the plans were extremely optimistic.

Postscript: manpower

The creation of Australian armoured formations placed a significant demand on national manpower in two ways. First, troops were required to man the armoured units. Added to this was the need for ancillary and supporting troops, training schools and establishments for the maintenance and repair of equipment.

The second demand for manpower arose from the manufacture of tanks. War Cabinet Agendum 150/1940 recommended that 859 cruiser tanks be produced in Australian factories to an Australian design.69 The manpower required for such a project would include a large number of skilled tradesmen to operate machine tools of some complexity. This demand was not only for quantity, but also for quality.

At the beginning of the war, manpower was not regarded as a problem, and it had not become a problem when Minute 375 was recorded on 2 July 1940. It was not yet a problem at the end of 1940, just before the decision was formally taken to create an armoured division.

But, as time went on, the manpower requirement gradually began to overtake the level of manpower available. In 1942 and 1943 the demand was such that the Government had to cut some of its programs. One of the major losers in this reduction was armour. It is thus important to understand how the procedures for manpower allocation developed and the progressive nature of the situations with which they attempted to deal.

This postscript reviews the manpower problem until the end of 1940. Subsequent chapters will follow the changing manpower situation and examine how it affected the development and use of Australia’s tank forces. This situation would eventually have dire consequences for the tank forces.

The Commonwealth War Book was the planning bible for pre-war preparations for a possible conflict. While such a bible was fine in theory, it was evidently not very practical. Butlin writes that ‘pre-war plans were imaginative literature; wartime conditions were hard fact.’70

Fortunately, there appeared to be little need for manpower planning in the early months of the war. A National Register had been established to measure numbers by age-groups, and a List of Reserved Occupations was used to allocate manpower between conflicting claimants.

In the first two years of the war, manpower problems were not acute because the scale of war effort relative to the population was small.71 This meant that most of the required transfers into wartime occupations (services or munitions production) could be achieved by voluntary action. There were large reserves of unemployed and there was a high level of patriotic motivation.

Manpower reallocation to meet the war effort could thus be achieved voluntarily within ordinary market processes. This was very much the mood of the general population. Labour supporters in particular were strongly opposed to any form of compulsion and the political balance was such that their views had to be taken seriously by the Menzies Government.

For the first few months of the war this attitude towards volunteering was also supported by the belief that Australia’s contribution to the fight against Hitler would parallel that of the 1914–1918 war. In that war the contribution was a voluntary expeditionary force (the AIF), some modest munitions production, and a substantial supply of food and raw materials.

In this first phase of the control of manpower in World War II, the control tools were the National Register and the List of Reserved Occupations. It was not long before a second phase began, around mid-1940. While there was still a high level of unemployment, at the same time, a growing shortage of skilled men for the specialised war industries was beginning to bite. As Butlin adds:

But behind these two factors there were taking shape conditions for an overall scarcity of labour which would force a drastic re-assessment of the relative claims of the Services, war industries, and the scarcely-touched range of civilian employment outside munitions in the narrow sense. At any time this scarcity might have become immediate and acute. In the event this third phase was delayed until mid-1941.72

At the end of 1940 the manpower demands of an Australian tank force were at their most embryonic. Production of tanks had been authorised, but no significant work had been done; the creation of an armoured division had yet to be sanctioned by Cabinet. And at this stage there appeared to be a plentiful supply of labour, so there would be no shortage of manpower to meet the demands of any envisaged expansion of tank forces or equipment.

Chapter 4:

HASTEN SLOWLY — 1941

Major events in 1941

In 1941 the creation of an Australian armoured force proceeded along several lines which were often interdependent. The initial line of progress involved the production of an Australian tank; this was followed by the establishment of AFV training schools; recruiting for and establishment of an armoured division; and operational use of Australian armoured units, especially the cavalry regiments of the AIF infantry divisions. All lines of progress were affected by competing demands for manpower.

Three events in 1941 had a significant impact on Australia’s armed forces. On 22 June, Hitler unleashed Operation Barbarossa, the German invasion of Russia. This operation provided the UK and the Commonwealth their first ally since mid-1940 in the fight against the German-Italian Axis. Initially, this invasion was a disaster for the Russians but, by the end of 1941, they had managed to turn the tide against the invading German armies.

Governor-General Lord Gowrie signs the declaration of war with Japan. Curtin became Prime Minister on 7 October 1941 and, two months later, the Japanese struck at Pearl Harbor. Present at the signing were, from left: Forde (Army), Curtin, Lord Gowrie, Chifley (Treasurer), and Evatt (External Affairs) (AWM 010688).

The second event was the election of a Labor Government in Australia on 7 October. The new Prime Minister, John Curtin, and some of his senior colleagues had been members of the Advisory War Council since its inception on 28 October 1940, and had thus played an important part in directing Australia’s war effort.1 Labor’s election to government to some extent mitigated the pressures from the unions experienced by the Menzies and Fadden Ministries.

7 December 1941. The Japanese carrier fleet attacked Pearl Harbor causing immense damage to the US Navy. A launch attempts to rescue a sailor who has jumped overboard from the USS Tennessee (AWM 043820).

The third event was the Japanese attack on the American fleet at Pearl Harbor on 7 December, and the immediate declaration of war by the USA. The world was now divided into camps. On one side were Germany, Italy, Japan and some smaller countries. On the other were the Allies, consisting of the UK and the Commonwealth, the USA, Russia, and China. In December 1941 the Allies were in a precarious position. They clung to the hope that, if they could just hold out for a few months, their combined economic strength would enable them to assemble a sufficiently large military force to counter those of the Axis powers.

Production of tanks in Australia

On 14 December 1940 Percy Spender had presented the Military Board’s proposal for the creation of an armoured division. This was discussed by the War Cabinet on 8 January 1941, and their approval was recorded in Minute 689 in the following terms:

Approval was given to the following recommendations of the Minister for the Army:

1. The constitution of the Australian Armoured Corps

2. The raising of AIF personnel required for the armoured portion of an Armoured Division, together with the necessary Engineer, Signal and Australian Army Ordnance Corps units, in accordance with approved war establishments, the number involved approximating 5,774 all ranks

3. The establishment of an Armoured Fighting Vehicles School and two Armoured Corps Training Regiments; but expenditure on the acquisition of additional camp and training areas is not to be authorised until it is determined that existing camp areas are not available for the purpose.2

Progress in local tank production was also noted in Minute 689:

It was noted that arrangements had been made to provide for the supply of the armoured fighting vehicles, consisting of 660 cruiser tanks and 240 universal carriers, and for the necessary armament for an armoured division, as approved in War Cabinet minutes 375 and 407.

The Deputy Chief of the General Staff stated that the local provision of tanks was proceeding satisfactorily. The design of the tank had been decided upon, and a wooden ‘mock-up’ was now being made. It was anticipated that no trouble would arise in regard to the capacity of traffic bridges to carry the tank, but the question was now being investigated in all States.

It is curious that the minute states that ‘the design of the tank had been decided upon’, when the tank design expert, Colonel Watson, did not arrive in Australia until the end of December.3 Considerable doubt about the statement is also occasioned by Report No. 7 (January 1941) from the Director-General of Munitions, which has this to say about the local production of cruiser tanks:

The Design and Development Section has been inaugurated, and technical officers from the army are working in cooperation with officers of this unit (Ordnance Production Directorate). Our representative in the United States has been fortunate to obtain a great deal of technical data and assistance from the US authorities. With this data and the possible supply of a number of components the design of a very modern and advanced type of tank should be possible here within six months.4

Hopkins, on the other hand, is very positive and optimistic, stating that Cabinet was informed in February 1941 that the first Australian tank was expected to be available in November that year.5

The need for tanks and armoured formations was reinforced by contemporary events on the other side of the world. On 3 January 1941, the 6th Australian Infantry Division under the command of Major General Iven Mackay attacked the Libyan port of Bardia.6 On 5 January, GHQ Cairo reported: ‘All resistance in Bardia ceased at 1330 hrs today.’7

Lieutenant General Sir Iven Mackay and some of his senior officers soon after Bardia. Back row, left to right: Berryman, Savige, Vasey; front row: Allen, Mackay, Robertson. All six had distinguished military careers (AWM 044266).

There was no doubt in Mackay’s mind as to what had swung the balance at Bardia. In a subsequent Australian Broadcasting Commission address he said:

We carried out the attack under the guidance and help of a sympathetic British Corps Commander who placed at my disposal additional artillery, machine-guns, anti-aircraft and anti-tank units of the British Army, and most important of all, though I mention it last, some troops and heavy British tanks.

To me the great lesson to be learned from the capture of Bardia is the value of heavy tanks. They are literally worth their weight in gold. Without tanks it would probably have taken weeks of heavy fighting and slaughter to capture such a strongly defended position. As it was, with a total loss in casualties of under 1,500 for both sides combined, this miniature Hindenburg Line was subdued in three days. Tanks may be costly, but they cost far less than men’s lives and bring rapid success to the side possessing them. Above all, the lesson for Australians to learn is that if Australia produces men to fight, she must also produce hundreds and hundreds of tanks for them to fight in.8

Such a statement from the architect of Australia’s first significant victory in World War II provided enormous encouragement to continue efforts to produce an Australian tank and create Australian armoured units.

By late 1940 Australia had become a significant supplier of weapons, ammunition and equipment to her own forces and to those of the UK and New Zealand. The Eastern Group Supply Conference was convened in New Delhi in October 1940 and aimed to improve the flow of war supplies to Empire forces in the Middle East, Far East, India and elsewhere.9 This was to be done by coordinating the industrial capacities of Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, India, and the Asiatic and African colonies.

These discussions resulted in the establishment of the Eastern Group Supply Council, permanently in session in New Delhi, with representatives from Australia, New Zealand, the UK, India and South Africa. Demands for war supplies were to be submitted to the Council, which would then decide which countries could best meet the demands. Once the decision had been made, the Council would ask the nominated countries to place the necessary contracts.

The Director-General of Munitions expressed his confidence that those demands placed on Australian industry following the establishment of the Council could be met without overstrain. The Treasurer, however, viewed the increased expenditure with concern. His thoughts on munitions production, which included the production of tanks, were recorded in War Cabinet Minute 777 of 12 February 1941:

The Treasurer expressed the view that the whole of the munitions program was in need of revision and consolidation before any decision was given on the proposed expansion of manufacturing facilities. He recommended that a Committee composed of representatives of Defence Coordination, Munitions, a Delhi Conference delegate, Army and Treasury [be convened] to consolidate the program and report further to War Cabinet. This recommendation was approved.10

Such a re-evaluation could only serve to delay progress. A few days later, on 18 February, the War Cabinet discussed Agendum 70/1941 ‘Production of tanks for the Army’.11 The results of the discussion were recorded in Minute 826, which stated, in essence:

Progress to date in the Munitions program for the construction of cruiser tanks and the prospective delivery date and rate of production were noted, indicating that the first tank would be delivered in November 1941. Thereafter, the schedule would be: five tanks per week for four weeks, seven per week for twelve weeks, and ten per week from there on. The initial delivery of 340 for the armoured division would be completed by 1 August 1942.

The tank was a cruiser with many features similar to the American M3 medium tank. It would weigh about 20 tons, have varying degrees of armour plating (thickness not specified), a 2-pounder main gun, two Vickers machine-guns and a smoke mortar. The tank would have a 400 horsepower engine, with a speed of 25 mph.

The manufacturing rights to the Guiberson 400-hp radial diesel engine were also being sought.12 If the Guiberson was not available, the General Motors diesel 6-71 would be used, with two engines of 225 hp being linked. This engine was similar to those being used in the Valentine Mark III manufactured in Canada for the British Government.13

This specification is very different from the eventual specification of the first Australian cruiser tank, the AC1 Sentinel. The Advisory War Council was doubtful about the deliveries promised and, on 20 February, recorded their thoughts on Agendum 18/1941, ‘Production of tanks for the Army’ in Minute 160:

Note was taken of the information contained in the Agendum. The Minister for Munitions stated that under the program outlined the first tank would be produced by November 1941, but after investigation he was rather doubtful whether this could be achieved. A major difficulty was armour-plating, but Australian plate had now been produced with the required resisting power. This could be produced very cheaply, and had the additional benefit that it could be welded rather than riveted, as was the case with standard armour-plate.14

The armour-plating and riveting mentioned in this minute is once again at variance with the casting method finally used. These two minutes demonstrate that, at this point (February 1941), the specification for the AC1 was still in a state of flux.

Non-Government members of the Advisory War Council discussed the production of tanks again on the morning of 28 February when Curtin informed them that the Guiberson engine would not be available for quite some time.15 The Acting Prime Minister, Arthur Fadden, noted that investigations were in progress and a report would be submitted by 31 March.

In response to the implied request for information, the afternoon session of the Council was told on 28 February that the Department of Munitions had reported that local production of an engine was a long-term affair and would take around twelve months.16 Cadillac engines were currently being considered rather than Guibersons. The plan was to order fifty Cadillacs, pending local production. The Department of Munitions had received advice that an Australian tank required an Australian-designed engine, and the American engines were being considered as a stop-gap measure only, to allow production of tanks to proceed.

By February, design had reached the mock-up stage and, by the end of March, marked progress had been made with detailed design.17 Experimental work had provided a basis for the solution of the cast armour problem and arrangements were being made for an early test of the three-engine link-up.

The US M3 medium tank was known as the Lee in the US Army and, with minor modifications, it was referred to as the Grant in the British Army. It was reliable and its 75mm main gun was effective. Its principal fault was that the 75mm was hull-mounted and had very limited traverse (AWM 063230)

This design related to the AC1, which was to be the equivalent of the American M3 medium. The major modification was the substitution of Australian ordnance for American, first with a 2-pdr and later with a 6-pdr main gun. It is difficult to see how a mock-up at this stage could have related to what was finally produced. There were still many uncertainties surrounding design and production.

The Director-General of Munitions’ Report No. 10 for April 1941 provides a realistic picture of the tank project status at that time.18 The specification was far from being firm and fixed, and several problems were foreseen:

Excellent progress can be reported on the preliminary stages of the establishment of facilities for the manufacture of Cruiser Tanks in Australia. During this past week several meetings have been held attended by members of the AFV Section, officers of the Ordnance Production Directorate, and the main contractors expected to be used in the project. At these meetings these points were discussed and decided:

• General policy for developing production

• Matters of design

• To build two pilot models as quickly as possible

• Type of motive power to be used

Another matter discussed was the facilities to make three of the most important components – the gear box, the driving axle, and the transfer case. Plant capacity for this type of work is sorely taxed at present, and the contractors, though keen to undertake the work, said that they would need additional machine tools and equipment immediately. Such items could only be obtained from the USA.

Colonel Milner, Superintendent of Design for the Army, has just returned from the USA with much valuable information about the general trend on design of the M3 Cruiser, together with detailed drawings of the gearbox, drive axle, and transmission. These drawings reveal the many difficulties to be expected in respect of machine tool availability and manufacturing technique.

The coordinating authority for the tank production project was nominated as the AFV Section of the Ordnance Production Directorate, and the contractors initially selected were:

Hull & turret castings: Bradford Kendall, Sydney; Chas Ruwolt, Melbourne

Suspension gear & tracks: McKay Massey-Harris, Melbourne

Gearbox: Sonnerdales, Sydney

Transfer case & axle: Coote & Jorgensen, Sydney

It still seems unlikely that the Army and the Directorate AFV had arrived at a definitive specification. This became evident at a meeting convened on 30 April 1941 at Victoria Barracks, Melbourne, to discuss munitions production generally and the production of tanks in particular.

Essington Lewis was Managing Director or Chief General Manager of BHP from 1926 to 1950, and thereafter Chairman. He was appointed Director-General of Munitions in May 1940, and his forceful personality ensured the efficiency of his department (AWM 077691).

The Minister for the Army, Percy Spender, chaired the meeting and its participants included the Minister for Munitions, Senator McBride; tank design expert Colonel Watson; the DCGS, General Northcott; the Master-General of the Ordnance, General Milford; Director-General of Munitions, Mr Essington Lewis; the Director-General of Ordnance Production, Mr Hartnett; and several others. The transcript of their discussions runs to ten pages.19 It is a very important element of the story of Australian tank production, and some of the most significant exchanges are reproduced. The first person to speak after the opening was Colonel Watson:

COLONEL WATSON

Our forecast of the position in regard to tanks is substantially correct. The design is complete, but there may have to be modifications to meet manufacturing needs. We have detailed drawings of all parts which are going to take a long time to produce. I can see no reason why we should not go into production of major parts, such as transmission gears and suspension. I do not think there has been any delay in design as we have fulfilled our prophecy that drawings would be ready by the 1st May. Our design is for a very heavily armoured cruiser.

MR SPENDER

Have there been any alterations in design brought back by Colonel Milner?20

COLONEL WATSON

Only a few minor alterations in design to the track and the turret. It is quite right to say that with the exception of the track there have been no important changes. The armour and armaments are the same as proposed. Armour is the principal problem today. I believe the difficulty in production of armour is on the metallurgical side. I am going to Newcastle on Friday to see a pouring of armour on a new formula which has been developed here to make the armour without nickel, in regard to which I believe the position is very difficult.

COLONEL MILNER

Variations in design brought back from the USA affect only the track and turret fittings.

COLONEL WATSON

The cast-iron armour is needed for the curved shape of the design. The Canadian tank is almost a replica of ours. It uses three Cadillac engines. Manufacture of the Guiberson engine would be a long-term project here. The first three Cadillac engines have arrived, and 1,265 are required. Production can be commenced for the track, suspension, and gearbox, and we should go straight ahead with these. We should not wait for the trial of the pilot model.

MR ESSINGTION LEWIS

If we finished the suspension, transmission and track, could we get the gearbox? Has it been produced for coupling up three engines?

COLONEL MILNER

Our gearbox is a replica of the American. Transmission has been designed, but the drawings are not quite complete. The design is complete but the detailed drawings have yet to be checked. We have 25 draftsmen working on the job, and the checking must be done before the drawings are issued.

MR ESSINGTON LEWIS

I am very worried about this tank problem. It is the biggest of the lot. It over-shadows shipbuilding and aircraft building because we have sufficient knowledge to build ships, planes, etc. It has taken a long time since the war started before we attempted to produce tanks. I do not know whether there were designs in England which we could have obtained. I thought perhaps it might be possible to get a captured German tank on which to work. The designing of the tank is a matter for Army and is quite outside the scope of Munitions, who are only concerned with production to Army designs. I am told they are casting the armour for these tanks in Canada.

MR FORSTER

I understand the castings for the Canadian tank are made in the USA.

MR ESSINGTON LEWIS

I am not so much concerned about the castings of plates. If they can do it in the United States, we can do it here. I am chiefly concerned about the gearbox and transmission. We are low in stocks of nickel. The UK has asked whether we cannot release some of the stocks we have on order. I have told them we cannot. It is true that in England they have always used nickel in bullet-proof steel.

In this country we have developed a steel which does not use nickel, and I have instructed our metallurgists to see if they cannot produce the steel without nickel suitable for tanks. We have made 2-pdr gun barrels without nickel, but this does not mean we will be successful in producing cast armour-plate. If we manufacture the plate the way we now propose it will be difficult to machine. We should therefore modify the design to require as little machining as possible.

We are not only short of nickel, but also of molybdenum. We have, however, told our metallurgists to go ahead, and are sending some to the USA to ascertain the method of steel production by the acid open hearth plan. But so far as the cast armour is concerned I am not worried, because if they can do it anywhere in the world we can do it here.

Our troubles are with the gearbox and transmission. The potential gear manufacturing capacity of the Commonwealth is not very great. Whether we could get anything like the designed program of gear and transmission production is somewhat doubtful.

If we could ignore everything else and commandeer all the machinery for gearbox and transmission production we might get somewhere. I do not think this is possible, however, as a large proportion of it is needed for other production which is quite as urgent as tanks. If we commandeer that capacity for tanks the other production will have to stop. The plain fact is that we have not enough machine tools for gear-cutting, and we have not much chance of getting more.

MR HARTNETT

I doubt if it could be said that the design is completely finalised. It can only be finalised when it is able to be produced. You cannot say these are the drawings and this is what we want made. You have first to make sure that manufacture can proceed according to the drawings. If we cannot manufacture according to the drawings, either new manufacturing processes have to be developed, or drawings made to fit in with existing manufacturing capacity.

COLONEL WATSON

I do not think we should wait until the pilot model is tried out. I think we should go straight ahead with the production of the major items.

MR HARTNETT

Tanks are a production headache. There is no established industry to lean on. For instance, no one commercially produces a gearbox transmitting 4-500 hp. The gearbox is the chief difficulty. If we cannot make cast armour the whole can be made by rolled plates around the frame.

We have had to work in conjunction with the Army, and when we are given the drawings we have to see whether the machine-hours for production are available. I think, however, we could get over the whole problem of the hull. We have taken a census of the casting facilities in the Commonwealth, and now the firms surveyed want the steel to go ahead with.

We have tried to produce the steel without nickel or molybdenum, and on Saturday we are having a trial pouring. If it is successful we could pour 350 tons of steel per week, which could be increased when more plant becomes available. Bradford Kendall, for instance, are installing a new 10-ton electric furnace, but it will take four or five months before the transformer for this is ready.

The engine horse-power needed is 25 hp per ton weight, with a minimum of 20 hp. We hesitated on the Guiberson engine because of price and delivery, and the first production is nine months off. Guiberson has offered us jigs and dies, but he cannot supply the machine tools; this makes his engine a very long-term project. In the meantime we have compromised on three Cadillac engines. We have a problem in harnessing them together, but in using the Cadillac engine we are tapping a source of supply which has not yet been affected by war requirements.

The US M3 light tank, or Stuart, is shown here during exercises in north Queensland. It was fast and reliable, and was good for reconnaissance and flank protection. Its speed and light armour made it unsuitable for jungle operations (AWM 063022).

One suggestion for a stop-gap solution to the need for tanks generally was to order 200 American M3 light tanks. The proposed AC1 was designed to counter German tanks, but light tanks would be quite sufficient to meet the threat posed by Japanese tanks. Both the Minister for the Army, Percy Spender, and the DCGS, General Northcott, were enthusiastic about the idea.

This meeting, and the statements of its participants, provide a clear indication of the status of the tank production project at the end of April 1941. It is absolutely clear that the user specification is still subject to change, and that the translation of this to a manufacturing specification has a long way to go.

Production bottlenecks were also recognised, particularly by Essington Lewis, and he establishes very clearly the need for the allocation of manufacturing resources in accordance with user priorities. Lewis also makes the eminently sensible suggestion that a captured German tank should be carefully examined. Tank designers in Britain took the arrogant view that only British designers could produce the best equipment and anything foreign must be inferior. This was indeed unfortunate for British tank soldiers. The Australian attitude as represented by Lewis was much more broadminded, and shows a willingness to learn from equipment that has proven successful.

The different points of view demonstrated in the exchanges during the meeting of 30 April are interesting and important. Broadly, there were three groups: first comprised the users, which included the immediate users, the Army, and the ultimate decision-makers, the politicians; the second group consisted of the designers and the third the manufacturers.

The Army and the politicians were justifiably keen to have an AFV that would strengthen national security. Because of their lack of experience with tanks there was little that either of the two user parties could provide as a practical contribution to the discussion.

The designers, as represented by the UK tank design expert Colonel Watson, expressed complete confidence in their designs, and Watson was keen to advance to production, bypassing much of the pilot stage. This was invariably a recipe for disaster in the production of as complex a mechanism as a tank.21 Watson was also determined to justify and praise the work of his department, even though there were as yet no firm targets against which to measure their performance.

The manufacturers were represented by the heads of the senior and subordinate departments responsible for the tank production project, Essington Lewis the Director-General of Munitions, and Mr Hartnett, the Director of Ordnance Production. Lewis makes sensible suggestions and demonstrates the negative effect of tank production on the manufacture of other munitions.

He does, however, state that ‘the designing of the tank is a matter for the Army, and is quite outside the scope of Munitions, who are only concerned with production to Army designs.’ This statement is fallacious. There must be coordination between the user, designer and supplier to arrive at a practical compromise specification that jointly best meets their needs and capacities. This is recognised by Hartnett who noted that designers had to take account of the realities of the manufacturing process when producing their plans.

Some of the comments made during the meeting show a weakness in the project management procedures used at that time. Before manufacture commences there must be a manufacturing specification. This brings together the user needs and the facilities, materials, skills and other resources that are available at the time and in the place where those needs are to be met. It takes time◦— often a long time◦— to arrive at a firm manufacturing specification. But without it there will be endless modifications, time delays, and cost overruns. Such problems certainly confronted the Australian tank production project as it proceeded.

In late March the Minister for the Army had asked the Board of Business Administration (BBA) for its views on the impact of tank production on the overall cost of munitions and on Australia’s manufacturing resources. The Board arranged a meeting with Essington Lewis and Hartnett. Hartnett outlined his department’s plans for production. Estimates were made of the effect of the tank program on costs and resources and the discussions were recorded in BBA Minute 531 ‘Formation of an armoured division’.22 The minute showed that there was particular concern over the pressure on skilled labour resulting from the formation of the armoured division and the manufacture of tanks.

This minute was discussed by the War Cabinet on 15 May. It is to be assumed that the Minister for the Army contributed the information he had gained at the meeting of 30 April. War Cabinet Minute 1088 recorded the discussion:

The Minister for the Army said that before a decision was taken on the matter of skilled labour he would have the proposals of the BBA further examined and an appreciation submitted to the War Cabinet, as suggested by the Treasurer, on the following lines:

a. An up-to-date statement of the position in regard to the prospects of local manufacture, giving a reviewed production program showing the effect tank production will have on other phases of munitions production.

b. The possibility, with a strong representation of the Australian case, of supply of tanks from American sources under the Lend-Lease Act, in lieu of local manufacture.

c. An appreciation of the effect of a) and b) on the plans for the formation and training of the Armoured Division.23

At almost the same time, on 16 May, Hartnett wrote to Essington Lewis to outline his views on the status of the tank project. He wrote a lengthy letter which contains a realistic picture of the progress of the project, as these extracts indicate:

The organisation and procedure between Army and ourselves is now well established, and the cooperation and collaboration are satisfactory. The General Staff of the Army have described in broad terms the type of tank they require. The Director of Design, AFV Section, Colonel Watson, has translated this into user specification. The Supervisor of Design in Army Drawing Office has produced basic design drawings, and provided us with sufficient general information to give us the overall proportions of the work to be carried out.

After diligent research the steel industry has evolved what appears to be a satisfactory alloy for cast armour plate with required ballistic qualities. A group of companies has been selected whose facilities can be expanded to enable us to cast the hull. This expansion will cost about £250,000, which will have to come either from Government funds or from the companies themselves.

The executives of the Moulders Union have been called in, and they offer every help and cooperation. A large number of moulders will have to be employed, and accelerated training of semi-skilled personnel or dilution will have to be admitted.

The composite design of three Cadillac engines linked together to a common drive shaft has been approved and released by the Army, and an order for these engines placed. A few have arrived, some are on the water, and delivery of the remainder in reasonably short time is assured.

The outstanding bottleneck is the gearbox, and whether we can find a manufacturer for the gearbox and final drive axles. The gearbox is a noncommercial unit having to handle a 400 hp engine with 800 foot-pounds torque, and with five forward speeds and one reverse, and preferably with synchromesh or easy gear change features.

In January Colonel Watson showed us a small sketchy print of the gearbox, and our leading gear manufacturers thought they could produce such a box. Recently Colonel Milner returned from the USA with details of the Medium M3 gearbox. It was quickly recognised that it was a precision and heavily stressed gearbox, and our manufacturers said they were not able to make it.

We immediately cabled the US asking for complete gearboxes, components, or the necessary machine tools. As yet we have had no reply, except that we could not expect a complete set of tools until mid-1942 or later.

Seven months ago one of our officers, Mr Chamberlain, went to the US to find out all he could about tank manufacture. He has driven most of the tanks being made in the US and Canada, and as well formed a small AFV Section working his direction. He put them to work on designing a tank assembled from components currently available, and at the same time they are looking for the machine tools we need here.

We have cabled to Mr Chamberlain to return to Australia and show his findings to the Army authorities and ourselves. We hear that he is trying to board the Clipper leaving on 17 May, due in Melbourne on 28 May.

Another matter of concern is the front drive axle. This is a complicated assembly, carrying a differential with a very large crown wheel, a gear compensated brake, steering mechanism, heavy stressed bearings, and terminating in driving sprockets. We could probably just get by with a limited production quantity of this axle, but to ensure adequate quantity and quality we need machine tools which are unavailable in Australia at present.

Our problem has been made much more difficult during the last month or two by the introduction of the large shipbuilding program. There seems no doubt that conflicting demands will be made on industry by this program and our tank building program. Defence Coordination will have to be asked in the very near future to define the priorities between ships and tanks. At the present we are virtually stuck pending the best solutions for the gearbox and the front drive axle.24

On 4 June the Minister for the Army reported to the War Cabinet on discussions following his statement recorded in Minute 1088. He had spoken with representatives of the Departments of the Army and of Munitions and three questions arose from their talks. The first concerned whether the order for 200 light tanks from the USA should be increased to 400. Second, the Minister asked whether the development work for the production of the ideal type of tank (the AC1), which would be a long-distance project, should proceed. The third question concerned whether a modified tank (the AC2), should be produced which could be accomplished as a short-term project.

The Australian Cruiser (AC1 or Sentinel) was a design commenced in late 1940 and was to be produced mainly from local resources. It proved impossible to make battleworthy tanks in time to see action, but many daunting technical problems were overcome (AWM 133677).

Cabinet approved the ordering of 200 additional light tanks with the necessary ammunition and spares from the USA.25 The Minister for the Army was asked to submit an agendum on those questions relating to tank production which required decisions. He considered it vital that a highly specialised person should give his undivided attention to the supervision of tank production, and this view met with general agreement.

The Minister submitted the required agendum (Supplement 4 to 150/1940) in June, and it was discussed by Cabinet on 10 July. Supplement 4 provides a clear and comprehensive picture of the status of tank production, the difficulties that the program faced, and a number of alternative actions. The agendum indicates that Cabinet was slowly appreciating the realities of creating tank production facilities and of raising an armoured division. This was merely one of the hundreds of problems that Cabinet dealt with on a regular basis at a time when communication was slow, and there were many threats on the horizon. An edited transcript of the agendum reads:

Background

This Agendum sets out the present (June 1941) position regarding tank equipment and personnel, both in reply to War Cabinet minute 1088 of 15 May (Supplement 3 to Agendum 150/1940) and as regards expectations of the provision of tanks from Great Britain and the USA. Six types of tank will be referred to:

1. The Australian Cruiser (AC1): this is the General Staff requirement of December 1940, weight about 26 tons, design speed 25 mph, three Cadillac engines.

2. Shortened Australian Cruiser (AC2): re-design of AC 1 using two Cadillac engines. The reduced horsepower is expected to permit the use of standard transmission assemblies made in the USA.

3. The latest US cruiser tank type M3 which mounts a 75mm gun in addition to a 37mm gun and two machine-guns. This tank is not yet in production, and is not likely to be available in Australia for some time.

4. The US M3 light tank: mounts a 37mm gun and machine-guns, and has a speed of 35 mph; it is now in production in the USA.

5. British infantry tanks: the Infantry Tank Mark II, or Matilda, mounted a 2-pdr gun and a machine-gun; its maximum speed was 16 mph. The Matilda had performed very well in North Africa, but its firepower could not be increased, and it was becoming obsolete. The Churchill had not yet reached field units.

6. British Infantry Tank Mark III, or Valentine; a reliable tank with a 2-pdr gun; its speed was 16 mph, and the strength of the suspension limited its total weight to 16 tons.

Status, June 1941

1. AC1

The basic principle in planning the AC1 was that only thoroughly tested components would be used. For this reason the gearbox, final drive, suspension and tracks were copied from the US Medium M3 because they were known to be capable of handling the high power input. These components are not available from the US.

A close study of the detailed drawings showed that a shortage of machine tools would be a serious bar to production. This situation has been partly eased by the probable availability of a commercial gearbox from the US. However, estimates of machine tool capacity show the impossibility of manufacture of the remainder of the transmission and final drive at any reasonable rate unless we can import the required machine tools.

These can only be obtained after a long delay, and the earliest estimated date for starting quantity production of the AC1 is May 1942, and there remain so many unknown factors that the start date may well be much later.

2. AC2

Mr Alan Chamberlain of the Ministry of Munitions has located standard tank components in production in the US which he considers could be imported and assembled here. The assembly thus built would be capable of transmitting the power of only two Cadillac engines. If the armour is not to be reduced in thickness, the maximum speed of the tank will be 16 mph.

Munitions estimate that providing the US components can be obtained, production of the AC2 could start in February 1942, and 375 tanks would have been produced by March 1943.

3. M3 Light Tanks from the USA

British authorities in London control the allotment of all equipment available from the USA. Our High Commissioner in London, Mr Bruce, has advised that we may be able to obtain 400 of the American M3 light tanks, together with ammunition and spares. This tank is not suitable for fighting against modern German tanks, but should be quite satisfactory for home defence and training.

4. Tanks from the United Kingdom

Enquiries have been made with the War Office regarding the provision of British tanks to be manned by AIF Armoured Corps personnel. The War Office has now told our High Commissioner that they may be able to provide Mark III Infantry tanks (Valentines) for one armoured brigade AIF. These would be for delivery in the Middle East. We should therefore make sure that we have tank crews ready for the delivery of these tanks. At the same time we should continue the production of our own tanks as a matter of the greatest urgency.

As a parallel and related activity to Supplement 4 to 150/1940, the BBA was debating its own Agendum 38/1941 Supplement 7, ‘Formation of an armoured division – production of tanks’.26 This contained a request from the Department of the Army for the additional funding to buy the components for 400 AC2 tanks. The Board checked with General Northcott and confirmed that the Army’s requirement for tanks was now 400 M3 lights, 400 AC2s, and 385 AC1s.

The Board concurred with the need for the funds to be made available for these purchases, but once again (referring to their Minutes 627 and 631) drew attention as a matter of extreme concern to the size of the demands being placed on industry. They recommended that, in order to manage competing demands on labour, materials and facilities, a Priorities Authority should be established as a coordinated entity to plan the Commonwealth’s entire manufacturing program.

The War Cabinet discussed Supplement 4 to War Cabinet Agendum 150/1940 on 4 July 1941, and presumably took into account the BBA’s deliberations. Minute 1169 records that ‘the Prime Minister and the Ministers for the Army and for Munitions should confer on the question of design and production of tanks, including the allocation of responsibility for design.’27

The armoured division was discussed again on 9 July. The CGS announced that the first armoured brigade was scheduled to go overseas around March 1942, and that the War Office had undertaken to provide infantry tanks for its equipment in the first quarter of 1942.28

The War Cabinet made a number of decisions concerning Supplement 4 to Agendum 150/1940 on 10 July, including several relating to the production of tanks. Cabinet agreed to continue the policy of making complete tanks in Australia with production to commence on a shortened Australian cruiser tank (to be called the AC2) until production could commence on the AC1. Efforts were to be made to increase the proposed rate of production of AC1 and AC2 to exceed twenty-five tanks per month. The order for 400 M3 light tanks was confirmed. Any British offer of tank equipment which was considered necessary and within the nation’s manning capacity would be accepted. These decisions were recorded in Minute 1191.29

On 11 July Essington Lewis wrote to General Northcott to tell him that a separate organisation for AFVs was to be established within the Department of Munitions.30 This would be known as the Directorate of AFVs (DAFV), and the head of this Directorate was to take charge of the production of AFVs. Input to DAFV would include specifications from the General Staff, and the DAFV would have a single drawing office dealing with both basic and detailed design.

The Design Section would comprise personnel from the present Military Design Section (AFV), and its head, Colonel Watson, who would report to the Director, AFV, Mr A.R. Code.31

The next forward step in the production of tanks was described in the Director-General of Munitions’ Report 11, dated 23 July 1941.32 The report stated that an experimental tank depot to be built on nine and a half acres at Fisherman’s Bend, Port Melbourne, was 45% complete.

On the same day, the War Cabinet held a meeting in Melbourne. The Minister for the Army referred to cablegram 3715 of 12 July from the High Commissioner’s office, London, providing information on the supply of tanks. The July allotment of M3 lights for July had been increased to six. The War Office recommended that M3 mediums supplement M3 lights, and ultimately replace them. With regard to existing orders, Australian should stipulate that, having placed an order for 400 lights, following the delivery of the first 150 lights, the remainder could be replaced by mediums.

Cabinet agreed to an amendment to the order along these lines. The Minister for the Army told Cabinet of a proposal, put to him by the General Staff, that local production of AC2s be abandoned in view of the prospects of improved supplies of M3 cruisers from the US. Cabinet rejected this proposal and decided that the local production program for both AC1s and AC2s as authorised should be continued. These decisions were noted in Minute 1245.33

This was not the end of the push to scrap the AC2 project. On 26 September General Northcott wrote to the Minister for the Army and recommended that the AC2 program should be abandoned, and production of the AC1 taken in hand without delay.34 He had been assured by the DAFV that an output of five AC1s per week could be reached from March 1942.

This recommendation attracted a rapid response. On 9 October 1941 the Secretary of the Department of Munitions advised his department that the Minister for the Army had approved a General Staff recommendation that the AC2 should not proceed, but that the AC1 be immediately accelerated as an Army equipment project of first priority.35 This amendment to the priority for production of Army equipment was confirmed by a Defence Committee statement on 3 November.36

Air Chief Marshal Sir Robert Brooke-Popham, Commander-in-Chief Far East, visited Australia and spoke to the War Cabinet on 16 October. One of the topics of his address was deficiencies in military equipment.37

Sir Robert stated that Australia had been asked to assist in the provision of personnel for tank units and he hoped that forty-eight tanks would be delivered by January 1942. This was reasonably satisfactory, although double this number would have been welcome for strengthening the defences of aerodromes. Sir Robert added, however, that Malaya was not tank country, and could not claim a high priority for the supply of tanks in view of the urgent needs elsewhere.

Bakri, Malaya, 18 January 1942. A Japanese tank is knocked out by 4 Australian Anti-tank Regiment. The Japanese made good use of tanks in Malaya, but the GOC 8th Australian Division, Gordon Bennett, remarked that he did not want tanks because they would be useless in jungle terrain (AWM 011300).

It is not clear where the tanks were to come from or where they were going. What is clear is that Sir Robert was wrong in saying that Malaya was not tank country, as the Japanese would very decisively prove in only a few months’ time.

Progress with the AC1 had been steady even as the debate over the AC2 raged.38 It had been decided that the hull was to be cast, so that much machining would be eliminated. Extensive experimental work was undertaken to develop a steel that could be cast and, at the same time, provide the required resistance to hostile fire.

The original plan was to cast the hull in six parts and then bolt them together. After some preliminary trials, Bradford Kendall, under the enthusiastic leadership of James Kendall, decided they could probably cast the hull in one piece. Late in 1941 they succeeded, and Hopkins observed their triumph:

Late in 1941 I was one of a group of army and munitions representatives invited to a foundry near Sydney, under conditions of great secrecy, and witnessed the sight of a huge crane dipping its hook into a furnace and lifting out the first AC1 hull, glowing bright red and with beautifully rounded contours instead of the awkward, angular appearance of the tanks built in other countries.39

The hull and turret of the AC1 were cast rather than welded, the technique used in the manufacture of many other contemporary tanks. It was a brave effort to cast an item as large as the hull, but the metallurgists and engineers at Bradford & Kendall succeeded (Tank Museum image).

Although this achievement was a great boost to the Directorate of AFVs, the tank project still faced many difficulties. In his reports 14 and 15, the Director-General of Munitions commented that: ‘Of all the projects undertaken by the Ministry of Munitions, tank production was the most difficult.’40 He added that they were shortly to hold a conference to consider the possibility of using singlerow Wasp engines for tanks. The first tank could probably be promised for May 1942, but this was dependent on the supply of machine tools from abroad.

The Director-General added that the machine tool situation was very unsatisfactory. Representations had recently been made to the UK for improved deliveries, but the reply indicated that the prospects of supply from the UK were deteriorating in view of Russian demands. Supply from the USA was also becoming difficult, and it was apparent that Australia would have to produce more machine tools if it were to fulfil its munitions program.

The conference on the Wasp engine and other matters was held on 24 November 1941 between the Ministers and representatives of the Departments of the Army, Air, Munitions and Aircraft Production.41 The CGS repeated his view that the AC2 tank was entirely unsuited to Army requirements. The conference decided that the AC1 tank was the only type that should be manufactured in Australia, and that the most suitable engine for use in this tank was the Pratt & Whitney single-row Wasp, a modification of the engine being produced by the Commonwealth Aircraft Corporation for installation in Wirraway aircraft. Three Wasp engines should be made available by the Aircraft Production Commission for modification and experimental purposes. The Wasp tank engine should be produced in Australia at the earliest possible date.

These engines could not be obtained from America because the authorities were not prepared to undertake the considerable amount of engineering work involved in modifying the Wasp aircraft engines manufactured there. The quickest and most effective way of commencing Australian production would be to extend the existing engine factory at the Commonwealth Aircraft Corporation.

It was important, however, that the production of essential aircraft engines should not be disrupted by the diversion of machine tools used in their manufacture. Efforts should therefore be made to obtain sufficient machine tools from overseas for the proposed new annexe to produce at least five Wasp engines per week for installation in tanks.

As the annexe would take twelve months to complete, it was decided to cable the USA to ascertain whether 200 single-row Wasp aircraft engines could be supplied and delivery to Australia commenced not later than March 1942, continuing at the rate of at least five engines per week. These would be used for aircraft. This would release a portion of Australia’s current manufacturing capacity for the production of modified single-row Wasp engines for tanks until the new annexe came into production.

On 31 December 1941, the Australian Government Trade Commissioner, New York, advised that the British-American Aircraft Committee had allocated 200 engines to Australia to be supplied at the rate of five to seven per week commencing in January 1942, and that a lease-lend requisition was being lodged for a further 200, delivery of which would commence in May at the same rate. The Trade Commissioner had also been negotiating for 500 gear boxes and other tank components. Delivery would commence in June at the rate of more than twenty sets per week.

As the question of priority between aircraft and tank production was the subject of much discussion at the conference, the Defence Committee was asked to make a recommendation on the matter. In a minute dated 8 January 1942, this Committee considered that, in view of the Prime Minister’s announcement on 16 December 1941 that the Government had decided to rank aircraft production as a matter of the first priority, all capacity available in Australia for the production of aeroplane engines must be devoted to engines for aircraft to the exclusion of engines for tanks. However, the Committee recommended that the local production of tanks proceed with the engines obtained from abroad.

On 6 December 1941, the Minister for the Army addressed a letter to the Prime Minister forwarding a copy of the proceedings of the conference. He suggested that immediate steps be taken to cancel all commitments for the production of AC2 tanks and expressed his concern over proceeding with the manufacture in Australia of the AC1 type of tank unless it could be established that the tank could be produced within a reasonable period.

He mentioned the provision for the manufacture of tanks by Canada and America and suggested that a cablegram be despatched to the authorities in the UK outlining the present status of tank production in Australia. The cable would also outline the prospective program of production (if single-row Wasp engines could be successfully developed for use with the Australian-produced tank). Advice was sought on whether such production should be pursued given the potential output of tanks in England, Canada and the USA in 1942 and 1943 and the diversion from manufacture of other types of equipment that might occur if Australia continued to manufacture tanks.

The tank status in Australia on 30 November 1941 was provided in a document, entitled somewhat elaborately but very explicitly: ‘Statement showing initial requirements for fighting units, including AMF (Order of battle) mobilisation, AIF in Australia and Armoured Division (AIF), for recruit training, and for six months’ reserve, together with stocks available.’42 The figures were:

Required

Initial equipment for fighting units: 548

Initial equipment for recruit training: 28

Six months’ reserve: 428

Available

US M3 light tank: 10

British light tank (obsolete): 8

This was not an encouraging situation one week before Pearl Harbor.

This report was presented on 3 December, and the tank position was again described at a War Cabinet meeting the next day. In delivering his weekly report, the CGS confirmed that ten M3 light tanks were in stock, and delivery of ten per month for January, February, and March had been promised.43 Four hundred of these tanks had been ordered, together with an appropriate amount of ammunition.

The CGS added that the design of the AC1 had been finalised and the first three pilot models assembled. The Minister for Munitions stated that the project was proceeding satisfactorily, a new factory would be ready in March, and he thought that the first deliveries of tanks would be made in May or June 1942.

Creation and training of armoured units

On 24 June 1940, Geoffrey Street, the Minister for the Army, had submitted War Cabinet Agendum 150/1940, ‘Production orders for Armoured Fighting Vehicles’.44 The agendum stated, among other things, that tanks were required for an armoured division for service in Australia or overseas. Appendix 2 of the agendum included a chart illustrating the proposed structure of the division, together with details of the personnel, transport, and weapons that would be required.

The agendum was discussed by Cabinet on 2 July. They did not directly approve either the production of tanks or the formation of an armoured division, but requested further investigation.45 In debates over the next five months, some action was taken on tanks, but none on the armoured division.

Cairo, 1941. General Sir Thomas Blamey was then Deputy Commander-in-Chief Middle East Forces and GOC AIF. These two roles could have conflicting demands, and Blamey had some heated discussions with Wavell and Auchinlech (AWM ART28252)

It was not until November 1940 that there was further pressure to create that division. CGS General Sturdee and Blamey in the Middle East both spoke of the importance of an Australian armoured division, and Sturdee directed Hopkins to prepare a proposal for such a division.46 Hopkins responded with commendable speed and, within a week, advanced a plan for creating the division, procuring the tanks, and recruiting and training the personnel.47

A week later, he was called to meet the CGS, who said that the plan had been approved and that Hopkins was to be appointed Deputy Director Staff Duties (AFV) at Army HQ, and was to have direct access to the DCGS, General Northcott.48

It was important that the War Cabinet approve the constitution of the Australian Armoured Corps, the raising of troops for an armoured division, and the establishment of a training organisation for armoured troops. This approval was duly given at the War Cabinet meeting on 8 January 1941, recorded in Minute 689.49

Hopkins, however, had not waited. He ascertained that the first major task was to train tank soldiers to operate the tanks when they became available. Supporting troops for the armoured division could be drawn from trained infantrymen, gunners, engineers, etc. serving in the AMF or the AIF.

Hopkins planned for the armoured division to complete its training in Australia between 15 May and 1 August 1942, depending on tank availability.50 This schedule allowed five and a half months for individual training plus another three to four months for sub-unit and higher collective training.

The initial requirements to establish a school and commence instruction required the selection and training of a cadre to form the AFV School instructional staff. The selection and acquisition of a permanent site for the School, including the provision of an area suitable for a tank gunnery range, was also essential. The range, which would double as a manoeuvre area for armoured units, required an area of at least 20,000 acres. Plans and preparation for the immediate construction of instructional buildings and student accommodation and the construction of a tank gunnery range were also required. Hopkins required the provision of training equipment including local design and manufacture of specialised tank gunnery and radio telephony equipment. The selection of suitable officers and NCOs to undergo AFV School courses was also a prerequisite.

The establishment of the School would also require the organisation of Armoured Corps training units to hold and train armoured division and subsequent reinforcement personnel. Arrangements had to be made for the selection and posting of a fair proportion of Regular Army officers to the Australian Armoured Corps including a number with overseas experience.

The requirement for urgency in establishing the AFV School was apparent. Fortunately, there was little risk in Hopkins’ anticipating War Cabinet approval by selecting personnel and starting to train the future school staff. Although everything seemed to be needed at once, the highest priority task was the selection and training of a cadre to form the instructional staff for the AFV School. Major R. A. Perkins was a fortunate choice as acting Commandant. He was readily available, energetic and keen, and had sound organising and instructional experience. Perkins was appointed on 28 December 1940.51

Almost simultaneously, the search for other Staff Corps officers and Army Instructional Corps (AIC) instructors to provide a strong nucleus resulted in the selection of Captain I. T. Murdoch and Major H. L. Moulds, both Australian Staff Corps, together with around twenty officers and warrant officers from the AIC. Moulds was a signals specialist, earmarked for the tank wireless school. Murdoch and most of the AIC came from the cavalry divisions. Captains Keith Watts and Cecil Ives, as the only two RTC-trained members of the AIC, bore a heavy burden. Almost unaided, they taught all the new entrants to the school. All the other instructors were highly trained, needing only to add technical knowledge regarding the new arm.

Puckapunyal, November 1942. The AFV School was established in February 1941, and this picture shows a Grant tank in the foreground, a tented camp centre left, and the general sweep of the training area in the background (AWM 027475).

Accommodation for the cadre was found at Balcombe, Victoria, which was convenient enough to Army HQ to allow Hopkins to give a little instruction and to watch progress. Perkins’ goal was to train the instructors so that they, in turn, would be ready to train tank personnel on 24 February 1941.

While Perkins and his staff were training the instructors, Hopkins’ next priority was to find a suitable site for tank crews to practise their skills. The site had to accommodate a tank gunnery range and provide sufficient space for tanks to manoeuvre as they would on a battlefield.

Several sites were investigated, and Puckapunyal, sixty miles north of Melbourne, met the requirements. The requisite 20,000 acres was rapidly acquired from its owners, and the instructing staff were transferred from Balcombe on 15 February 1941.52 They were scheduled to start the first course on 24 February.

The process of recruiting for the armoured division, initially officers and NCOs, began with the Military Board secret memo S 586 dated 17 January 1941.53 This memo was circulated to all commands. Eastern Command, headquartered at Victoria Barracks in Sydney, forwarded it to twelve organisations which included field and training units of all arms. The essential points in selecting officers and NCOs for the armoured units were outlined in the first two paragraphs and Appendix D of the memo:

I am commanded by the Military Board to state that approval has been given for the raising of the armoured, engineer, signals and ordnance units of an armoured division for service with the A.I.F. Personnel will be drawn from all Commands, and its formation will be initiated by the installation of an armoured training regiment in each of the Eastern (NSW) and Southern (Victoria) Commands Details of the establishments of these training regiments, of the composition of the division, and of the allotment of quotas to Commands and Military Districts will be issued as soon as possible.

In the meantime, it is desired that the selection of a proportion of Officers, Warrant Officers and NCOs for armoured units be put in hand forthwith. Officers selected from the A.M.F. will be appointed to the AIF. Captains and Lieutenants will be selected in Commands Majors will be recommended to Army Headquarters for selection.

Appendix D: Notes for guidance in selection of Officers and NCOs for armoured units

It is hoped to obtain Officers with a basic knowledge of discipline, interior economy and the tactics of their own arm. Those selected will have to master, in a very short space of time, the details of a new arm which include some technical knowledge. They will also have to grasp and apply new tactical ideas and organisation and a new tactical procedure in which movement and consequently thought is four times faster than in their old arm.

They should be alert types possessing, so far as can be judged, quickness of thought and adaptability in addition to the normal attributes expected of an officer. Education is an advantage.

Knowledge of or interest in motor vehicles or wireless may be an indication of suitability. It is not essential but will assist the Officer to absorb instruction more readily. Good experience of this nature, however, is most useful. Age of those selected should be reasonably close to the ages for AIF Officers, if not within them. A special recommendation should accompany over-age officers selected, listing reasons for recommendation. Approval for selection of over-age officers will be given by A.H.Q. Youth, generally speaking, is an advantage in armoured work.

NCOs should be alert, have power to command, and be able to instruct.

Some of the students graduating from the AFV School were to be posted to the Armoured Training Regiments where they would instruct recruits for all units of the Australian Armoured Corps. A major problem in the early stages of all armoured training was the shortage of equipment on which students could receive practical and realistic training.

One effect of this was to raise queries about the timing of the training, and about its cost. On 14 March 1941 the Minister for the Army asked the BBA to evaluate, as a matter of urgency, the increased estimates for the formation of the armoured division and of the two armoured training regiments. The Board was particularly concerned about the armoured units’ demand for skilled labour, and drew several conclusions, including:

• The Board knows that all three services are having difficulty in finding skilled mechanics. The Board considers that the enlistment of such men for an armoured division which cannot be fully equipped for another two years needs to be further reviewed.

• The Board submits that the training program for the armoured division should be related to and dependent on the time within which the necessary equipment will become available.

• The skilled men should therefore be enlisted only when they are really needed, bearing in mind that their withdrawal from industry will adversely affect the production of munitions.

• In summary, the Board strongly recommends that there should be a further review of the proposals for the enlistment and training program for an armoured division in the light of the observations made above.54

The BBA’s Minute 531 was discussed at the War Cabinet meeting of 15 May 1941. Cabinet recorded that it could not make a decision regarding enlistment of skilled personnel into the armoured division until a realistic timetable for delivery of tanks for training had been set.55 The tanks could either come from local production or from American sources.

In May, Major Perkins handed over the administration of the now established AFV School to Lieutenant Colonel Leslie Pittock ‘Pip’ Crouch, MC, an RTC officer who had been selected to take command.56 Perkins had laid an excellent foundation on which to build, and Crouch was able to use his knowledge and experience to keep the development of the School moving along at a brisk pace.

In June, the Minister for the Army, Percy Spender, submitted Supplement 4 150/1940 to the War Cabinet. The section of the agendum concerning the formation of the armoured division describes plans to raise the armoured, engineer, signals and ordnance personnel for the armoured division between July and September 1941. They were to be given five months’ training, at the end of which they would be 80% trained. They would be ready to complete their training on tanks in Australia (if they were available) or to go overseas to receive equipment and finish their training there. In either event they should be 80% trained by January-March 1942, and fully trained by March-May 1942. Supplement 4 recommended to the War Cabinet that armoured, engineer, signals and ordnance personnel for the division should be recruited between July and December 1941. A second recommendation concerned raising the additional unarmoured and ancillary units for the division between September and November 1941◦— this would constitute an additional 4,400 all ranks. Finally, the supplement recommended raising the support group for the division (mainly artillery and infantry) in October and November 1941; these would number a further 4,200 all ranks.

The War Cabinet discussed this agendum on 4 July. Minute 1169 records simply that ‘the discussion also included questions of the command and personnel of the armoured division.’57

At the same meeting, the War Cabinet discussed Supplement 9 to Agendum 141/1940 ‘Provision of motor-cycles for the AMF and the Armoured Division’.58 Minute 1166 records their approval to place an immediate order with the British Ministry of Supply for 9,300 motorcycles.59

The equipping of the armoured division continued with a request from the Minister for the Army on 23 June 1941 for 3,007 motor vehicles (other than tanks and motorcycles)60 and this was approved by the War Cabinet on 10 July (Minute 1190).61

One issue of primary importance in raising tank crews is that of gunnery. A tank is basically a mobile gun-platform with the prime function of bringing accurate fire on hostile targets. Recruits can learn how to look after the tank guns in a classroom or workshop setting, but there is no substitute for live firing to develop trained tank gunners. Hopkins was well aware of this, and chose Puckapunyal as a training area partly because it was a site on which a gunnery range could be constructed while also meeting the requirements for public safety.

An area of 30,000 acres at Singleton NSW was requisitioned as the site for a training area for the troops of Eastern Command. The area was suitable for manoeuvres as well as a tank gunnery range. The picture shows trainees in 1945 learning the 6-pdr anti-tank gun attack drill (AWM 113915).

Tank gunnery requires a target that moves, if possible in an irregular fashion, simulating manoeuvring hostile targets. The construction of the mechanism for this moving target was entrusted to a team under the leadership of the Chief Electrical Engineer of the Victorian Railways, Mr H.P. Colwell.62

A mock-up of the target was built in the Spotswood railway yards, and the trials proved satisfactory. The team then transferred its activities to Puckapunyal, where they worked with Army engineers to produce the moving target to exercise and sharpen the skills of the tank gunners. The range at Puckapunyal was officially opened on 29 July 1941.63

While Puckapunyal served the needs of Southern Command, another site was required for Eastern Command in New South Wales. Possible sites were examined, and in July a proposal was submitted by the Minister for the Army for a range at Singleton. It was submitted to the War Cabinet as Supplement 6 to Agendum 150/1940 and was called ‘Formation of an Armoured Division AIF: provision of accommodation and an AFV range for the Armoured Division’.64

The area at Singleton was deemed suitable for a tank gunnery range, and an existing camp at Greta, twenty miles away, was considered sufficiently close to accommodate troops training at Singleton. There would be minor facilities at Singleton to allow the men to bivouac at the range site for short periods. The site would also be available for field firing practice and manoeuvres by all arms. This would considerably enhance the training opportunities for troops stationed at Greta.

Supplement 6 was considered by the War Cabinet on 3 September 1941 and a decision made to acquire 30,000 acres of land at Singleton and authorise construction of an AFV range there.65 The decision on additional accommodation at Greta and Singleton was deferred pending a further submission by the Department of the Army.66

Guidelines had been provided for the selection of junior officers and NCOs, and their training was well under way by mid-1942. It had now become a matter of great importance to select and appoint the directing staff for the division as a whole. This included the GOC, his staff, brigade commanders and their staffs, and the COs of the armoured regiments.

The supporting arms in the division such as artillery, infantry, engineers, and signals could all be recruited or transferred from existing units. The Field Artillery Regiment, for example, could be transferred as a complete unit from another formation, and would come with its establishment of fully trained soldiers of all ranks.

The problem for the armoured units was that there were few resources on which they could call. The Light Horse units were the closest in function, and many of them did, in fact, become armoured regiments. There were also many enlisted soldiers and others who had not yet enlisted who were keen to join a force that promised action and excitement.

The process of gazetting regimental COs began in April 1941 and, in early May, a number of senior officers attended a course conducted by Hopkins at the AFV School.67 The object of the course was to provide an introduction to the tactical handling of armour at regimental and brigade level, and to familiarise the audience with the content of the School’s training programs.

Students of the first course completed their training on 16 May 1941 and were temporarily posted to the armoured training regiments where they could continue their training until the formation of the armoured division. The students of the second course arrived at Puckapunyal on 22 May. The raising of the armoured regiments was now much closer, and this second batch had frequent interviews with already gazetted senior officers who were starting to select their officers and NCOs.

It appears that, as early as January 1941, Major General Northcott had been selected to take over the armoured division, a decision of which Hopkins was critical.68 He had worked with the DCGS for several months and judged that Northcott had the attributes of a good staff officer, but was not quick enough to grasp the essentials of a situation and make decisions in the command of a highly mobile force.

Whatever Hopkins thought, Northcott assumed command of the 1st Armoured Division early in September 1941.69 As soon as he took over he began to select his own staff and subordinate commanders. Hopkins became General Staff Officer (GSO) 1, Brigadier F.B. Hinton, Commander of the 1st Armoured Brigade, and Brigadier W.J.M. Locke, Commander of the 2nd Armoured Brigade.70

By December 1941, the 1st and 2nd Armoured Brigades were in full training, equipped with the only tracked vehicles available: machine-gun carriers. The 1st Armoured Brigade comprised the 2/5th, 2/6th, and 2/7th Armoured Regiments, and the 2nd Brigade of the 2/8th, 2/9th, and 2/10th Armoured Regiments.71 There was some way to go before they could be called an effective fighting force, but they had plenty of enthusiasm.

Manpower in 1941

The Commander-in-Chief Far East, Sir Robert Brooke-Popham, visited Australia in February 1941, and told a War Cabinet meeting on 14 February that the Allies were in urgent need of additional munitions and that Australian production should press ahead.72 Later during the same meeting, the Acting Prime Minister, Arthur Fadden, stated that he proposed to appoint a Parliamentary Committee to conduct a survey of unemployed manpower and of manufacturing establishments not currently engaged in the manufacture of munitions. He stated that:

It is essential that the full resources of the nation should be marshalled for the war effort. For some time we have felt that, although the great majority of our unemployed have been absorbed into wartime industry, there may remain a possible unemployed reserve.

It is intended that those conducting the survey should find out to what extent it is possible to link such men and resources with productive work which will be of help to the nation in its war program. If it is possible to effect changes which will bring the whole of our industrial resources on to a wartime basis, Australia will have reason to be satisfied that it has not left neglected potential sources of power.73

The members of the Committee were recommended by the Advisory War Council at their meeting of 20 February.74 The Committee included two members from the Government side of the house who were critics of the Government, and three members of the Opposition. When Menzies returned from overseas some weeks later he commented that the Committee was loaded against the Government, although its instigators defended their action by saying that it had led to a diminution of complaints against the Government concerning manpower and resources.75

On 1 May 1941 the Advisory War Council reviewed the Munitions program, raising the issue of manpower.76 Mr Beasley, a non-government member of the Council, stated that 23,000 people were out of work in New South Wales, and requested that, in any further drive, consideration be given to employing these people in munitions production.

Mr Curtin added that he wanted to know how far existing problems with munitions production could be resolved if all available manpower was called up, and particularly, how it could be utilised. The Director-General of Munitions stated that if skilled men in non-essential industries were made available they could be put to work on the manufacture of machine tools, of which there was a critical shortage. The manufacture of these tools would then provide further employment for semi-skilled and unskilled workers.

This meeting made a number of decisions concerning manpower, including the immediate appointment of a Director of Labour in the Department of Munitions. Regulations were to be promulgated to prevent workers engaged in the manufacture of munitions transferring from one workshop to another without the permission of the prescribed authority. Power was to be vested in the prescribed authority to direct that plant and labour currently utilised for the production of non-essential supplies should be diverted to the production of munitions or other essential needs.77 There is a clear indication that some form of overall manpower control is needed, but the ‘prescribed authority’ is not as yet defined or appointed.

On 8 May 1941, the Parliamentary Committee presented its first interim report. Hasluck comments that ‘it left an impression that it was more interested in criticism than investigation.’78 The second interim report, presented on 31 May, was only marginally better, as was the third on 18 September.

Meanwhile, a more practical approach to the use of manpower was gradually taking shape. On 26 May, Harold Holt, then Minister for Labour and National Service, submitted a memorandum to the Cabinet which included the statement that:

It seems clear that we have sufficient manpower available to cope with present commitments, and that the Reserved List of Occupations, though it may be possible to improve it in details, is not standing in the way of the raising of sufficient men for the armed forces. But it is obvious that in the future we shall be faced with more serious competition for bulk manpower, and an accentuation of the competition already experienced for men with special skill and experience.79

Mid-1941 saw the formation of two organisations to deal with the allocation of manpower and resources. The Department of War Organisation of Industry was established on 26 June 1941,80 and the Manpower Priorities Board on 25 July.81 Mr W.C. Wurth was appointed Director of Manpower Priorities. Wurth proved to be a very effective administrator and, according to Butlin, ‘the circumstances of the time and his personality produced remarkable results. The Board drew the blueprint of what was to become the Directorate of Manpower, and began to discuss major policy issues which were to become acute in 1942.’82

Wurth’s own assessment was that it was now (July 1941) necessary to effect the transition from a static to a dynamic manpower policy.83 The problem was one of labour mobilisation rather than labour conservation. He makes the very telling observation that ‘up to December 1941 there existed no manpower organisation geared to total war.’

Australian armoured operations, 1941

Although the armoured division was under development for the whole of 1941, and was neither ready nor equipped for battle, there were still armoured units that went into action. These were the reconnaissance regiments which formed an integral part of the infantry divisions, later renamed divisional cavalry regiments.

Libya, 30 January 1941. Carriers of 6 Division Cavalry Regiment relax after the capture of Derna. The regiment was, at this time, armed only with carriers, but contributed significantly to O’Connor’s amazing desert victory (AWM 044257).

The first divisional cavalry regiment to be formed was the 6th Divisional Cavalry Regiment, which commenced enlistment on 3 November 1939 and sailed with the remainder of the division in January 1940.84 The regiment went first to Palestine and then to Egypt, where it was stationed in September.85

On 8 December General O’Connor began his attack on the Italian Army and met with immediate success.86 Prior to the battle, the decision was made to send one of his attacking divisions, the 4th Indian, to the Abyssinian front, and to replace it with the 6th Australian. The 4th Indian was transferred after the capture of Sidi Barrani, and left the North African battlefield on 14 December 1940.

The first major battle for the 6th Australian Division resulted in the capture of Bardia in January 1941.87 The division’s cavalry regiment was holding the Siwa oasis 150 miles inland, and the only part of the regiment to take part in the Bardia operation was A Squadron under the command of Major Denzil Macarthur-Onslow. The squadron was ill-equipped for battle and, according to one account, had only twenty clapped-out carriers and no light tanks.88

Tobruk, 23 January 1941. Italian tanks captured at Bardia are manned by crews from 6 Division Cavalry Regimentt. The tanks are the Carro Armato 11/39, made by the firm Ansaldo. The kangaroos show that they are under new management (AWM 005043).

However, A Squadron made a very positive contribution to the actions at Bardia, at Tobruk, and in the pursuit to Benghazi. At Tobruk they acquired some captured Italian tanks, on which they painted kangaroos to indicate ownership and to dissuade allies from firing at them.

While A Squadron was in action along the Mediterranean coast, the remainder of the regiment was 150 miles south containing the Italian garrisons at Siwa and Giarabub until a sufficiently large force could be assembled to assault the two fortresses. This became possible in March 1941 when the 18th Infantry Brigade was able to move the 2/9th Battalion and detachments from other units of the brigade to Giarabub.89 The assault was successful, and the integral role of the cavalry regiment was acknowledged by the infantry.

The 6th Cavalry Regiment returned to Helwan in April and was re-equipped with Vickers Light Tanks Mark VI B and machine-gun carriers.90 Towards the end of May the regiment moved to North Palestine to replace the 7th Divisional Cavalry which had been sent to Cyprus as part of the island garrison.91 The 7th remained in Cyprus until August 1941 when it rejoined the division and relieved the 6th Cavalry.

Syria, June 1941. British light tanks manned by crews from 6 Division Cavalry Regiment advance into Syria. This shows that some of the country was reasonable going for the tanks (AWM 042211).

The 9th Division left Australia in April 1941 and also went to Palestine.92 All three cavalry regiments, the 6th, 7th and 9th, saw action in Syria in 1941.93 This largely forgotten campaign was a hard-fought battle against metropolitan and colonial French troops. It introduced the three regiments to the realities of war, and showed that they could make a valuable contribution to the operations of their infantry divisions.

Chapter 5:

TO THE BARRICADES — 1942

Major events in 1942

The wake-up call that jolted Australia into action was the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941, a date that marks a convenient boundary between 1941 and 1942.1 Churchill is reputed to have said that mid-1942 was for him the period of greatest anxiety of the whole war. The year began with disaster after disaster. On 10 December 1941 the British battleship HMS Prince of Wales and the battlecruiser HMS Repulse were sunk in the South China Sea.2 The Japanese had landed on the coast of Malaya on 8 December and swept down the peninsula to Singapore, capturing the city on 15 February.3 On 23 January Rabaul fell and, on 19 February, Darwin was bombed for the first time. On 8 March Japanese troops entered Rangoon, on 9 April the US forces on Bataan surrendered, followed by those on Corregidor on 6 May. On 20 May the defeated Allied troops withdrew from Burma. This was a year that began with unparalleled Allied reversals.

These disasters were mitigated for the Allies by the knowledge that they now had the world’s most powerful industrial nation, the USA, locked into their alliance. They believed that, if they could only hold out for the first few months of 1942, they would eventually be victorious. It would be a hard road, but the end was assured.

Of all the countries on the Allied side, Australia was the most endangered by the Japanese attack. Although Japan had consistently been recognised as a threat, the speed and ferocity of the Japanese Army’s assault came as a shock to both the Australian Government and its senior military officers. All the early disasters affected the homeland of Australia much more than the UK and the US. In only a few weeks the Australian Government and people could feel a Japanese net tightening around them.

Darwin, 19 February 1942. The first air-raid on Australia. The SS Neptuna (covered in smoke) eventually blew up. The SS Zealandia, right, was dive-bombed and eventually foundered. Nine out of the thirteen ships in the harbour were sunk (AWM ART 22831).

Australia had considered itself shielded against attack from the north by the Malay Barrier, the string of islands centred on Papua New Guinea. The Japanese, however, regarded the barrier as a stepping stone, the capture of which would facilitate the invasion of mainland Australia.

Japanese forces were too strong for the garrisons of Rabaul, Ambon, and Timor. These three Australian outposts were attacked on 23 January, 30 January, and 19 February respectively. The defenders fought gallantly until overwhelmed by the enemy’s superior forces. Then, wherever possible, they withdrew into the jungles where pursuit was difficult and unprofitable.

The next objective for the Japanese was the mainland of Papua New Guinea. Their plan was to obtain footholds on the north and south coasts of the island, and to destroy the Australian defences at both points. These footholds would allow them to develop sea and air bases in preparation for the invasion of mainland Australia. The northern landings presented little difficulty. On 8 March 1942 a Japanese battalion landed at Lae and another at Salamaua; at the same time a detachment landed at Buka Island in the Solomons.

Over the next few weeks, the situation rapidly worsened as the dismal picture painted by the Official Historian portrays:

The beginning of May found the Japanese vigorously on the move through the whole area north of Australia. At Corregidor the end was coming for Wainwright and his men; in Burma the British-Indian force was being pushed back to India. In the islands closer to Australia some sort of climax was obviously approaching; in the Solomons the Japanese air attacks on Tulagi were intensifying; behind Lae and Salamaua the men of the New Guinea Volunteer Rifles were hanging grimly to the edges of the Japanese occupation; at Port Moresby General Morris had been warned that a decisive moment was at hand. On the mainland itself General Herring was still racing time at Darwin, and north-west Australia was open for a series of progressive Japanese steps towards Fremantle.

In the east the First Army had been told that probable moves by the Japanese would be the capture of Port Moresby, followed by a progressive advance south under cover of land-based aircraft, and that the whole coastline from Brisbane to Townsville could not then be held.4

But, while the Japanese appeared dominant in May 1942, they were about to suffer their first major setback with the mauling of their invasion fleet by the US Navy in the Battle of the Coral Sea which raged from 5 to 8 May 1942.5

Midway Island, Central Pacific, 3–6 June 1942. The superstructure of the carrier USS Yorktown is on fire after a Japanese air attack during the Battle of Midway. The Yorktown was later abandoned and sank, but Midway was a decisive Allied victory, and was one of the turning points of World War II (AWM PO2018.117).

The Battle of the Coral Sea spelled a major strategic gain for the Allies, who had succeeded in turning back the Japanese invasion fleet, relieving the immediate pressure on Port Moresby. The threat remained, but the Japanese advance had been stemmed and time was very much on the side of the Allies.

A month later came the naval Battle of Midway, fought from 4 to 6 June.6 This was the decisive battle of the war in the Pacific, resulting in the loss of the greater part of the Japanese carrier fleet. After mid-1942 the Japanese tide was gradually pushed back in what was initially a slow and costly process, characterised by the re-taking of the Kokoda track^7 and the capture of Guadalcanal.8 Elsewhere on the battlefields of the world the Germans in North Africa were defeated at El Alamein in a battle lasting from 23 October to 4 November, and Rommel began his retreat westward, never to return. In Russia, in the last days of 1942, the German Sixth Army was surrounded and dying at Stalingrad. The year from December 1941 to December 1942 was truly a year for steady nerves.

Provision of tanks 1942

In November 1941 there were eighteen tanks available to the Australian armoured forces, of which ten were US M3 light tanks and eight ‘obsolete British light tanks’.9 No more tanks were received from overseas before the end of 1941 and the locally produced AC1 had not yet reached the pilot stage. At the same time, Australian industry was producing items for mobile forces, while War Cabinet Minute 1603 of 22 December recorded that:

The provision of 1,000 additional LP2A carriers for the AMF was approved in order to maintain continuity of production until a review is made as to the relation of the total requirement to other commitments, from the standpoint of a balanced program. The review is also to show the extent to which the proposed production of carriers synchronises with other aspects such as the output of machine-guns.10

Surprisingly, Advisory War Council Minute 659 of 6 January 1942 indicates that the Army was far from completely mechanised.11 One of the topics covered by the CGS in his weekly report was ‘Purchase of horses for the Army’:

Mr Fadden referred to the prices being paid for horses by the Department of the Army. He understood that up to £20 per head was being paid and he noted that in the CGS Report 101 an expenditure of £150,150 had been authorised for the purchase of 8,650 horses. This was greatly in excess of the market price, and he asked if the Minister would make enquiries and inform him of the position.

Percy Spender took over as Minister for the Army in the Menzies Government after the death of Geoffrey Street. After Curtin became Prime Minister, Spender was a non-government member of the Advisory War Council, and was particularly critical of the tank production program.

However many horses were required, much effort continued to be expended in trying to obtain tanks for the Army, although the best method to achieve this remained a matter for debate. On 7 January the Minister for the Army, Percy Spender, forwarded to the Prime Minister copies of minutes from the CGS and DCGS regarding the provision of tanks. The minutes covered the fundamental question of whether Australia should continue the tank production project, or whether greater pressure should be applied to the UK, the USA and Canada to supply tanks to Australia from their existing output. Spender sent the minutes on with a covering note:

I have refrained from giving a decision on these two submissions because I am in somewhat of a quandary as to what should be the future policy in regard to this question. I feel that, if Australia could be assured of obtaining its full tank requirements from the USA and Canada, the resultant release of skilled manpower and machine tool capacity for other equally important needs would be considerable.12

On 2 January, War Cabinet Agendum 358/1941 Supplement 1, ‘Orders to maintain production’ was presented to Cabinet.13 The agendum suggested policies for the provision of equipment to AIF units at home, in the islands to the north, or elsewhere overseas and to AMF units. The requirements in each case were for initial equipment and a nominated number of months’ reserve.

Richard Casey in Cairo, 30 August 1942. He was then Minister of State for the Middle East, to which post he had been appointed by Churchill. Casey had previously been Australian Minister in Washington. He is seen here with Air Chief Marshal and Lady Tedder (AWM MED0559).

The proposals, which included the provision of 1,029 AC1 tanks, were approved in Minute 1711, subject to the policy (yet to be determined) on the production of tanks in Australia.14 The minute also noted that the High Commissioner in London, Stanley Bruce, and the Minister in Washington, R.G. Casey, were to be asked to advise the War Cabinet of the results of their attempts to persuade the UK and US to supply Australia with tanks from their production stocks.

The request for information concerning tanks supplies had already been made in cablegrams sent on 17 January to Bruce in London (No. 486) and to Casey in Washington (No. 8), both of which included these two paragraphs:

Present plans provide that Australia will become a very important base for allied operations against Japan. Having regard to the vital change in the war situation, the Government is gravely concerned at the paucity of tanks in Australia for allied as well as for our own protection. Our fighting manpower is by no means unlimited, and our need for the maximum number of cruiser tanks to economise manpower and increase our powers of defence is immediate.

In the circumstances outlined, it is desired the strongest representations be made that adequate supplies of tanks be diverted to Australia at the earliest date from UK and US production. Our immediate minimum need is 775 cruiser tanks; our stock is practically nil.15

The exchange of cablegrams that followed No. 486 to London provides a very interesting insight into the strategic and supply situation, particularly in relation to Russia. Casey cabled from Washington on 22 January 1942:

I have seen Field Marshal Dill, the senior British Service representative on the Strategic Allocations Committee, and he will do all possible from this end. The large allocation of tanks from Britain and the United States to Russia is the most important individual factor in the tank allocation problem. About one third of American cruiser tank production is now going to Russia, together with a very appreciable proportion of British tank production. I suggest that in the present circumstances it is advisable to press hard for temporary diminution in the allocation of tanks to Russia, in order to allow the diversion of some American tanks to Australia.16

The Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs in London cabled Curtin on 31 January to say that, in response to Australia’s urgent requests, 275 US light or medium M3s and fifty British Matildas would be supplied to Australia from the February and March output. On 5 March better news was received from Sir Earle Page in London.17 In his cablegram (No. 2040) he said:

Tanks. Australia asked for a total of 140 Matildas. 200 have been released. 775 American cruiser tanks were requested. 905 have been released. Of the Matildas released 20 were shipped in January, 60 in February, 60 are for shipment in March and 20 for each of the succeeding months. Of cruiser tanks released ten were shipped from United States as far back as August. Twenty were shipped from the United Kingdom in January and a further 50 were to have been shipped from the United States in January. So far as I know only 15 have gone due to the American shipping position. The following were released for shipment from the United States: 125 February, 150 March, 150 April, 200 May, 200 June.18

On 12 March Curtin wrote to Spender to ask if the information in Earle Page’s cable changed the priority for local tank production. Spender attended a meeting of the Advisory War Council on 18 March at which the Minister for Munitions, Mr Makin, stated that the first locally made tank had completed its trials and could begin final production.19 Spender must have been better informed than Makin because, on 8 April, he wrote to the Commander-in Chief, General Blamey on the question of tank production.

In essence, Spender commented that, although tank production in Australia had commenced in 1940 and many promises had been made on delivery dates, none had been completed to date. In fact, only one pilot model of the AC1 had been produced. As delivery dates were still being postponed, it was unlikely that Australian-built tanks would be available to the Army for some considerable time. The Minister further stated that the last official test of the AC1 tank had been conducted on 17 January at Fishermen’s Bend and the tank had broken down. General Blamey was asked to investigate and report on whether the current tank program should remain a top priority.

General Blamey responded in a minute dated 17 April, explaining that the tank project was no longer a long-range project and was, in fact, very close to fruition. The breakdown on 17 January was of a minor nature and was no indication of unreliability or faulty design. While a number of tanks were now being delivered from overseas, their designs were rapidly becoming obsolete, while the Australian tank was of an advanced design and capable of adjustment to meet additional requirements. Summing up, General Blamey stated that he considered the Australian tank to be outstandingly successful and one that would prove to be a very potent asset.20

These views were conveyed to the Prime Minister in a letter dated 22 April 1942 and approval was sought for the Australian tank production program to be continued as a top priority. The Prime Minister concurred in a letter dated 30 April 1942.

Ottawa, May 1941. Menzies is greeted by the Prime Minister of Canada, William Mackenzie King. On the left is Major General T.W. Glasgow, Australia’s High Commissioner to Canada (AWM PO0048.144)

In the first quarter of 1942 cooperation with Canada was seriously considered. Canada had been on a war footing since 1939, and its economy was well suited to industrial production. Following Pearl Harbor, Canada immediately offered assistance to Australia and, on 17 January 1942, the Australian High Commissioner in Ottawa, Sir William Glasgow, reported in cablegram No. 16:

Canadian government is favourably disposed towards rendering assistance wherever possible in the Pacific area now that unity of the Far East Command has been established, and would consider the request for military assistance provided it came from Wavell, the Unified Commander, and not specifically from Australia or New Zealand. The Canadian government is keen to cooperate in every way.21

This cablegram was discussed by the Advisory War Council, which endorsed the recommendations of the Chiefs of Staff that the Canadian Government should be asked to establish a Canadian Army force in Australia to be used as a General Headquarters (GHQ) mobile reserve. The War Cabinet approved the recommendations on 20 January.22 On 5 February the Minister for External Affairs, H.V. Evatt, told Cabinet that he had given the Chief of Staff’s appreciation to the High Commissioner for Canada, Major General V. Odlum, for transmission to the Canadian Government.23

Glasgow went to see the Canadian Prime Minister, Mackenzie King, and wrote to Curtin on 26 March to advise him of the results of the meeting.24 Canada, he said, was ‘anxious to cooperate with our sister Dominion in every practicable way at this time of danger’, but did not feel that it was in the interests of the Allied war effort to send an expeditionary force in the form of an armoured division at this time.

Canadian help in boosting Australia’s tank strength was thus not forthcoming, but a tentative forward step was taken on 31 March when the War Cabinet debated Agendum 166/1942 ‘Conversion of AMF cavalry units’.25 Cabinet was told that the conversion of these units would take twelve months, and they sought Blamey’s views before approving the agendum.26 It is noteworthy that the time for conversion of these units is much more realistic than the time estimates for the creation of an armoured division and the production of a battle tank.

By 30 April 1942 the inventory of tanks in Australia was beginning to improve. According to Hopkins, there were sixty-nine US M3 light tanks and fifty-four US M3 mediums in the country at this time.27 The Chiefs of Staff report to the Advisory War Council on 25 April states that 210 tanks were held, of which eighty were two-man tanks diverted from the Dutch allocation.28 These were Marmon Herringtons and, although not a combat tank, they were useful for training.

In early 1942 the AC1 with its 2-pdr gun was deemed no longer competitive with the new designs of German tanks, although it was still regarded as effective against Japanese tanks and thus production would continue. To overcome the relative weakness of the AC1’s firepower, the turret would be redesigned to accept a larger gun. Whatever larger gun was chosen, it had to be available in Australia◦— the only candidate was the 25-pdr field gun.

For experimental purposes a 25-pdr was mounted in an AC1 turret and, with considerable courage, the firing officer entered the turret to fire the first round.29 This gunnery trial took place at Fort Gellibrand, Williamstown, on 29 June 1942. Even before the gunnery trial, the modified tank, named the AC3, had been ordered, with the Army requesting 400 AC3s from the Ministry for Munitions on 27 May.30

In general form, the AC3 was similar to the AC1, although the turret was slightly larger and the hull angles were modified to improve protection. To accommodate the 25-pdr in place of the 2-pdr, the coaxial Vickers machine- gun was eliminated, as was the hull machine-gun. The hull gunner was no longer needed, and the space thus vacated was used to store more of the now much more bulky ammunition. The AC3 was thus deprived of a machine-gun capability, a grave disadvantage in the eyes of any tankman.

Spender was still unhappy about tank procurement and told Blamey so in a letter dated 5 June.31 In view of the improved prospects of a supply of tanks from overseas, wrote Spender, and the fact that the amount of factory capacity allocated to local tank production was imposing a burden on railway maintenance facilities, he remained doubtful that the tank should be first priority. He noted also the consideration that increasing tank strength must involve increasing demands for tank maintenance.

A chart enclosed with the Minister’s letter indicated that, while the production forecast was for 600 tanks by July 1941 and 1,000 by December of the same year, the latest estimates forecast thirty-seven by September 1942, 100 by December, 200 by May 1943, and 330 by June 1943. General Blamey was asked to make further comment.

Spender again raised his concerns at a meeting of the Advisory War Council on 11 June. The Council was discussing its Agendum 244/1942, Report 22 (April 1942) from the Director-General of Munitions, Essington Lewis.32 Spender questioned whether the manufacture of tanks should continue in view of the heavy demands on materials, manpower and machine tools and in view of the prospective delivery of tanks from overseas. The Council decided to ask Lewis to their next meeting to discuss the problem in its entirety.33

Spender received a reply from General Blamey prior to that meeting. In a letter dated 18 June, Blamey outlined his reasons for urging the continued manufacture of the AC3.34 He described the characteristics of the tanks available to the Australian Army and commented that the US M3 light tank had been completely outmoded by experience in the Middle East. The US M3 medium also had many faults and had been superseded in the US Army by the M4 (Sherman). The M4 represented a significant improvement, but Australia had not been allotted any M4 tanks. Blamey added that the AC3 was a good design and, once it had overcome any inherent teething troubles, it would be a first class modern tank. German design was moving towards the mounting of higher muzzle velocity guns and the AC3 was capable of mounting such weapons.

El Alamein, November 1942. This Sherman M4A1 had been damaged in the battle, but was still able to move. The Sherman was the tank most commonly used by the Allies in World War II. It was reliable, but was prone to catch fire.

Blamey concluded his letter by recommending that ‘as an immediate objective we should produce enough for the initial equipment and annual wastage of one armoured brigade. This will be a total of 463 AC3s.’ Blamey was right about the obsolete M3 lights which were used six months later by the unfortunate 2/6th Armoured Regiment in the attack on Buna. His comment on the AC3 was a little optimistic: the gunnery trials with the AC3 mock-up were yet to commence.

On 9 July 1942 the Advisory War Council met to discuss the manufacture of munitions. A memorandum containing a technical description of the Australiandesigned cruiser tank and information as to planned productive capacity was circulated by the Director-General of Munitions.35

Plans for the development of the tanks’ firepower were presented by the Director-General. He referred to the initial arrangement for the provision of 2-pdr guns until the 6-pdr gun was available, and the subsequent intention to mount 25-pdr guns. It had now been decided to equip the tanks with the 3-inch 17-pdr gun which was being developed in the UK.36 The 17-pdr gun would come into production in Australia as the 25-pdr gun tailed off. This was achievable as Australian Army requirements for the 25-pdr would shortly be fully met. Production of the 6-pdr and 2-pdr guns would also be reduced.

The Director-General addressed the local manufacture of ammunition for the 17-pdr, stating that shell cases and solid and armour-piercing shot could be manufactured, although the production of propellant and primer had not been confirmed. A new turret had also been designed for the gun. The Director-General added his opinion that the Australian tank was better than the American M3 medium tank, its 17-pdr gun making it superior in firepower and speed to any other Allied tank.

Essington Lewis referred to cablegram X 456 of 5 July from the Director◦— General, Australian War Supplies Procurement, Washington, in which he advised that the US Lend-Lease authorities were temporarily delaying all new requisitions for the Australian tank program. This action was a reaction to questions raised by Mr Wasserman concerning the diversion of facilities to the production of rolling stock for the railways and tank maintenance.

The Director-General reiterated that the tank program had been approved by the US Lend-Lease Mission to Australia, by General MacArthur and by General Blamey. A firm order for 400 AC1 tanks and a temporary order for 375 AC2 tanks had been placed with the Department of Munitions. He asked for a decision on whether the program should continue.

On the same day, the War Council recommended^37 and the War Cabinet subsequently approved:38

That the tank production program previously authorised by the War Cabinet should proceed and should be completed with the utmost despatch and vigour;

That any difficulties that may arise in the provision of requirements from the United States for the tank production program should be intimated by the Director-General of Munitions to the Prime Minister, who will take up the matter with General MacArthur at the Prime Minister’s war conference;

That, if necessary, the Prime Minister should make representations to President Roosevelt.

On 15 August the Prime Minister held a War Conference to discuss future policies for the prosecution of the war and the production of munitions. One item for discussion was Agendum 8/1942, ‘Australian Tank Production’.39 This agendum was based on a letter dated 23 July from Mr Charles Denby, Leader of the US Lend-Lease Mission to Australia.40 Denby noted that objections to the Australian tank production program had been raised in Washington, and he requested that these be addressed. The objections were based on uncertainty over such issues as whether the tank program might prevent the manufacture in Australia of railroad or other urgently needed equipment. A second concern focused on whether the program of tank manufacture might prevent the proper maintenance of American tanks in Australia.

The Department of Munitions advised that the tank program would not interfere with the railway rolling stock program, adding that requirements for maintenance and production generally indicated a different class of engineering plant. Apart from component parts, advised the Department, there would not be a significant duplication of effort, either in respect of plant or types of labour.41

Other objections which were rebuffed included: the period which must elapse before satisfactory results could be achieved; the casting of the frame in one piece; the difficulty of transporting the Australian tank both within and outside Australia in view of its weight; delay in determining the power plant to be employed; the availability of M3 tanks from America making unnecessary the production of an Australian tank; and the employment of manpower on more pressing needs.42

Doubt could be cast over the veracity of the answers to some of these objections. For example, objection 10 asserted: ‘The completed production model has not yet been turned over to the army for thorough testing. There is therefore no sound basis for assuming that the tank as planned will be satisfactory in combat.’

The Department responded: ‘The completed production model will be handed over for field trials this week. Certain tests have already been carried out to the complete satisfaction of the Director, AFVs and the Chief Inspector of AFVs, both of the Department of the Army.’ The answers appear too positive for the stage reached in the project.

General MacArthur advised the Prime Minister by letter on 28 August 1942 that, as a result of the discussion at the Prime Minister’s War Conference, he was ‘most heartily in agreement with the proposal that Australia should have a tank production program.’43 He further advised that he would ‘continue to give favorable endorsement to requisitions and communications relating to the manufacture in Australia of types of tanks approved by the Australian Army and adopted by it as its standard equipment.’ The Director-General of Munitions was advised of MacArthur’s endorsement by the Prime Minister in letters dated 28 August and 5 September.

On 29 September 1942, the Director-General of Munitions submitted his Report No. 26 (August 1942) to the War Cabinet.44 The report stated that: ‘Production is continuing steadily at the Chullora tank annexe although the line is not yet complete. Present indications are that three tanks will be completed during the month of August.’ The report also noted that drawings for the Thunderbolt tank were proceeding according to schedule and that the changeover to the production of Thunderbolt tanks in NSW was expected to take place during the third week of December. This is a rare mention of the ‘Thunderbolt’ tank◦— which was, in fact, the AC3. The name is found in very few other references.

The Australian Cruiser 3 (AC3, or Thunderbolt). The tank shown mounts two 25-pdr guns, test-fired to simulate a 17-pdr. ‘Thunderbolt’ was about right! (AWM PO3498.008)

By September and October 1942 support in the USA for the Australian tank program was beginning to wane. On 30 September and 3 October the Director-General War Supplies Procurement in Washington advised that ‘the whole of the Australian tank program is being referred to the Chiefs of Staff for analysis and decision.’45

In his report to the Advisory War Council on 15 October, the CGS advised that he had heard from the London Munitions Assignment Committee that no further M3 medium tanks would be allotted to Australia.46 The Committee had enquired whether light tanks would be acceptable in lieu. The Council noted that this proposal would affect the composition of the armoured divisions and asked the CGS for more information.

During that discussion of the Director-General of Munitions Report 28 (October 1942), the CGS indicated that four AC1 tanks were undergoing Army trials, while twelve others were being completed.47 He estimated that a production rate of five tanks per week would be achieved by the end of the year. Components to sustain this rate of production would be available from the US.

In cablegram X9376 of 28 October, the Director-General, Australian War Supplies Procurement, advised that the US Department of Ordnance had recommended that the tank manufacturing program in Australia be discontinued and that Australia should fall into line with Great Britain and Canada in using tanks of a standard American design.48

The matter had been referred to the Combined Munitions Assignment Board for joint consideration with the Combined Resources and Production Board. Mr Ash stated that, if Australia agreed to manufacture the US M4 or T20 type, the US authorities would extend full cooperation and assistance in continuing existing production until the changeover date.49 However, if Australia insisted on continuing to build a tank of Australian design which differed to the M4 or T20, no further assistance would be provided by US authorities in supplying components or machine tools. Further overall requirements for finished tanks and other projects would also be affected.

In cablegram No. 9262 of 4 November, the Department of Munitions replied that the question of a change in policy would require consideration by the War Cabinet.50 Prior to this, further information would be required on whether the M4 and T20 could be manufactured in Australia.

In cablegram Yll7 of 7 November, 1942, the Director-General, Australian War Supplies Procurement, advised that, subject to certain alterations of tooling which could be effected in Australia, the machine tools already on requisition for Australian tank production would be suitable for making complete M3 tanks.51 The US authorities had advised that the M3 manufacturing plant could be easily adapted for the M4 and later the T20.

In cablegram No. 186 of 7 November, Mr Bruce advised that the President’s objective of 75,000 tanks for 1943, with UK production of 11,000, would provide sufficient tanks to equip 200 armoured divisions with 100% reserves (compared to Germany’s strength of twenty-five armoured divisions).52 The UK Minister of Production, Mr Lyttleton, was visiting Washington to promote closer coordination between production and strategy and to discuss whether such a large number of armoured divisions was required.

To the end of October 1942, 1,200 tanks had been released in the US for the Australian Army, of which 1,153 had been received. Army requirements for approved establishments were 798 for initial requirements and 670 for six months’ war wastage.

In cablegram No. SW107 of 17 November 1942, the Australian Minister in Washington was asked to approach the President for his assistance in securing Australian requirements for the tank program.53 It was pointed out that the tank program was part of Australia’s policy to provide increasing self-sufficiency and reduce reliance on overseas sources, and was intended to provide a degree of reinsurance against failure of overseas supplies.

It was also noted that General MacArthur had indicated his agreement with this policy and his intention of continuing to endorse requisitions relating to manufacture in Australia of types of tanks approved by the Australian Army and adopted as its standard equipment. The Minister was authorised to assure the President that the Prime Minister was prepared to accept in principle the proposal that the Australian tank program should produce a standard M4 type, but that in the meantime the production of the Australian cruiser tank would be continued until the changeover could be effected.

On 18 November^54 the Minister replied that he had spoken to the President, that General Sturdee, Head of the Australian Military Mission in Washington, considered that there was some chance of a favourable result being reached during the next few days, but that, if necessary, he would again broach the matter with the President.55

In cablegram No. S.190 of 10 December 1942, the Australian Minister, Washington, advised that a special committee appointed by the Munitions Assignment Board had agreed that future delivery of components from the US to Australia should be limited to the quantity required for the production of twenty tanks per month until July 1943, the matter to be reconsidered prior to that date to ascertain what, if any, additional production could be achieved.56

The Minister added that the decision was understood to mean that the delivery of components in relation to the quantity required to produce twenty per month was independent of any production which might be achieved from components or manufacturing resources already available in Australia.

In cablegram No. 213 of 15 December, Mr Bruce advised that one of the results of Lyttleton’s visit to Washington was a reduction in the US tank program for 1943 from 75,000 to 36,000.57

Armoured formations: their place in the Australian order of battle

At the end of 1941 the 1st and 2nd Armoured Brigades were in full training, but had not yet trained as a division. Their role in the Australian order of battle was contingent on that of the other Australian Army formations.

On 1 September 1941, the Australian Army comprised the AIF, all volunteers prepared to serve anywhere in the world, and the AMF, liable for service only in Australia or Australian territories.58 The largest part of the AMF was the militia, soldiers who served part-time, but who could be called up for full-time service in an emergency.

On 1 September 1941, the AIF consisted of four infantry divisions and one armoured division. The 6th, 7th and 9th Infantry Divisions were in the Middle East and, by this time, had amassed considerable battle experience. The 8th Division was in Malaya and had not yet seen action. The armoured division was still training in Australia and had practically no tanks.

The militia units of the AMF comprised four infantry divisions, the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th and two cavalry divisions, the 1st and 2nd. There were also four Commands and four Military Districts (MDs), each of which had various troops under command.59 Two further MDs were 7 MD in Darwin and 8 MD in New Guinea.

Although much thought had been given to the threat posed by Japan, the attack on Pearl Harbor had caught the Allies by surprise, particularly the USA and Australia. The Australian Government had immediately sprung into action, and the War Cabinet had convened on 8, 9, 11, and 12 December 1941 to meet the threat that was now close at hand. Cabinet Minute 1557 of 8 December outlines the steps taken, notably that Cabinet should:

• Agree that the situation should be accepted as involving a state of war against Japan;

• Review the need to send troops to Rabaul, Port Moresby, and the Netherlands East Indies;

• Obtain a proposal from the Chiefs of Staff for the immediate expansion of the AMF;

• Identify items of munition in short supply;

• Obtain from the Chiefs of Staff a comprehensive strategic appreciation of the situation that now existed.60

The next day, 9 December, the War Cabinet met again, and Minute 1558 records that the CGS described the AMF’s order of battle: ‘Currently the number of AMF troops in training or on full-time duty is 134,000. The establishment of the front line AMF is 246,000, and therefore 112,000 troops should be called up. This will achieve partial mobilisation, i.e. the figure does not include first line reinforcements and certain rearward services.’61

The CGS asked for 112,000 men but, before approving this number, Cabinet decided to wait for the more detailed appreciation requested in Minute 1557. As an immediate measure, however, Cabinet approved the recall of 25,000 men for service in the AMF for the duration of the war.

On 11 December the War Cabinet debated the defence of Australia in relation to Agendum 418/1941, ‘Defence of Australia and adjacent areas, COS [Chiefs of Saff] appreciation’,62 and in Minute 1576 recorded their approval of the call-up of 114,000 men for military duty.63 It was noted that:

a. This will provide for the mobilisation, less first reinforcements, of the fighting portion of the field army, together with adequate base and line of communication troops to maintain them.

b. A further total of 53,000 remain to be called out to complete the full scale of mobilisation, including first reinforcements.

c. This measure is considered necessary by the Chiefs of Staff in order to bring units of the Army to the highest level of training possible in the shortest time to meet external aggression.

At the same Cabinet meeting, and also related to the massive expansion of the AMF, approval was given to the call-up of Class II, ‘All men between the ages of 35 and 45 who are unmarried or widowers without children’, and Class III, ‘All men between the ages of 18 and 35 who are married or widowers with children.’64

The War Cabinet meeting on 12 December and the Advisory War Council meeting of the same date each gave further consideration to Agendum 418/1941. Both meetings recommended that the Chiefs of Staff submit a supplementary appreciation describing the best disposition of existing forces to ensure the defence of the Newcastle-Sydney-Kembla-Lithgow area; and Darwin, Port Moresby, adjacent islands and New Caledonia.

This supplementary appreciation was submitted by the Chiefs of Staff on 15 December in Agendum 418/1941, Supplement 1. This was a very comprehensive document, which recorded the strength and disposition of forces to meet a Japanese attack on mainland Australia and the Malay Barrier and the degree to which those forces were trained and equipped.

The agendum was discussed by both the Advisory War Council and the War Cabinet on 18 December, and a number of preparatory actions approved:

i. The military garrison at Moresby should be increased to a brigade group. On threat of attack the air forces should be reinforced to the capacity of the aerodrome at Moresby;

ii. The question of the reinforcement of Rabaul should be constantly reviewed in the light of the naval situation;

iii. The defence of New Caledonia should be kept under review;

iv. The retention of Suva as a fleet base is of first importance;

v. We should inform the American authorities of our intentions and the planned disposition of our forces.65

These actions strengthened the Malay Barrier, the first line of defence, with the next task to protect mainland Australia. Winston Churchill had asked whether Australia was in immediate danger of invasion in force and the Chiefs of Staff responded in Agendum 32/1942:

We consider that the danger of invasion in force will remain until we have clearly stabilised our front along the Malay Barrier, or until we have secured supremacy over the Japanese Fleet.66

They also commented on the need to strengthen the defences of mainland Australia, and said of the reinforcement of the Home Defence Forces:

We welcome the suggestion that our land forces should be reinforced by American formations, provided they come here fully equipped. We assume that such troops would be subject to the Chief of the General Staff for training and operations. Apart from the question of Australian security, Australia is an admirable base for offensive action against the Japanese in the SW Pacific area, and it is desirable that forces for this purpose should be located here as soon as possible.

The Advisory War Council approved the Chiefs of Staff statement in general, but suggested that it be modified to state that it was expected that full equipment would be provided by the US and to make the point that there were also serious deficiencies in aircraft and other equipment.67 Their approval was passed on to the War Cabinet, which approved the statement with these modifications.68

By December 1941 the armoured portion of the 1st Armoured Division, the 1st and 2nd Armoured Brigades, were in full training, although with very few AFVs in which to train. The place that armoured forces were to occupy in the Australian order of battle was considered in the middle of 1941 in War Cabinet Agendum 197/1941 ‘Prime Minister’s visit abroad, 1941: objectives of Empire strength with special reference to Australia’s effort – Army’.69

One of the sections of the agendum was ‘Future strength and organisation of the AIF’. This is an important part of the document in terms of the history of the Australian Armoured Corps. It becomes progressively more important as supplements to the original agendum are submitted for discussion, a process that lasted some months.

The original agendum was submitted in early June 1941, and implied that the Armoured Division would be sent to the Middle East when it was sufficiently trained. It would require a total of 38,000 men, which included 1,000 first reinforcements and 23,000 Corps, Army, GHQ, Base and Line of Communication troops in support. Its status in priority was ‘E’, which signified ‘requiring to be trained and formed after 1 March 1942.’70

In addition to the Armoured Division’s manpower requirements, there was also an Army Tank Brigade which required a further 3,000 men. This brigade was to be armed with heavy tanks, and to be used in direct close support of infantry.

On 13 August 1941, Supplement 1 to 197/1941 was called more specifically ‘Future establishment and organisation of the AIF’, and it advanced various proposals:

i. Maintain the existing Corps of four infantry divisions and one armoured division.

ii. Increase the establishments of the existing Corps to conform to British war establishments; this would need 7,000 more men;

iii. Form two Army Corps in the Middle East, each of two divisions made up from the three Australian divisions and the one New Zealand division. This would need additional AIF units, with an extra manpower commitment of 10,500 over and above the commitment in proposal 2;

iv. The UK War Office proposal that Australia provide 29,000 men per division towards the total requirements of 38,000, the divisions to include four infantry and one armoured; Australia would also provide an Army tank brigade;

v. Reduce the existing organisation to a Corps of two infantry divisions and one armoured division, and 8th Division as a separate formation.

On 13 August 1941, Cabinet decided that proposals 3 and 4 were beyond the country’s capacity, that the reduction proposed in 5 was not contemplated, that they would try to meet the commitment of proposal 2, but if that proved impossible, they would fall back on proposal 1.71 Cabinet also stated that the Department of the Army was to concentrate on raising the armoured portion of the Armoured Division. If necessary, the additional units could be provided overseas if the division went to the Middle East. While it remained in Australia, militia units could be used to complete the division’s organisation and training.

Supplement 2 to 197/1941 made revisions to Supplement 1, and also presented manpower figures. For the Australian Armoured Corps, the significant comment was:

The formation of the Armoured Division must be proceeded with, either for service in Australia or overseas, as armoured forces are an absolute essential under modern conditions. The provision of an Army Tank Brigade is an equally important component of the Army to ensure that our troops have reasonable armoured resources to cope with enemies equipped on a modern scale.

Supplement 2 was discussed by the War Cabinet on 4 September 1941 and, in Minute 1354,72 its members decided to defer consideration until they could do so in conjunction with a general review of manpower, authorised by Minute 1188 on 10 July.73 All necessary information had been assembled for the meeting of 17 September, and the Cabinet decision was recorded in Minute 1373:

The Army will be reorganised into: a Corps of three divisions less one brigade group, but including an Army Tank Brigade and increased establishments; 8 Division with increased establishments; armoured portion of an Armoured Division. In the event that the Armoured Division was sent to the Middle East and needed to make up the complete division with support troops, it might be necessary to reduce the infantry divisions in the Corps from three to two.74

Government House, Canberra, 24 September 1943. Labor Government after swearing-in by the Governor-General, Lord Gowrie. Seated, from left to right: Norman Makin, Jack Beasley, Ben Chifley, John Curtin, Lord Gowrie, Frank Forde, Dr Herb Evatt, Senator Collings, Senator Keane.

There is no record of a Cabinet discussion of Supplement 3, but Supplement 4 contained some clearly expressed views from General Blamey, who had just returned from the Middle East. He was particularly emphatic that disbandment or conversion of units with honourable war records would be damaging to morale. The War Cabinet, which was now under the leadership of John Curtin,75 made the following decisions at its meeting of 26 November 1941:

To complete the Armoured Division by raising new units in Australia and by re-allotment of existing non-divisional units and from reinforcements in the Middle East; to defer for the present any reduction in infantry divisions in the Middle East: Middle East commitments will be reviewed when the Armoured Division proceeds overseas.

It was noted that the additional men needed to maintain the proposed organisation, and the probable number of volunteers coming forward, would make it inevitable that the number of infantry divisions would be reduced in the course of time.76

On 24 December Supplement 5 to 197/1941, the first supplement to be submitted after the outbreak of war with Japan, was presented to Cabinet. It contained several statements relating specifically to Australian armoured forces, including:

The present situation [war with Japan] precludes the despatch of the Armoured Division to the Middle East as planned. The immediate problem is equipment, and the best that can be done at present is to equip the armoured portion of the division with carriers by March 1942. Organised on this basis, and with maintenance units being raised in Australia, the Armoured Division could form an effective mobile force to cooperate with the AMF.

It was also noted that the rate of enlistment for the AIF had increased substantially since the Japanese attack of 7 December.

Minute 1636 recorded that the program for raising and training the Armoured Division should continue, including the raising of ancillary units in Australia.77 A cable (ML 518) was sent to London for the British Government describing the actions planned for the Armoured Division, and stating that an Army Tank Brigade would now not be provided for the Middle East.

By 1 January 1942 the threat of a Japanese invasion of Australia was growing. The Government moved to ensure that defence of the country was an absolute priority. Four primary actions were taken: no military troops left for overseas; the recall of 6 and 7 Divisions was commenced, albeit somewhat hampered by the British Government’s attempts to divert them to Burma or Java; troops were promised by the Americans; and, as mentioned above, voluntary enlistment increased sharply.

For the present there were no battles for the Australian Armoured Corps to fight, although they had to be prepared to do what they could to repel a Japanese invasion. The military policy for the defence of Australia was outlined in mid-February by the CGS, General Sturdee,78 and by the GOC Home Forces, Iven Mackay.79

These very senior and experienced officers made two basic points: that forces should not be dispersed, but should remain concentrated; and that the present strength of forces in Australia was sufficient only to defend those areas deemed to be vital for national survival. Politicians such as Forde, then Minister for the Army, who clearly had his electorate at the forefront of his mind, said that all populated parts of Australia should be defended. This is military nonsense, and would have led to the piecemeal destruction of the Army had the country been invaded. Forde’s view created the myth of the Brisbane Line, which persisted for many years.80

The Advisory War Council discussed the defence of Australia on 18 March and, fortunately for the troops and for Australia, arrived at these decisions:

a. Darwin and Port Moresby should be defended to the fullest possible extent, and every endeavour should be made to provide adequate forces for so doing;

b. Movement of military forces from southern parts of Australia to northern was affirmed;

c. Forces and defences at Fremantle should be strengthened in view of its development as a naval base;

d. Continuous pressure should be exerted to build up naval and air forces to provide the strengths laid down in the Chiefs of Staff appreciation, especially for Northern Australia and New Caledonia;

e. The Navy should provide sea communications to Darwin, to ensure the maintenance of adequate supplies.81

Puckapunyal, 20 June 1942. Generals Blamey and Robertson at a review of 1 Armoured Division. Robertson, universally known as ‘Red Robbie’, was GOC of the Division at this time, and had brought it to a high level of readiness for action (AWM 025454).

During the early months of 1942 the number of troops in Australia gradually increased; the 6th and 7th Divisions returned home, Americans started to arrive and the AMF expanded significantly. The Armoured Division received its first tanks and continued to prepare for battle. On 21 February a new armoured formation, the 2nd Armoured Division, was created.82 The composition of the armoured divisions was now:

1st Armoured Division: 1st and 2nd Armoured Brigades

2nd Armoured Division: 6th Armoured Brigade and 3rd Motor Brigade

On 23 April the 2/5th Armoured Regiment received its first US M3 medium (Grant) tank and, within a few days, the regiment had received its full complement of fifty-two Grants.83 The other armoured regiments also received their tanks, and this significantly boosted the troops’ morale and added to the reality of their training.

Major General Horace (Red Robbie) Robertson had taken over command of 1 Armoured Division during April, and he now planned collective training for the whole division. This developed into a large-scale exercise in an area to the west of Narrabri, NSW. The exercise conditions were very realistic and the troops had plenty of unconfined space in which to manoeuvre all the tanks of the division.84

Field training under Robertson continued until October and resulted in a highly trained division with excellent morale, ready to fight in any theatre of war. The Sydney Morning Herald of 28 October 1942 said of the division:

It is very doubtful if [before going into action] there has ever been an Australian division fitter than this one, or prouder, or keener for action; or a division in which discipline has been crisper and the bearing of the men and officers better.85

It was indeed unfortunate that the vicissitudes of war denied the division the opportunity of battle. The Government decided, understandably and correctly, that their greatest value in 1942 was to form part of the force to defend Australia.

The structure of the Australian Armoured Corps was altered on 6 May, 17 October, and 15 November. On 6 May, the 2nd Armoured Division was renamed the 2nd Motor Division (although there is some doubt whether this happened, because by 15 November the same formation is once again the 2nd Armoured Division). Also on 6 May, the 3rd Army Tank Brigade was formed, comprising the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Army Tank Battalions. The brigade was under command 1 Armoured Division and was progressively equipped with Matilda tanks.86

On 30 June the War Cabinet discussed a proposal by General Blamey for the reorganisation of the Army.87 Blamey wanted a balanced force, adjusted to meet the flow of equipment and capable of being sustained by the population of the country, taking other demands into account. He proposed reducing the ten infantry divisions to nine, and creating three armoured divisions from the 1st Armoured Division and the 1st and 2nd Motor Divisions. The armoured divisions were to consist of one armoured brigade and one motor brigade, a lesson from British experience in the Middle East.

Between 17 October and 15 November, changes were made which resulted in the greatest expansion of the Australian Armoured Corps during the war. After 15 November, the main formations of the Corps were:

1st Armoured Division: 1st Armoured Brigade and 3rd Motor Brigade

2nd Armoured Division: 6th Armoured Brigade and 2nd Motor Brigade

3rd Armoured Division: 2nd Armoured Brigade and 1st Motor Brigade

3rd Army Tank Brigade 88

The locations of the armoured formations in the Australian order of battle also changed during the year. On 31 March 1942 General Blamey proposed that the First Army, the Second Army, III Corps, and various Military Districts should come under command of GHQ, where he was Commander-in-Chief.89 This reorganisation was approved by Cabinet on the same day. The 1st Armoured Division was now an element of the Second Army, commanded by Lieutenant General Mackay.90

By 1 May, GHQ had become Land Headquarters (LHQ) and the armoured divisions were distributed thus:

1st Motor Division in First Army

2nd Motor Division in Second Army

1st Armoured Division as LHQ reserve^91

On 19 July the state of readiness of the three divisions and the 3rd Army Tank Brigade was assessed as follows:

Formation

Readiness

% Equipment

1st Armoured Division

E

80

2nd Motor Division

D-F

45

1st Motor Division

F

55

3rd Army Tank Brigade

F

50

The readiness categories signified:

D: brigades efficient in static role, need more training as brigades and division.

E: units are trained; brigade and higher training needed.

F: unit training not yet complete.92

Throughout the entire Army, very few divisions or brigades rated higher than D. The major exception was the 7th Division of the AIF, all of whose three brigades rated A, ‘Efficient and experienced for mobile offensive operations’.

At the end of 1942 the Australian Armoured Corps and the three armoured divisions were still at the maximum strength attained on 15 November. The splitting of the brigades of the 1st Armoured Division had been particularly distressing for the troops of the division, and it was now apparent that their chances of active service were diminishing.

Yet there was still a requirement to defend Australia and, during the last weeks of 1942, the newly constituted 1st Armoured Division moved to Western Australia, and the 3rd Armoured Division to Central Queensland. The 2nd Motor Division had become the 2nd Armoured Division and remained in Melbourne and the 3rd Army Tank Brigade was at Singleton in NSW.

For the Australian Armoured Corps, 1942 had been a year of enormous effort and commensurate promise. But, as the year ended, it was becoming clear that much of that effort had been wasted and little of the promise would be fulfilled.

Manpower 1942^94

At the end of 1941 there was no manpower organisation geared to total war. There was, however, the Manpower Priorities Board, with Wallace Wurth as its Chairman, which drafted the blueprint of what was to become the Directorate of Manpower and discussed looming policy issues.

With the outbreak of war against Japan, protection of the country’s borders and territories was now a matter for urgent action rather than deliberate planning. On 11 December 1941, the War Cabinet authorised the call-up of 114,000 men for military duty.95 Some of these were already part-time soldiers in the militia, and some would come from the ranks of the unemployed. Most of them, however, would already be contributing to the war effort in munitions production, or in producing goods and services for Australian and US troops and the civilian population.

The Government realised that manpower for the services would deplete reserves of manpower available for other work of varying degrees of importance to the survival of Australia. The Manpower Priorities Board now deemed it necessary to move from a static to a dynamic manpower policy. The Board considered that:

The effect of the operation of the List of Reserved Occupations had been to conserve manpower, to withhold from enlistment or call-up for the armed forces men of skill or experience which could be used profitably in the direct war effort. In some cases these men were actually using their skill for war purposes. In other cases they were simply being held back in civilian occupations and carrying on civilian jobs. The problem was now one of labour mobilisation rather than labour conservation.96

The entry of Japan into the war prompted immediate discussion on new controls over the use of manpower. There were several points to consider:

1. An organisation would have to be made responsible for manpower administration;

2. Civilians would have to be registered;

3. The new controlling body would have the right to exempt any man from service in the forces;

4. It would be able to protect industries from unnecessary turnover of employees;

5. It would stand above the various competitors for manpower (services, munitions, rural, civilian needs, etc), and have the power to ration supplies of manpower.97

These points were incorporated into a submission that was discussed by the War Cabinet on 31 December 1941.98 The submission proposed that a Directorate of Manpower should be established to:

• Be the sole authority responsible to the Department of Labour and National Service for policy making;

• Compile and maintain a manpower register;

• Have offices throughout the country;

• Administer the List of Reserved Occupations;

• Establish a register of protected industries;

• Have power to control exemption from military service;

• Be the sole channel for engagement of labour by all employers.

The submission to Cabinet was expanded (by Supplement 1 to Agendum 446/1941) to include a draft of the Manpower Regulations, and was endorsed by Cabinet on 19 January 1942.99 The regulations were issued on 31 January.100

The first quarter of 1942 saw ever-increasing pressure on the supply of manpower and, in March, a submission was prepared for Cabinet entitled ‘Review of war commitments in the light of altered conditions’.101 On 9 April Cabinet discussed the agendum and recorded that:

A Committee consisting of the Ministers for the Army, Air, Navy and Munitions, War Organisation of Industry, and Labour and National Service, was appointed to review periodically the manpower situation, and to report to War Cabinet on any measures considered necessary. The first review on the lines suggested in the agendum is to be made as soon as possible.102

On 2 May the newly appointed Departmental Manpower Committee delivered its first report which highlighted the gravity of the manpower situation.103 The additional requirement for manpower (men and women) to the end of 1942 totalled 318,000; available reserves amounted to 130,000, producing a significant shortfall. The Committee came to the immediate conclusion that the situation could be met only by a significant increase in the employment of women on work previously regarded as the preserve of men, or by a very severe reduction in the production of goods and services for the civilian market.

Cabinet discussed the Committee’s findings and recorded on 26 May 1942 that a number of steps would be taken:

• No restriction to the expansion of the armed forces or to munitions production;

• Strength of armed forces to be adjusted to the armament available;

• Production for export to be reviewed;

• Repair and maintenance of ships and aircraft to take precedence over new construction;

• Drastic curtailment of inessential industries;

• No further call-up to the services of workers in rural industry.104

On 6 June another factor was added to the discussion on manpower for the rural industry and the War Cabinet stated that there should be a stocktaking of essential foodstuffs and the resources required to produce them.105

In August 1942 the Departmental Committee produced its second report which concluded that the provision of manpower was falling behind the schedule to meet requirements.106 In the three months April–June, the shortfall was 35,500, and the chances of reaching the target of 318,000 by the end of the year were receding rapidly. Employment in civil production had fallen by 140,000; total enlistments had absorbed 240,000 and war production 110,000. Such figures were a measure of the enormous strain on the civil sector of the economy and on the life of civilians.

The Japanese threat remained grave, and Australians generally were prepared to endure some restrictions in goods and services. However, the Committee felt that stronger measures were required, stating that:

Every new project will mean sacrificing a project already approved, and the Director-General of Manpower should have the power to direct men and women to transfer from one job to another, and should have powers of compulsory call-up of men and women.107

These and other recommendations were submitted to the War Cabinet on 31 August. Cabinet approved the submission, adding the requirement that the Committee include representatives of the armed services as members.108 The War Cabinet decisions were approved by the full Cabinet on 22 September and by the Advisory War Council on 15 October.109

By the end of 1942, the Director-General of Manpower was warning that Australia’s wartime commitments were beginning to press severely against the limits of resources.110 These commitments included all the needs of the services and the civilian population, augmented by the needs of the US troops in Australia and by the requirement to export whatever could be spared to help the Allies.

Resources were expanded by increasing working hours, by continuing to employ workers due for retirement, and by the large-scale employment of women. There was, however, an ever-growing gap between the supply and demand for labour.

It was now necessary for the government to query whether some uses of manpower were optimal for the national war effort. For the Australian Armoured Corps there were two fundamental questions. Was the manpower in armoured units providing value to national security in proportion to its size and cost? And were the resources, skilled labour, and plant and equipment devoted to the production of an Australian tank providing worthwhile results? Battleworthy tanks from the UK and the USA were now in Australia in sufficient numbers, and plenty more could be obtained.

At the beginning of 1943 the Government faced a decision over whether the investment in armoured forces and in tank production was paying off. Put simply, could the men in the Australian Armoured Corps and the workers engaged in tank production be employed in positions where their contribution to the national war effort would be of greater value?

Australian armoured operations, 1942

Divisional Cavalry Regiments

In March 1942, the 6th and 7th Divisional Cavalry Regiments left Syria to return to Australia. The 6th, equipped with carriers, went to the Northern Territory and then back to Queensland. Eventually, the 6th was converted to a commando unit, becoming the 2/6th Australian Cavalry (Commando) Regiment.111

Aleppo, Syria, November 1941. A troop of 9 Division Cavalry Regiment on manoeuvres. Each troop consisted of three British light tanks and three Bren Gun Carriers. Both vehicles were highly mobile (AWM 021103).

The 7th moved to Queensland and trained with carriers.112 In September 1942 the unit was sent to New Guinea, where it was equipped with carriers for the defence of Port Moresby. Later in 1942, due to infantry losses on the Kokoda Track and at Milne Bay, it was decided to use the cavalry regiment as infantry.

On 19 December the regiment was in action on the Sanananda Track.113 After a month’s fighting they were relieved by a US infantry battalion. By that time there were only fifty-two men left out of 420. Fifty-five had been killed, sixty-seven wounded, three died from scrub typhus, and 243 were suffering from malaria. The regiment re-formed in Queensland in February 1943 and, in March, was converted to a cavalry commando unit.

The 9th Divisional Cavalry Regiment had fought in Syria in 1941 and had moved to Palestine at the end of the campaign.114 In January 1942 they returned to Syria for patrolling duties. When the 9th Division was sent to Egypt to counter the German advances in July 1942, the Cavalry Regiment went as part of the division.

Valentines of 40 RTR at Thompson’s Post in the northern sector of the El Alamein line, October 1942. This section of the line was the domain of the 9th Australian Division (Tank Museum image).

The regiment was equipped with a variety of reasonably modern tanks. They provided two squadrons for the protection of Divisional HQ and were involved in several tank-versus-tank engagements. During the battle of Alamein in October and November, the regiment remained in divisional reserve. In January 1943 the 9th returned to Australia and was sent to North Queensland before also converting to a cavalry commando unit in December 1943.

2/6th Armoured Regiment 348

The 2/6th Armoured Regiment was the first unit of the 1st Armoured Division to see action. The Japanese had established strong defensive positions on the northern coast of New Guinea at Gona, Buna, and Sanananda. The Australian and American infantry were suffering heavy losses attempting to dislodge the Japanese and called for armoured support. Initially, carriers were used in support of the infantry, however, in an attack on 5 December 1942 the carrier force was wiped out and the infantry took heavy casualties.115 Tanks, regarded as the most effective infantry support, were then requested.

The 2/5th Armoured Regiment had been selected to be the first unit of the 1st Armoured Division to go into battle, but their Grant tanks were too heavy for the sea transport available. The 2/6th had the US M3, or Stuart, light tank, which could be landed, albeit with difficulty, on the coast of northern New Guinea.116

Four tanks from C Squadron at Port Moresby landed at Hariko and four tanks moved up from Milne Bay. The eight tanks were formed into X Squadron under the command of Captain Norman Whitehead, comprising two troops of three tanks each, one tank as Squadron HQ and one tank in reserve.117

On 18 December 1942, X Squadron supported the 2/9th Australian Infantry Battalion in an attack to the east of Buna, in an area between Cape Endaiadere and the lower reaches of Simemi Creek. Initially the tanks provided excellent support, but gradually they became bogged, bellied, or damaged by enemy action and were withdrawn from action.

The next major action was on 24 December when an attack was made along the ‘old’ Buna airstrip.118 The Japanese had dual-purpose anti-aircraft guns in their bunkers, and all four Australian tanks were knocked out, three by the Japanese guns, while the other fell into a crater.

Eleven more tanks from A Squadron left Milne Bay on 24 December and arrived in the Buna area on 26 December. On 29 December they supported an attack by the 2/10th Infantry Battalion on Giropa Point. The attack was unsuccessful and, during the course of the battle, many of the tanks became bogged in the swampy ground.

Giropa Point, Papua, 2 January 1943. Stuart tanks of 2/6 Armoured Regiment attack Japanese pillboxes in the final assault on Buna. The Stuarts provided valuable support to the infantry, but they were too fast and too lightly armoured for jungle fighting.

A further attack on 1 January 1943 succeeded in taking Giropa Point, and the tanks provided effective support where the ground permitted.119 The end of this campaign for 2/6th Armoured Regiment came on 10 January, when four tanks supported the 2/12th Infantry Battalion at Sanananda. The tanks’ only possible axis of advance was along a narrow track with swamps on either side. The tanks were forced off the track by Japanese anti-tank fire and were either knocked out, damaged, or bogged. They were unable to provide any more assistance to the infantry and the conclusion was correctly drawn that, in this area, the ground was entirely unsuitable for tanks. Further employment of armour to support infantry attacks would be useless.

Buna-Gona-Sanananda. These three settlements on the north-east coast of New Guinea were the scene of bloody battles against entrenched and fanatical Japanese between November 1942 and January 1943.

Analysis of tank actions at Buna-Sanananda.

In spite of the great gallantry and persistence of the tank crews and their commanders, the actions at Buna and Sanananda were an inauspicious start for the Australian Armoured Corps. However, the experience highlighted the difficulties of fighting in the jungle and prompt action was taken to analyse and surmount those difficulties. Some of the corrective measures set in train included:

1. Tanks: it was clear that the M3 light tank was the wrong tank for supporting infantry in close country. Lightly armoured, it was designed for speedy movement as a reconnaissance vehicle, but in support of infantry it had to move at infantry pace. Consequently, when initial surprise had been overcome it was very vulnerable to the anti-tank fire that the Japanese could assemble quite readily.

2. Going: wherever they are, tanks have to select the terrain that will allow them room to manoeuvre and thus be flexible in how they can help their infantry. Much of the terrain of New Guinea and the other islands of the Malay Barrier is difficult for tanks, but there are still many areas where they can manoeuvre. Sufficient time must be allowed for tank commanders to reconnoitre, preferably in conjunction with their infantry.

3. Communication and cooperation: systems of communication, both tank-to-tank and tank-to-infantry, must be reliable and all troops must have intensive training to make good use of the systems. Cooperation between all arms, especially tanks and infantry, requires that each understands what the other can and cannot do and under what circumstances they need support. Once again, continuous intensive training is essential.

The Australian Armoured Corps learnt a great deal from the experience of the 2/6th at Buna-Sanananda and proved far more effective in the later battles of 1943.

Chapter 6:

THE STORM RECEDES — 1943

World events in 1943

In 1943 the tide of war turned against the Germans and the Japanese in favour of the Allies. On 31 January the German Sixth Army surrendered at Stalingrad and, during January, General Kleist’s armies were forced to retreat from the Caucasus and fall back on Rostov. This significantly reduced the danger of a German advance to the northern borders of Persia and relieved pressure on the north-eastern flank of the Allies in the Middle East.

On 23 January the Japanese in the Gona-Sanananda-Buna pocket on the north coast of New Guinea were finally destroyed and the threat to Port Moresby was effectively eliminated. The Americans in the Central Pacific were gradually contracting the outside ring of Japanese conquest, but it was a slow and bloody business.

In North Africa the German boundaries of conquest were also contracting. Tripoli was captured on 29 January and the combined advances of the First Army from Tunisia and the Eighth Army from Tripolitania resulted in the destruction or capture of all German forces in North Africa, the final surrender taking place on 15 May 1943.

The liberation of the North African coast allowed the Allies to re-enter Europe with the invasion of Sicily on 10 July followed by the invasion of Italy on 3 September. Progress in Italy was slow and 1943 is characterised by slow, steady advances in Russia, Africa, Europe and the Pacific against continued dogged resistance.

One area of great danger to the Allies was the Atlantic Ocean. The Atlantic convoys were the lifeline for Britain and all the troops stationed there. According to British Admiralty records, ‘The Germans never came so near to disrupting communication between the New World and the Old as in the first twenty days of March 1943.’1 Fortunately, new tactics to protect convoys and sink U-boats were implemented in the last days of March. These had a sudden, dramatic effect and, while the threat to merchant shipping continued, the U-boats began to suffer heavy losses and the danger to the sea link gradually eased.

In the air the pendulum had also begun to swing towards the Allies, although the German counter-measures against Allied bombing were becoming progressively more effective. At the end of 1943 the Mustang fighter came into service and immediately demonstrated its value in protecting bombers on their long-range missions.

For the Australian Armoured Corps, the most significant event of the year was confirmation that its employment would be confined to the South West Pacific. The 1st Armoured Division had been developed along the lines of a British armoured division, suitable for use in open country such as the North African desert or the plains of Europe. Even in those two areas there were many places where the going was difficult.

Australian tanks were now to be used in the very close country of the Malay Barrier. This country was characterised by poor visibility, unreliable communication and precipitous terrain alternating with swamps. Armoured formations would have to develop new tactics and methods of communication if they were to be useful. They also needed the right type of tank.

Provision of tanks, 1943

At the beginning of 1943 the Australian Army had some 1,460 tanks, comprising:2

Matilda (UK infantry tank Mark II): 304

US M3 light tank (Stuart): 260

US M3 medium tank (Grant): 757

Marmon-Herrington two-man tank: 138

Australian Cruiser Mark I (AC1): 4

At this time the Australian Armoured Corps was at its peak strength, and consisted of three armoured divisions and one Army Tank Brigade. As the armoured divisions had one armoured brigade each, there were four armoured brigades requiring tanks. A total in excess of 1,400 tanks would be sufficient, but there were still reservations about the tanks listed above.3

A knocked-out Matilda, North Africa, late 1941. In early 1941 the Matilda was ‘Queen of the desert’. But later the powerful German anti-tank guns were too much for its armour, and its 2-pdr gun could do little harm to its opponents (Tank Museum Bovington, image 385/C1).

The Matilda was a good tank, but was useless against German tanks because of its 2-pdr gun. The turret was too small for a larger gun to be mounted, and the hull was not large enough to accommodate a bigger turret. Not all the 304 tanks were fit for action. Many had suffered on the sea journey to Australia and, because there were no spares for them held locally, extensive cannibalisation was necessary to convert unfit tanks into runners.

The M3 lights were reliable tanks for reconnaissance, but their light armour made them unsuitable for use as main battle tanks and for the close support of infantry where their high speed was unnecessary.

The Grants had proved themselves in action in North Africa and, at Alam Halfa on 31 August 1942, had turned back a determined thrust by Rommel.4 They had one major disadvantage, however, in that their 75mm main armament was mounted in the hull. It had very limited traverse and, in order to fire, the tank had to move forward, exposing it to enemy fire.

The Marmon Herrington two-man tank was little more than a carrier, but it was reliable and was useful for training. Many of these were destined for the Netherlands East Indies, but events of early 1942 meant that some of them were diverted to Australia (source: Paul Handel, Dust, Sand and Jungle).

The Marmon-Herringtons were mechanically sound but, as AFVs, they rated not much better than a carrier and were quite unsuitable as a weapon for armoured formations.

The Australian Cruiser 4 (AC4) mounted a 17-pdr gun on an AC3 chassis. It could have been a very powerful tank, although the turret must have been rather overwhelmed with the breech of the gun and a reasonable amount of ammunition (AWM PO3498.009).

There was a need for more and better tanks if the four tank brigades were to fight as complete formations in reasonable tank country. This need prompted the continuing development and production of the AC series, particularly the AC4 with its 17-pdr gun. On the other hand, there were several arguments against prolonging the investment of materials, skilled labour, equipment, money and time in local tank manufacture. First, it was difficult to envisage that local tanks could be proven and produced before the end of 1944. By that time the tank factories of the USA and the UK would almost certainly have produced tanks that made all the AC series obsolete.

Second, the number of tanks required was likely to fall. It seemed less and less probable that Australian tank units would be sent to fight in North Africa or Europe and the principal theatre of operations would now be the Malay Barrier. Operations at Buna and Sanananda had proven that tanks could provide valuable assistance to the infantry, but the terrain would prevent tanks being used in large numbers.

Third, pressure was mounting on the limited supply of manpower, and it was becoming vital to institute a system of priorities for its use. Questions were likely over whether investment in local tank production was giving the returns to national security that could be obtained from other projects.

Fourth, the AC series, if used in the same operations as other Allied tank forces, would need a special and additional support system of spares and repair and maintenance. This would create a burden on logistics that was considered, particularly by the Americans, to be unwarranted.5

On 2 February 1943 Spender,6 who had been Minister for the Army in the Menzies and Fadden Governments, and was now a non-government member of the Advisory War Council, referred to a report which stated that no further tanks would be imported from the USA.7 He commented that this was difficult to reconcile with the local tank production program. The CGS explained that:

There were now about 1,300 tanks in Australia. Certain United States types were not at present being made available to Australia, and there was also a shortage of spare parts. There was a great diversity in the types that had been received, many of which were at the end of the production line. A great deal of effort and considerable diversion of resources will be necessary to make many of the tanks battle-worthy. Tanks frequently arrived without prior advice of their shipment. It had been decided, therefore, to suspend further deliveries from the United States, pending availability of new types now coming into production.8

Spender noted that the Chiefs of Staff reports had given the impression that all the tanks, except the two-man tanks, could be used for operations. It now appeared that a large number had, in fact, little or no operational value and he asked whether the Council could be informed how many were fit for battle. At the Council meeting on 9 February the CGS provided the following information in reply to Spender’s request:9

The numbers of tanks received in Australia from the United States are:

326

M.3 light

502

M.3 medium (General Grant)

250

M.3 medium (General Lee)

1,078

-

With the exception of the General Lee type, all of these tanks were operationally efficient. When tanks of the General Lee type were despatched, Army was informed that a large number of modifications would be necessary to bring the tanks up to the standard of the General Grant type. To make them battle-worthy, 16 modifications would have to be made, but it was decided to reduce the number of modifications to 9, as General Lee tanks would not be sent overseas. This type had proved very useful for training purposes in Australia.10

Requirements of tanks for service with units, i.e., initial equipment, were approximately 500. Provision for wastage was at the rate of 160% per annum and in addition, 100% reserves for each type were to be held. Local production of tanks was necessary to assist in providing these requirements. The light tank will ultimately be discarded.

The Australian tank was better than the General Grant tank and incorporated many of the features of the United States M4 type.11 The main components for the American and Australian tanks were interchangeable. Twenty-five Australian tanks had been delivered to the Army and 25 were on the production line. Present production averaged 9 per fortnight, and this would be increased to 20 per fortnight in June.12

It was probable that additional General Grant tanks could be obtained but this type was now at the end of the production line. Further, the Army was unable to handle any more tanks at present in view of maintenance difficulties. There was no prospect of obtaining the latest M4 type from the United States for some time in view of demands for other theatres, whereas local manufacture would enable up-to-date types to be available immediately. Local manufacture was also important from the aspect of providing facilities for the servicing of tanks.

The suspension of the importation of tanks was only a temporary phase. The Commander-in-Chief, Australian Military Forces, had investigated the matter and was satisfied with the position.

The interchange between Spender and the CGS brings into focus the personal opinion, knowledge, experience and ambition of the main players in any debate on matters of government. Many statements are not based on proven facts, and some of the responses are glib.

The parties concerned with tank production in Australia included the Department of Munitions, the Army, the Manpower Directorate, and the US Lend-Lease Administration. It was this last body that sent an arbiter, Colonel G.A. Green, charged with finalising all Australian tank needs from July 1943 onwards.13 His mission was highly unwelcome to Munitions, who protested that the investigation should have waited until the new models of local tanks, the AC3 and AC4, were in production.

Green came notwithstanding.14 He was well briefed and thorough in his analysis. He held a key discussion with Lewis in the presence of Blamey and even Code, the technical enthusiast for the Australian tank, conceded that Green’s report was fair and impartial. The report was dated 17 May 1943 and formed Appendix C of War Cabinet Agendum 299/1943.15

Green’s foreword outlined his main theme, that his criticism of Australia’s tank programme is directed primarily at the policy which has been adopted rather than its method of execution. Prior to 1940 Australia did not possess an Armoured Fighting Vehicle industry and its tank background was nil; consequently it was manifestly impossible to expect production of battleworthy tanks in sufficient time to meet an imminent invasion; furthermore technical difficulties which must inevitably be encountered in production of tanks were not sufficiently realised and an adequate test programme was not envisaged.16

He pointed out that, at the time of his review in May 1943, Australia was attempting to produce three tanks:

• AC1 with 2-pdr gun: 65 had been ordered, 58 had been produced, 35 delivered; six were in use, three for testing and three for training. None were available for issue to field units owing to modifications which had not been finalised. This type was judged to be obsolescent because of its 2-pdr gun.

• AC3 with 25-pdr gun: 200 had been ordered and one pilot model produced, which was being tested. It was complete except for the power traverse mechanism of the turret. It was estimated that it would be six months before this model would be clear for production. 146 hulls and 106 turrets had been cast, and total expenditure was £4,700,000.

• AC4 with 17-pdr gun: drawings for this tank were not complete and would not be finished for about three months.17

Green noted several weaknesses in the AC1 and expressed his belief that it was a tank unsuited to combat. This view was endorsed by General Northcott, who wrote to Essington Lewis on 12 April to say that the Army could not accept any more AC1s until a long list of faults had been corrected.18 These included unreliable traverse tyres, inadequate engine cooling and ventilation and an unacceptable radio installation. Green also noted these and other faults, but praised some elements of the work that had been done, such as the casting of the hull, the excellent design of the gun-mounting and the tank’s low profile.

He recommended that work on all AC series tanks should cease except for a minimal program to prove the design of the AC4. In addition, a nucleus of productive capacity should be established for possible expansion in an emergency. Green’s view was endorsed by Blamey at a meeting on 7 May and the combination of Green’s factual report and the withdrawal of Army support sounded the local tank production program’s death knell.19

In a cablegram of 8 July from London, Dr Evatt advised that the London Munitions Assignment Board had suggested the allocation of 310 of the US M4s (Shermans) to Australia.20 The Sherman was the predominant medium tank being introduced into the American and British armies and Evatt considered that it should also become Australia’s standard medium tank.

The Minister for the Army, Forde, then presented Agendum 299/1943, which advocated the cessation of local tank manufacture, to the War Cabinet. On 15 July 1943, the War Cabinet considered that agendum and also Agendum 317/1943, which referred to the report to the Defence Committee on tank production furnished by the Services and Munitions Programme Review Subcommittee.21 This report was opposed to continued production. The War Cabinet decided:

In view of the information set out in the Agenda Nos. 299 and 317/1943, War Cabinet agreed in principle to the cessation of the tank production program.

Approval was given to the recommendation submitted in paragraph 12(d) of the agendum for the placing of orders for the supply under Lend Lease of 310 US M4 (Sherman) tanks of an estimated value of approximately £10,850,000.

The foregoing is subject to the agreement of the Commander-in-Chief, Southwest Pacific Area, and the receipt of satisfactory assurances from the London Munitions Assignment Board that Australia’s requirements of Sherman or later model tank can be supplied from overseas. The matter is then to be submitted to the Advisory War Council.22

On 5 August 1943, in accordance with the decision of the War Cabinet, a communication was sent to General MacArthur by the Prime Minister.23 On 7 August the Secretary of the Department of the Army advised that the London Munitions Assignment Board had anticipated no difficulty in the allocation of 310 Sherman tanks for Australia, provided the type ordered was available.24 The M4A1 was considered the most suitable for Australian conditions and the Army representatives in both London and Washington advised that this type was the most readily available.

Sydney, 7 June 1943. General MacArthur, Commander-in-Chief Allied Forces, South West Pacific Area, is welcomed by Prime Minister Curtin at Sydney airport. The two established a good working relationship, although MacArthur tended to ignore the Australian Army (AWM 052513).

On 14 August, General MacArthur told the Prime Minister that he believed the War Cabinet had acted wisely in approving the cessation of local tank production, and that he was sure there would be no difficulty in filling future tank requirements from overseas.25 General MacArthur said that he would be glad to approve the Australian Army requisitions for Sherman tanks and to assign them appropriate priorities.

On 26 August 1943, the Secretary of the Ministry of Munitions forwarded a copy of a memorandum from the Director-General.26 In this he recommended that all the activities of the AFV Directorate beyond those necessary to maintain the current requirements of the Army should be terminated; he also raised the question of disposal of products and components which had been acquired or were being manufactured. He suggested that tanks almost completed or well on the way to completion should be produced. Tanks which had reached the halfway stage or less should be scrapped unless their components could be used elsewhere or as replacement parts or even returned to the USA.

The Minister for Munitions agreed with the recommendations of the Director-General. The Secretary of the Department of Munitions confirmed that the plan for disposal of products and components was appropriate and he was tasked with approaching the Department of the Army on 6 September.27 On 11 October, the Army responded that these matters would be made the subject of an agendum for consideration by the War Cabinet. On 14 October the Advisory War Council approved the cessation of the local tank production program and the placing of an order for 310 Sherman tanks.28

The final nail in the coffin of Australian tank production came on 4 February 1944 when the War Cabinet recorded:

In view of the decision in Minute 2979 relative to the cessation of tank production, and the Army proposals now submitted in respect of Australian tanks and components, the War Cabinet assumes that work on tank production in the Munitions Department has ceased.29

Evaluation of the Australian tank production program

While there had been a few tank enthusiasts in the Australian Army prior to 1939, Army’s High Command had displayed little interest. The outbreak of war prompted some consideration that tanks might be useful and, on 18 October 1939, the CGS, Lieutenant General Squires, had asked the Master-General of the Ordnance to embark on the design of a tank for the Army. It was to be a light cruiser and a pilot model was to be produced and trialled.

The request also included an outline specification that contained sufficient information for the Master-General of the Ordnance to commence work. No reply appears to have been received to the request, probably because of the pressures from numerous other items of war material and there appears to have no follow-up from the CGS.

The first real interest shown by the Government was sparked by the stunning success of German armour in the conquest of France in May and June 1940. On 24 June 1940 the Minister for the Army, Geoffrey Street, submitted Agendum 150/1940 ‘Production orders for AFVs’ to the War Cabinet.30 His proposals were approved on 2 July with the statement that: ‘Approval is given to place orders for 859 cruiser tanks and 2,012 universal carriers.’31 It was not clear whether the tanks were to be procured from overseas or manufactured locally. It was obviously impossible for the British to release any of their desperately needed tanks and no arrangement had been made for supply from the USA. Thus the only option for the Australian Army and industry was to build tanks locally.

Plans for local manufacture matured slowly. Between September and December 1940 a user specification was formulated and technical assistance was secured in the person of Colonel Watson, a British tank design expert. From this point local tank manufacture became a serious business, well supported by enthusiastic design and production staff.

In May 1943, almost three years after the start of the tank program, no tanks had been produced that were fit for issue to field units. The AC1 was judged to be obsolescent, the AC3 program had produced one pilot model and the AC4 was still being designed. There were several reasons for terminating the program, the first of which was that the Army already had a surplus of tanks. Some of these were not exactly what the Army wanted, but later models and more tanks could readily reach Australia from overseas. In any event, the tanks from the local program did not meet the Army’s requirements. Second, Australia’s war situation had changed and the need for tanks in large numbers had disappeared. Third, other needs for manpower, materials and equipment were far more urgent than local tank manufacture. Butlin adds a final analysis of the tank program:

These facts made it absolutely clear that in the national interest the only logical conclusion was to terminate the tank program. But those who had committed themselves to the program were not easily convinced. Jensen, the Secretary of the Munitions Department, had a lifetime’s devotion to building up Australian munitions production;32 Code, with his personal commitment to solving the problems of a demanding production project;33 the Army hoping, despite disappointments, for a usable tank so long as imports continued to be difficult; technical men fired with a desire to solve technical problems; and many who (apart from Jensen’s vision of a post-war munitions industry) could foresee the industrial base for long-term use which was being forged; all were insensitive to the competing demands of other urgent needs.

These men held sincere convictions and enthusiasms which could only be overcome by overwhelming evidence, and that evidence was not available until, as 1942 proved, the unpromising prospects for a battleworthy Australian tank, the availability of imports, the change in the war situation, and the over-commitment of the Australian economy emerged and could not be denied. Acceptance of all these made abandonment of the programme inescapable, but it was only the clear determination of the Americans to deny to the programme all future support, and their insistence on Green’s investigation (which brought all these issues into sharp focus) that belatedly brought the project to an end. In equipment, knowhow and training of labour, its contribution to post-war industrial development was significant, but as a war measure it was disastrously wasteful and was persisted in far too long.34

Armoured formations and the Australian Order of Battle, 1943

In late 1942, the War Cabinet asked the Chiefs of Staff for an appreciation on the defence of Australia, addressing one important question: ‘What is the minimum strength of the forces needed to ensure the defence of vital areas on the mainland of Australia to meet all possible contingencies of the strategical situation?’35 The appreciation was submitted as Agendum 404/1942, and made these observations:

The Chiefs of Staff consider that to counter all possible Japanese moves, including the diversion of forces to attack the Northern Territory or Western Australia, our forces should continue as at present to carry out offensive operations with limited objectives. These operations would have the object of clearing the enemy out of bases now in his occupation, from which he can launch attacks against Australia and interfere with our lines of communication.

In planning to defend the vital areas of Australia, Cabinet desires us to take into account all possible contingencies. We are to regard what is possible rather than what we consider likely. We must therefore assume that the Naval and Air Forces are unable to prevent an invasion of Australia at any point chosen by the enemy, and that accordingly it is necessary to dispose forces on the mainland in strengths adequate to resist invasion in the areas likely to be attacked. To do this it is estimated that an Air Force of 71 squadrons (including 11 transport squadrons) and an army of 25 divisions would be required.36

In the agendum, the Chiefs of Staff also noted that in New Guinea there were two infantry divisions (the 6th and 7th), three brigade groups, and one US division. It was not possible to send more Australian forces to New Guinea owing to the dangerously depleted forces available to defend the mainland. Those forces consisted of six infantry divisions, three light armoured divisions in the process of formation, and one US division. It is interesting to note that the force of twenty-five divisions was never mentioned again. Militarily it was a realistic figure, but it must have made the politicians realise that there were limits to what they could promise the people in remote areas of Australia.

The fighting in New Guinea from September 1942 to January 1943 had taught the Army many lessons including the fact that the standard infantry division was heavier than was appropriate for jungle fighting and that, even in jungle terrain, tanks could provide useful support to the infantry.

The CGS reported to the Advisory War Council on 25 January 1943 that:

Experience of jungle fighting in New Guinea had resulted in a decision to organise the 5th, 6th, 7th, and 11th Australian divisions specially as ‘Jungle Divisions’. The new organisation would cut down requirements of artillery, transport, machine-gun carriers, etc, and would make the formations lighter and more flexible. Provision was made for the use of lighter artillery, which could be transported by air.37

The tank actions at Buna and Sanananda in December 1942 and January 1943 had shown that tanks could provide valuable support, but there needed to be close integration of armoured and infantry operations. Each arm had to understand what the other could and could not do. It was also quite clear that the US M3 light tank was not the right tank for the jungle and was not geared for close support of infantry.

The Army decided that a formation was required specifically to provide armoured support for Australian forces operating against the Japanese in New Guinea and the islands and, on 16 February 1943, the 4th Armoured Brigade was formed for this purpose.38 Initially it was allotted the 1st Army Tank Battalion (Matildas), the 2/6th Armoured Regiment, which had returned from New Guinea where it had used M3 light tanks, and the 2/9th Armoured Regiment, equipped entirely with M3 medium tanks (General Grant).

North Nerang, Queensland, 21 July 1944. General Blamey visits 4 Armoured Brigade, commanded by Brigadier Denzil Macarthur Onslow (numbered 3 on jacket), who had previously commanded A Squadron of 6 Division Cavalry Regiment at Bardia and beyond. Macarthur Onslow was a courageous and effective leader of armoured troops (AWM 068104).

The new 4th Armoured Brigade contained its proper proportion of engineers, signals and services. Its headquarters were formed from HQ 6th Armoured Brigade which was no longer required with the disbanding of the 2nd Motor Division. Brigadier Macarthur-Onslow was appointed commander and the brigade concentrated at Singleton on 10 March 1943.

In pursuing its task, the 4th Armoured Brigade developed an organisation of completely self-supporting regimental groups. In fact, it became in part an armoured pool from which units and even sub-units could be provided to form the armoured components of task forces set up for various operations including amphibious landings.

The brigade also had an important training function and provided policy direction and supervision as well as technical advice to the commanders of the formations engaged in operations. It undertook development and training in connection with various types of specialised equipment such as tank-dozers, flame-throwers (Frog), mortar tanks (Hedgehog), bridge-laying tanks and amphibious tanks. These were all developed for use in the tropics and organised for tactical employment by the brigade.

Southport, Queensland, 13 January 1944. The 4th Armoured Brigade developed a number of specialised AFVs, of which the flame-throwing Matilda, or Frog, was one. The flame-throwing fuel (FTF) was held within the tank, which made it much more manoeuvrable than the Churchill Crocodile, whose FTF was in a towed two-wheel trailer (AWM 063057).

In February 1943, the same month as 4th Armoured Brigade was formed, the 2nd Armoured Division was disbanded.39 It was very unlikely that it would be required for overseas service of the type for which it had been designed and pressures on manpower were mounting. By March the Australian order of battle had become:

Mainland Australia

First Army: 3rd Armoured Division, 4th Division

II Corps: 6th Division (16th and 30 Brigades), 7th Division, 9th Division

Second Army: 1st Division, 3rd Army Tank Brigade

III Corps: 1st Armoured Division, 2nd Division

NT Force: 12th Division

Reserve: 3rd Brigade, 4th Armoured Brigade

New Guinea Force

3rd Division (17th Brigade)

11th Division (7th and 15th Brigades)

5th Division (4th and 29th Brigades)40

General Blamey, Commander-in-Chief of the AMF, planned to reorganise his forces so as to maintain an effective striking force for offensive operations, noting the commitment to defend the Australian mainland and Australian New Guinea.41 Cabinet requested that the Commander-in-Chief’s plans for reorganisation of the AMF, with particular reference to the strength for New Guinea, be submitted as soon as possible.42

The task of reorganisation was carried out rapidly, and General Blamey’s plan was submitted to Cabinet by the Minister for the Army as Supplement 1 to Agendum 106/1943 on 12 April 1943. It is an important document, illustrating the proposed disposition of forces, including all armoured formations then in existence. The greater part of the text of Supplement 1 is reproduced below:

Agendum 106/1943, Supplement 1, Re-organisation of the AMF

This agendum submits the Commander-in-Chief’s views in accordance with the directions of War Cabinet Minute No. 2715.

i. Since returning from New Guinea, the Commander-in-Chief has put into effect progressive plans for the reorganisation of the AMF based on

a. recent experiences under tropical conditions;

b. the need for reducing the Order of Battle in view of the high wastage rate and low intake of manpower into the Army.

ii. Any re-organisation is limited, however, by the need to

a. prepare a force of three Infantry Divisions (with ancillary units) for offensive operations in accordance with the plans of the Commander-in-Chiefs Southwest Pacific Area;

b. maintain adequate additional forces to defend our territories in Australian New Guinea and the mainland, and provide a reserve of units for relieving units in New Guinea.

The total minimum requirement for (a) and (b) above has been assessed as the equivalent of nine Infantry Divisions, two Armoured Divisions, one Armoured Brigade, one Army Tank Brigade, and proportionate nondivisional Base and Line of Communication Units; three of the Infantry Divisions with ancillary units are required for New Guinea.

iii. This requirement insofar as the defence of Australia is concerned is based on the altered strategic situation since the submission of the Commander-in-Chief’s last appreciation in September, 1942, when Japanese Naval and Army units were concentrated in great strength in the Southwest Pacific, and the position was one of extreme gravity.

Since then the recent successful campaigns in the Solomons and New Guinea areas, and the effectiveness of air attack on Japanese invasion convoys, have improved our position considerably by forcing the enemy front farther to the north, and by allowing us to seize the initiative. This has not removed the danger of invasion, since the enemy’s reaction has been to increase his land and air forces to a very great degree. It is obvious that he does not intend to accept his defeat without a great effort to wrest the initiative back from us.

In these conditions it is a justifiable and indeed an unavoidable risk to weaken our defensive forces in areas most remote from the enemy, and to concentrate such forces in areas in which they are most likely to be required. With this in view the forces in Australia are now in course of being disposed as follows:

Queensland: Torres Strait Force (approximately one Battalion group); one armoured division; brigades in movement to and from New Guinea; and the offensive force of three divisions and ancillary units en route to or in training in the Atherton area.

Darwin: One Infantry Division and ancillary units.

Western Australia: One Infantry Division, one Armoured Division and ancillaries.

New South Wales: One Infantry Division and ancillary units, one Armoured Brigade and one Army Tank Brigade.

Other States: Miscellaneous units but no field formations.

iv. The allocation of three Infantry Divisions for the defence of New Guinea is based on the need for holding areas of strategic importance and the provision of a small force for reinforcing such areas or other points that may be threatened. The areas in question are Milne Bay, Goodenough Island, which requires a minimum of one Division, Buna which requires another division, Wau which requires a minimum of two brigades, and Moresby, for which there remains one Brigade as a general reserve and for its own defence. As will be seen, three divisions are considered to be the barest minimum, and it should be noted that the reserve is only sufficient for the general area mentioned.

v. In addition to the AMF formations, arrangements have been made to retain 158 U.S. Regiment for garrison duties in New Guinea, whilst the remainder of the U.S. Forces in Australia are being trained as a Task Force for special operations,

vi. In view of increased Japanese interest in the Arafura Sea area, the garrison at Merauke is being increased from one Battalion Group to a Brigade Group less a Battalion. Any serious Japanese threat in the direction of Merauke would have to be met from the force being prepared in Australia for future offensive operations.

vii. In view of the total requirements referred to above, up to now it has been possible to disband only the 2nd Motorised Division.43 Further reductions are being effected by:

a. disbanding ancillary units;

b. reducing the Headquarters of Lines of Communications and Line of Communication Units

c. replacing AMF by Volunteer Defence Corps personnel in static defences (i.e. Anti-Aircraft and Coast Artillery).

The extent of the above-mentioned reductions cannot be stated at present because they are being carried out progressively as each component of the Army is reviewed. It is quite clear, however, that the ultimate reduction in the Order of Battle as a result of these measures will not exceed 20,000 at the most, and that either the intake into the Army will have to be increased or further field formations must be disbanded.

viii. On present indications there will be a deficiency of 55,000 in personnel required for the initial manning of units in the reduced Order of Battle and the provision of a reinforcements pool. In addition, the present intake of manpower into the Army is insufficient to make up wastage once operations recommence. The monthly wastage rate based on the proposed reduced Order of Battle is 11,900, whereas the monthly intake is now 4,000 only, and is gradually decreasing.

ix. In view of the circumstances outlined in the preceding subparagraphs the Commander-in-Chief considers that:

a. further releases of manpower from industry should be sought to make up any deficiency which exists in the numbers required for the reduced Order of Battle, reinforcement pool, and adequate reinforcements for the force on re-commencement of operations;

b. If the releases from manpower to the extent required cannot be made, and it becomes necessary to disband further field formations, then the force being prepared for offensive operations should be reduced by one infantry division (with ancillary units). The reason for this is that the Australian New Guinea and mainland defensive component has been reduced to the barest minimum.

On 30 April 1943, the War Cabinet discussed General Blamey’s proposed reorganisation of the Army, and decided:

This report is to be referred to the Defence Committee to review the strengths of the three Services that can be maintained. The Committee will take into account the advice of the War Commitments Committee that 10,000 persons per month is the maximum available for the Services and munitions production together. This will allow the defence Committee to correlate munitions production with the Services requirements for munitions.

If it appears necessary to disband additional formations, the Minister for Defence will discuss with the C-in-C South West Pacific Area the effect of reducing the Australian force preparing for offensive action by one division.44

The Defence Committee acted as required by Cabinet and, on 6 May, submitted its report^45 which concluded that:

i. The Navy’s monthly requirement for 500 personnel should be met;

ii. Army and Air Force should submit statements showing how their Orders of Battle would be affected by progressive reductions of personnel intake by 1,000 per month. The Army intake would drop by decrements of 1,000 from 11,000 to 4,000.

iii. Munitions and Allied Works Council should provide information showing the minimum monthly intake to carry out existing programs; and the effects of reducing that minimum intake by various (unspecified) lower rates.46

On 15 July the War Cabinet held a meeting at which several matters relating to the organisation of the Army were discussed. The Defence Committee’s report of 6 May was submitted as part of Agendum 272/1943, ‘Review of personnel programs for the Services – allocation of manpower between the Services and Production Departments’.47 Cabinet made decisions under thirteen headings, the most significant of which were:

• 10,000 males and 4,000 females per month should be allocated between the Services, Munitions, and Works Council on a temporary basis, the allocation being reviewed and reported on monthly;

• The Army force being prepared for offensive operations should not be reduced by one division;

• Certain items should be placed in a category of ‘absolute priority’ in respect of allocation of manpower, notably the repair and maintenance of naval craft needed for amphibious operations, and the establishment of repair and maintenance facilities for operational aircraft of the Allied Air Forces;

• Consideration be given to increasing available manpower in Australia by employing prisoners of war, by allowing further dilution of skilled labour, and by working longer hours.48

The second major item for discussion on 15 July was Agendum 311/1943, ‘The Australian War Effort’. Cabinet adopted the agendum’s recommendations for the principles which should govern the nature and extent of Australia’s war effort, which were:

The nature and extent of the Government’s war effort will primarily be governed by the Commander-in-Chief’s strategical plan of operations as approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and as related to the global strategy laid down by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

The nature and extent of the Commonwealth’s war effort should be within its physical capacity to fulfil, within the required time, and taking into account the commitments already approved or subsequently entered into.

The primary consideration in every proposal is how it makes the maximum contribution to the Australian war effort in the South West Pacific Area. The only exceptions are those contributions which can be peculiarly made by Australia to the effort of the United Nations in another theatre, e.g. supply of foodstuffs to Britain.

‘Maximum contribution’ means the raising of forces or the provision of resources, supplies or services which can best be done by Australia to assist the military effort of the United Nations in SWPA. Whilst the development of resources for new construction or manufacture may be necessary as a basis on which to establish the provision of repair and maintenance facilities and services, repair and maintenance will take priority over new construction and manufacture, except as may be required for vital items in short supply.

Long-term projects which may only offer a problematical contribution to the war effort, yet absorb manpower and production resources, will not as a rule be adopted unless: recommended by the C-in-C SWPA; approved by the War Cabinet because they may create important production resources for post-war; satisfactory supply cannot be obtained from overseas. Otherwise, long-term projects may entail large capital expenditure on assets which will either have to be disposed of as unproductive, or may create excess capacity which the Government may not be able to fill with orders for war materiel.49

The War Cabinet’s decisions regarding both policy and action had an immediate effect on the Australian Armoured Corps. On 16 July instructions were issued for the conversion of the 3rd Tank Brigade into two tank battalion groups.50 On 31 August the Australian Armoured Corps comprised:

1 Armoured Division: 1 Armoured Brigade; 3 Motor Brigade

3 Armoured Division: 2 Armoured Brigade

4 Armoured Brigade: 1 Tank Battalion, 2/6, 2/8, 2/9 Armoured Regiments

2 Tank Battalion Group

3 Tank Battalion Group

The battalion ‘group’ was structured to be more or less self-contained and, in addition to the basic tank battalion, would typically include: a Light Aid Detachment (LAD); signal maintenance troop; troop of engineers; platoon of the Service Corps; section of the Light Field Ambulance; detachment of the Brigade Ordnance Field Park; and a section from the Armoured Brigade Workshops.51 It could thus operate independently. All the different units in the group would develop an understanding of the ways in which they could provide mutual support.

Another experimental AFV developed by 4 Armoured Brigade was a Grant tank fitted with a wading kit which enabled it to cross rivers and streams (AWM 063073).

Further reductions became necessary and, on 24 September 1943, the 1st Armoured Division was disbanded. The 3rd Motor Brigade and the Divisional Armoured Car Regiment were allotted to the 2nd Infantry Division. The 1st Armoured Brigade became an independent brigade.

On 19 October 1943, the 3rd Armoured Division was disbanded and the Armoured Corps order of battle was now:

1 Armoured Brigade Group, stationed in Western Australia

2/1 Armoured Brigade Reconnaissance Squadron

2/5 Armoured Regiment

2/7 Armoured Regiment

2/10 Armoured Regiment

4 Armoured Brigade, in Queensland, training for jungle operations

2/6 Armoured Regiment

2/9 Armoured Regiment

2/4 Armoured Regiment

New Guinea Force

2/8 Armoured Regiment, at Port Moresby

1 Tank Battalion, under command 9 Infantry Division^52

On 11 November the Prime Minister informed the Advisory War Council that a comprehensive review of the manpower situation had been sent to General MacArthur.53 MacArthur’s assistance was sought in giving effect to the changes in the Australian order of battle in so far as his cooperation (as Commander-in-Chief SWPA) was required.

On 8 December Curtin told the Council that he had discussed the decisions of the Government relating to the Australian war effort with MacArthur.54 MacArthur had expressed his appreciation for the assistance he had received from the Australian Government, services and people generally. He said that it was entirely a matter for the Australian Government to decide the nature and extent of its war effort. He expressed his full agreement with the general principles laid down.

The fortunes of the Australian Armoured Corps declined drastically during 1943. At the beginning of the year it consisted of three armoured divisions and two armoured brigades; by the end of the year it had been reduced to two armoured brigades. There were two principal reasons for the change: the altered strategic situation, in which the Australian Army was likely to fight only in the jungle terrain of the Malay Barrier and beyond; and the mounting pressure on the limited supply of manpower.

The Buna-Sanananda campaign had shown that tanks had the potential to save many infantry soldiers’ lives, but also that in most battles only small numbers of tanks could be profitably used. It made sense to have an armoured formation designed specifically for jungle warfare, and this was accomplished in February 1943 by the establishment of the 4th Armoured Brigade. There was also a need to replace the M3 lights with a more appropriate tank and the Matilda was an excellent choice.

Morowa, Western Australia, 13 February 1943. Grant tanks of 1 Armoured Division are delivered by transporters. The last remaining units of the Division, still in WA, were disbanded in September 1944 (AWM 029132).

Units of the 4th Armoured Brigade were in action in late 1943 while the 1st Armoured Brigade remained in Western Australia until it was disbanded in September 1944. The 4th Armoured Brigade was the sole unit to carry the Armoured Corps banner into action from late 1943 to the end of the war.

Manpower 1943

In Agendum 327, approved by the full Cabinet on 22 September 1942, the probability of delay in fulfilling the manpower requirements of the 1942 war program was highlighted and provision made for a review of the implications of this delay to be undertaken by a Special War Commitments Committee. This Committee met on 6 January 1943, with the Prime Minister in the chair.

The Committee was provided with a document, ‘The manpower situation at the beginning of 1943’.55 Dominating the whole of the manpower problem was a simple set of statistics.56 The nation’s commitments would require for each month, January to June 1943, 35,000 persons; the maximum number available was 10,000 a month. The mathematics were unambiguous: Australia’s commitments could not be fully discharged and the attempt to meet all might imperil the most vital.

The Committee recommended to the Government that:

• The Defence Committee should immediately review present plans for the expansion of the services and of war production, given the availability of manpower to carry out the program;

• A Manpower Commission to be set up by Act of Parliament with the power to procure and direct the transfer of manpower;

• The Director-General of Manpower to transfer skilled labour to the Army and to shipbuilding;

• Endorsement for more effective action against absenteeism and for discipline in protected establishments.57

The Minister for War Organisation of Industry, Dedman, agreed to these recommendations and presented them to the War Cabinet on 22 January 1943. They were discussed on 30 January and Cabinet made several decisions, of which the most significant was: ‘The review of war production programs already in hand by the Defence Committee to be expedited, and the plans for expansion of the Services on which these are based are to be examined simultaneously.’58 The other recommendations were agreed, except that regarding the Manpower Commission, which was discreetly abandoned.59

The Defence Committee was evidently not as expeditious as Cabinet would have liked. On 23 March Cabinet discussed Agendum 99/1943 and Supplement 1 to that agendum, ‘Assignment of Australian production of army weapons and ammunition, April and May 1943’.60 In Minute 2714, the War Cabinet vented its displeasure in no uncertain terms, particularly with the performance of the Defence Committee and the Department of the Army.61 Cabinet’s conclusions, summarising a four-page minute, were:

The War Cabinet desires to make it quite clear that the main initiative rests with the Defence Committee and the Service Departments in determining the minimum requirements of the manpower and production capacity for the material and personnel objectives of their revised programs. The first step in the re-assessment of these needs is governed by the speed with which they handle the review of their programs. In view of the vital importance of the manpower situation as represented to the Government by the Service and Munitions Departments, and the Government’s knowledge of the critical position in essential civil industries such as rural production, the War Cabinet directs:

i. That this work be completed by Service Departments and the Defence Committee with the utmost expedition;

ii. That the program be dealt with piece-meal if possible, or by items on which production objectives have been reached or are in view;

iii. That the personal attention of the C-in-C, Australian Military Forces, be again drawn to the delay that has arisen, the present position, and the views of the Government thereon;

iv. The Defence Committee and the Department of the Army are to be informed of the grave view which the Government takes of the handling of this matter, in view of the strong representations previously made by the Government.

On the same day, Cabinet reinforced the message to the Commander-in-Chief, and Minute 2715 records that: ‘the C-in-C’s views regarding the reorganisation of the AMF, with special reference to the strength for New Guinea, are to be submitted to the War Cabinet as soon as possible.’62

Blamey had responded to the messages of Minutes 2714 and 2715 on 12 April, his proposal for the reorganisation of the AMF submitted as Supplement 1 to Agendum 106/1943.63 He recognised that his requirements demonstrated a deficiency of 55,000 in personnel required for the initial manning of units in the reduced order of battle and the provision of a reinforcement pool. He suggested that the shortfall be met by releasing further manpower from industry, but that if those releases could not be secured, it might be necessary to disband one of the divisions from the force being prepared for offensive action.

During the Advisory War Council meeting on 29 April 1943, Spender made two points about manpower. He asked how the manpower problem was being addressed and was referred to the establishment of the War Commitments Committee.64 He also stated that the Manpower Authorities were conducting raids on clubs and hotels and were then detaining members behind locked doors for manpower examination. He questioned the legality of these actions.

Spender’s reference to the War Commitments Committee, with the implication that it was being established, suggests that it was not yet in being. However, Wurth states that it was appointed in January 1943.65 It consisted, he said, of representatives from the services, Munitions, Supply Council, Allied Works and War Organisation of Industry, and was chaired by the Director-General of Manpower.

It appears that the Committee’s functions were not promulgated until 14 May, when the War Cabinet discussed Agendum 200/1943‘Functions of the War Commitments Committee’ and approved the recommendations of that agendum.66 The Committee’s main roles were to advise and recommend action rather than order it. The final paragraph summarises its functions: ‘Generally, to make such reports or recommendations to the Minister for Defence on the current situation as may seem desirable to the Committee, either from the viewpoint of Australian programs, or in the light of the total requirements of the United Nations.’67

On 13 July 1943 the War Cabinet issued an attachment to Minute 2968 entitled ‘The Australian War Effort’.68 Paragraph 25 of the document, ‘General co-ordination of manpower reviews’ states that:

The reviews of the manpower situation under the various phases of the war effort as outlined above will provide a basis from which the War Commitments Committee will be able to co-ordinate the whole manpower position, and to report from time to time on particular aspects or the aggregate situation. These reviews will be made at regular intervals in view of the continual adjustments to the strength of the forces and the changes to the works and production programs.

There were several changes taking place during 1943, and these were summarised in a report prepared by the War Commitments Committee on 14 September.69 This report stated that the requirement for additional manpower was becoming urgent in:

• Basic industries on which the Australian military effort depended (transport, power, timber, minerals, etc);

• Provision of food for Australia, for export to Britain, and for the rapidly growing Allied Forces in the Pacific area;

• Maintenance of equipment in all areas, particularly rural and munitions production. Equipment generally was facing severe deterioration unless action was taken promptly.

At the same time, there were substantial manpower demands for the direct military programs, which included the defence of Australia, the defence of the Malay Barrier and the provision of a strike force for the Commander-in-Chief South West Pacific Area. Continued manufacture of munitions also required a substantial supply of manpower. There were simply not enough people to service all these demands and the report summarised its findings by recommending that the Government:

Relieve the Services of the responsibility for some of the commitments on which their manpower estimates were based, and/or endorse a further regulation of the civilian economy and reduce the supply of goods (especially food) and services to Britain and to Allied Forces in the Pacific.

The War Commitments Committee’s report was submitted to the War Cabinet as Agendum 379/1943 and discussed at the Cabinet meeting on 1 October.70 In Minute 3065 Cabinet recorded at length its decisions and the reasons for them.71 They approved the release of a total of 40,000 from the services and Munitions combined, directed the allocation of 15,000 to the rural sector, and limited the monthly intake of men and women into the services.

However, the requirement to release people from the services and munitions production was easy to state, but not so easy to fulfil. At a meeting of the full Cabinet on 23 November, the Minister for Commerce and Agriculture suggested that certain elements in the Army were obstructing applications for release.72 He referred to an alleged procedure by COs in which persons nominated for release were paraded and addressed by the CO. Many COs contended that they had the final decision as to whether or not a man should be released.

The Attorney-General stated that an organisation should have been established to deal specifically with the matter of releases. Individual applications would not shift 20,000 men from the Army to industry◦— there must be some degree of compulsion, and it must be efficiently and competently organised.

The decisions of the War Cabinet on 1 October constituted a step towards optimising the employment of the men and women of Australia to prosecute the war. But, as Butlin argues:

A concerted effort was made in October to change the allocation of labour resources, but little had been achieved by the end of the year. For the whole of 1943, therefore, manpower was deployed in a way consistent with the blockade conditions of early 1942, but seriously out of step with the scheme of military and economic specialisation that had been developed by the UK and the USA for the final stages of the war in Europe and the Pacific.73

By the end of 1943 Australia had been at war for more than four years. In this period the contribution of the Australian Armoured Corps had been confined to the operations of the 6th, 7th, and 9th Divisional Cavalry Regiments, the actions of the 2/6th Armoured Regiment around Buna, and those of the 1st Tank Battalion in the Finschhafen area. In New Guinea the tanks had provided valuable but limited support to the infantry. The tank soldiers themselves were willing and courageous. However, given the ever-increasing pressures on manpower it was unsurprising and logical that the strength of the Australian Armoured Corps declined so drastically during 1943.

Chapter 7:

TO THE ISLANDS — 1944–45

World events 1944-45

The last year and a half of the war saw the continued retreat and final defeat of the German and Japanese forces, although this was far from a rout. Both staged a tenacious fighting retreat and none of the Allied forces could expect easy victories. This period was characterised by a number of significant events, including the invasion of north-west Europe and the dropping of the atomic bomb.

The Australian Army formed the left wing of MacArthur’s advance to the Philippines and was gradually squeezed out of the main thrust. The battles fought by the Australians were still bloody and intense, including the campaigns on the Huon Peninsula, at Wewak and Aitape, on Bougainville and in Borneo.

Most of these battles were fought in the jungle. Movement was made difficult by the density of the foliage, by the precipitous terrain and by swamps and swift-flowing rivers. While these posed enormous challenges for the infantry, the task was even more daunting for the tanks.

Australian Armoured Corps 1944–45

This chapter follows the fortunes of the Armoured Corps from September 1943 to the end of the war in the Pacific. In September 1943 there were only two armoured brigades left in the Armoured Corps, the 1st in Western Australia and the 4th, which was readied for action in the jungle.1 The 1st was finally disbanded in September 1944 and thus the only brigade with battles to record was the 4th, which forms the focus of this chapter.2

While local tank production ceased in 1943, a number of Australian cruiser tanks had been accepted by the Army despite their recognised faults◦— which the Department of Munitions had undertaken to correct. Before these corrections could be completed, however, the War Cabinet ordered the project’s cessation.3

The tanks issued at various times to armoured units were the US M3 light (Stuart), the US M3 medium (Grant), and the British Infantry Tank Mark II (Matilda). Stuarts had been used in the Buna-Sanananda battles of December 1942 and January 1943, but were found to be quite unsuitable for the support of infantry in jungle fighting. For jungle conditions it was clear that the Matildas were better qualified than the Grants; they were more heavily armoured and their main armament was mounted in a fully rotatable turret. In early 1944 some units were issued with Grants, but these were soon replaced with Matildas. While the standard Matilda gun tank had only a 2-pdr main gun in contrast to the Grant’s 75mm weapon, there was also a close support version armed with a 3-inch howitzer.

The Matilda was powered by two AEC diesel engines of 95 hp each.4 The Matilda IV had a No. 19 wireless set, a main fuel tank holding fifty-six gallons, and was fitted for an auxiliary tank holding a further thirty-six gallons. The 4th Armoured Brigade was armed primarily with Matildas for all its campaigns and several special attachments were developed to provide useful capabilities.

The organisation of the 4th Armoured Brigade was determined by the fact that it was a ‘tropical scale’ formation. Experience had shown that most jungle fighting was effectively conducted by a squadron at most, frequently in groups of two tank troops, and often by only a single troop. These detachments required a substantial logistical support element close at hand. To meet this need the brigade was organised into regimental groups. On 29 February 1944, the 4th Armoured Brigade comprised five regimental groups:5

1st Tank Battalion (renamed 1st Armoured Regiment in June 1944)

2/4th Armoured Regiment

2/5th Armoured Regiment

2/7th Armoured Regiment*

2/9th Armoured Regiment

*According to Hopkins, the 2/7th Regiment was disbanded on 7 January 1944. The organisation chart above was clearly not quite up to date.

Because of the jungle conditions, Brigade HQ operated only as a tactical, co-ordinating and administrative HQ. The war establishment did not provide a protective troop of AFVs in HQ Squadron, resulting in a much reduced establishment.6 However, in addition to the armoured regimental groups, several other units came under brigade command:

• An independent field squadron of engineers with eight officers, 278 other ranks, and eighty-five B vehicles;7

• A signal squadron and cipher section, with four officers, sixty-five other ranks and twenty-six B vehicles;

• Australian Army Service Corps: armoured brigade company with fifteen officers and 597 other ranks; four tank transporter sections, which were used on mainland Australia, but did not accompany the unit to a tropical station;

• Medical: light field ambulance with ten officers, 166 other ranks and thirty-eight B vehicles

• Sections for intelligence, pay, postal, and provost.

Coomera, Queensland, 10 January 1944. Troops of 106 Light Field Ambulance prepare to evacuate a wounded man on a 4 Armoured Brigade exercise. Each regimental group of the brigade was allocated a section of the Field Ambulance to ensure speedy treatment of wounded men (AWM 063031).

There were variations in the vehicles issued between standard and jungle units. Motorcycles and scout cars in the Intercommunication Troop of the Armoured Regiment were replaced with jeeps (more formally, trucks, ¼-ton). The jeep was a very mobile and versatile vehicle, not too heavy to be manhandled out of mud and swamps.

In terms of AFVs, the standard regiment had fifty-two 2-pdr and six 3-inch howitzer close support tanks, while the tropical scale regiment had forty 2-pdr and eighteen close support tanks. The increase in 3-inch howitzers provided greater capacity for heavy high explosive fire at close range, which proved very effective in wiping out bunkers.

The composition of a regimental group is described in the ‘History of the 2/9th Armoured Regiment’:

March 1944 found the unit possessed of a first class Australian Electrical and Mechanical Engineers (AEME) workshop, Ordnance Field Park, a Corps of Signals maintenance troop of three sections and a AEME Light Aid Detachment. These and the Regiment’s three tank squadrons allowed the operation of three independent squadron formations on a widely dispersed front.8

The regimental groups were well provided with B vehicles. The establishment of the 2/9th Armoured Regiment was:9

Unit

Vehicles

Offrs

ORs

Armoured Regiment

Matilda: 2-pdr x 40, CS x 18

34

513

Signals Troop B vehicles x 6

2

18

Ordnance Field Park B vehicles x 15

1

30

Light Aid Detachment B vehicles x 24

1

59

Workshop B vehicles x 38

4

137

Hopkins records that the 1st Tank Battalion had three additional support units: a troop of engineers, a light field ambulance section, and a Service Corps platoon.10 These additional units were essential given the widely dispersed nature of the jungle battles.

Operations in the Huon Peninsula, November 1943 to January 1944

The focus of Japanese defensive strength in the South West Pacific was the port of Rabaul which boasted the magnificent Blanche Harbour, the crater of an historic volcanic eruption. It could accommodate a substantial navy in deep and safe water and was well defended by the Japanese Naval Air Force. MacArthur’s early strategy aimed to recapture Rabaul then advance to the Philippines.

Lae, New Guinea, 4 September 1943. The 9th Division, commanded by Major General George Wootten, lands at Lae. The last LST is stuck on the beach, and the tug is pulling it off (AWM 042372).

From 17 to 24 August 1943 a conference was held in Quebec between Roosevelt and Churchill and their Chiefs of Staff.11 Long writes that:

Two important decisions concerning the Pacific theatre were made about this time. The Combined Chiefs decided that the strongly-held fortress of Rabaul should be bypassed, a proposal that had been under discussion at Washington since June. They wished instead to encircle it by seizing Kavieng, Manus and Wewak. MacArthur was opposed to attacking Wewak before Rabaul, but the Joint Chiefs of Staff overruled him. They decided also that in the summer of 1943-44 western New Britain and the Gilbert and Marshall Islands should be attacked, that Ponape and the Admiralties should be taken in the southern winter of 1944, and Truk and the Marianas in the following spring and summer.12

The immediate requirement of the Joint Chiefs of Staff strategy was the occupation of the northern coastline of New Guinea. Once ports and airfields had been constructed there, the passage of the Vitiaz Strait would become very dangerous for the Japanese and the Allies would have jumping-off sites for their advance further north.

In September 1943 a combined sea-air-land operation involving the 7th and 9th Australian Infantry Divisions alongside American troops captured Lae and Salamaua and, in the process, took possession of the important airfield of Nadzab.13 The operation was conducted with speed and skill, and Lae fell sooner than expected. MacArthur and Blamey then decided to press rapidly along the coast of the Huon Peninsula, towards the immediate objectives of Finschhafen, Langemak Bay, and the high ground of the hinterland, particularly the dominant feature of Sattelberg. Sattelberg was a mountain mission station five miles inland and 3,000 feet above sea level.

Milne Bay, Papua, September 1942. Japanese Ha-Go light tanks bogged along a Milne Bay track. These tanks were something of a threat to the Australian defenders, but the terrain limited their potential (AWM 026632).

The attack on Finschhafen was conducted by the 20th Infantry Brigade (Windeyer) of the 9th Division (Wootten), and a strong beachhead was established some six miles north of Finschhafen.14 Japanese reaction was swift and the 20th Brigade was subjected to fierce counter-attacks. The Japanese also mounted a stout defence at Finschhafen itself. In the light of the strength of the Japanese resistance, Windeyer asked Wootten for another infantry battalion. He also requested a squadron of tanks, for which he could see important tasks.

The 1st Tank Battalion of the 4th Armoured Brigade had been undertaking amphibious and jungle training, and was moved to Milne Bay in August 1943. There the battalion gave demonstrations to the infantry to show the value of tank support, and continued to learn how to use tanks in the jungle. In September the battalion was moved to Morobe on the north coast of New Guinea, 100 miles south-east of Lae.

On 9 October, Major Ford of the 1st Tank Battalion scouted the Finschhafen area and reported that tanks could operate in small numbers and that the infantry was enthusiastic about the possible use of tanks to deal with strongpoints.

Finschhafen, New Guinea, 22 September 1943. Landing Ships Tank (LSTs) landing stores on the beachhead. LSTs were capable of carrying a squadron of heavy tanks or an equivalent tonnage of military supplies (AWM 057465).

One of the problems in the campaigns in the South West Pacific Area was the reluctant cooperation of the US Navy. The Navy had many commitments in the Pacific, and there was a particularly strong demand for landing craft of all types.15 Thus the timing of the provision of landing craft to transport the tanks from Morobe to Langemak Bay to meet Windeyer’s request was potentially problematic.

Early in the morning of 19 October, a lookout at Morobe reported the presence of an LST (Landing Ship Tank) in the bay.16 It had arrived without warning to find C Squadron standing by at six hours’ notice. The squadron, under the command of Major Sam Hordern, embarked with all possible speed and sailed at 1530 hours that day. Nine officers and 136 other ranks embarked, together with eighteen tanks, five jeeps, one slave battery carrier and one fitters’ carrier.17 They took with them rations, fuel and ammunition for ten days. Next morning, at 0330 hours, the LST began to unload at Langemak Bay. The battalion’s war diarist records the scene:

An unloading party met the ship, but appeared to have little or no organisation and showed a desire to watch the tanks rather than unload. As a result squadron personnel unloaded the greater bulk of the stores which were packed in the tank deck, and some confusion was caused by unloading both tanks and stores together. The narrow strip of beach and the track from the beach was soft and muddy. Operations were done under blackout conditions as enemy aircraft were attacking shipping farther out in the bay. The ship’s commander had expressed his intention of leaving in one hour irrespective of whether all stores were off. Stores were being dumped at the unloading point causing much congestion. A number of tanks got off, then one bogged on the track just clear of the beach, and the remainder had to be diverted and a detour made through thick secondary growth necessitating a sharp turn on the soft beach. Despite these difficulties all vehicles were unloaded and moved off the beach. At 0430 the LST commenced to move away with large quantities of fuel, ammunition and rations still on board. Men were still throwing ammunition off, and jumping into the water themselves with the ramp half up.18

As soon as it landed, the squadron began training with the infantry of the 26th Brigade (Whitehead), which comprised the 2/23rd, 2/24th, and 2/48th Infantry Battalions. Squadron officers also began to reconnoitre the anticipated battle areas to determine which areas were suitable for tanks. Much of the terrain consisted of steep jungle-clad hills, although there were some patches of fivefoot-high kunai grass on the coastal plain. The few tracks available were narrow, twisting, and in places liable to subside into the valleys below. In general, visibility was limited to a few yards. The tanks had two advantages: they were unexpected and they were◦— initially at least◦— impervious to any anti-tank measures the Japanese could devise.

C Squadron moved from the coast to the forward assembly area at Jivevenang, which they reached on 13 November.19 The track from the coast ran through thick jungle and was very steep in parts. Its surface became glassy and slippery in hot weather, making it difficult for the tanks with their steel tracks to climb its steep slopes. Their arrival at Jivevenang gave them the opportunity to train with the infantrymen of the 2/48th Battalion and to use sand-table exercises to prepare for the attack on Sattelberg. During this period the tanks remained well concealed to preserve the element of surprise.

Sattelberg area, New Guinea, 17 November 1943. As a wounded soldier of 2/48 Battalion is carried back for treatment, Matildas of 1 Tank Battalion move forward with the infantry (AWM 060615).

The 26th Infantry Brigade’s plan of attack, in so far as it affected the tanks, involved the advance of the 2/48th Infantry Battalion, supported by two troops of C Squadron, from Jivevenang along the axis of the Sattelberg road. The track ran for the most part along a high ridge which, at times, narrowed to a razorback, covered with dense bamboo and thick secondary growth.

The attack began on 17 November with C Company of 2/48 Battalion supported by 5 Troop, with Major Hordern’s tank in the rear.20 There was stiff opposition from heavy machine-guns and bunkers sited to cover the road, with visibility limited by dense bamboo. The infantry used walkie-talkies to communicate with the tanks.

At around 1500 hours the track of the leading tank (Lieutenant O’Connell) was blown off by an unexploded 25-pdr shell, blocking further progress by the tanks as the track was too narrow for passing. Some enemy approached close to Corporal Tomlin’s tank and threw explosives onto the front, blowing the Besa machine-gun back into the turret and slightly wounding two of the crew.

Sattelberg area, November 1943. This Matilda is in danger of falling over a 30-ft drop, but engineers of 2/13 Field Company are dragging it to safety with the bulldozer in the background (AWM 016228).

A perimeter was formed round the tank with the broken track and it was eventually repaired. The crew had been closed down for about eight hours and the tank was peppered with small arms fire. During the day, the tanks fired 120 rounds of 3-inch howitzer shells, 11,700 rounds of Besa and 234 rounds of 2-pdr high explosive and made considerable headway. The infantry’s casualties were very light.

The following day a composite troop of two 2-pdr tanks from 1 Troop and one 3-inch close support tank from 2 Troop was used. By 1130 hours two tanks had succeeded in getting onto Coconut Ridge, knocking out two 37mm guns, about fifteen machine-guns and a possible heavy gun. The damaged tank was repaired during the day and returned to the fight. By nightfall, advance tank HQ and seven tanks were rallied with A and D Companies.

The advance up the Sattelberg track continued over the next two days. At one point the tanks left the road using a track prepared by infantry and engineers and successfully engaged a pocket of resistance blocking the progress of the 2/23rd Battalion on the left flank. The main track became too difficult for the tanks some distance from Sattelberg and the final assault was an infantry battle. It was in this final push that Sergeant Tom Derrick won the VC.

The final attack had been assisted on the right flank by 4 Troop, which had moved up the 2/48th area on the high ground east of Sattelberg. The approach to this area was the worst going so far encountered. The tanks were preceded by a bulldozer, and their success in negotiating such country amazed everyone, including the tank crews themselves.

The next attack in which the tanks participated was further to the north along the coast. On 24 November a composite troop consisting of 3 Troop and one tank from 2 Troop commanded by Lieutenant Watson, crossed the Song River near its mouth and reached HQ 2/23rd Infantry Battalion. On 26 November they supported two companies of the 2/32nd in an attack on Pino Ridge.21

The approach to Pino Ridge was up steep kunai slopes with patches of wooded jungle. The tanks advanced in pairs through the kunai guarded by the infantry moving on the fringe of the jungle. The enemy refused to face the tanks, and the objective was easily gained.

The next stage of the advance was along the coast to Bonga. Here the terrain consisted of flat marshy ground covered with dense jungle. The tanks were quite unable to get off the track and delays due to difficulties in crossing some creeks meant that, for much of the time, they had to follow the infantry. In some places there were bridges over the creeks, but the Japanese had taken the precaution of sawing through the bridge members. The approaching Australians were forced to wait for the engineers to construct a bridge, or for the creek banks to be broken down to form a ford.

At these points the infantry adopted their routine jungle tactics and, if they met strongly entrenched defences, simply waited for the tanks to advance. Their supporting fire was invariably decisive. The tanks involved in this advance were 2 and 3 Troops of C Squadron.

After Bonga, the axis of advance turned inland for a short period. Here the ground consisted of steep kunai slopes with large patches of jungle. The Bonga– Wareo track ran along a high spur with numerous ravines on either side. The enemy offered strong resistance from positions often sited in the jungle well clear of the track. The tanks were initially held in reserve, attacking strongpoints located by infantry patrols. On 2 December one tank fought a duel with one 75mm and one 37mm Japanese gun at a range of 200 yards and was eventually disabled after taking fifty hits. No shells penetrated the armour, but tracks and track adjusters were damaged, requiring several hours of repairs.

Coast north of Finschhafen, November 1943. Matildas of 1 Tank Battalion advance with infantry of 29/46 Battalion, probably on 19 November. The next day they captured a key objective, Fortification Point (AWM 016290).

On the same day, General Wootten issued orders for the next phase of the advance north. The first major objective on this axis was Fortification Point, to be captured by the 4th Infantry Brigade, which had recently come under Wootten’s command. The attack began on 5 December with the 29/46th Infantry Battalion supported by 3 Troop of C Squadron.

In this area the ground was flat and swampy, intersected by numerous banked creeks. There were some patches of kunai but, in general, thick secondary growth predominated on the narrow coastal flat, with steep kunai hills to the west. The tanks were again used as a strong reserve of armoured firepower to be brought forward when solid opposition was struck. The forward infantry had to make an initial assault on a strong line of bunkers protected by a minefield. The tanks were successful in demolishing the bunkers and assisting the infantry to break through, but in the subsequent advance the tanks were delayed at creek crossings and by enemy defensive methods, forcing the infantry to continue to advance without their support.

At this stage enemy anti-tank mines proved very effective. These mines were buried deep on and off the track and were cleverly concealed. Three tanks, a bulldozer and a tractor had tracks blown off and one tank was badly damaged. In view of the difficulty of locating the mines, either with mine-detectors or by probing with bayonets, another track was cut to allow the tanks to keep up. The delay caused by the necessity to cut tracks meant that the infantry were without tanks for two days.

On 11 December, the HQ and A Squadron of the 1st Tank Battalion reached Finschhafen and Colonel Glasgow immediately ordered the relief of C Squadron by A Squadron. The relief was completed on 15 December. At this stage the infantry were positioned outside Lakona three miles short of Fortification Point attempting, with artillery support, to eliminate a pocket of Japanese hemmed in against the coast. In two days they had made little progress. The tanks had been delayed by a succession of creeks over which the engineers had to build crossings with the help of bulldozers, but soon rejoined the infantry to support them in a further attack. This attack destroyed the enemy in a little over an hour’s fighting.

Several more rearguard positions were overcome before the force reached Fortification Point on 19 December. On 21 December, the 4th Infantry Brigade was replaced by the 20th Brigade, which continued the advance towards Sio, fifty miles to the north-west. Here the coastal belt was fairly wide, flat and covered with kunai. Except for the creeks, the going was not too difficult and the serious obstacles were bypassed by using landing craft from beach to beach.

As the pace of the advance quickened, the opportunities for tanks diminished and, when tanks were used, the enemy generally fled. The campaign virtually ended for the tanks on 9 January 1944 when A Squadron was moved back to join the rest of the battalion at Bonga. The battalion was renamed the 1st Armoured Regiment on 1 June 1944 and, during that month, the regiment moved back to mainland Australia.

The value of tanks in the Huon Peninsula operations

Lae, New Guinea, 1 October 1943. Lieutenant General Sir Iven Mackay, left, GOC New Guinea Force, talks with Major General George Wootten, GOC 9 Division (AWM 133486).

One of the most interesting accounts of the tank operations on the Huon Peninsula is a report prepared by Major General George Wootten who commanded the 9th Infantry Division during these battles.22 It is significant that, while he describes the actions in which tanks took part, more than half the report discusses the lessons learnt regarding the use of tanks in the jungle. An edited version of the latter part of his report is reproduced below. The principal topics Wootten covers in the report are: training, including joint training with other arms; infantry/tank cooperation in battle; engineer assistance; replenishment; and enemy anti-tank measures encountered or anticipated.

The Huon Peninsula. This forms part of the northern coastline of New Guinea. It is extremely rugged, and a hostile area to the battles that were fought there from September 1943 to January 1944.

Training

Tanks and infantry must train together before operations begin. An interchange of officers and NCOs between tank and infantry battalions before they go into action together is highly desirable. Such attachments should last for as long as a month, if that can be made possible.

Training should cover operations in at least these types of terrain: jungle tracks; virgin jungle or secondary growth; coconut plantation with secondary growth 3-4 feet high; open flat kunai; steep kunai slopes; and any other special ground conditions likely to be met.

After tank and infantry officers and NCOs have developed mutual understanding through the attachments mentioned above, it is then essential for an infantry company as a whole to train with a troop of tanks for at least seven days and longer if practicable. During this period the infantry will obtain a thorough knowledge of the capabilities, power of manoeuvre and limitations of tanks and particularly their vision difficulties.23

Infantry officers and NCOs should be trained in ground recce for tank ‘going’, so that they can identify possible routes and be able to guide tanks appropriately. Tanks can become bogged or immobilised in narrow defiles, and the infantry must recognise this. It is also necessary for engineers to train with tanks in the type of country over which fighting is expected.

Reconnaissance, and the approach march

Wherever possible a careful recce should be made of the routes to be followed by tanks. Routes for the approach march should be chosen so that it can subsequently be converted into the main supply line. Squadron Recce Officers should be attached to the infantry to advise on the use of tanks and to recce suitable routes.24 When the tanks are employed as the spearhead it will not be possible to make a recce and the greatest care must be taken in directing the tanks; drivers must be trained to avoid all suspicious looking objects and to pick the best going.

If the tanks are to have the advantage of surprise, great care must be taken to conceal the move to the forward assembly area. The move may have to be made by night and it will be necessary to cover the engine noise by artillery or mortar fire, or by aircraft flying in the area during the move. When the tanks have reached the forward assembly area they should be well camouflaged.

Tank/infantry cooperation and tactics

Except where tanks are being used for the first time as a surprise weapon, they will rarely be able to precede the infantry or even accompany them. Natural tank obstacles are numerous in the jungle, and a resourceful enemy can improve and enhance them. To hold the infantry back until the tanks can get forward is to delay the advance unwarrantably, and infantry must always be prepared to go forward without tank support.

Normally, therefore, the tanks should move in rear of the leading infantry, ready to be called forward when serious opposition is met. Even where the enemy position is protected by a tank obstacle, natural or artificial, it will usually be possible in the jungle for the tanks to advance to the flank or rear of the obstacle and provide effective direct fire support for an infantry attack.

Gusika, New Guinea, 16 March 1944. Lieutenant Scott-Stevenson of Signals Section, 4 Armoured Brigade, uses an SCR 536 (Set Complete Radio). These radios proved effective in maintaining contact between infantry units, and between infantry and tanks (AWM 071275).

Communication between all arms is vital. Easily the best method of communication is the walkie-talkie (SCR 536).25 This can be netted to the tanks’ No. 19 sets.26 An SCR 536 should be issued to: the leading platoon commander; the leading company commander; the engineer platoon commander with one to company HQ as a spare. All should be on the same frequency and strict wireless discipline is essential. A simple battle code should be devised and extensively practised. The infantry should understand tank wireless procedure and other troops of tanks at forward rally or nearby should maintain listening watch.

Part of the process of communication is the indication of targets. Concealment is easy in the jungle and the Japanese are good at it. Pinpointing enemy weapons and positions has been one of the greatest difficulties for tanks and infantry, and much time should be devoted in training to developing workable methods of indicating targets. Verbal messages over the SCR 536, pointing with rifles, and use of tracer or of smoke bombs, will all be required under varying circumstances.

After an objective has been gained there comes the difficult phase of mopping-up. This requires a drill for systemically clearing out the enemy bunkers and foxholes in a captured position under the cover afforded by the tank weapons. The infantry have to be aware that there can be considerable back-blast from the burst of the tank’s main armament, and they should take cover when tanks are firing at short range. Tank gunners must carefully observe the position of our forward troops before opening fire.

At this stage of the action there must be particularly close cooperation between infantry and tank commanders. It proved most satisfactory when a tank officer, say the troop leader when a troop is being employed, or the squadron leader when more than one troop is engaged, is on the ground rather than in his tank. He is in direct contact with the officer commanding the assaulting infantry, and is in touch with his tanks by means of a handset.

The support between infantry and tanks is reciprocal. Tanks can provide direct heavy fire to winkle out strongpoints, but infantry can provide essential protection for tanks. In daylight an infantry section should be specifically appointed to give close protection for each tank against enemy attack by hand-held anti-tank weapons. All troops should be trained in this task in varying tactical formations. They should be shown the ideal distance to follow or flank a tank so as to give maximum protection at minimum risk.

For protection at night, infantry and tanks should train together in the formation of night perimeters. Where an infantry battalion is echeloned down a track, it is often advisable for the tanks to be within the perimeter of the second company where replenishment and maintenance are more easily carried out. Tanks should be given fixed-line defence tasks in the event of a counter-attack, and thus materially increase the firepower available.

Engineer assistance

One of the chief difficulties to be overcome in the use of tanks in the jungle is their safe passage forward to the scene of battle, and to accomplish this without delaying the advance of the infantry. To do this, engineers must be trained to work with tanks and have the right equipment.

Wewak area, New Guinea, 26 April 1945. Engineers of 2/1 Field Company RAE have been clearing mines, and are riding back to their unit on a Matilda. Mine clearance was an invaluable function performed by the RAE (AWM 091264).

Experience in the Huon Peninsula suggests that the tasks to be undertaken by the engineers fall into the two categories of removal of obstacles and construction of a track forward. The principal obstacles are minefields and tank ditches. In general the enemy has sited his minefields in defiles, sometimes buried to a depth of 9 to 12 inches. The recommended solution is to keep off track, especially when crossing ravines. Detection by mine detectors in the jungle is very difficult due to broken ground, depth of burial, and moisture.

In constructing a way forward the major task is to create routes by which the tanks can cross creeks. It has been found that a solution is to doze down the creek banks and then place a low-level bridge at the bottom. In some places the creek bottom may be firm enough to form a ford, thus obviating the need to construct a bridge. In many situations an additional task may be to make a jeep track to help in replenishment and command.

Wewak area, New Guinea, 13 May 1945. Sappers of 2/8 Field Company RAE constructing a permanent bridge over a creek. The bridge will be capable of carrying vehicles up to the weight of at least a Matilda (AWM 092015).

The amount of assistance needed in a given operation is dependent on four factors. The first is the number of lines of advance. This determines the second, which is that each line of advance needs one platoon of engineers. Thirdly, engineer assistance should come from field companies or field squadrons trained to work with the type of tanks to be used. Fourthly, the engineers need mechanical equipment. Desirable pieces of equipment are D6 Angledozers, and D6 or D7 tractors. This equipment should be held in a central pool under the control of the officer commanding the field company or squadron and he should allocate it according to operational priorities.

Replenishment

Ammunition: no real problem was encountered in the supply of ammunition. The greatest expenditure by a tank in one day was 250% of first line ammunition, but normal usage for a troop was 100% per day.

Fuel: the tanks have averaged one mile to 3½ gallons. This gives a range of about 25 miles, assuming that the auxiliary tanks are used. Because the tanks seldom moved more than ten miles in a day and retired to some form of harbour each night to replenish, there was little likelihood of being halted due to lack of fuel. Oils and lubricants carried on the tank are adequate for several days’ fighting.

Replenishment was carried out by establishing a series of dumps. Jeeps brought forward the most forward dump to the tank harbour each night. One jeep was found sufficient to maintain one troop. On occasions when the track was impassable native carriers were used.

Japanese anti-tank measures

The lessons learned as described in General Wootten’s report were supported by a Training Instruction issued by the 4th Armoured Brigade on 8 February 1944, and by a memo written on 23 February by Lieutenant Colonel D.D. Glasgow, CO of the 1st Tank Battalion. This section draws on all three sources.

Milne Bay, 7 September 1942. A Japanese Type 94 37mm anti-tank gun captured during the Milne Bay battle. This was a highly mobile weapon, but would have made little impression on the armour of a Matilda (AWM 026537).

The Japanese used anti-tank ditches, mines and various sorts of weapons in their attempts to halt the advance of the tanks. The ditches, according to the Australian sappers, were often poorly sited in that the tanks were able to bypass them. The flanks of the ditches were not protected by mines, although they were covered by fire, sometimes a 37mm gun. Such an obstacle could be overcome by advancing to the ditch, knocking out the covering fire, then bypassing the ditch. The ditch could then be filled in and corduroyed by the sappers.27

A Japanese Type 93 landmine. It had a 7-in diameter, and was 2-in thick. It would have been devastating for wheeled vehicles and carriers, but would not have stopped a Matilda (AWM 069417).

The Japanese employed several types of explosive charges, some of them standard mines and some of them ad hoc devices such as picric blocks, prepared charges, and artillery shells. They laid mines singly and in fields. The type 93 mine was not successful. The enemy later employed a composite mine with which he succeeded in blowing the track off one tank and so badly damaging the engine and transmission of another that the tank had to be written off.

When used in a composite format the 93 mine was effective, as stated; it also had the advantage of a small iron content, making it proof against the mine detector when buried deep. If the minefields were well sited with effective mines and covered by determined fire, they were a grave menace in jungle fighting. It was considered probable that the enemy would become more skilful in his use of minefields, and much thought was given to confronting this danger.

The Japanese guns used to oppose the tanks were the 37mm and the 75mm. Both guns used HE in these operations. While they failed to knock tanks out, they damaged idlers, track adjusters, and suspensions, in some cases immobilising the tanks.

All reports describing Japanese anti-tank measures emphasise that they were completely unprepared to meet Matildas and thus all their counter-measures were extempore. Colonel Glasgow states that: ‘It is safe to anticipate that much more attention will be paid to tank defence by the Japanese in the future, probably by mines and higher-velocity anti-tank guns. We should take this into account in future training for jungle fighting.’

Australian equipment and personnel

This section discusses the advantages and disadvantages of the equipment used by the 4th Armoured Brigade and comments on some aspects of the life of a tank soldier in the jungle.28

The Matilda tank

The climbing ability of the Matilda was quite remarkable, and it negotiated terrain which had previously been considered tank-proof. A lower ratio reverse gear and lower track pressure are the only desirable modifications needed. Some type of shield to protect the track in the front is required; it would have to be fitted so that it could be raised when climbing steep inclines. As speed is of little consequence and because it is likely that the enemy will employ heavier anti-tank guns, thought should be given to adding more armour to vital parts of the tank.

The main causes of tanks being put out of action were damage to the idlers and damage of one sort and another from the enemy. Eighteen idlers were replaced during operations in the Finschhafen area, due in most cases to small pebbles and coral building up in the sprocket hubs and suspension, which caused excessive track tension and bent idler shafts. Failures also occurred when tanks skidded down an incline and took the full impact of the tank on the idlers on reaching the bottom.

Jeeps

Jeeps were most satisfactory and they were the only vehicles other than tanks which could negotiate the jungle tracks. One jeep was sufficient to maintain a troop once dumps had been established, but sometimes it was necessary to run a shuttle service. The jeep was only hampered by its low clearance, which limited its fording depth and made it prone to becoming bellied.

Diamond T Wrecker

This vehicle is excellent in mud or sand, but its low ground pressure makes it inferior in hill climbing unless fitted with heavy chains. The Diamond T will tow a tank and can be used for tank recovery using suitable tackle and a system of pulleys. When trees are not available it needs some form of ground anchor.

Slave Battery Carrier (SBC)

The Slave Battery Carrier (SBC) was a Loyd carrier modified to service some of the electrical needs of a tank unit. It had a powerful battery charger, essential when the tanks were in a situation where they could not safely recharge with their own charger. The squadron electrician also travelled on the SBC (image from author’s collection).

The SBC provides electrical assistance to all vehicles and is especially valuable in recharging tank batteries. When tanks are stationary for any length of time, but have to have the radio running, the tank batteries can easily run flat. The SBC is a modified Carden Loyd carrier.29 Its gearing is low, and it pulls well. Its main disadvantage is that the tracks are prone to slip off; in 25 miles of running the tracks were thrown 17 times. As a battery charger the vehicle is ideal, but the track trouble caused considerable delay.

Maintenance

It is impossible to over-emphasise the importance of good maintenance. The success or failure of the unit depends on whether the vehicles will keep going. Conditions in the tropics are such that a great deal more time must be spent on maintenance than is usually necessary. All vehicles must be mechanically perfect before going into action and brief inspections and greasings should be made whenever possible during approach marches.

Wewak area, New Guinea, 30 August 1945. Corporal Huggins, 2/4 Armoured Regiment workshop RAEME, repairs a Matilda. The rugged conditions in New Guinea meant that meticulous attention to maintenance was vital to the success of tank operations (AWM 095841).

It is not always possible to carry out maintenance at night during the actual fighting and it is only by having vehicles at a high standard of efficiency that units can hope to remain in action. A useful additional item of equipment would be a framework to hold a tarpaulin to be erected over the tank engine at night to allow crews and fitters to work using lights.

Medical services and personal equipment

Medical orderlies moved well forward with the tactical group. The infantry unit was responsible for the Regimental Aid Post and the Advanced Dressing Station.30 Careful policing of malaria precautions resulted in a record low incidence of malaria.

The present two-piece overall is not entirely satisfactory. It is inclined to catch on projections in the tank and the gap between jacket and trousers has caused many colds. A one-piece overall with zip fasteners is suggested.31 There are no tents provided for crews and two two-man Indian pattern tents are necessary issue for each tank. Crepe rubber or rope soled boots should be provided for tank crews to prevent slipping.

Conditions in the tropics are such that most personnel lost a good deal of weight during the campaign. The best physical training prior to embarkation for the tropics would be exercises designed to keep men fit, but at the same allowing them to carry a little excessive weight.

Tank employment and actions 1944-45

On 12 July 1944 MacArthur asked Blamey to relieve American troops of responsibility for the northern Solomon Islands from 1 October and New Britain and the entire mainland of Australian New Guinea from 1 November.32 Blamey proposed to do this with six brigades. But the American force they would be replacing was three times as large and it was considered demeaning to the Americans to have their role assumed by a force one-third their size. MacArthur would not agree to so great a reduction and, following discussions, it was decided to use the equivalent of four Australian divisions.

On 11 August, Blamey issued instructions to meet MacArthur’s request.33 HQ 1st Australian Army under Sturdee would move to Lae and take over command of all forces in the New Guinea territories. Savige’s II Corps was to assume command in the Solomons using the 3rd Division (7th, 15th and 29th Brigades) and two independent brigades, the 11th and 23rd. New Britain was allotted to the 5th Division (4th, 6th and 13th Brigades) and Aitape the 6th Division (16th, 17th and 19th Brigades).34 The 8th Brigade would continue to operate along the northern coast of New Guinea between Madang and the Sepik.

The role of I Corps, comprising the very experienced 7th and 9th Divisions, was subject to much debate.35 It was first proposed that it should take part in the assault on the Philippines, then that it should attack to the west into the Netherlands East Indies (Indonesia); finally, this was translated into an attack on the Japanese on the island of Borneo. A 9th Division brigade was to attack Tarakan and the remainder of the division would take the Brunei Bay area. The final operation would see the 7th Division capture Balikpapan and its oil installations.

Wewak area, New Guinea, April 1945. Matildas of C Squadron 2/4 Armoured Regiment move along the beach near Kofi village. This was an obstacle-free path for advancing, as long as the beach was firm enough for the tanks (AWM 091249).

The chronology of the movements of the Australian formations was, in outline:36

6 Oct 1944: HQ 3rd Division opens at Torokina, Bougainville Island

4 Nov: Troops of 6th Brigade land at Jacquinot Bay, New Britain

8 Nov: HQ 6th Division opens at Aitape

13 Nov: Troops of 5th Division relieve Americans at Cape Hoskins, New Britain

24 Nov: Campaign on Bougainville opens

31 Dec: 6th Division complete at Aitape

1 May 1945: Troops of 9th Division land on Tarakan Island

11 May: Wewak captured by 6th Division

10 June: Troops of 9th Division land in Brunei Bay, Borneo

1 July: Troops of 7th Division land at Balikpapan

15 August: Japan surrenders

Tanks were used in the operations to capture Wewak, to eliminate the Japanese on Bougainville, and in the operations on Borneo. The terrain presented many difficulties, and there was some reluctance on the part of several commanders to use tanks at all. Where they were used they proved effective and saved many infantry lives.

Wewak

The tanks used at Wewak were those of C Squadron, 2/4th Armoured Regiment under the command of Major Cory. They were in action on 6 January 1945 at Matapau and on 16 February at Dogreto Bay. Movement forward was difficult and it was not until 25 April that tanks were used again in an attack on Boiken Plantation. In this action the tanks had little fighting although, as the Regimental History explains:

It was quite apparent that the Nips had no stomach for the tanks for there was ample evidence where they had speedily evacuated as the tanks approached. The advance along the coast for the last three days was the fastest of the campaign◦— a further argument for Major Cory in the use of tanks.37

The main problem seems to have been to convince the infantry of the value of armour.38 Major Cory must have worn out several pairs of boots tramping from battalion to battalion asking for a job and trying to ‘sell’ his tanks. Part of the trouble was the absence of facilities to help the vehicles to pass tankproof obstacles. Landing craft were generally insufficient for unloading supplies at Aitape and the coastal track was often impassable to heavy vehicles carrying bridging stores. Even when the tanks were present and conditions suitable, there seems to have been a degree of reluctance on the part of infantry commanders to include armour in their plans; when they did, tanks were used in ones and twos. Apart from the ‘penny-packet’ mentality, it is always unwise to split up the subunit organisation. Unfortunately, this lesson seems never to have been learned in the New Guinea operations.

Wewak area, New Guinea, 10 May 1945. Stretcher-bearers carry out a casualty while Matildas of 2/4 Armoured Regiment support the infantry of 2/4 Battalion (AWM 091729).

The final assault on Wewak commenced on 5 May and the infantry were supported by three troops of the 2/4th Armoured Regiment. The armour played an important role in subduing strongpoints and helped to keep infantry casualties low. Following its capture, Wewak remained the home of the 2/4th Armoured and they spent many months there before returning to Australia for demobilisation.

Bougainville

The Australians agreed to take over from the American troops on Bougainville towards the end of 1944. Bougainville held little interest for the Americans other than as a minor base for their advance to the north. They were stationed around Empress Augusta Bay on the western shore of the island, with the township of Torokina as their main base. They had decisively defeated two Japanese attacks in March 1944, and since then had maintained a passive defensive perimeter.

There were some 40,000 Japanese troops on Bougainville, concentrated in three areas: around the Buka Passage in the north of the island; at Numa Numa and Kieta to the east; and in the south from Buin to Mosigetta.39 The Japanese were desperately short of supplies and, as a result, only 20% of their forces were in the forward areas. Of the remainder, 35% were growing crops or fishing, 15% were on transport duties and 30% were sick.

Allied naval and air superiority made it most unlikely that they would receive any reinforcements and, in any event, Japanese forces had to deal with far more important threats closer to home. The Japanese senior commanders and the soldiers on Bougainville followed a ‘live and let live’ policy, at least for the time being. This policy had been endorsed by the Americans, resulting in the existence of an unofficial truce.

As soon as the Australians took over they started aggressive patrolling and their first planned action was a platoon attack by the Queenslanders of the 9th Infantry Battalion. This was to capture a feature called Little George Hill on the track to Numa Numa. Its success signalled to the Japanese that the truce on Bougainville was over.

It was argued at the time and has been argued many times since that the campaign on Bougainville was unnecessary and a waste of young Australian lives. This view was forcefully put by Major N.I. (George) Winning in discussion with an old friend who was also on Bougainville, Major Russell Lyons. Winning was an enterprising and courageous commando leader who commanded the 2/8th Commando Squadron. Lyons records Winning’s comments:

George was furious◦— his commando group, under his leadership and accompanied by selected natives, had spent nearly a month casing the island, the Japs and the deployment of their forces. ‘It’s nothing but a bloody self-supporting POW camp,’ were Winning’s words. ‘To fight a war here and provoke hostilities will be nothing more than sinful destruction and wastage of bloody fine men who deserve to be laid off and sent home to their people.’40

What Winning suggested was a modification of one of the three courses of action open to Blamey on taking over from the Americans. In a report written on 18 May 1945, Blamey noted:

There were three courses of action left open to me on taking over from the US Forces. These were as follows:

Course A: To take over the American defences within their perimeters as they then existed and by passive defence to protect the airfields and base installations contained within the perimeters.

Course B: To go for an all out offensive against enemy strongholds with full scale air and naval support when the latter could be developed.

Course C: By aggressive patrolling to gain information of enemy strengths and dispositions, about which little was known by American formations, and by systematically driving him from his garden areas and supply bases, forcing him into starvation and destroying him where found. Eventually to bring about his total destruction.41

What Winning advocated was Course A, slightly modified by using patrols to remained informed of Japanese dispositions and movements. But Blamey had no doubt that Course C was correct, in particular ‘driving him from his garden areas and destroying him where found’. Because the Japanese were dependent on their gardens for most of their food, they would fight to defend them. Blamey justified his decision, writing:

To remain inactive for months while awaiting the development of full scale naval and air support is a negation of all military teaching and common sense. It reduces the morale of the troops and leads to disciplinary troubles as seen during the long stay of our troops on the mainland. It is a colossal waste of manpower, material and money. In the tropics it reduces rapidly the resistance to tropical diseases and wastage of men increases rapidly. It encourages the enemy and gives him increasing influence and control over the natives.

Blamey’s statements raise several questions which will be discussed in the next chapter. The statement that seems particularly doubtful, however, is that ‘it encourages the enemy and gives him increasing influence and control over the natives.’ The Japanese were very arrogant and brutal in their dealings with the natives, and whatever encouragement they might gain from Allied inactivity would be minimal.

The aggressive attitude implied by Blamey was present in most of the senior officers on Bougainville and in many of the troops. The actions there were undertaken professionally, courageously and with the dedication typical of the Australian soldier. The campaign on Bougainville resolved itself into three simultaneous offensives:

• In the north of the island, to force the enemy into the Bonis Peninsula and there destroy him;

• In the central sector to clear Pearl Ridge and then patrol aggressively to threaten the enemy lines of communication along the east coast;

• To advance south towards the main enemy concentration, to destroy his gardens and ultimately all his forces.42

The GOC 3rd Infantry Division was Major General William Bridgeford. He was an ex-cavalry officer who had been GOC 3rd Armoured Division until it was disbanded in October 1943.43 His experience would have made him aware that, in spite of the difficult terrain, tanks could provide life-saving support to his infantry. Initially, however, he was allotted only B Squadron of the 2/4th Armoured Regiment. This squadron, under the command of Major Ken Arnott, sailed from Madang on 14 December 1944 and reached Torokina two weeks later.

Bougainville, 30 March 1945. Matildas of 2/4 Armoured Regiment wait to cross a bridge on the Toko–Darara Road as sappers of 15 Field Company RAE put the last planks in position (AWM 090279).

B Squadron was able to prove the value of tank support in an action on 31 March during the Buin offensive.44 The 25th Infantry Battalion was astride the Buin Road near the Puriata River when it was counter-attacked and two companies were cut off. On the night of 30 March, B Squadron reached the 25th Battalion HQ. The next day, the tanks moved forward and the Japanese, without anti-tank weapons, retreated. The two companies were saved without loss. Five days later the tanks helped drive off a Japanese attack on Slater’s Knoll.

Bougainville, 26 April 1945. Matildas of 2/4 Armoured Regiment cross the ford over the Sindou River on the Buin Road. They are supporting an advance by 24 Infantry Battalion which is to relieve an ambushed tractor train (AWM 091229).

The remainder of the offensive along the Buin Road allowed the tanks, often assisted by sappers and bulldozers, to traverse some very difficult terrain and to provide frontal and flanking support to the infantry. The strength of the tank force was augmented early in May 1945 with the arrival of Regimental HQ and A Squadron of the 2/4th Armoured Regiment.45 This allowed the tanks to provide more support to the infantry, although the Japanese continued fighting along the Buin Road until the war ended on 15 August.

Tanks were unable to participate in the central offensives on Bougainville due to the very rugged terrain. In the north, a troop of tanks was sent to help the infantry in the Soraken Plantation area. On 25 July they went into action with the 27th Infantry Battalion. The ground was too swampy for the tanks to advance towards the objective, but they were able to provide useful fire support.

Bougainville. Bougainville is the largest of the Solomon Islands, 40 miles wide and 120 miles long. The mountain range which forms its backbone rises to a height of 8,500 feet.

Borneo

Fighting by the Australians in Borneo in 1945 consisted of three operations. Designated Operation Oboe, they employed the 7th and 9th Infantry Divisions and the 1st and 2/9th Armoured Regiments. The operations, orders of battle, and planned start dates were:

• Oboe 1: Tarakan; 26th Brigade of 9th Division and C Squadron of 2/9th Armoured Regt; 1 May 1945

• Oboe 6: Brunei Bay; 20th and 24th Brigades of 9th Division; HQ and A and B Squadrons of 2/9th Armoured Regiment; 10 June

• Oboe 2: Balikpapan; 18th and 21st Brigades of 7th Infantry Division and A and B Squadrons of 1st Armoured Regiment

The various orders of battle indicate that there was a willingness to use tanks in greater numbers than in previous operations. Gun tanks and some specialist tanks were used. Frogs (Matildas converted to flame-throwing tanks) were used during Oboe 6, while Oboe 2 saw the employment of a troop of Frogs, a troop of tank-dozers and a Covenanter bridge-layer.

Tarakan, Borneo, 5 May 1945. Tank crews of 12 Troop C Squadron 2/9 Armoured Regiment enjoy a meal during a pause in their advance (AWM 089482).

During the action on Tarakan, the tanks were confronted with terrain more difficult than any other they had encountered in the South West Pacific Area.46 There were boggy hollows, pockets of heavy jungle and short, precipitous slopes. Where the tanks could move along the tracks, they found that the Japanese had blocked and mined them and, in places, covered them with artillery. The tanks provided what support they could to the infantry, but Tarakan, ‘a raft of mud anchored in the Celebes Sea’, was certainly not tank country.

The initial operations in Brunei Bay included the capture of Brunei Town and Labuan Island. In advancing to Brunei Town, A Squadron of the 2/9th Armoured Regiment found its path blocked by a creek. No engineer assistance was available to assist the tanks to cross, so the town was taken by the infantry.

The actions on Labuan Island were more difficult, but the terrain allowed the tanks to provide support in combined operations with the infantry and the sappers. Frogs were used to great effect in some of the later actions on Labuan.47

Balikpapan, Borneo, 1 July 1945, Operation Oboe 2. Soldiers of 18 Infantry Brigade supported by Matildas of 1 Armoured Regiment move forward after the landing (AWM 110422).

Operation Oboe 2 at Balikpapan employed two squadrons of tanks, more than had been assigned to any previous operation. It is perhaps significant that this was the last major action of the Australian Army in World War II and it was not until then that the benefits of tanks working as part of a battle group were appreciated by the higher command.48

In spite of difficult going, this time caused by soft, sandy ground, the tanks of A and B Squadrons of the 1st Armoured Regiment provided valuable support to the infantry. Their only equipment failures were the tank-dozers. These proved quite unsatisfactory, so their blades were removed and they were used as gun tanks. The D8 tractors were then used for the recovery of bogged tanks.

The gun tanks and Frogs provided effective assistance to the infantry at Balikpapan. They were helped by the slightly better going, and by the fact that the Japanese had no useful anti-tank guns. The Japanese compensated for this lack, however, by creative use of mines and anti-tank ditches.

All the operations on Borneo demonstrated the value of tanks in saving infantry lives, even in some of the most challenging terrain. The more training and experience tank crews completed in jungle conditions, the better equipped they were to surmount the extraordinary difficulties of the country. It was certainly regrettable that more of the unused armoured regiments were not mobilised for these final campaigns.

Borneo. The battles in Borneo were fought in North Borneo and on the east coast at Tarakan and Balikpapan.

Chapter 8:

WASTED EFFORT

This chapter reviews the efforts of the Australian Government and Army to create and use armoured forces in World War II through the establishment of two main projects. The first project involved the creation of the Australian Armoured Corps, the second the production of a locally made tank. Both projects consumed substantial resources in terms of manpower, materials, equipment, and enthusiasm. Both produced very little useful output for employment on operations.

The preceding chapters examined Australia’s World War II armoured experience in terms of:

• The growth and decline of armoured formations, including where they were employed;

• The attempt to manufacture a cruiser tank in Australia;

• The lessons learned by those armoured units that saw action.

While the armoured units involved in operations overseas fought with distinction, the total investment in tank forces yielded only a small dividend. There was considerable waste of resources that could have been used elsewhere in a far more valuable contribution to the global Allied war effort. This wastage resulted from decisions made by the Government and the Army. This chapter examines the reasons for those decisions —all of which were well-intentioned◦— and explores alternative courses of action that could have avoided this reprehensible waste of resources.

Armoured formations

The growth and decline of armoured formations

For more than a year after the beginning of the war there was little interest in establishing armoured formations. Authority to create an armoured division was finally granted in December 1940. Once commenced, the process was rapid and efficient. However, the lead times inherent in such a process meant that, with the outbreak of the war against Japan on 7 December 1941, the Australian Armoured Division was far from fully trained, and was almost completely unequipped.

By July 1942 the division was ready to conduct exercises as a complete formation. These exercises, held between August and October, brought all its constituent units together to meld a highly professional formation, ready for action in whatever theatre of war it might be needed.

By now there was a natural reluctance on the part of the Government and the Army to send the division to the Middle East◦— the theatre for which it had been trained. The Japanese posed a very real threat to mainland Australia and the division was an important component in Australia’s defence. In fact armour was considered so important that additional armoured formations were created and, by November 1942, there were three armoured divisions and one Army Tank Brigade.

In spite of the amassing of this considerable force, it was not until late 1942 that an opportunity arose to use tanks in support of infantry◦— in what appeared to be the highly unsuitable terrain of the north coast of New Guinea.

The Stuart tanks used in the Buna-Sanananda battles of 1942–3 were unsuited to jungle fighting but, in spite of all the difficulties, the 2/6th Armoured Regiment provided useful support and saved many infantry lives. The valuable contribution of the tanks in these battles persuaded the Army that there was a need for a specially trained formation to provide tank support in the jungle.

To meet this need, the 4th Armoured Brigade (Tropical Scale) was formed on 15 February 1943.1 It comprised three armoured regimental groups, each with sufficient support under its commander to be attached to an infantry formation. This meant that Brigade HQ was more administrative than operational, and that it was under strength compared to a standard armoured brigade.

The composition of the brigade changed from time to time and, in February 1944, there were five regimental groups: the 1st Tank Battalion (later the 1st Armoured Regiment), and the 2/4th, 2/5th, 2/7th and 2/9th Armoured Regiments. The 1st Armoured Regiment saw action in the Finschhafen area from November 1943 to January 1944, and at Balikpapan in July 1945. The 2/4th was part of the campaign to capture Wewak between late 1944 and early 1945, and the 2/9th fought in Bougainville from March 1945 to the end of the war.

Of all the regimental-sized units in the Australian Armoured Corps during World War II, only seven saw action. Three of these were the cavalry regiments included on the establishment of the infantry divisions, namely the 2/6th, 2/7th and 2/9th Cavalry Regiments. These fought in the campaigns in which their respective divisions took part in North Africa and Syria. All three were converted to cavalry (commando) regiments at various times in 1942 and 1943.2

The other formations of the Armoured Corps were less fortunate: none of the divisions saw action as divisions and none of the brigades as brigades. Of the thirteen armoured regiments and the three special purpose squadrons, only four of the regiments saw action. In those actions they were employed only as squadrons, never as a complete regiment and frequently the actions were as single troops and occasionally as single tanks.

Shaggy Ridge, New Guinea, 10 January 1944. This was some of the country in which 2/9 Infantry Battalion had to fight. Quite obviously no tank support could be expected (AWM 070004).

One indicator of the severity of battle is the number of casualties. This is by no means a completely valid criterion, because casualties are sometimes caused by the incompetence of the commander and the nature of the battles fought. However, the numbers provide interesting comparisons. For the whole of World War II, the total number of armoured soldiers killed◦— including killed in action (KIA) and died of wounds (DOW)◦— amounted to eighty-two for the three cavalry regiments and thirty-six for all other armoured regiments.3 By way of comparison, the 2/9th Infantry Battalion suffered 287 casualties.

Infantry losses are almost invariably higher than those of any other arm and the 2/9th Infantry Battalion fought a long war. The battalion saw action at Giarabub and Tobruk in North Africa, at Milne Bay, Cape Endaiadere and Sanananda in Papua, on Shaggy Ridge in New Guinea and at Balikpapan in Borneo.4

The tank crews were always willing to fight, and when they did it was with courage and determination, often in appalling conditions for tanks. The drivers and commanders in New Guinea and the islands were able to traverse ground that would have been considered totally impassable by crews who fought in North Africa and Europe. Even the tanks that fought with Slim in Burma would have sent their congratulations.5

The creation of the Australian armoured formations in World War II was a remarkable feat and, by September 1942, the 1st Armoured Division was a world-class fighting force. It was a tragic waste of time, effort, resources and enthusiasm that it was allowed to contribute so little compared with what it could have done and was more than willing to do.

Reasons for waste

With the exception of a very small number of enthusiasts, the Australian Army in 1939 appeared to have no interest in tanks. The tank supporters were predominantly in the militia and their tanks were almost obsolete. The only officer of any seniority prepared to advocate for tanks before 1939 was Major Ronald Hopkins. In May 1939 he was appointed GSO 2 (Mechanisation and Armoured Fighting Vehicles) in the Directorate of Staff Duties at Army Headquarters. The appointment lapsed in November 1939 and the role remained unfilled until Hopkins, now a Lieutenant Colonel, was appointed Deputy Director of Staff Duties (AFVs) in November 1940.6

There was thus a gap of a year in which there was no-one to advance the cause of tanks at Army HQ. It is curious that there was such a lack of interest. Monash had appreciated what tanks could do as part of a team and the Battle of Hamel on 4 July 1918 was a masterpiece of integration of infantry, artillery, tanks and air power. Many other similar actions took place from 8 August 1918 to the end of World War I.

The experience of the Australian Army with tanks was positive in 1918, but the Australian attitude always seemed to be coloured by the disaster of the First Battle of Bullecourt in April 1917.7 Because the unreliable tanks did not provide the anticipated support in this action, the Australian infantry suffered grievous casualties. Their deep mistrust of tanks remained as a haunting memory and the subalterns of 1918, generals in 1939, may have harboured this lack of trust.

The example of the British Army’s attitude to tanks from 1919 to 1939 was also unhelpful. Despite some successful innovations in tank manoeuvre around 1930, development of British armour regressed from then on. It was not helped by the dogmatic stance of British tankmen such as Percy Hobart.8 Although a brilliant trainer, he was unwilling to accept that tanks required the support of other arms or, more correctly, that tanks were essentially a supporting arm. The concept of integration was foreign to the British Army, with particularly disastrous results in North Africa.

This compartmenting of the branches of the British Army also meant that force commanders, either infantry or cavalry, had little idea as to how they should use tanks. Nigel Duncan, ultimately a tank major general, commented that, during his time as a subaltern, the attention given to training in the use of armour was almost non-existent.9 In 1935 he attended Staff College and, in an interview in 1978, he was asked about the Staff College instructors’ attitude to armour.10 He replied that ‘Armour teaching was disgraceful at Staff College. The handling of armour was virtually ignored.’ The Staff College students of 1935 were those who would have to command or employ armoured formations from 1939 to 1945. No wonder there were so few who could do this competently.

In the Australian Army, which was guided to a considerable extent by the methods of the British Army, knowledge of tank warfare was not considered sufficiently important to devote any more than slight attention. Indeed, there was effectively no Australian armour at the time of the outbreak of war in 1939. It is astonishing that the success of the German armoured divisions in Poland in September 1939 did not strongly suggest to the Australian Army and Government that tanks had become an essential part of an army. The CGS initiated a move in the right direction in October 1939, but the idea fell on stony ground and his suggestion was not pursued.

It was not until the much more alarming and far greater success of German armour in overrunning France in May and June 1940 that attention was paid to the true effectiveness of armour by the Minister for the Army, Geoffrey Street. Street had served with distinction in the First World War and had risen to the rank of brigadier in the militia. On 24 June he submitted to the War Cabinet, of which he was a member, Agendum 150/1940 ‘Production orders for Armoured Fighting Vehicles’.11 While this was an important step for Australian armour, it was a somewhat imprecise document, stating as it did that, because German tanks were successful in Poland, Belgium and France, Australia should have some too.

Street used the word ‘provision’ rather than ‘production’, thus implying that, if they could be procured from overseas, that would serve. But at that time Britain required every ounce of resource for the defence of the British Isles and the USA was not in a position to supply tanks. The tanks would have to be made locally.

How Street envisaged using the tanks was also imprecise. He comments in the agendum that ‘the most effective against the AFV is the AFV’, but mentions no other uses for tanks. He suggests that an armoured division should be formed and that tanks should be provided to the Army generally.

Street was not alone in his lack of precision. Doctrine for the use of tanks has exercised the minds of military thinkers since they first appeared on the battlefield in 1916. British analysts held varying views, and this lack of single direction combined with a lack of funding meant that, by 1940, the best the British Army could boast in the way of tanks was a brigade and a division. The 1st Army Tank Brigade had two battalions, the 4th and 7th RTR. They were armed partly with the useless Infantry Tanks Mark I, but had a few Matildas which gave the Germans something of a fright. The 1st Armoured Division was incomplete, and was able to achieve nothing. The purpose of the tank brigade was to support the infantry, which it did quite well. The purpose of the armoured division was to provide a powerful mobile striking force capable of exploiting a breakthrough and pursuing a broken enemy. German tank doctrine was better articulated, as events in Poland and France demonstrated. The key factor was the cooperation and understanding between all arms working together as a battle-group or kampfgruppe. Russian doctrine, in spite of the emasculation of its officer corps in 1937, was sufficiently flexible to learn from its mistakes and, in time, rivalled that of Germany.

Australian tank doctrine was first briefly promulgated in a paper written by Hopkins on 13 November 1940 which reiterated the statement that ‘the only reply to the armoured attack lies in the counter-action by our own AFVs.’12 Because Australian armoured units were not in action until December 1942, there was little experience to guide the modification of doctrine to suit the needs of the battlefield. However, doctrine evolved for jungle warfare from that time on was practical and effective.

As the dates above suggest, the creation of an Australian armoured force was a lengthy process, even after the outbreak of war. Street was the instigator of that force and maintained its momentum until his tragic death in an aircraft crash on 13 August 1940. His death appears to form part of the reason for the sluggish progression of his proposals until 7 January 1941, on which date the War Cabinet approved the formation of an armoured division and the gazetting of the Australian Armoured Corps.13

Activity had, in fact, been instigated prior to this date and, in 1941, great strides were made. The development of the tank training establishments and field units was an excellent piece of planning and a well-executed project. Hopkins had planned for the armoured division to complete its training by mid-1942. It took slightly longer but, by September 1942, the 1st Armoured Division had exercised as a complete division at Narrabri.

Unfortunately, the slow start meant that the timing was flawed. When Japan entered the war on 7 December 1941, the 1st Armoured Division was ill-prepared for battle. By the time it was ready in August 1942, the threat to mainland Australia was such that the division was forced to remain to protect the homeland. The 9th Cavalry Regiment saw action at Alamein but, after that, all the operations of the Australian Army were concentrated in the islands to the north of Australia, the Malay Barrier.

Much of the country in those islands was jungle and previous notions of tank use determined that they could not serve any useful purpose in close country. This was regrettable, especially for the soldiers of the 8th Division in Malaya, where the Japanese made very effective use of tanks. As Hopkins notes:

In Malaya, the 8th Australian Division had been held in reserve until the later stages of the campaign when the Japanese advance had reached a point well south of Kuala Lumpur. It had no armour as its divisional cavalry regiment had been handed over to the 9th Division before leaving Australia. The reason for this was that it was thought that tanks, even the light tanks of the cavalry, would be unusable in the jungle terrain which covered the greater part of the peninsula. This was not only the view of the divisional commander, Major-General H. Gordon Bennett; a not inconsiderable body of service opinion thought the same way at that time. How wrong they were is a matter of history.14

In fact, the going in Malaya, judging from the illustrations in the Official History and the rapid movement of Japanese tanks, was eminently suitable in many areas for the effective use of tanks.15 The British experience in Burma also demonstrated that the terrain was suitable for tanks. In February 1942, the 7th Hussars and 2nd RTR of the 7th Armoured Brigade arrived in Rangoon. In the retreat from Rangoon to the north and eventually to India, the 7th Brigade provided valuable support to the Burma Corps in conditions similar to those in Malaya.16

Malaya, 17 January 1942. A Japanese Type 97 tankette camouflaged by leaves during the invasion of Malaya. Japanese tanks were very effective in speeding up their army’s advance, even though the Malayan terrain had been considered tank-proof by the Australian High Command (AWM 127895).

While the Japanese used tanks successfully in Malaya, conditions in Papua-New Guinea, the Solomons and Borneo were far more difficult. There were practically no roads, the jungle was dense, there were many creeks and swamps and much of the terrain was hilly and precipitous. However, by creating the Tropical Scale 4th Armoured Brigade and by evolving practical combined tactics with infantry, artillery, and engineers, the tanks were able to save many lives and assist in the achievement of military objectives.

The contribution of tanks to the war effort was significant, but it was a great deal less significant than it could have been. There were large numbers of tank units available in 1942 and 1943 which were practically unused. While large tank forces could have been employed to great effect in 1944 and 1945, tanks were used in small quantities only.

Because all the branches of the Army◦— and the Navy and Air Force◦— were competing for a share of a limited stock of resources, it was essential to determine where the investment would generate the best return. The most important resource was manpower and, even in early 1942, the supply was beginning to fall short of demand. Material and production resources were also beginning to be squeezed.

Determining the optimum allocation to the branches of the services was, and still is, a very difficult problem. It was particularly difficult for a government facing the threat of invasion for the first time in the country’s history. Furthermore, the Army Command had no experience in of the use of tanks and thus no means of determining where they could make the most cost-effective contribution to the Army’s war effort.

It was not until three years after the outbreak of war that Australia had an armoured division ready for battle. It was another year before a tank formation, the 4th Armoured Brigade, was trained and ready to fight in the jungle. This provides some indication of the lead time required to develop battleworthy formations. Ideally, some assessment of where tanks are likely to be needed should be completed in the time it takes to raise, train and equip the appropriate tank formation.

The basic military concepts of concentration of force, clear objective, surprise, and fire and movement apply wherever soldiers have to fight. These must be learnt and modified to suit the different environments where actions are fought. The plains of northern Europe, the snow-covered steppes of Russia, the mountains of Italy, the deserts of North Africa and the jungles of New Guinea are some of the environments in which tanks have fought. Before allocating resources to creating and maintaining a tank force, the Government, with the advice of Army Command, must ascertain where they are likely to be fighting in the lead time that it takes to prepare them and make decisions accordingly.

The same reasoning also applies to the provision of the AFVs themselves.

The Australian Cruiser (AC) Sentinel Tank

The second project in the creation of the Australian armoured force involved production of a locally made tank. This project ended in failure and wasted effort, but the process itself overcame many daunting technical difficulties and material shortages. The concept of the tank was admirable, particularly for its low profile and the curved shape of the hull and turret. However, it was designed for 1941 and could not possibly have been battleworthy before 1944, by which time it would have been out of date◦— and, as it eventuated, had been laid to rest.

This section summarises the history of local tank production and identifies some of the reasons for the project’s failure. The chronology of the project is outlined in Appendix 2 and the details of the events are described in the sections dealing with local tank production in Chapters 3, 4, 5, and 6.

History of tank production in Australia: a summary

Prior to 1939 the Australian Army had shown little interest in tanks. The outbreak of war prompted some action and, in October 1939, the CGS asked the Master-General of the Ordnance to develop a pilot model of a light cruiser tank. This request was neither acted upon nor followed up. It was not until the triumph of German tanks in the downfall of France in May and June 1940 that the value of tanks was recognised.

In June two proposals for the provision of tanks were put to the War Cabinet. Both were given qualified approval, but action was slow until the arrival of the tank design expert Colonel Watson in December 1940. During the first half of 1941 there was considerable progress, but not always in the right direction. There were variations to the user specification, for example in the thickness of the armour. A deeper understanding of the capabilities and limitations of local manufacturers forced changes to the way in which the user specification could be converted to reality.

An AC1 in 1942. It was armed with a 2-pdr gun, which by this time had become obsolete. It proved an adaptable design, but development had started too late for any chance of a battleworthy tank before 1944 or 1945 (AWM 133677).

In June 1941 a proposal for a simpler model, the AC2, was submitted and approved, although production of the original design, the AC1, was to continue. Almost as soon as the AC2 project began, its value was questioned. Cabinet confirmed its continuation in August, but in September its value was queried again and in October production was halted.

In the week before Pearl Harbor, the Army needed 1,000 tanks and had eighteen, of which ten were Stuarts and eight were obsolete British light tanks. Once the USA had joined the war and British tank production was in full swing, Percy Spender, a former Minister for the Army, suggested that all tanks should now be obtained from overseas, and the local program shut down.

Blamey told Spender and the Prime Minister that the AC1 was an outstandingly successful tank, and the Prime Minister agreed that the program should continue. It now became clear that the AC1 with its 2-pdr gun would be no match for German tanks, although it would still be adequate against the Japanese. In May 1942, development of the AC3 with a 25-pdr gun was approved and, according to Blamey, it was a first-class modern tank. In August, Spender continued to query the value of the entire tank project, but the War Cabinet, Blamey and MacArthur steadfastly maintained that the project should be executed with the utmost vigour.

Towards the end of 1942 the US authorities who were affected by the tank project, the Lend-Lease Administration, Munitions Assignment Board and the Department of Ordnance, became concerned that the project was consuming resources that could be used for tasks more critical to the global war effort. In February 1943 Australia had more than 1,000 serviceable imported tanks, but the CGS continued to argue that local production should continue.

The US authorities were becoming increasingly dissatisfied and were now supported by a number of Australian politicians and senior Army officers. Finally, in March 1943, the Lend-Lease Administration sent Colonel Green to Australia to examine the nation’s need for tanks. Green presented his report in May, advocating cessation of the complete program except development work on the AC4, which was to mount a 17-pdr gun.

In July 1943 the War Cabinet approved cessation of the tank program and, when approached for his opinion, MacArthur concurred with the decision. In August proposals were made for the disposal of tanks and components at varying stages of manufacture and, in the end, sixty-five tanks were completed which were only ever used for training. The project had produced little of any value and consumed substantial resources. This occurred despite the fact that the project team had met and overcome prodigious difficulties and developed some ingenious solutions, as was explicitly acknowledged by Green in his report.

Why was the tank project a failure?

It was time that was at the heart of the failure. The project started too late and, given the late start, an Australian-made tank capable of matching the tanks of 1945 could not have been produced before the end of the war.

As noted, up to 1939 the Australian Army expressed very little apparent interest in acquiring an armoured force. British tank forces were pitifully inadequate in 1939, in quality and quantity and in doctrine. Because the Australian Army was strongly influenced by the British, it is not surprising that the Australians did not consider tanks to be of prime importance in 1939. The success of the German tanks in Poland, however, was noticed by the High Command. On 18 October 1939, Lieutenant General Squires, who had just been appointed CGS, asked the Master-General of Ordnance to produce a light cruiser tank to pilot stage. Few details are known about this request including, for example, the user specification. What is certain is that there was no discernible action by Ordnance to comply or by the CGS to expedite. Ordnance had such a heavy workload in developing weapons and ammunition for the services, including the construction of factories and other infrastructure, that they may simply have had no time for a completely new project. Had the project been pushed by Squires, some action might have been taken, but he too was fully occupied in expanding the Army. His health may also have been an issue: he died on 3 March 1940.17

The fall of France provided a greater incentive than Poland and, in June 1940, Street proposed the provision of tanks and the creation of a tank division.18 This proposal was approved, but follow-up was slow, and was not helped by the death of Street in an air crash on 13 August. There seems to have been a lack of urgency until the beginning of 1941, when Colonel Watson took charge of the design of the AC1.

There was thus a delay of fifteen months from the outbreak of war until a genuine commitment to build a local tank was evident. This delay ensured that no Australian tank could be ready for battle until the end of 1944 at the earliest.

Extravagant promises were made to have tanks ready by November 1941, then by May 1942 and so on. Such estimates were wishful thinking. They took no account of the number of tasks to be produced and the time that each task would realistically take. The planning of the project was not helped by the uncertainty of the user requirements, the restrictions on what could be procured from overseas and the shortage of such vital factors as machine tools and skilled labour. For example, the engine power for the tank changed from three Cadillac engines to a single Guiberson 400 hp radial diesel and then to two Pratt & Whitney single-row Wasp aero engines.19 It seems that the project team believed that the change from one sort of engine to another would not significantly affect the design of other parts of the tank.

There seemed to be no realistic way of estimating how long project activities should take, particularly those relating to trials. The assumption was that the initial trial of a pilot or production model would be successful, or very nearly so, and the project team could quickly move on to the next step. In fact a tank is a complicated piece of equipment and modifications will always be required.

The project also had many stakeholders and all of these had the right to examine and comment on all stages of design and production. The Army High Command was concerned that the tank be battle-competitive when it reached the battlefield; tank crews were keen to ensure its combat suitability and user-friendliness; maintenance crews at all levels were interested in the tank’s serviceability and ease of repair; and manufacturers were affected by its ease of construction given the materials and facilities available.

In any project, the observations of the stakeholders are essential and take time to gather and assess. Modifications are made, and further trials are held. The iterative process may take months, both with the pilot and the production model. There are many examples of tanks that could have been satisfactory had more time been spent trialling and listening to the feedback of the stakeholder observers.20

In the case of the Australian cruiser, the initial predictions of time were exceedingly optimistic. This is strange, because Watson was nominated as a tank expert and must have possessed some knowledge of the length of the production process. One example of the time required to produce a tank, tested and ready for use by field units, was available in the development of the US M26 (Pershing). Design commenced in May 1942 with the finished tank intended to replace the Sherman. The M26 went through a number of variations and prototypes, and was finally standardised as the M26 in March 1945. In spite of the advantages of a chain of proven tanks, considerable know-how in tank design and manufacture and modern and very large manufacturing facilities, it had still taken three years to put a new tank on the battlefield.

In terms of the quality of a tank or any other piece of military hardware, statements by senior officers are sometimes viewed as if they are sacrosanct and a thoroughly uninformed opinion may be taken by less elevated mortals to be the complete truth. Blamey, for example, stated on 17 April 1942 that the AC1 was ‘outstandingly successful’ and, on 18 June, called the AC3 an ‘outstanding modern tank’. MacArthur was not quite so specific, but on 28 August 1942 he heartily agreed that Australia should have a tank production policy. By 1943 MacArthur was becoming less and less interested in the Australian Army and he was happy to provide a soothing answer when asked. Blamey, on the other hand, was vitally interested in the Australian Army. His continued encouragement of the tank program is hard to understand, unless he was misinformed on the real state of the program or had some undisclosed reason for wanting it to continue.

An AC3 with 25-pdr gun. Although none of the Australian Cruisers went to war, the basic design of the AC1 was far-sighted. The turret ring and turret were enlarged first for the 25-pdr AC3 and again for the 17-pdr AC4, in neither case requiring significant modifications to the rest of the tank (Tank Museum image).

The status of the tank program in mid-1943 is accurately summarised by Butlin, who notes how those closely involved and committed to the development of Australian armour were blind to its inefficient use of national resources. Only the more objective view of the Americans, and their denial of support, terminated the project.

Feedback from armoured operations

Those Armoured Corps units that saw active service performed well and provided useful support to the infantry and other arms. The 2/6th, 2/7th and 2/9th Cavalry Regiments provided valuable service to their divisions in the battles in North Africa and Syria. In the last half of the war they were converted to cavalry (commando) regiments. In that role they once again demonstrated their fighting qualities as highly trained and formidable units. Hopkins comments on the conversion:

The Australian divisional cavalry regiments all contained some of our most highly trained and experienced armoured personnel. On return from the Middle East their role as commando units was considered by many, including the units themselves, as a serious and unfortunate waste of skilled manpower. It is true some officers and NCOs, from time to time, were transferred to armoured units in Australia in order to pass on their knowledge and experience. These were a small proportion; opponents of the change felt that it would have been much more satisfactory to retain all of them in an armoured role.

The actual decision was based on the slender opportunities for employment of light armoured reconnaissance units in jungle areas. This implied no serious lack of faith in armour but only in a particular type of armoured unit.21

The other four armoured units that saw action in the islands of the Malay Barrier came under the command of the 4th Armoured Brigade, whose war establishment was tailored to jungle conditions. They, too, provided valuable support for their infantry, helping them to achieve their objectives with fewer casualties. Perhaps more importantly, they learnt from difficulties encountered and operational failures. This feedback they incorporated into training instructions and operating procedures and into suggestions for the modification of equipment. Two significant documents recorded this feedback: the 4th Armoured Brigade Training Instruction No. 7; and Armoured lessons learned from operations in SWPA, published by the Armoured Centre in 1984.22

January 1942, Syria. Light tanks of 7 Division Cavalry Regiment on manoeuvres near Aleppo, faintly seen in the distance. There is winter snow on the ground, but the going appears fairly good.

Training Instruction No 7

This instruction was issued on 8 February 1944. It was based on the experience of tanks in the armour/infantry operations at Sattelberg and along the New Guinea coast north of Finschhafen. The ‘General’ section of the instruction provides a summary of the lessons learnt:

Matilda tanks were employed in jungle warfare for the first time during operations north of Finschhafen during November and December 1943. Until then it was generally considered that the jungle was tank-proof. However, a close reconnaissance of this country showed that the terrain was better than expected for the use of tanks. Their subsequent success proved that there was much greater scope for tanks in the jungle than had been previously thought. The terrain did present great difficulties, but in every case they were overcome. New techniques and tactics were developed, and a careful study of these should prove of much value in future training.

The employment of tanks was undoubtedly responsible for the saving of many infantry casualties, and it is possible that the mere threat of tanks caused the enemy to give up without a fight in situations where he would normally have fought to the last man. However, neither infantry nor tanks should be lulled into a false sense of security by this success. Either because of the unexpected appearance of tanks, or because they were ignorant of how to deal with them, the enemy missed many opportunities to delay or even destroy the tanks. They had no anti-tank gun that could penetrate the Matilda’s armour, and their mines were quite inadequate.

We cannot hope to find ourselves in such a fortunate position again when we next employ tanks against the Japanese. Experience has shown that it is unwise to rely on armour alone; we must have good plans backed up by effective cooperation between infantry, engineers, and tanks. Tanks on their own can be destroyed by anti-tank guns and mines.

The detailed sections of the instruction cover the role and importance of the engineers in jungle fighting, tank/infantry cooperation, reconnaissance and the approach march, protection of tanks at night, indication of targets and communication, Japanese anti-tank methods, and the performance of some of the weapons used by the 4th Armoured Brigade. The instruction also deals with maintenance, replenishment, medical facilities and physical fitness, and personal equipment.

Subsequent operations at Wewak and in Bougainville and Borneo allowed continuing evaluation of tactics and procedures to meet the difficult jungle conditions and to combat new anti-tank methods developed by the Japanese.

Armoured lessons learned from operations in SWPA

While published by the Armoured Centre in 1984, Armoured lessons learned from operations in SWPA was almost certainly written earlier, although the date and identity of the author are unknown. The 4th Armoured Brigade clearly had a hand in its authorship, with possible inputs from the infantry formations that had been supported by the tanks. It covers some of the topics dealt with in Instruction No. 7, but adds general recommendations on training, allotment of armour, planning and amphibious operations and liaison.

Training

Two types of training were suggested: first for armour and second for cooperation between armour and other arms, particularly infantry. The specific armour training included conversion to new equipment and the training of regimental instructors. Joint training with infantry was intended to provide each arm an understanding of the tactics and procedures of the other and to develop mutual confidence. The training was to be conducted at the three levels of troop/platoon, squadron/company and regiment/battalion.

At the troop/platoon level tank crews were sent to live with infantry units, bringing their tanks with them. Each party would become familiar with the weapons, tactics, communications, and general living conditions of the other. The infantry were to ride on the tanks, both to develop a feel for tank movement, to understand the tank crew’s vision limitations and to see how they could safely use the tank as a means of transport when opportunity afforded.

Combined training for squadrons and companies built on the training for troops and platoons and included practising various tactical formations, communication from infantry to tanks and vice versa, mutual protection in battle and in laager, and indication of targets. This would be reinforced by joint field firing exercises with all weapons of both arms using live ammunition.

At the regimental level the training was designed for the commanders of all arms at least down to troop leaders and platoon commanders and, if possible, to the next subordinate level. The training was to include TEWTs, discussions, sand-table exercises and set-piece demonstrations using live ammunition.23 The participating weapons were the standard infantry and tank weapons as well as artillery, mortars and aircraft. It was noted that ‘many officers of other arms, including some of senior rank, revealed very little knowledge of armour’s possibilities and limitations. This type of training is therefore essential.’

Allotment of armour

After training exercise ‘Robin’ in July 1944, the COs of the 2/4th and 2/9th Armoured Regiments argued that armour should be allotted on the scale of one regiment per infantry division. The exercise had shown that infantry commanders were continually asking for tanks, and it was argued that the sentiments expressed during the exercise would be duplicated on the battlefield. It was recommended that the allotment be permanent, thus ensuring familiarity and confidence between the two arms.

Tank forces in action should be commanded by the most senior tank officer capable of exercising command. In the jungle this would often be the Squadron Leader, or even the Troop Leader. This could throw heavy responsibility on junior officers, who should not accept being ‘run’ by the infantry commander. A troop leader should remain mounted to fight his troop as it was observed that most casualties occurred outside the tank.

In the jungle the Squadron Leader can be at a static command post, in a jeep, or in his own tank. He must be in constant communication with the infantry commander, and able to direct his tanks for optimum effect. The CO assumes direct command only when more than one squadron is in the same operation, which will be seldom. His role is to decide with infantry commanders the policy for the use of tanks, to allot troops, ensure reliefs and provide administrative and technical support.

Planning, including amphibious operations

Planning for jungle operations followed the same procedure as for any action. It was noted, however, that ‘infantry commanders made an infantry plan, and then “fitted the tanks in”. This is wrong.’ Each operation should be a combined operation, taking into account the capabilities and limitations of each arm to arrive at the best compromise. The joint planning will always include the sappers and, where they can be used, artillery, mortars, aircraft and other arms.

Experience confirmed that success resulted from thorough planning, while hasty planning usually meant failure. Planning itself had to be planned so that there would be sufficient time for soldiers at all levels and in all arms to be aware of what was to be achieved and what part they had to play.

New Guinea, 22 September 1943. Loading the Finschhafen force equipment into an LST. The truck gives some idea of the size of the LST, and also shows how easily the LST can reach the beach (AWM 057442).

The report drew attention to the special care necessary when planning amphibious operations. Use of movement by sea allowed operation commanders considerable flexibility, regrettably inhibited by lack of landing craft. Planning had to include the Navy as an additional arm of the greatest importance. The Navy took charge of the operation until troops were landed on the hostile shore. If there were naval vessels that could supply additional firepower, they too were part of the planning team.

Cooperation and understanding between the Navy and the Army was essential for a successful landing. Joint training needed to be particularly intensive because of the unfamiliarity of sea with land and land with sea. The training needed to be practical, with Army troops embarking on landing craft, sailing to the hostile shore and disembarking in good order to go into action.

Liaison

To achieve maximum cooperation between infantry and tanks there needed to be good liaison at all levels. At regimental level it was between the tank CO and the GOC of the infantry division, supplemented by liaison officers from both arms. At the squadron level the Squadron Reconnaissance Officer fulfilled his traditional role of liaison with the relevant infantry commander.

At troop level, when a troop was operating on its own, an additional officer was required to provide liaison between the troop leader and the infantry commander. This temporary liaison officer acted as advisor to the infantry during reconnaissance and, on the approach march, moved with the infantry HQ during action and provided a communication link with the troop leader at all times during the action.

Comment on feedback

The feedback recorded in these two documents was objective, realistic and useful. It made suggestions on what could be improved, what future dangers might have to be addressed and what lessons should be communicated to soldiers taking part in future battles in jungle country. It suggested where tanks could be employed to the benefit of military operations, and also pointed out how the tanks and other arms, particularly infantry and engineers, should work together to provide mutual support.

Yet for various reasons, some valid and some not, the Australian Army relegated armour to a minor role in the years after 1945.24 US and British forces provided tank support in Korea, there was little need for tanks in Malaya and none during the Confrontation. When the opportunity to use tanks as a supporting arm arose during the Vietnam conflict from 1968 to 1971, many of the lessons learnt in the SWPA had to be relearned.

Wasted effort: the reasons

The Australian investment in armoured forces in World War II proved to be a significant waste of resources. Those resources could have been of much greater value to the Allied war effort if used elsewhere. These negative comments relate in no way to the labours of the fighting soldiers, who performed gallantly on the inhospitable battlefields to which they were called.

The blame for actions taken or not taken lies with the Government and the Army High Command. And yet at those levels there was just as much determination that Australia should make a worthwhile contribution to the war effort. There may have been some disagreements and some personal conflicts, but their determination was as resolute as that of the soldiers.

A voice in the wilderness

The Australian Army in World War II had no direct experience of commanding armoured operations as its infantry had been supported by British tanks with varying success. The fiasco and tragedy of First Bullecourt was a permanent slap in the face, and there was no desire after 1919 to investigate the potential of tanks in a future Australian Army. This is not surprising because the British Army, with extensive experience and success in using tanks, was also very doubtful in the immediate post-war years about the need to retain its Tank Corps.

When World War II broke out there was thus no-one to advise the Australian Government and Army on the benefits of having a tank arm. The senior officer concerned with tanks was Major Ronald Hopkins and he was too junior for his advice to be heard. The Government’s time was filled with a myriad of problems and decisions. Without the forceful promotion of the value of tanks, they found no time to devote to the matter.

This lack of understanding and enthusiasm persisted for at least the first nine months of the war. The success of German tanks in the conquest of France in May 1940 was an abrupt warning call. Even then, the view expressed was that ‘the Germans have made good use of tanks, we should have some too.’ In the agendum submitted to the War Cabinet asking for tanks, there was no indication as to how they were to be used, almost certainly because this was not known.

The senior commanders of the Army had no training or experience in the use of tanks, and they had no tank advisor of sufficient seniority to have credibility. They needed a man such as Brigadier Vyvyan Pope, appointed in 1940 as Advisor AFV to Lord Gort, Commander of the British Expeditionary Force in France. Even Pope, with many years in tank units and recent command of the 3rd Tank Brigade, ‘found difficulty in bringing expert advice to bear on senior officers who had habitually failed to acquaint themselves with the limitations, as well as the possibilities, of armour.’25

Senior officers in the Australian Army had no training in the limitations and possibilities of armour. Their first opportunities to evaluate armour came in the campaigns in North Africa, beginning with the 6th Division’s battle at Bardia in January 1941. The GOC 6th Division, General Iven Mackay, was very appreciative of the value of tanks in this and subsequent battles. General Blamey’s positive view of tanks, first gained at Hamel as Chief of Staff to Monash, was reinforced by what he saw in North Africa.

However, there was still no formal training for senior commanders in the use of armour. This resulted in such mistakes as the use of tanks in penny packets, rather than employing them in the largest possible tank formation consistent with the operation and the terrain. Another error was the inability to envisage where tanks could be used. General Gordon Bennett dismissed the use of tanks in Malaya because of the difficult terrain. His view was completely disproved by the effective employment of Japanese tanks, with unfortunate results for the infantry of all Allied nations in Malaya.

Optimum use of a scarce resource such as armour is not easy to control. The system devised by the British 79th Armoured Division, however, worked well.26 That division comprised a range of specialised tanks, often referred to as ‘funnies’. They included minesweeping tanks (flails), flame-throwers (crocodiles), bridge-layers, armoured personnel carriers, LVTs (landing vehicles tracked), amphibious tanks, and AVREs (armoured vehicles Royal Engineers) fitted with a variety of appliances.

An Armoured Vehicle Royal Engineers (AVRE) of 6 Assault Regiment, 79 Armoured Division. This vehicle is a Churchill Petard, armed with a 290mm mortar capable of sending a 20kg explosive charge to a distance of 80 metres. It would have been ideal for jungle operations (image from author’s collection).

Because they were all specialised, effective, and in limited supply, there had to be some means of ensuring that these tanks were used where they could do the most good. This was achieved by including officers of the 79th Armoured Division in the planning of a major operation in which their tanks could provide specialised support. If a particular ‘funny’ was allocated, for example, to an infantry division, a liaison officer would form part of the allocation. The tanks themselves were commanded by their usual commander and the liaison officer acted as advisor to the infantry commander. The liaison officer was, in fact, far more than an advisor, because he could tell the GOC how to use the special tanks; the liaison officer also had the authority to withdraw the funnies when the task for which they had been allocated had been completed.27

This type of system was developed by the Australian 4th Armoured Brigade in 1944 and 1945 and reinforced the same point◦— that the infantry did not have the authority to ‘run’ the tanks.

Take time by the forelock

Maintenance of national security requires, among other things, an intelligence system that alerts the government to potential dangers. That intelligence must be presented in sufficient time for the government to take steps to be physically ready to confront the danger when it becomes real. Inattention to the importance of time will mean that a country may be unprepared to meet imminent danger and be forced to take hasty measures which may well prove unsatisfactory.

The conduct of the British Governments under Baldwin and Chamberlain in the years leading up to 1939 is a clear example of inattention to time. Although there were many indications of German aggression, including physical movement such as the annexation of the Rhineland in 1936, very little effort was made to prepare the country for war.

The development of tanks in the British Army was likewise time-sensitive: in October 1939, a month after the declaration of war, the number of useful tanks in the British Army was 130.28 By May 1940 there were twenty-three Matildas and 158 cruisers in France, although all of these were left behind after Dunkirk. In the UK there were fifty infantry and 200 light tanks and a crash program of tank manufacture was instigated immediately. Because of the Government’s natural insistence on the need for rapid delivery, and the lack of an ongoing tank development program of any value, the next tanks delivered to field units◦— Covenanters, Crusaders, Churchills◦— were only marginally better than useless. Subsequent models such as the Cromwell were just adequate and the Churchill improved to the same standard. The only competitive British tank produced during the war was the Comet, of which fewer than 250 were delivered to field units and then not until early 1945.

The lead time for a new tank◦— from the initial specification to receipt of operational tanks by field units◦— cannot be less than three years and may be as many as six. This assumes that there is a reasonably firm specification at the outset, i.e. the users of tanks or their superiors can state clearly what the tank is required to do. The broad requirements are translated into specifics such as the types of main and ancillary armament; the speed at which the tank must move and over what sort of country; range of operation required and thus how much fuel; what opposition is to be expected, and what protection or thickness of armour is appropriate.

A major problem for British tank designers and manufacturers between 1919 and 1939 was the lack of a detailed specification. This stemmed in turn from uncertainty as to how tanks should be used. The first matter to consider is therefore the function of an armoured force.

In the Australian Army the situation was perhaps worse than in the British Army. At the outbreak of war there were no armoured units and no local production of tanks. Time’s forelock was left very much untugged and it was more than fifteen months before programs were initiated for the creation of armoured formations and the local manufacture of a tank.

Once started, the project to create an armoured division was executed with alacrity. Training establishments were set up, troops were recruited, trained, and formed into units and, after another twenty-one months, the 1st Armoured Division was ready to go into action as a complete and competent formation. But by that time, September 1942, it was too late. The Japanese were the immediate threat and there appeared to be limited opportunities to use tanks in the jungle.

Local tank manufacture was an unsuccessful project which consumed resources that could have been used to greater advantage in other projects. Once again, the project took a long time to commence and, in this case, the project planning was poor. There seems to have been no clear plan that included all the necessary activities, while the time estimates for those activities were extremely optimistic. This meant that the promised date for the delivery of the tanks receded further and further into the future.

The project planning was not helped by continued changes to the specification. These changes meant, among other things, that machine tools initially requested were no longer needed and new ones had to be ordered. This apparent indecisiveness and wastefulness led the suppliers of tooling, many of them in the USA, to question the competence of the project managers. In the end it was action by US agencies that resulted in the termination of the tank project. Time was thus a vital factor in local tank manufacture; the project started late and its duration was grossly underestimated.

Envoi

Maintaining national security is a fundamental role of Government. That security is provided partly by armed forces, which must be established to provide the greatest possible value; that is, they provide maximum function for minimum cost. The first task for the Government is to decide on the precise function or functions of the armed forces and the separate arms that comprise them. The armoured units that are the subject of this book were a fundamentally new arm which required some definition of their role before the Government commenced its program to create and equip a tank force.

There are several types of conflict in which AFVs can be usefully employed, including traditional tank battles, either as a mobile strike force or as infantry support; anti-guerrilla campaigns, as in the Vietnam War; anti-terrorist activities; and peace-keeping duties. The Government has to predict the need for a particular type of AFV which is appropriate for the nominated role in sufficient time to obtain it. If the Minister decides that AFVs are required to discharge specific functions, then he must ensure that they are employed in such a way that they provide function commensurate with their cost. This requirement is as valid today as it was over sixty years ago when the Government received minimal function for the enormous costs incurred.

A number of important lessons were learned from the employment of AFVs in World War II. These included the vital nature of timing, both in the training of formations and in the provision of equipment. In addition, roles must be clearly defined and all parties to any battle group must be fully aware of the limitations and possibilities of the others. They must also be taught how to work in combination. These lessons are as valid today as they were in 1945.

APPENDICES

Appendix 1:

TANKS IMPORTED FOR USE BY AUSTRALIAN ARMOURED UNITS

This appendix describes the tanks that were imported into Australia to equip the units of the Australian Armoured Corps. It also shows inventory levels of those tanks at various times between June 1940 and August 1943.

The three tanks imported in useful quantities were the US M3 light tank, the US M3 medium tank, and the British Matilda. Quantities of Marmon-Herrington light combat tanks were also imported, but they were suitable only for training. In this appendix, the tanks are described in brief, while references are provided to more detailed technical information.

US M3 light tank or Stuart

References:

Fletcher, The Great Tank Scandal, pp. 91–92

Handel, Dust Sand and Jungle, pp. 52–55

Ellis, Tanks of World War II, pp. 173–177

The Stuart was an improved version of the M2 A4 light tank which was designed at Rock Island Arsenal in the USA in the spring of 1940. The M3 incorporated lessons learnt in the campaign in north-west France in May and June 1940, and its design was approved and standardised in July 1940. It entered production in March 1941.

The Stuart was lightly armoured, its thickness varying from 12 to 56mm. It had a 37mm gun in a revolving turret, and two machine-guns. The original engine was a 7-cylinder radial continental of 250 hp. To ease a supply problem, 500 were powered by a Guiberson T1020 diesel engine. Maximum speed was 35 mph.

The Stuart was best suited to a reconnaissance role, ideally in open country where its speed could compensate for its light armour. When used as the main battle tank for the sabre squadrons of an armoured regiment, it was almost always hopelessly out-gunned. It was used in this role by British troops in North Africa. When it was introduced the tank crews were so impressed with its speed, ease of handling, and reliability that they called it a ‘Honey’, and the name stuck. But at the same time the crews knew that the tank would be significantly outperformed by the opposing German armour, and that they would need a great deal of skill, courage, and luck to survive.

The Stuart’s configuration also made them unsuitable for close cooperation with infantry. They were vulnerable to most of the enemy’s anti-tank weapons, whether the enemy was German or Japanese, and were not particularly good where the going was muddy or soft. In the right role they were excellent, but all too frequently they were employed in quite the wrong conditions. This was sometimes due to ignorance of how to use tanks, but more often because there were no other tanks available.

US M3 medium tank: Lee or Grant

References:

Fletcher, The Great Tank Scandal, pp. 89–92

Handel, Dust Sand and Jungle, pp. 57–61

Ellis, Tanks of World War II, pp. 43–47

Roberts, From the Desert to the Baltic, pp. 94–105

In mid-1940 the US Army decided to upgrade its existing M2 A1 medium tank, the major change comprising the mounting of a 75mm gun in a hull sponson. As well as the 75mm, the M3 had a 37mm gun in a fully revolving turret. The result was both positive and negative.

The 75mm was dual purpose, and was both a very effective anti-tank gun and able to deliver a respectable high-explosive shell; this was the major positive, to which could be added the inherent mechanical quality of American equipment. It was reliable and powerful, with a 9-cylinder Wright Continental radial engine of 340 hp that gave it a maximum speed of 26 mph.

The first of the two negatives was the height of the tank, which was ‘as high as the Tower of Babel’ according to Major General Douglas Pratt of the British Tank Mission to the US. The tank’s second disadvantage was that its hull gun had only very limited traverse and, when manoeuvred into a useful firing position, it could be very exposed. The relatively light (35–56mm) armour added to its vulnerability.

Three firms were contracted to the US Army to produce the M3 medium. They had pilot models ready by April 1941 and, by August that year, full-scale production had commenced. In spite of some reservations, the British decided to buy the M3 medium. They asked for modifications to meet British operating requirements, which included the turret having a rear overhang to hold the radio, and the elimination of the commander’s cupola. Experience had shown that a hit on the cupola could decapitate the commander.

The M3 medium incorporating the British specification was called the Grant, and the original M3 used by the Americans was called the Lee. The differences were really quite minor. In spite of the disadvantages of the hull-mounted gun and the high profile, the Grants proved their worth in the Battle of Alam Halfa in North Africa beginning on 30 August 1942.

The 22nd British Armoured Brigade under the command of Brigadier Pip Roberts was ordered by General Montgomery to select and prepare defensive positions on the southern and eastern slopes of the high ground of Alam Halfa. Each of Roberts’ four regiments had one squadron of Stuarts or Crusaders, and the other two squadrons had just been equipped with the newly arrived Grants.

To conceal their height, the Grants were hidden in the broken foothills and, where suitable positions could not be found, they were excavated by bulldozier. When the Germans advanced, they inflicted some damage with their new longbarrelled 75mm Panzer Mark IVs, but the Grants held their own and hit the German tanks hard. The defence by the 22nd Brigade and many other units forced the Germans to break off the action on 2 September and retreat westwards.

The Grant was gradually replaced by the Sherman and, in April, the Grant was classified by the Americans as ‘limited standard’, finally being declared obsolete in April 1944.

British Infantry Tank Mark II (A12) Matilda

References:

Fletcher, The Great Tank Scandal, pp. 13–15

Handel, Dust Sand and Jungle, pp. 61–65

Ellis, Tanks of World War II, pp. 98–102

Bingham, Matilda, complete pamphlet

Design of the Matilda began in November 1936. A mock-up was built by April 1937, and the first pilot was ready in April 1938. Even before the pilot had been built, a production order was placed for sixty-five tanks in December 1937, and this was increased to 165 in May 1938. The Matilda was not easy to mass produce because of the size and shape of the armoured castings used in the design. Nonetheless, almost 3,000 were made before production ceased in August 1943.

In 1940 and the first half of 1941, the Matilda was the most powerful tank in operation anywhere. It created alarm in Rommel’s division in Northern France in May 1940, and in January 1941 provided very valuable support to the 6th Australian Division in the capture of Bardia. It was shipped in large quantities to Russia, where it was reputedly popular with the Russian troops for its reliability and excellent protection. It was also used successfully by Australian tank units in New Guinea, Bougainville, and Borneo, where it showed how effective a support weapon it was in jungle fighting.

Unfortunately, its design limited the largest main gun it could mount to a 2-pounder. After mid-1941 this was insufficient to knock out German tanks at a reasonable range, and its armour could not withstand the fire of the German 88mm and the long-barrelled 75mm.

Marmon-Herrington light combat tank

References:

Fletcher, The Great Tank Scandal, p. 98; p. 104

Handel, Dust Sand and Jungle, pp. 56–57

The Marmon-Herrington Company of Indiana, USA, produced considerable quantities of at least two AFVs. The first was an armoured car, the Marmon-Herrington Mark III, which was an excellent armoured car and saw service all over Africa. Around 2,000 had been built before production ceased in the summer of 1942.

Another product of the Indiana factory was the Marmon-Herrington CTLS-4TA, also known as the Two-man Tank or the Light Combat Tank. This was a tracked vehicle driven by a six-cylinder petrol engine, with a machine-gun mounted in a turret that had a limited traverse of 270 degrees. Quantities of these tanks had been sold to China and the Netherlands East Indies, but the unexpected Japanese onslaught of December 1941 and January 1942 caught many of them in transit by sea.

Where possible, these shipments were diverted to places where they could be safely landed, and Australia was one such place. These tanks were of little use in fighting, but were excellent as training vehicles for the armoured regiments and for guarding the aerodromes in northern Australia. They were withdrawn in early 1943, and were declared obsolete in November 1943.

Tanks in Australia

The tanks available to the Army in Australia on 3 September 1939 were ten British Mark VI light tanks and four Vickers medium Mark IIs. These were useless as fighting tanks. The full Cabinet was told on 16 June 1940 that the Army had no tanks. By November 1941 there were ten Stuarts and eight obsolete British light tanks. This was more than two years after the war had begun, and almost eighteen months after the War Cabinet was strongly advised by the Minister for War to create an armoured force.

From June 1940 on, there was a push for Australian industry to produce an Australian tank, but action was slow, and estimates of durations for project activities were completely unrealistic. The first Australian production tank, the AC1, was delivered in August 1942. It had many faults and required an extensive rework. By December 1942 a total of four AC1s had been delivered to the Army.

The table ‘Inventory of tanks’ below shows the four AC1s in column 6. AC1s are not included in subsequent entries. Column 5, ‘MH’ is for the Marmon-Herrington light combat tanks. They have been included in Column 7, which is the aggregate of Columns 2 to 6.

Column 8 shows the tank strength in Australia according to The Army War Effort, published by the Army in 1944. It does not say where the figures came from, but it was written when the information was recent, and the authors would presumably have had access to the relevant records.

AUSTRALIAN ARMY: INVENTORY OF TANKS 1940–1943

*Total: The total in column 8 is taken from The Army War Effort issued by the Australian Army in 1944. That publication provides no sources for its information. Column 7, ‘Total’ is the sum of the figures for individual types of tank shown in columns 2 to 6. In some months there are differences between the two ‘totals’. This may arise because the stocks were counted on different days of the month, or because of the difficulty of accessing complete and accurate information.

Appendix 2:

AUSTRALIAN TANK PRODUCTION CHRONOLOGY

This appendix compiles information from various sources to provide a chronology of the design and production of a locally made tank. The sources are:

NAA A5954 587/2 History of Tank Production in Australia

Hopkins, Australian Armour, pp. 29–30 and Chapter 8, ‘Production and procurement 1939–1945’, pp. 57–74.

Butlin, War Economy 1939-1942, pp. 319–322.

Butlin and Schedvin, War Economy 1942-1945, pp. 70–79.

Mellor, The Role of Science and Industry, Chapter 14, ‘Armoured Fighting Vehicles’, pp. 301–322.

Handel, Dust, Sand and Jungle, Chapter 5, ‘Armoured vehicles and equipment’, pp. 47–68. Deals with all armoured vehicles used by the Australian Army, but devotes only half a page to the Australian cruiser. This is a reasonable proportion in relation to its value to field units.

Chapters 3, 4, 5, and 6 of this book, sections on provision of tanks.

Chronology

1939

18 Oct: CGS, General Squires, requests the Master-General of the Ordnance to produce a light cruiser tank to the pilot model stage. No action appears to have been taken.

1940

26 Jan: School of Mechanisation created.

19 Jun: War Cabinet Agendum 141/1940 ‘Production of war material – Army’. Included in Statement B ‘Equipment, ammunition etc required for AIF and AMF which are now produced in Australia’ is Serial 25: 199 Tanks, medium A 13 Mark I, with the notation Technical specifications being investigated.

24 Jun: War Cabinet Agendum 150/1940 ‘Production orders for AFVs’ requests 859 tanks with delivery of 70 per month beginning in September or October 1940. No mention is made of the request for tanks in Agendum 141.

25 Jun: War Cabinet Minute 363 approves Agendum 141 as an objective for the Director-General of Munitions.

2 Jul: War Cabinet Minute 375 considers Agendum 150, but does not directly approve the production of tanks. Instead, it requests more information on plans for British tanks and on effect of tank production on other munitions.

13 Aug: Minister for the Army, Geoffrey Street, killed in air crash.

Sept: Committee formed to prepare specifications for Australian cruiser.

Dec: UK tank expert, Colonel Watson, reaches Australia via USA.

1941

Jan: Director-General of Munitions states that design should be possible in six months.

8 Jan: War Cabinet Minute 689 records statement by DCGS that design of tank had been decided.

18 Feb: War Cabinet Minute 826: type of engine not yet decided; could be either three Cadillac Model 75 V8 engines or a Guiberson 400 hp radial diesel.

20 Feb: Advisory War Council Minute records that the specification for armour plate and fabrication are being investigated.

30 Apr: Conference in Melbourne: Lewis and Hartnett state very real production problems and emphasise that design is not yet finalised.

May: Director-General of Munitions’ Report 10 for April 1941 notes that design of the Australian cruiser is still under way.

16 May: Letter from Hartnett to Lewis: experiments needed for casting hull; hold-ups with gearbox and final drive.

4 Jun: Suggestion for a simpler AC2 to complement AC1.

10 Jul: War Cabinet Minute 1191 approves commencement of production of AC2 and continued production of AC1.

23 Jul: General Staff proposes that production of AC2 be halted because of deliveries of Grant tanks from the USA. Cabinet does not agree and authorises continued production of AC2.

26 Sep: CGS proposes scrapping of AC2 program.

9 Oct: Minister for the Army approves scrapping of AC2 program.

24 Nov: CGS repeats statement that AC2 is useless for Army needs.

30 Nov: Current tank status: 1004 tanks needed; available 10 Stuarts and 8 obsolete British light tanks.

7 Dec: PEARL HARBOR: JAPAN AT WAR WITH AUSTRALIA.

1942

7 Jan: Letter from Spender to PM: should local production continue, or should pressure be put on UK and USA to supply tanks?

31 Jan: Notification of supply of 325 tanks in total from UK and USA.

5 Mar: Supply upgraded to 1105 in total.

8 Apr: Spender to Blamey: AC1 broke down in production trial; should production continue?

17 Apr: Blamey: Yes, AC1 outstandingly successful.

22 Apr: Blamey tells PM same story.

30 Apr: PM agrees to continue tank production program.

27 May: Production of 400 AC 3s (armed with 25-pdr to meet German tanks) approved; production of AC1 to meet Japanese tanks to continue.

11 Jun: Spender asks Advisory War Council meeting whether local tank production should continue.

18 Jun: Blamey endorses continued production of AC3, calls it a first-class modern tank.

9 Jul: War Cabinet Minute 2255 confirms local production to be pursued with utmost vigour.

15 Aug: Question asked at PM’s War Conference: ‘Should local production continue?’ Answer: ‘Yes.’

28 Aug: MacArthur ‘heartily agrees that Australia should have a tank production program.’

30 Sep: Advice received that Australian tank program is being referred to the US Chiefs of Staff for analysis and decision.

28 Oct: US Department of Ordnance recommends that Australian tank production should cease and Australia should use tanks standardised in US and British Armies.

10 Dec: US Munitions Assignment Board decrees that delivery of tank components to Australia will be sufficient for 20 tanks per month only.

1943

9 Feb: Current stock of serviceable tanks 750 US and 300 British. CGS maintains still necessary to continue local production.

Mar: US Lend-Lease Administration sends Colonel Green to assess Australian tank production.

17 May: Green presents report advocating cessation of tank production except for a minimum program to prove the design of the AC4.

13 Jul: War Cabinet agrees to the cessation of the tank production program (Minute 2979).

14 Aug: MacArthur tells PM that cessation of tank production is wise.

26 Aug: Proposal for disposal of tanks and components at varying stages of manufacture.

ENDNOTES

Chapter 1

1. Harry Gordon, An Eyewitness History of Australia, Penguin, Melbourne, 1976, p. 115. ‘Australian troops arrive in the Sudan to fight the Saracens’ was the title of an article by Joe Melvin published in the Melbourne Argus on 5 May 1885. It describes the arrival of the force at Suakin, and has a splendid picture of the NSW contingent embarking in Sydney.

2. PRO WO 279/74 Report on the Staff Conference held at the Staff College Camberley, 9–11 Jan 1933.

3. David French, Raising Churchill’s Army, Oxford University Press, USA, 2001, p. 18.

4. Ibid., p. 176.

5. The Junkers 87 Sturzkampfflugzeug, diving fighter plane, abbreviated to Stuka, made a screaming noise when diving on its target that was so blood-curdling as to paralyse all but the bravest.

6. Peter Beale, The Great Mistake, The History Press, UK, 2004, p. 23. The auftragstaktik implied at least three things: the junior commander, who could be an NCO, takes over command automatically if his superior is disabled; he is fully trained to do so; and he always knows what his superior’s mission is.

7. The origins of the tank have been discussed in many books. A good brief synopsis is contained in the contribution by David Fletcher to J.P. Harris and F.N. Toase, Armoured Warfare, Batsford, London, 1990, pp. 5–9. A comment on the parentage of the tank is also made in Peter Beale’s Infighter: 9th Battalion Tank Corps 1916–1919, privately published, Valentine, NSW, 2004: ‘There are some interesting points to consider in the development of the tank in 1915 and 1916. Several people can lay claim to a share of the parentage of the tank, including Winston Churchill, William Tritton, Walter Wilson, Eustace Tennyson d’Eyncourt, Murray Sueter, Albert Stern, and Ernest Swinton. The technical problems were triumphantly overcome by Tritton and Wilson, and all the others had some part to play in producing the tanks and working out how best to use them. But it has to be acknowledged that without the drive and enthusiasm of Winston Churchill progress would have been much slower, and Britain would have been deprived of an important weapon at a critical time.’

8. David Fletcher, The British Tanks 1915-19, Crowood Press, Marlborough, 2001, pp. 47–48.

9. David Fletcher, Tanks and Trenches, Sutton Publishing, UK, 2009.

10. Especially the Australians at First Bullecourt. For more detail, see Chapter 2.

11. The battle of Cambrai is described in every history of the employment of tanks. A reference of particular interest is: ‘Preliminary Report on Tank Corps Operations 20 Nov – 1 Dec 1917’, undated, BCII/12 Fuller Papers, Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives, Kings College London (LHCMA).

12. The period 8 August to 11 November 1918 is known as ‘the last Hundred Days’ or ‘the Hundred Days’. It was, in fact, only ninety-six days.

13. Clough Williams-Ellis, The Tank Corps, George Newnes, London, 1919, pp. 202–206.

14. Kiggell to Robertson, ROBERTSON 1/14/40, Robertson Papers, LHMCA.

15. Launcelot Kiggell, Note on the use of tanks, PRO WO 158/832.

16. J.F.C. Fuller, Memoirs of an unconventional soldier, Nicholson & Watson, London, 1936, p. 97.

17. J.P. Harris, Men, ideas, and tanks, Manchester University Press, 1995, p. 165.

18. George Lindsay had been in the Machine Gun Corps during the war and, following the end of the war, he went to Iraq where he commanded a force of armoured cars. He returned to England in 1923 and became Chief Instructor at the RTC Centre for two years. He was Inspector RTC at the War Office from 1925 to 1929.

19. Captain Basil Liddell Hart had served with distinction in the Great War. He was invalided out of the Army in the 1920s and became a military correspondent. He was an influential writer and an outspoken advocate of tanks.

20. Charles Broad served in the Great War in the artillery and, after serving as an instructor at the Staff College, transferred to the RTC in 1923. He was appointed Commandant of the Tank Gunnery School and, in 1925, he succeeded Lindsay as Chief Instructor at the Tank Corps Centre.

21. Percy Hobart was a dedicated and forceful officer who had served with distinction in the Engineers in the Great War. He transferred to the RTC in 1923. He was a man of firm and fixed views, an excellent trainer of troops, and who, for good or bad, had a significant effect on tank doctrine from 1930 to 1945.

22. See British Dictionary of National Biography under Lambart, Frederick Rudolph. He succeeded his father as Tenth Earl of Cavan while serving in South Africa in 1900. In the Great War he held several senior commands, ending with command of British troops in Italy, March 1918.

23. Harris, Men, ideas, and tanks, pp. 211–212.

24. Ibid., p. 217.

25. Modern Formations, Section 3, The advent of the Armoured Fighting Vehicle, Tank Museum Library, Bovington, 1931.

26. For a sympathetic account of Montgomery-Massingberd’s attitude to mechanisation, see Harris & Toase, Armoured Warfare, pp. 42–43.

27. Harris, Men, ideas, and tanks, p. 247.

28. ‘Handing over notes for my successor’, undated but presumably March or April 1936, M-M 158/9, Montgomery-Massingberd papers, LHCMA.

29. J. Walter Christie (1865–1944) was an American engineer and inventor. One of his inventions was the helicoil suspension system for tanks in which each large road wheel had its own spring-loaded assembly. Christie suspension was used in the Russian BT and T 34 tanks and in the British cruiser range. He was stubborn and prickly, and his attitude to American officialdom resulted in none of his designs being used in American equipment.

30. Harris, Men, ideas, and tanks, pp. 283–4.

31. ‘Notes on my life’, pp. 86–88, ALANBROOKE 3/A/2, Alanbrooke Papers, LHCMA.

32. For an account of the most important tank action in these campaigns see Kenneth Macksey, Tank Warfare: A History of Tanks in Battle, Panther Publications, London, 1976, pp. 98–100. A brief note on the battle of Khalkhin-Gol in August 1939 is in Georgi Zhukov, Marshal Zhukov’s greatest battles (ed. Harrison Salisbury, trans. Theodore Shabad), Harper & Row, New York, 1969, pp. 7–9.

33. Ronald Lewin, Man of Armour, Leo Cooper, London, 1976, pp. 107–122.

34. For a detailed account of this interview, see Lewin, Man of Armour, pp. 127–8

35. George Forty’s The First Victory, Guild Publishing, London, 1990, provides an account of this campaign as a whole; the 6th Australian Cavalry Regiment is mentioned on pp. 161 and 166.

36. ‘The Armoured Division in battle’, issued by 21 Army Group, Holland, December 1944. In the introduction, Montgomery says: ‘This is the third pamphlet in the series I have issued. The first was “Some notes on the conduct of war and the Infantry Division in battle”; the second was, “Some notes on the use of air power in support of land operations and direct air support”; and this one, “The Armoured Division in battle”. These three pamphlets together provide a very useful foundation on which to base our fighting and our training.’

37. George Forty, Tank Commanders, Motorbooks International, USA, 1993, p. 125.

38. G.P.B. Roberts, From the Desert to the Baltic,William Kimber, London, 1987, p. 159.

Chapter 2

1. There are many accounts of the Battle of Cambrai and its importance in the history of World War I. General accounts include those by John Keegan, The First World War, Hutchison, London, 1998, pp. 395–7; Cyril Falls, The Great War, 1914–1918, Military Operations, France and Belgium, 1917, Perigee, New York, 1959, pp. 315–324; Basil Liddell Hart, A History of World War I (1914–1918), Faber & Faber, London, 1934, pp. 337–348. Accounts relating to the use of tanks are in Harris, Men, ideas, and tanks, pp. 120–126; A.J. Smithers, A New Excalibur, Leo Cooper, London, 1986, pp. 136–144; Beale, Infighter, pp. 120–126.

2. A brief appreciation of the work of C.E.W. Bean is provided in the preface to vol. IV of the Official History of Australia in the War of 1914-1918, pp. xiii–xviii.

3. The context of the First Battle of Bullecourt is described in Keegan, The First World War, pp. 250–252. Official accounts of the battle are: ‘Summary of tank operations 9-12 and 23 April 1917’, Part II ‘Operations’, pp. 7–11, PRO WO 95/91; Falls, Official History, Military Operations, France and Belgium, 1917, The German retreat to the Hindenburg Line and the Battle of Arras, pp. 236–240; Bean, Official History, vol. IV, pp. 270–354.

4. Keegan says of Hubert Gough (The First World War, p. 424) that he did not have a reputation for thoroughness. He was a cavalryman and a favourite of Douglas Haig, also a cavalryman. Gough had played a leading part in the Passchendaele offensive, and his army had suffered a major share of the casualties. Officers who served under him formed the opinion that lives were lost in the battles he planned because he failed to coordinate artillery support with infantry assaults, failed to limit his objectives to attainable ends, failed to curtail operations that had patently failed, and failed to meet the standards of administrative efficiency which the commander of the Second Army, General Plumer, did so admirably.

5. Bean, Official History, vol. IV, pp. 271–273.

6. Smithers, A New Excalibur, p. 98.

7. Ibid., p. 98; Bean, Official History, vol. IV, p. 315.

8. Smithers, A New Excalibur, p. 98.

9. Bean, Official History, vol. IV, p. 352.

10. Haig to War Office, 5 June 1917, para 1, PRO MUN 4/2791.

11. Fletcher, The British Tanks, 1915-1919, pp. 80–86.

12. The evolution of the Mark V is described in Fletcher, The British Tanks, 1915-1919, pp. 118–122. The first Mark V was delivered to Central Workshops in France on 14 January 1918.

13. The Battle of Hamel was very important as a demonstration of effective use of combined arms. In the overall scheme of things, however, it was only a small action, as Liddell Hart comments in his A History of the World War I (1914–1918): ‘It was the brilliant little surprise action at Hamel on 4 July and its revelation of the decline of German morale which inspired Rawlinson with the idea of a wider offensive.’ For detailed accounts of the battle, see Bean, Official History, vol. VI, chapters VIII and IX, and John Laffin, The Battle of Hamel, Kangaroo Press, Sydney, 1999.

14. Keegan, The First World War, pp. 423–440.

15. Ibid., p. 432.

16. Ibid.

17. The Whippet tank, or Medium Mark A, is described in Fletcher, British Tanks 1915-1919, pp. 115–118, and in Smithers, A New Excalibur, pp. 147–8. It was lighter and faster than the Mark IV or Mark V, and had the potential to be used in the cavalry roles of reconnaissance and pursuit.

18. In late September 1916, Lieutenant Colonel Hugh Elles, DSO, was appointed to command the tanks in France. He was a natural choice and a good one. A fellow tank officer described him as ‘precociously successful and admirably good looking, reasonably vain of his appearance, but quite modest as to his attainments. He is immensely popular not only in the Tank Corps but in the Army generally. He struck me as one of the paladins of the war, modernised and adjusted to the conditions of the hour. Decisions do not come to him easily, and he is sensitive to influences, taking a good deal of time to make up his mind, but with a great deal of personal charm and power of leadership. He makes no profession of indifference to danger, but probably no-one in the army would lead a forlorn hope as cheerfully.’

19. Williams-Ellis, The Tank Corps, p. 179.

20. Bean, Official History, vol. VI, p. 267, quoting Monash.

21. Ibid., p 268, quoting Monash.

22. Ibid., p. 283.

23. Ibid., pp. 293–294.

24. Lieutenant Colonel the Hon. John Dennis Yelverton Bingham commanded 8 Battalion Tank Corps in this battle, and was awarded the DSO for his actions. The citation reads in part: ‘He was responsible for the successful assembly of tanks on the night of 3 July, and by his personal supervision largely contributed to the successful launching of the tanks in their attack. Prior to 4 July, under all conditions of hostile shelling, and almost daily, this officer personally reconnoitred the ground over which the tanks under his command were to operate.’ In addition to Lieutenant Colonel Bingham’s DSO, the Tank Corps Battalions and supporting 1 Tank Field Company were awarded eleven Military Crosses, two Distinguished Conduct Medals, and eighteen Military Medals.

25. Fletcher, British Tanks 1915-1919, pp. 124–125. Carrier tanks were also called supply tanks, tank tenders, or baggage tanks. Early supply tanks had been cobbled together from redundant Mark Is and IIs, and were issued to tank battalions. In February 1918 independent tank supply companies were established using converted Mark IVs. Each Mark IV had its original sponsons removed and replaced by larger ones, and mesh frames were fitted inside to prevent stores falling against the engine.

26. Williams-Ellis, The Tank Corps, p. 182.

27. Ibid., p. 183.

28. Ibid., p. 185.

29. Bean, Official History, vol. VI, p. 328.

30. This letter was provided by Sydney’s great-grandson, Matthew Huntingdon, and his permission to use it is gratefully acknowledged and appreciated.

31. Ivan Chapman, Iven G Mackay, Citizen and Soldier, Melway Publishing, Melbourne, 1975, pp. 109–110.

Chapter 3

1. The plans for the Battle of Amiens, 8 August 1918, included ten heavy and two light (Whippet) battalions. This was approximately the proportion of heavies to Whippets for the last hundred days of the war. See Harris, Men, ideas, and tanks, p. 176.

2. On 18 May 1918, a War Office paper entitled ‘Proposals for the use of tanks in 1919’ was sent to Haig. Haig commented on this in June, identifying its main points as: (i) the Germans can only be defeated on the Western Front; (ii) to defeat the Germans a definite breakthrough on a broad front is necessary; (iii) a successful breakthrough on a broad front can only be made using large numbers of tanks. He accepted these points, but emphasised that tanks should be part of an all-arms force, and that, although tanks were a necessity, he was not willing to sacrifice everything else to their production. Haig’s notes are in PRO WO158/830.

3. TCOIV/5, Fuller papers, Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives, Kings College London (LHCMA).

4. RUSI Journal, vol. 65, February to November 1920, p. 74.

5. Harris, Men, ideas, and tanks, p. 197.

6. Ibid., p. 68, pp. 106–7, p. 166. Harris is concerned throughout his book to counter the view held by tank enthusiasts such as Fuller that the High Command was one of the major barriers to the effective use of tanks.

7. John Coates, ‘Preparing armoured units for overseas service’ in The Australian Army and the Vietnam War 1962-1972, Peter Dennis and Jeffrey Grey (eds), Army History Unit, Canberra, 2002, p. 74.

8. Quoted in R.N.L. Hopkins, Australian Armour, Australian War Memorial, Canberra, 1978, pp. 13–14.

9. Military Board agendum 129, 11 August 1926.

10. The Tank Corps training centre was moved from Bisley to Bovington in mid-1916. It is near Wareham in the county of Dorset and has a large tract of heathland to the north of the camp which is good for training tank recruits to drive. Nearby is the gunnery range at Lulworth, where tank gunners can practise firing main and secondary armaments out to sea. Bovington and Lulworth remain the Headquarters of the Tank Corps, now the Royal Tank Regiment, to this day.

11. Hopkins, Australian Armour, p. 15. The tanks were Vickers Medium Tanks Mark II, and they cost £72,000 in total.

12. Commonwealth of Australia Gazette 131/1927.

13. Paul Handel, Dust, Sand and Jungle, Australian Military History Publications, Sydney, 2003, p. 10.

14. The total number of tanks on the strength of the two Light Companies combined was ten Vickers lights Mark VI A. One of the Armoured Car Regiments had three cars, and the other four. The 1st Tank Section had four Vickers mediums Mark II (Ibid., pp. 5 and 14).

15. Hopkins, Australian Armour, p. 26.

16. Stanley Melbourne Bruce had fought with gallantry and distinction in World War I. He entered Parliament in 1918 and quickly rose to be Prime Minister from 1923 to 1929. He was High Commissioner in London from 1932 to 1945. He was created Viscount Bruce of Melbourne in 1947.

17. R.G. Neale, Documents on Australian Foreign Policy (from here on DAFP), vol. II, Document 308, cablegram, Bruce to Menzies, 26 October 1939.

18. DAFP vol. II, Document 134, cablegram Menzies to Chamberlain.

19. DAFP vol. III, Document 16, letter Bruce to Menzies, 2 January 1940.

20. DAFP vol. III, Document 71, letter Menzies to Bruce, 22 February 1940.

21. Gavin Long, The Six Years War, Australian War Memorial, Canberra, p. 10.

22. Ibid., p. 8.

23. David Horner, High Command, Australian War Memorial, Canberra, 1982, p. xix.

24. Long, The Six Years War, p. 29. Churchill’s own account of his rise to the leadership is contained in the final chapter of vol. I of his History of The Second World War (Cassell, London, 1949). On page 24 of vol. II he records his speech to the House of Commons on 13 May 1940: ‘You ask, what is our policy? I will say: it is to wage war, by sea, land, and air, with all our might and with all the strength that God can give us: to wage war against a monstrous tyranny, never surpassed in the dark, lamentable catalogue of human crime. That is our policy.’

25. Long, The Six Years War, p. 28.

26. Horner, High Command, p. 19. The first meeting of the War Cabinet was held on 27 September 1939. Minutes of the War Cabinet meetings are held in the National Archives of Australia in the Shedden papers, A5954 803/1 to 811/2. The only minute recorded for the first meeting was: ‘Procedure – Attendance of Chiefs of Staff. It was decided that the Chiefs of Staff would not be present continuously at War Cabinet meetings, but should attend only on those occasions when their advice is required on any matter that is under consideration.’

27. Hopkins, Australian Armour, p. 29.

28. In 1938, Prime Minister Joseph Lyons had asked that a senior British Army officer should come to Australia to report on the state of the Australian Army. Lieutenant General E.K. Squires was the officer sent. Soon after the outbreak of war he was appointed Chief of the General Staff.

29. Hopkins, Australian Armour, p. 30.

30. David Fletcher, The Great Tank Scandal, HMSO, London, 1989, p. 34.

31. The development chain for British cruiser tanks is described in Peter Beale, Death by Design, Sutton Publishing, UK, 1998, pp. 48 – 56.

32. Fletcher, The Great Tank Scandal, p. 4, and Beale, Death by Design, pp. 160–165. On 29 May 1940 a Tank Board was appointed. The terms of reference make it plain that the Board was regarded as a temporary body. It was required to ‘consider the whole situation regarding the production and design of tanks and to advise the Minister of Supply as to future action.’

33. Vyvyan Pope was a forceful and intelligent officer who had won the DSO and MC and lost an arm in World War I. In the battles in France in May 1940 he was advisor on AFVs to the Commander-in-Chief of the BEF, Lord Gort. Pope was able to see much of the armoured action at first hand, and to identify lessons to be learnt.

34. Beale, Death by Design, pp. 74 – 82. It is a characteristic of many military production projects that they omit some activities essential to the project and underestimate the time needed for all activities. In this case, the activity where the required duration was always underestimated was the field trial for the new tank.

35. David Fletcher, The Universal Tank, HMSO, London, 1993, p. 113. Comets were issued to 29 Armoured Brigade, the armoured component of 11 Armoured Division, but did not see action until after the Rhine crossing (23 March 1945).

36. NAA A2653 1940 vol. 1: Military Board Agendum 14/1940 ‘Army School of Mechanisation’.

37. Handel, Dust, Sand and Jungle, p. 9.

38. War Cabinet minute 262, NAA A5954 803/2 folio 183.

39. This meeting is recorded in War Cabinet minute 263 (see note 43).

40. War Cabinet minute 263, ‘The international situation and Australia’s war effort’, NAA A5954 803/2 folio 186-7.

41. War Cabinet minute 267 para 3, NAA A5954 803/2 folio 193.

42. Annex A to Full Cabinet minute 20, NAA A5954 803/2 folio 246-8, significant items are:

25-pdr guns — none

60-pdr and 6-in guns — a few

2-pdr anti-tank guns — none

anti-tank rifles — a few

tanks — none

carriers — very few

motor transport — bodies made locally, but engines must be imported

43. Handel, Dust, Sand and Jungle, pp. 47–50.

44. Ibid., pp. 49–50.

45. Both items of agenda are in NAA A2671. Each file contains many pages, and they are not sequentially numbered.

46. Fletcher, The Great Tank Scandal, pp. 11–13. This description contains clear line-drawings showing side, front, and rear elevation of the A13. The A13 is also described in Harris, Men, ideas, and tanks, pp. 298–299.

47. NAA A5954 804/1 Folio 265.

48. NAA A5954 804/1 Folio 276.

49. Major General Vernon Sturdee was promoted Lieutenant General and appointed Chief of the General Staff on 30 August 1940 following the death of General Sir Cyril Brudenell White.

50. Adrian Liddell Hart (ed), The Sword and the Pen, Crowell, New York, 1976, p. 6.

51. Beale, Death by Design, p. 35.

52. Ibid., p. 42 et seq.

53. In the Instruction issued by 21 Army Group in December 1944 The Armoured Division in Battle, the first section following the introduction is entitled ‘A few notes on tanks’. This section expresses Montgomery’s thoughts about tanks in his usual clear and concise style:

• A tank is an armoured vehicle designed to carry about fire-power; this definition, once understood, simplifies the problem of the employment of armour on the battlefield.

• The tank must have a really good dual-purpose gun, and mechanical reliability is a necessity.

• In 21 Army Group it is the policy to have only two types of tank: the capital tank (to fight), and the light tank (to reconnoitre). The term ‘capital tank’ means a dual purpose tank, suitable for working with infantry and also for operating in an armoured division.

• The aim is that all armoured brigades, whether in an armoured division or independent, should be equipped with the capital tank; they can then operate efficiently either in the role of infantry support or in that of a mobile strike force.

• The weight of the tank should not exceed 45 tons. Having selected the best possible gun as a primary weapon, and designed an engine with sufficient horse-power to give the required speed, then armour should be fitted to the maximum weight allowed.

Note: Monty’s ‘capital tank’ was subsequently called the Universal Tank and latterly the Main Battle Tank (MBT).

54. Their decision was recorded in War Cabinet Minute 375, NAA A5954 804/1 folio 276.

55. NAA A5954 803/2 folio 249B.

56. NAA A5954 804/1 folio 292. The minute notes that the provision of these requirements is to be related to the supply of AFVs noted in Minute 375.

57. For a report on the plane crash, see Gordon, An Eyewitness History of Australia, pp. 310–311.

58. Hopkins, Australian Armour, pp. 58–59.

59. NAA A5954 587/2, ‘Notes on history of tank production in Australia’, para 4.

60. Quoted in D.P. Mellor, The Role of Science and Industry, Australian War Memorial, Canberra, 1958, p. 304.

61. NAA A5954 587/2 para 5.

62. NAA A5954 489/1, Report No. 5 by Director-General of Munitions, November 1940.

63. Hopkins, Australian Armour, pp. 36–37.

64. Ibid., pp. 331–339. Hopkins calls this proposal ‘The Cowra Paper’, because, at that time, he was stationed at Cowra in command of the 7th Australian Cavalry Regiment. This paper can also be accessed in NAA MP729/6 37/401/228. As well as the text of the paper in Hopkins, this NAA document includes four appendices with details of the division’s composition, equipment, and training. The output of the training schools is shown in timelines.

65. Gavin Long, Greece, Crete, and Syria, Australian War Memorial, Canberra, 1953, pp. 538–539.

66. NAA A2653 1940 vol. 4, Military Board Agendum 337/1940.

67. NAA A2671 Supplement 2 to War Cabinet Agendum 150/1940.

68. NAA AWM224 MSS 44 Part 14, ‘Land Headquarters AFV School, Puckapunyal, Victoria’.

69. NAA A2671 War Cabinet Agendum 150/1940.

70. S.J. Butlin, War Economy 1939-1942, Australian War Memorial, Canberra, 1955, p. 224.

71. Ibid., p. 225.

72. Ibid., p. 227.

Chapter 4

1. The three initial representatives of the Labour Party on the Advisory War Council in addition to Curtin were: Frank Forde, John Beasley and Norman Makin. See David Horner, Inside The War Cabinet, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 1996, p. 213.

2. NAA A5954 805/1 folio 516.

3. NAA A2671 War Cabinet Agendum 150/1940 Supplement 2.

4. NAA A5954 489/1.

5. Hopkins, Australian Armour, p. 61.

6. See Gavin Long, To Benghazi, Australian War Memorial, Canberra, 1952, pp. 163–206; and Forty, The First Victory, pp. 134–150.

7. Chapman, Iven G Mackay, Citizen and Soldier, p. 187.

8. Ibid., p. 191.

9. Butlin, War Economy 1939-1942, pp. 333–5. The political implications of the Conference are discussed in Paul Hasluck, The Government and the People, 1939-1941, Australian War Memorial, Canberra, 1952, pp. 302–303.

10. NAA A5954 805/1 folio 574.

11. NAA A2671 WC Agendum 70/1941.

12. Fletcher, The Great Tank Scandal, p. 84. states that the Stuart II was the British designation for a US M3 Light with a Guiberson 9 cylinder radial diesel engine. Thus the Commonwealth forces were experienced in the use of this engine.

13. NAA A5954 805/1 folio 608.

14. NAA A5954 812/2 folio 117.

15. NAA A5954 812/2 folio 124 AWC Minute 180, ‘Transmission gear for tanks’. Many of the War Cabinet and Advisory War Council minutes have this title. It is a phrase that can mean any or all of the elements in the power train, which can include the engine, transfer shaft, gearbox and final drive.

16. NAA A5954 812/2 folio 129 AWC Minute 204.

17. NAA A5954 587/2 ‘Notes on History of tank production in Australia’ covers the period 28 June 1940 to 21 October 1943. Authorship is not disclosed.

18. NAA A5954 489/1; this control symbol contains Reports 1 to 10 from the Director-General of Munitions. All subsequent reports have their own individual control symbols.

19. The transcript of the discussions at this meeting is contained in NAA A2671 War Cabinet Agendum 150/1940. It is to be found between Supplements 3 and 4, and has no identifying number. This is a very important document. Not only does it provide a vivid picture of the status of the tank project, but also demonstrates the attitudes of the three main groups of stakeholders. Group 1, the users, consisting of the politicians and the Army, don’t know much, but they want as much as they can get. Group 2, the designers, are sure that their designs are so good that there is no need for pilot models, and manufacture can start from the design drawings. Group 3, the manufacturers, have their feet firmly on the ground, and see many problems in bringing the project to a successful conclusion. And at this stage there is no one person in charge of the project.

20. Lieutenant Colonel A. Milner was Superintendent of Design at Army HQ. The reason for sending him to America is related in Mellor, The Role of Science and Industry, p. 307.

21. In The Great Tank Scandal (p. 58), David Fletcher makes this point in respect of the British A22, or Churchill. There was an urgent need for tanks in mid-1940 and, as Fletcher explains: ‘In an attempt to satisfy this need for haste it was decided to go straight into production from the drawing board. One of the engineers in the team said that the first production run of 500 would provide 500 pilot models.’ This was completely accurate, and it took more than two years before all the serious bugs had been ironed out of the Churchill. The only time Churchills saw action during the first three years of their existence was when the Canadians attempted to land at Dieppe in August 1942, and that was a disaster.

22. Minute 531 can be found as a supporting paper in Supplement 4 to War Cabinet Agendum 150/1940, NAA A2671.

23. NAA A5954 806/1 folio 795.

24. This letter is a supporting paper in Supplement 4 to War Cabinet Agendum 150/1940, NAA A2671.

25. NAA A5954 806/1 War Cabinet Minute 1116.

26. NAA A5954 322/2.

27. NAA A5954 806/1 folio 854.

28. NAA A5954 806/1 folio 857: War Cabinet Minute 1173, Weekly Progress Reports by Chiefs of Staff.

29. NAA A5954 806/1 folios 871–2: War Cabinet Minute 1191, ‘Provision of tank equipment and personnel’.

30. Mellor, The Role of Science and Industry, p. 307, note 3.

31. Ibid., p. 306, note 9. Code was an engineer who had worked with vacuum oil, and was Director of AFV Production from 1941 to 1944.

32. NAA A5954 489/2.

33. NAA A5954 806/2 folio 897, WC Minute 1245 ‘Tanks for the armoured division’.

34. NAA A5954 587/2 para 10.

35. Ibid., para 11.

36. NAA A5954 357/1.

37. NAA A5954 813/1 folios 316 to 321, Minute 533 ‘Discussion with C-in-C Far East’. Sir Robert gave a long talk covering three main topics: foreign situation; strategic position; military plans and preparedness.

38. Mellor, The Role of Science and Industry, pp. 309–312.

39. Hopkins, Australian Armour, p. 60.

40. Reports 14 and 15 were the Director-General of Munitions’ reports for August and September 1941. They were presented to the War Cabinet on 6 November, and were recorded in Minute 1476, NAA A5954 807/1 folio 1030.

41. NAA A5954 587/2 ‘Notes on history of tank production in Australia’ paras 12 and 13.

42. NAA A5954 555/10.

43. NAA A5954 807/1 folio 1064, War Cabinet Minute 1527.

44. NAA A2671 War Cabinet Agendum 150/1940.

45. The War Cabinet’s decision is recorded in Minute 375, NAA A5954 804/1 folio 276.

46. Chapter 3 contains details of this proposal.

47. Hopkins, Australian Armour, pp. 331–339; see also NAA MP 729/6 37/401/228. Hopkins calls his document ‘The Cowra paper’ because he wrote it while stationed at Cowra. The second document is more complete and contains organisation charts and establishments.

48. Ibid., p. 37.

49. NAA A5954 805/1 folio 816.

50. Hopkins, Australian Armour, pp. 41–42.

51. AWM224 MSS 44 Part 14.

52. Ibid.

53. AWM54 943 2/14 Armoured Division Training Depot; Military Board secret memo S 586 1941.

54. NAA A5954 322/3 Board of Business Administration Minute 531, Formation of an armoured division. Recommendations arise from discussion of BBA Agendum 38/1941 Supplement 2.

55. NAA A5954 806/1 folio 795, War Cabinet Minute 1088.

56. Handel, Dust, Sand and Jungle, pp. 136–7 provides an interesting biography of Pip Crouch. He joined the British Machine Gun Corps as a gunner in World War I at the age of seventeen, transferred to the tanks, and was wounded when his tank was hit in April 1917. On discharge from hospital he was commissioned into the Tank Corps. He won his MC in India in 1937, and was a very talented sportsman.

57. NAA A5954 806/1 folio 854.

58. NAA A2671 141/1940.

59. NAA A5954 806/1 folio 853.

60. NAA A2671 War Cabinet agendum 150/1940 Supplement 5.

61. NAA A5954 806/1 870.

62. Hopkins, Australian Armour, p. 46.

63. Handel, Dust, Sand and Jungle, p. 42.

64. NAA A2671 150/1940.

65. Recorded in Minute 1349, NAA A5954 806/2 folio 955.

66. The submission was made as Supplement 6 to War Cabinet Agendum 150/1940, NAA A2671.

67. Hopkins, Australian Armour, pp. 52–3.

68. Ibid., p. 50. Hopkins thought that armoured commanders needed to be quick of thought and decision, and that although Northcott was an excellent soldier, his thought processes were too slow.

69. The exact date appears to have been 1 September 1941. See Horner, Crisis of Command, p. 30.

70. Hopkins, Australian Armour, p. 51 and pp. 314–5.

71. Handel, Dust, Sand and Jungle, p. 33.

72. NAA A5954 805/1 folio 585, War Cabinet Minute 802.

73. NAA A5954 805/1 folio 592, War Cabinet Minute 809.

74. NAA A5954 812/2 Advisory War Council Minute 150. The members of the Committee were: E.S. Spooner and J.P. Abbott, members of the Government, but critical of its performance; the three members of the Opposition were: E.J. Holloway, A.S. Drakeford, and J.S. Rosevear.

75. Hasluck, The Government and the people, 1939-1941, p. 391–2.

76. NAA A5954 812/2 folio 167, Advisory War Council Minute 312.

77. Ibid., folios 169E and 169F.

78. Hasluck, The Government and the People, 1939-1941, p. 393.

79. Ibid., p. 394.

80. Ibid., p. 368.

81. Ibid., p. 395.

82. Butlin, The War Economy 1939-1942, p. 479.

83. Australian Manpower Directorate, The Control of manpower in Australia, Canberra, 1945, .p 17. Authorship of this document is not acknowledged, but it seems quite probable that if Wurth was not the author himself, he played a large part in its production.

84. Hopkins, Australian Armour, p. 33.

85. Long, To Benghazi, pp. 71–72.

86. Forty, Tank Commanders, pp. 72–74. Richard O’Connor was one of Britain’s few good commanders of armoured troops. In this action his command was called Western Desert Force, which subsequently became XIII Corps. While on reconnaissance he was captured in 1941, but later escaped, and commanded VIII Corps in Normandy. He had some disagreement with Montgomery, who sacked him in late 1944.

87. Three good accounts of O’Connor’s destruction of the 10th Italian Army are: Long, To Benghazi, pp. 143–206; Forty, The First Victory,; and Correlli Barnett, The Desert Generals, Viking Press, New York, 1961, pp. 19–65, who calls O’Connor ‘the forgotten victor’.

88. Forty, The First Victory, p. 142.

89. Gordon Dickens, Never Late, Australian Military History Publications, Sydney, 2005, p. 61.

90. Handel, Dust, Sand and Jungle, p. 17.

91. Ibid., p. 22.

92. Ibid., p. 26.

93. Gavin Long, Greece, Crete, and Syria, Australian War Memorial, Canberra, 1953. In the last 200 pages of this book, Long provides a detailed account of the Syrian campaign, describing where appropriate the actions of the cavalry regiments.

Chapter 5

1. David Horner (ed), The Battles that Shaped Australia, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 1991, pp. 2–44. Horner’s account of Pearl Harbor describes both the attack itself and its implications for Australia.

2. Lionel Wigmore, The Japanese Thrust, Australian War Memorial, Canberra, 1957, pp. 143–145.

3. Horner, The Battles that Shaped Australia, pp. 46–99. As for Pearl Harbor, this account describes the campaign as well as its effect on Australia.

4. Dudley McCarthy, South-West Pacific Area, First Year, Australian War Memorial, Canberra, 1959, pp. 79–80.

5. Horner, The Battles that Shaped Australia, pp. 140–167. See also McCarthy, South-West Pacific Area, First Year, pp. 80–83, which includes a good explanatory map of the action and the movements of the naval vessels.

6. The importance of the Battle of Midway in the war in the Pacific, if not in the world war as a whole, is highlighted in Liddell Hart’s History of the Second World War, pp. 349–353. Keegan, The Second World War, pp. 221–229 makes the specific point that before the battle the Japanese had six large aircraft carriers, the Americans three; at the end of the battle they had two each. Naval balance in the Pacific had thus been restored, and the Americans were starting to build new carriers at a pace completely unmatched by the Japanese.

7. Kokoda was re-taken by the Australians on 2 November 1942, and Japanese resistance in the Buna-Gona area ended on 23 January 1943.

8. The American attack on Guadalcanal began with the landing of the US Marine Corps on 7 August 1942, but it took many ferocious land and sea battles before the Japanese finally left the island on 9 February 1943.

9. NAA A5954 555/10.

10. NAA A5954 807/1 folio 1128.

11. NAA A5954 813/2 folio 413.

12. NAA A5954 587/2 ‘Notes on history of tank production in Australia’, para 18.

13. NAA A2671 358/1941.

14. NAA A5954 807/2 folio 1176.

15. NAA A2676 2255 Tank requirements and availability, July 1941 to January 1942.

16. Ibid.

17. Sir Earle Page was an eminent member of the Country Party, and had been Prime Minister from 7 to 26 April 1939. In September 1941 he was sent to London to represent Australia at the British War Cabinet. He was able to keep his colleagues at home closely informed about British Cabinet discussions and decisions.

18. NAA A5954 587/2 para 24.

19. NAA A5954 813/2 folio 496, Advisory War Council Minute 843 para 3.

20. NAA A5954 587/2 paras 25 and 26.

21. NAA A5954 813/2 folio 424, Advisory War Council Minute 683.

22. NAA A5954 807/2 folio 1178, War Cabinet Minute 1718.

23. NAA A5954 807/2 folio 1242, War Cabinet Minute 1853.

24. NAA A981 DEF 59 Part 2.

25. NAA A2671 Agendum 166/1942.

26. NAA A5954 808/1 folio 1325 War Cabinet Minute 2060.

27. Hopkins, Australian Armour, p. 62.

28. NAA A5954 814/1 folio 528, Advisory War Cabinet Minute 914. The Marmon Herringtons were made in Indianapolis, USA, and were intended as an airborne tank. A number of these tanks had been ordered for delivery to the Netherlands East Indies and, following the Japanese invasion, the tanks were diverted to Australia. See Handel, Dust, Sand and Jungle, pp. 56–57; and Fletcher, The Great Tank Scandal, pp. 71 and 79.

29. Mellor, The Role of Science and Industry, p. 317.

30. NAA A5954 587/2 para 29.

31. Ibid., para 30.

32. NAA A2671 244/1942.

33. NAA A5954 folios 563-4, Advisory War Council Minute 964.

34. NAA A5954 587/2 para 31.

35. NAA A5954 814/1 folio 585 Advisory War Cabinet Minute 987.

36. Beale, Death by Design, p. 107. In September 1940 the British War Office received reports that the Germans were developing tanks with armour between 100 and 150 mm thick. They decided to develop a gun capable of penetrating this at a reasonable range, and their specification called for an anti-tank weapon of 3-inch calibre firing a 17 pound shot at a muzzle velocity of 2,700 feet per second. Mock-ups were approved in August 1941, and pilots in October. First deliveries of the production models were made in April 1942, and the field-mounted gun came into general service in 1943. It was the best Allied anti-tank gun produced during the war, and was easily a match for the German 88mm.

37. Australian War Cabinet Minute 987, NAA A587/2 para 43.

38. War Cabinet Minute 2255, NAA A5954 808/1 folio 1392.

39. NAA A5954 669/12.

40. NAA A587/2 para 40.

41. Ibid., para 43.

42. NAA A5954 669/12. The objections raised were extensive and searching. For example, there are thirteen sub-questions to main question No. 4, and the total number of questions asked was twenty-five. See letter dated 5/8/42 from Secretary, Department of Munitions, and Annex ‘A’ of Agendum No. 8/1942 of Prime Minister’s War Conference.

43. NAA A5954 587/2 para 44.

44. NAA A5954 491/2 and NAA A5954 587/2 para 52.

45. NAA A5954 587/2 paras 54 and 55.

46. NAA A5954 814/2 folio 660, Advisory War Council Minute 1085, Section 2 para (a).

47. NAA A5954 491/4.

48. NAA A5954 587/2 para 56.

49. American tank design proceeded along defined chains that contained a large number of prototypes and variations. The main chain of medium tanks in World War II was M3, M4, and M26. The M3 (Lee or Grant) was based on the M2, and the M4 (Sherman) was based on the M3. The M4 had the same basic chassis as the M3, but the great improvement was to do away with the 75mm hull gun and replace the 37mm in the turret with a 75mm. The Sherman was modified as time went by, and the tank was used to make many specialpurpose vehicles such as roller-type mine exploders, flails, bulldozers, rocket-launchers, flame-throwers, etc. At the suggestion of the US Ordnance Department, development of a medium tank to replace the M4 was commenced in early 1942. The pilot model T20 was completed in June 1943. It was armed with a 76mm high velocity gun, and was powered by a 470 hp Ford V8 engine. Trials of the T20 showed several major faults, and only one pilot model was built. The development process continued with the T23 (first pilot model completed in January 1943; the T20 and the T23 were developed in parallel, using different transmissions and suspensions), the T25 and the T26. The T26 had increased armour protection, and both the T25 and the T26 mounted a 90mm gun. The final result of this chain of experimentation was the M26, or Pershing. This had a 470 hp engine and a 90mm gun, and was standardised as the M26 in March 1945. It had taken three years, January 1942 to March 1945, to develop the Pershing, and it was firmly based on a chain of previous tanks. The US Army’s Ordnance Department had a weapons design and production centre, Rock Island Arsenal. When wartime production required rapid and enormous expansion, the design and production expertise to build tanks had already been established, and could be transmitted to the wartime arsenals managed by the commercial firms Ford, Chrysler, Fisher, Baldwin, Lima, and Massey-Harris. For more details see Chamberlain and Ellis, Tanks of the World 1915-1945, Arco Publishing, New York, 1969, pp. 174–190.

50. NAA A5954 587/2 para 57.

51. Ibid., para 58.

52. Ibid., para 59.

53. NAA A5954 587/2 para 61.

54. Ibid., para 61.

55. Lieutenant General Sir Vernon Sturdee had been CGS from 30 August 1940 to 9 September 1942. Blamey then appointed him to Washington.

56. NAA A5954 587/2 para 62.

57. Ibid., para 63.

58. Horner, Crisis of Command, pp. 291–293.

59. For a map of the various Military Districts, see Long, To Benghazi, p. 28.

60. NAA A5954 807/1 folios 1080-1085.

61. Ibid., folios 1088–1089.

62. CP183/1 vol. 3.

63. NAA A5954 807/1 folios 1102–1103.

64. War Cabinet Minute 1577 NAA A5954 807/1 folio 1103.

65. Advisory War Council Minute 599, NAA A5954 813/2 folio 382; and War Cabinet Minute 1586 NAA A5954 807/1 folio 1116.

66. CP183/1 Volume 3 Cabinet Minute 684 NAA A5954 813/2 folio 425.

67. Advisory War Council Minute 684 NAA A5954 813/2 folio 425.

68. War Cabinet Minute 1719 NAA A5954 807/2 folio 1178.

69. CP183/1 Volume 3; there are five supplements to this agendum, all of which are subsequently referred to in the text; they are all filed with the original agendum.

70. NAA A5954 806/1 folios 829-830, War Cabinet Minute 1138.

71. NAA A5954 806/2 folio 938, War Cabinet Minute1322.

72. NAA A5954 806/2 folio 957.

73. NAA A5954 806/1 folio 870.

74. NAA A5954 806/2 folios 965-6.

75. There had been considerable political instability in the Parliament for the previous twelve months and more, partly because of the personality and approach of Menzies, and partly because there was nationwide uncertainty about what government policy should be. Menzies resigned on 29 August 1941, and was replaced by Fadden from the same side of the House. Less than six weeks later, Fadden found than he no longer had sufficient support to govern, and returned his commission to the Governor-General. The Governor-General immediately sent for the Labor leader, John Curtin, and he became Prime Minister on 7 October 1941. Curtin and four of his senior ministers, Forde, Makin, Evatt, and Beasley had all served on the Advisory War Council, and were thus familiar with the business of running a war. Curtin was a dedicated man and a good Prime Minister, but was perhaps fortunate in that the Japanese attack two months after his assumption of office brought the country solidly behind him. The events surrounding these changes is described clearly and in detail in Hasluck, The Government and the people 1939-1941, pp. 491–523.

76. NAA A5954 807/1 folios 1057-8, War Cabinet Minute 1520.

77. NAA A5954 807/1 folio 1142.

78. ‘Future employment of AIF: General Sturdee’s paper of 15 February 1942’ is to be found in Wigmore, The Japanese Thrust, pp. 675–678.

79. Mackay’s appreciation was submitted to the Minister for the Army, Forde, on 4 February 1942. The text of this document is in Chapman, Iven G. Mackay, Citizen and Soldier, pp. 253–256.

80. In March 1943 a statement made by General MacArthur appeared in the press which started the Brisbane Line controversy. He said that when he arrived in Australia the intention of the Australian High Command was to give up the northern part of Australia, and defend a line just north of Brisbane. He immediately changed this attitude◦— he said◦— and made New Guinea the front line of defence. General Blamey was justifiably furious about this statement, and a correspondence raged, part of which can be found in NAA A5954 1300/1. It would appear that General MacArthur had either not read the appreciations of Sturdee and Mackay, or could not understand them.

81. NAA A5954 813/2 folio 495, Advisory War Council Minute 842.

82. Hopkins, Australian Armour, p. 325; see also AWM54 44/2/17.

83. Ibid., p. 98.

84. A major difficulty for armoured formations training with the British Army in the UK was the lack of any reasonably sized area in which to manoeuvre. The Australians had plenty of space, and made good use of it.

85. Quoted in Hopkins, Australian Armour, p. 105.

86. AWM54 44/2/17.

87. CP183/1 agendum 281/1942 and War Cabinet Minute 2224, NAA A5954 808/1 folio 1382.

88. Hopkins, Australian Armour, p. 326; and AWM54 44/2/17.

89. CP183/1 Volume 6 Agendum 186/1942.

90. NAA A5954 808/1 folio 1323.

91. Horner, Crisis of Command, pp. 299–300.

92. MP729/6 42/401/142 quoted in Horner, Ibid., pp. 302–304.

93. The principal sources used for this discussion of manpower in 1942 are: S.J. Butlin and C.B. Schedvin, War Economy 1942-1945, Australian War Memorial, Canberra, 1977, pp. 13–47;Hasluck The Government & the People 1942-1945, pp. 283–288; Wurth,Control of Manpower in Australia Feb 42 to Sep 44, War Cabinet Agendum 197/1942, CP183/1 Volume 6; Control of Manpower in Australia was written in late 1944. Wurth had been Chairman of the Manpower Priorities Board, and was appointed Director-General of Manpower on 29 January 1942. This publication is the more significant because it was written by the person in charge, able to understand the external implications of the Directorate, and to understand its internal workings. Agendum 197/1942 is expanded by four supplements, and in total is a document of more than 130 pages. It is a comprehensive account of the manpower problems faced in 1942 and early 1943, and of the steps taken to provide solutions.

94. NAA A5954 807/1 folios 1102-3, War Cabinet Minute 1576.

95. Wurth, Control of manpower in Australia, p. 17.

96. Ibid., pp. 18–19.

97. NAA A5954 807/2 folio 1146, War Cabinet Minute 1646.

98. NAA A5954 807/2 folio 1167, War Cabinet Minute 1695.

99. Statutory Regulations 1942 No. 34.

100. War Cabinet Agendum 197/1942, CP183/1 Volume 6.

101. NAA A5954 808/1 folio 1335, War Cabinet Minute 2091.

102. Butlin and Schedvin, War Economy 1942-1945, p. 22.

103. NAA A5954 808/1 folio 1359, War Cabinet Minute 2160.

104. NAA A5954 808/1 folio 1382, War Cabinet Minute 2223.

105. Butlin and Schedvin, War Economy 1942-1945, p. 39.

106. Ibid., p. 44.

107. NAA A5954 808/2 folio 1417, War Cabinet Minute 2327.

108. NAA A5954 814/2 folios 662-3, Advisory War Council Minute 1090.

109. Wurth, Control of manpower in Australia, p, 31.

110. Handel, Dust, Sand and Jungle, p. 19.

111. Ibid., pp. 24–26.

112. Dickens, Never Late, pp. 219, 227, and map p. 224.

113. Handel, Dust, Sand and Jungle, pp. 26–28.

114. The actions of the 2/6th Armoured Regiment are described in several books and documents. The most detailed account is in Handel, The Vital Factor, pp. 125–208. Very interesting comments on the use of tanks from the infantry perspective can be found in the history of the 2/9th Infantry Battalion, Never Late by Gordon Dickens, pp. 191 et seq. See also McCarthy, South West Pacific, First Year, pp. 449–517.

115. Hopkins, Australian Armour, p. 112.

116. Ibid., pp. 115–116.

117. Handel, Dust, Sand and Jungle, pp. 69–70.

118. Hopkins, Australian Armour, pp. 117–118.

119. Ibid., p. 120.

Chapter 6

1. Liddell Hart, A History of World War I (1914–1918), p. 388.

2. Hopkins, Australian Armour, p. 63; Department of Defence, The Army War Effort, Canberra, 1944, p. 9.

3. For more details of these tanks, see Appendix 1.

4. Roberts, From the desert to the Baltic, p. 95, says of the Grants at Alam Halfa, where he commanded 22 Armoured Brigade: ‘The second important factor was the qualities and peculiarities of the Grant tank, which was the mainstay of the defence. The 75 mm gun was mounted in a sponson on the side of the tank. This prevented good, natural hull-down positions being selected, and since the gun had a very limited traverse only limited areas of fire were available for each tank. The tank was very high which increased the difficulty of concealment in anything but very broken ground. To make the best use of them we put them into the broken foothills, and where suitable positions could not be found these were achieved by bull-dozing.’

5. Hopkins, Australian Armour, p. 64.

6. Advisory War Council Minute 1132, NAA A5954 814/2 folio 700.

7. Chief of Staff’s Report 153, 3 January 1943, NAA A5954 335/8.

8. Advisory War Council Minute 1132 NAA A5954 814/2 folio 700 para 2.

9. Advisory War Council Minute 1135 NAA A5954 814/2 folio 705.

10. The Lee was the American version of the US M3 medium, and the Grant the British version. The British required a rear overhang to the turret to allow a wireless set to be installed, and elimination of the commander’s cupola. It seems strange that sixteen modifications were needed to convert a Lee to a Grant. See Appendix 2.

11. This statement seems to be stretching the truth. Certainly the AC series had its main armament mounted in the turret, but that armament was only a 2-pdr. The Grant was proven in battle, while the AC was still being modified.

12. These figures are rather more optimistic than those provided by Green in May.

13. Colonel G.A. Green was born in Sydney, but served with the British Tank Corps in World War I, where he was awarded the MC. He had been a consulting engineer to the US Secretary of War and, in 1942, joined the Lend-Lease Administration in London. He was regarded as anti-Australian, but it appears that this view was taken only by those who might be adversely affected by his report.

14. Butlin, The War Economy 1942-1945, p. 76.

15. NAA CP183/1 volume 15.

16. Quoted in Butlin, The War Economy 1942-1945, p. 76.

17. NAA A5954 587/2 para 85.

18. Butlin, The War Economy 1942-1945, p. 77, footnote 8.

19. Ibid., p. 77.

20. NAA A5954 587/2 para 76

21. NAA A2671 317/1943.

22. War Cabinet Minute 2979 NAA A5954 809/1 folio 1655.

23. NAA A5954 587/2 para 78.

24. Ibid., para 79.

25. Ibid., para 80.

26. Ibid., para 81.

27. Ibid., para 82.

28. Advisory War Council Minute 1241 NAA A5954 815/1 folio 801.

29. War Cabinet Minute 3300 NAA A5954 809/2 folio 1805, dealing with Agendum 62/1944.

30. NAA A2671 150/1940.

31. War Cabinet Minute 375 NAA A5954 804/1 folio 276.

32. Butlin, The War Economy 1939-1942, p. 254, footnote 5; John Jensen had had extensive experience in the senior levels of Defence Supply since 1923, and had written the history of munitions production in World War I.

33. Mellor, The role of science and industry, p. 306; A.R. Code was an engineer, and was the Director of AFV Production from 1941 to 1944.

34. Butlin, The War Economy 1939-1942, p. 78–79.

35. War Cabinet Minute 2428, 14 Oct 1942, NAA A5954 808/2 folio 1453.

36. NAA A2671 404/1942 ‘Defence of Australia’.

37. Advisory War Council Minute 1118 NAA A5954 814/2 folio 685.

38. Hopkins, Australian Armour, p. 126; also AWM54 44/2/10.

39. Ibid., p. 326; also AWM54 44/2/17.

40. Long, The Six Years War, p. 293.

41. NAA A2671 106/1943.

42. War Cabinet Minute 2715, NAA A5954 809/1 folio 1553-4.

43. As pointed out earlier, there was some uncertainty regarding the name of this division. It must be assumed that it was what had come to be called the 2nd Armoured Division.

44. War Cabinet Minute 2810 NAA A5954 809/1folio 1589.

45. This report is included as a supporting document in the file for Agendum 106/1943, NAA A2671.

46. The Allied Works Council had been formed in 15 February 1942. Its Director-General, E.G. Theodore, had ‘the direction and control of the carrying out of works of whatever nature required for war purposes by the Allied Forces in Australia.’ See Butlin, The War Economy 1942-1945, pp. 142–143.

47. NAA A2671 272/1943.

48. War Cabinet Minute 2969 NAA A5954 809/1 folio 1649.

49. The statement of principles is contained in a document filed as an attachment to War Cabinet Minute 2968, and can be found in NAA A5954 809/1 folios 1660-1665. It has two sections, General Principles and Detailed Priorities and Procedure. There are six sub-sections in the second section, and these are: strength of Australian services, munitions, supplies other than munitions; other needs for the civilian population, works, and essential services.

50. Department of Defence, The Army War Effort, p. 8.

51. Hopkins, Australian Armour, p. 129.

52. Ibid., p. 130.

53. Advisory War Council Minute 1253 NAA A5954 815/1 folios 811-2.

54. Advisory War Cabinet Minute 1270 NAA A5954 815/1 folio 824.

55. NAA CP183/1 Volume 6, War Cabinet Agendum 197/1942 Supplement 4.

56. Butlin, The War Economy 1939-1942, p. 46.

57. War Cabinet Agendum 197/1942 Supplement 4 Appendix A.

58. NAA A5954 808/2 folio 1520, War Cabinet Minute 2616.

59. Butlin, The War Economy 1939-1942, p. 47.

60. NAA CP183/1 Volume 12.

61. NAA A5954 809/1 folios 1549-1553.

62. NAA A5954 809/1 folios 1553-4.

63. NAA CP183/1 Volume 12.

64. NAA A5954 814/2 folio 751, Advisory War Council Minute 1185.

65. Wurth, Control of manpower in Australia, p. 32.

66. NAA CP 183/1 Volume 14.

67. NAA A5954 809/1 folios 1602-3, War Cabinet Minute 2843.

68. NAA A5954 809/1 folios 1660-1665.

69. NAA A5954 306/1 ‘Review of manpower situation, October 1943’.

70. NAA CP183/1 Volume 16.

71. NAA A5954 809/2 folios 1695-1703.

72. NAA A2703 53 ‘Minutes of Full Cabinet meeting 23 November 1943’.

73. Butlin, The War Economy 1939-1942, p. 359.

Chapter 7

1. Hopkins, Australian Armour, p. 327.

2. Ibid., p. 328.

3. Department of Defence, The Army War Effort, p. 72.

4. For the detailed specifications of the Matilda tank, see James Bingham, Infantry Tank Mk II Matilda, Armour in Profile No. 15.

5. Department of Defence, The Army War Effort, Appendix B.

6. Ibid., p. 10.

7. ‘B’ vehicle was the term used for unarmoured wheeled vehicles. Excluded from the category were armoured cars, scout cars, half-tracks, and motorcycles. Most B vehicles were fourwheeled, although some of the heavier vehicles were six-wheelers. The four-wheelers could be either four wheel drive (4x4) or two wheel drive (4x2). For any vehicle in the forward areas of an operation, four wheel drive was essential. For more detail, see Forty, British Army Handbook 1939-1945, pp. 266–280.

8. AWM54 44/2/19.

9. Department of Defence, The Army War Effort, Appendix B.

10. Hopkins, Australian Armour, p. 129.

11. Arthur Bryant, The Turn of the Tide, Collins, London, 1957, pp. 708–718.

12. Long, The Six Years War, p. 324.

13. Nadzab is twenty miles inland from Lae, in the broad Markham Valley. After its capture on 5 September 1943, it was rapidly developed into one of the largest airbases in New Guinea. See David Dexter, The New Guinea Offensives, Australian War Memorial, Canberra, 1961, p. 364.

14. Victor Windeyer was ‘distinguished both as a scholar and a soldier – a combination not uncommon in the history of the Australian Army.’ He commanded the Sydney University Regiment in 1937, the 2/48th Battalion in 1940 (which he led at Tobruk), and in January 1942 he was appointed to command the 20th Brigade, which he led at Alamein. See Dexter, The New Guinea Offensives, p. 330.

15. Landing craft had been developed to make the task of landing troops on a hostile shore less risky. The landings on Gallipoli had demonstrated the need for special craft that could approach the shore, let down a door in their bows, and allow men and vehicles to wade ashore. On some shores they could actually beach, and men could land dry-shod. By 1943 there were several varieties of landing craft, including the Landing Craft Assault (LCA), Landing Craft Mechanised (LCM), Landing Craft Tank (LCT), Landing Ship Tank (LST), and Landing Craft Infantry (LCI). There were also Assault Personnel Destroyers (APDs) and Landing Vehicles Tracked (LVTs). The LST could land 500 tons of men, equipment and supplies, and the LCT 250 tons. The LCI could land 200 men on a beach. For a successful operation it was essential that the Army and the Navy should have extensive joint training in embarking, beaching, and disembarking. See Dexter, The New Guinea Offensives, pp. 272–273.

16. Hopkins, Australian Armour, p. 132.

17. The slave battery carrier is a tracked vehicle that provides electrical assistance to all vehicles and is particularly valuable in recharging tank batteries.

18. Quoted in Dexter, The New Guinea Offensives, p. 549.

19. AWM54 591/7/25 ‘Employment of tanks in jungle warfare, 4 Armoured Brigade, November/December 1943, Finschhafen Sattelberg Wareo’. This file contains documents relating to these actions:

1st Australian Tank Battalion, Narrative for November 1943

4th Armoured Brigade Training Instruction No. 7 ‘Employment of tanks in jungle warfare’ 9th Australian Infantry Division: Report on use of tanks in operations north of Finschhafen 1st Tank Battalion: Report on tank tactics by the CO, Lieutenant Colonel D.D. Glasgow The 9th Division report contains diagrams showing infantry/tank jungle tactics and the placement of mines by the Japanese. The report is signed by GOC 9th Division, Major General Wootten.

20. Ibid, 9th Division report.

21. Hopkins, Australian Armour, p. 135.

22. See AWM54 591/7/25. This is a particularly informative report, and is unusual in that a senior infantry officer shows a clear understanding of the way tanks can and should be used.

23. An understanding of where other arms can provide assistance and where they need such assistance is vital if an army is to make the best use of all its resources. The role of the artillery was generally understood by other arms, but in the British Army in particular there was an almost complete lack of understanding as to how infantry, tanks and engineers should work together. The Australian Army managed the cooperation much better.

24. The main tasks of the Recce Officer are to provide a link between the infantry and the tanks and to reconnoitre the path along which the tanks will make their next move. The second task especially had been carried out by Recce Officers since World War I. It demands an eye for selecting the best going and the ability to remember the chosen route and then to guide the tanks along it.

25. The 4th Armoured Brigade Training Instruction No. 7 (AWM54 591/7/25) states that the walkie-talkie is the appropriate method of communication between tanks and infantry. It also states that the batteries deteriorated quickly and that when it rained water ran down the aerial and into the set, causing a short which put the set out of action.

26. When radios are used to communicate between the separate elements of a military formation they operate as a network in which all radio stations are on the same frequency. To maintain security the network frequency may be changed as often as every day and the first daily task of a radio operator is to make sure that he is correctly ‘netted’ to the control station. The procedure for voice communication is laid down in detail to ensure that messages are clear, concise and unambiguous. Correct procedure must be learnt by anyone who has to operate a radio.

27. In the jungle (and elsewhere) the tracks to be followed were often soft and muddy. To allow continuous passage of men and vehicles without causing too much deterioration of the track, actions were taken to strengthen the surface. Strength could be provided by natural material such as timber or by specially designed metal covering. The strengthening process was called ‘corduroying’.

28. Most of the information in this section is taken from the 4th Armoured Brigade Training Instruction No. 7, contained in AWM54 591/7/25.

29. The Carden-Loyd military vehicles were the result of a partnership between Sir John Carden and Captain Vivian Loyd. Carden died in 1935, but the joint name was retained for the carrier that was successfully used in WWII. See Christopher Foss and Peter McKenzie, The Vickers Tanks, Patrick Stephens Ltd., UK, 1988, pp. 57–64.

30. A general procedure for dealing with casualties is described in Beale, Tank Tracks, pp. 115–116. First Aid could be given by the front-line soldiers themselves, but the more serious a casualty was the further back he progressed in the medical system. The Regimental Aid Post was the first port of call, then the Advanced Dressing Station or Field Dressing Station, and next a Base Hospital in the field. Provided he had regained sufficient fitness, the casualty could be returned to the front line from any of these stages.

31. When a tank is hit or otherwise damaged it may be necessary to get out quickly. However, tanks are not designed for a quick exit. There are many projections and obstacles and tank crews get somewhat festooned with lanyards, microphones, headsets, binoculars, map-cases, and the loops, belts and pockets of their own clothes. The suggestion of a one-piece overall makes good sense, in that it reduces the chances of getting snagged on the tank’s internal projections, as well as reducing the incidence of colds.

32. Long The Six Years War, p. 405.

33. Ibid.

34. Long, The Final Campaigns, p. 248n.

35. Long, The Six Years War, pp. 405–406.

36. Long, The Final Campaigns, xix–xx.

37. The 2/4th Armoured Regiment War History Committee, Tank Tracks, Halstead Press, Sydney, 1953, p. 93.

38. Hopkins, Australian Armour, p. 143.

39. Peter Charlton, The Unnecessary War, Macmillan Australia, Melbourne, 1983, p. 37.

40. Ibid., p. 33.

41. Long, The Final Campaigns, Appendix 3, pp. 608–616 provides the complete text of General Blamey’s ‘Appreciation on operations in New Guinea, New Britain and the Solomons’. It records the history of what had happened up to May 1945 and the reasons for the decisions taken. It foreshadowed what was to happen after May.

42. Charlton, The Unnecessary War, p. 42.

43. Hopkins, Australian Armour, p. 327.

44. For a detailed description of this action see Long, The Final Campaigns, pp. 160–164.

45. Ibid., p. 183.

46. Hopkins, Australian Armour, p. 159.

47. The use of the Matilda flame-throwing tank (Frog) was recorded in AWM54 925/5/5 ‘Report on tank operations: flame-throwing tanks on Labuan Island July 1945’. This file contains two documents. The first is a tactical and technical report on the use of Frogs, which includes a detailed map of the operation. It was compiled by HQ 2/9th Armoured Regiment. The second is a report by Brigadier S.H. Porter, commanding 24 Infantry Brigade. He makes several perceptive points about infantry/flame tank cooperation and says in his final paragraph: “The effect of flame-thrower tanks on enemy morale was probably the greatest factor contributing to the success of the operation. In the area of operations gun tanks supporting infantry had been used previously; but the enemy, on ground eminently suitable for defence, had stubbornly resisted all our advances. When flame-thrower tanks were used resistance quickly collapsed.’

48. Hopkins, Australian Armour, pp. 167–172.

Chapter 8

1. Hopkins, Australian Armour, p. 326; AWM54 44/2/17; and Department of Defence, Army War Effort, Appendix B, sheet 2.

2. Hopkins, Australian Armour, p. 325.

3. Handel, Dust, Sand and Jungle, pp. 142–169, ‘Armoured unit histories’.

4. Ibid. Dickens provides a detailed and vivid history of the battles of the 2/9th Infantry Battalion in World War II, in the course of which they suffered a total of 975 battle casualties.

5. See Bryan Perrett, Tank tracks to Rangoon, Robert Hale, London, 1978, for a description of tanks in the retreat from Rangoon in February to May 1942, in the subsequent battles to hold the Japanese attacks and in the final triumphant return to Rangoon. Some of the country was reasonable tank going, but the Arakan coastline, where Indian and British tanks fought in 1943, 1944, and 1945, had much in common with the jungles of New Guinea, Bougainville, and Borneo.

6. Hopkins, Australian Armour, p. 313.

7. See Chapter 2.

8. Major General Percy Hobart was a strong advocate of the use of tanks, and it was he who trained the 7th and 11th Armoured Divisions, at various times the best tank divisions in the British Army. But he was so forceful in his views that he discouraged many potential tank supporters. He also promulgated the concept of armour working independently and the equally unfortunate concept of tanks firing on the move, rather than using fire and movement See Kenneth Macksey, Armoured crusader: a biography of Major General Sir Percy Hobart, Hutchinson, London, 1967.

9. Duncan gave distinguished service as a tank officer in World War II, commanding a brigade in the 79th Armoured Division. He remained influential in British armoured circles after World War II.

10. Beale, Death by Design, pp. 176–177.

11. See Chapter 3 for the complete text of this agendum.

12. Hopkins, Australian Armour, p. 331.

13. NAA A5954 805/1 folio 516 War Cabinet Minute 689.

14. Hopkins, Australian Armour, p. 75.

15. Wigmore, The Japanese Thrust.

16. Perrett, Tank tracks to Rangoon.

17. Long, To Benghazi, p. 83.

18. War Cabinet Agendum 150/1940, NAA A2671.

19. NAA A5954 587/2 History of tank production in Australia.

20. British tank manufacture was especially prone to underestimate the time required for trialling. Sometimes, as in the case of the Churchill tank (A22), the underestimate was due to political pressure. David Fletcher, The Great Tank Scandal, p. 58, has this to say: ‘The Prime Minister took a special interest in this tank which in due course was to bear his name, but it was a mixed blessing. When the first order was placed on 1 July 1940 he demanded that 500 should be completed by March of the following year, despite a warning from the Director of Tanks and Transport that this was quite impossible, since nine months was just half the usual time required to produce the prototype of a brand new tank from the drawing board. In an attempt to satisfy this urge for haste it was decided to go straight into production from the drawing board. This bypassed the normal practice of building and thoroughly testing prototypes first. Such a course, which is anathema to any respectable engineer, could only be justified by the circumstances, and one engineer, when told that there would be no prototypes said that on the contrary there would be 500 of them!’ The prediction of 500 prototypes was quite correct. The first Churchills were issued to field units in June 1941, and for at least the next eighteen months they were a fitter’s nightmare and would have been so unreliable in action as to have been a disaster. That disaster was realised in the mainly Canadian attack on Dieppe on 19 August 1942.

21. Hopkins, Australian Armour, p. 108.

22. AWM54 591/7/25.

23. A TEWT is a Tactical Exercise Without Troops. As this implies, it was carried out by commanders only, without troops or weapons. It was normally held on the ground, and tactical problems would be posed, discussed and the answers analysed. In this way commanders could work out how to deal with a tactical problem without being in the field with all equipment, an expensive and time-consuming operation. In a sand-table exercise the ground was represented by a model, but the procedure was the same.

24. Hopkins, Australian Armour, pp. 182–184.

25. Lewin, Man of Armour, pp. 107–109.

26. A good description of all the types of tanks used by 79 Armoured Division is contained in Fletcher, Vanguard of Victory.

27. This account of the modus operandi of 79 Armoured Div was contained in a personal communication from David Fletcher, Historian at the Tank Museum Library, Bovington, UK. David is the author of many books on armoured warfare. See also Nigel Duncan, 79th Armoured Division, Hobo’s funnies, Windsor, Profile Publications, 1972.

28. Beale Death by Design. The book as a whole recounts the incompetent way in which the British Army designed, built, and used tanks in World War II. Chapter 3 deals specifically with British tank development from 1919 to 1945.

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Beale, Peter, Death by Design, Sutton Publishing, UK, 1998.

Beale, Peter, Infighter: 9th Battalion Tank Corps 1916-1919, privately published, Valentine, NSW, 2004.

Bean, C.E.W., The AIF in France, vol. IV of the Official History of Australia in the War of 1914-1918, University of Queensland Press, 1982.

Bean, C.E.W., The AIF in France, vol. VI of the Official History of Australia in the War of 1914-1918, University of Queensland Press, 1983.

Blair, Clay, MacArthur, Futura, London, 1977.

Brune, Peter, A Bastard of a Place, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 2004.

Brune, Peter, Those Ragged Bloody Heroes, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 1991.

Bryant, Arthur, The Turn of the Tide, Collins, London, 1957.

Butlin, S.J., The War Economy 1939-1942, Australian War Memorial, Canberra, 1955.

Butlin, S.J. and Schedvin, C.B., The War Economy, 1939-1945, Australian War Memorial, Canberra,1977.

Chapman, Ivan, Iven G. Mackay, Melway Publishing, Melbourne, 1975.

Charlton, Peter, The Unnecessary War, Macmillan Australia, Melbourne, 1983.

Churchill, Winston, The Second World War, Cassell, London, 1949.

Day, David, Menzies and Churchill at War, Paragon House, New York, 1988.

Dexter, David, The New Guinea Offensives, Australian War Memorial, Canberra, 1961.

Dickens, Gordon, Never Late: 2/9 Australian Infantry Battalion 1939-1945, Australian Military History Publications, Sydney, 2005.

Donovan, P.F., Waltzing Matildas: 2/9 Aust Armd Regimental Group, Blackwood, South Australia, 1988.

Ellis, Chris, and Chamberlain, Peter, German tanks and fighting vehicles of World War II, Phoebus, London, 1976.

Ellis, John, The Sharp End of War, David & Charles, London, 1980.

Ellis, John, Brute Force, Andre Deutsch, London, 1990.

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Fletcher, David, The Universal Tank, HMSO, London, 1993.

Fletcher, David, The British Tanks 1915-19, Crowood Press, Marlborough, 2001.

Fletcher, David, and Sarson, Peter, Matilda, Osprey, London, nd.

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Gallaway, Jack, The odd couple: Blamey and MacArthur at War, University of Queensland Press, 2000.

Gordon, Harry, An Eyewitness History of Australia, Penguin, Melbourne, 1976.

Grinyer, Norman Robert, The 2/7th Australian Cavalry Regiment, Daram Printing, Sydney, 1974.

Gudmundsson, Bruce I., On Armor, Praeger, Westport, Connecticut, 2004.

Handel, Paul, Dust, Sand, and Jungle, Australian Military History Publications, Sydney, 2003.

Handel, Paul, The vital factor: a history of the 2/6th Aust Armd Regt, Australian Military History Publications, Sydney, 2004.

Harris, J.P., Men, Ideas and Tanks, Manchester University Press, 1995.

Harris, J.P. and TOASE, F.N., Armoured Warfare, Batsford, London, 1990.

Hartley, Frank J., Sanananda Interlude, Book Depot, Melbourne, 1949.

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INDEX

A

aeroplane 115–16

British-American Aircraft Committee 116

Handley-Page bombers 45

World War I, in 15

Aitape 206, 231, 232, 233

Alam Halfa 177, 272

Alamein 34, 168

Ambon 135

America 66, 91, 116, 117, 134, 278

declaration of war by 91

tank supplies to Australia 109, 115, 138, 139, 140–1, 147–51, 270–2

American Air Force 45

American Army 45, 51, 53, 54, 144

American Navy 136, 212

USS Yorktown 136

Amiens, Battle of 38, 53–4

ammunition, replenishment 225–6

amphibious tanks 189, 262–3

anti-tank weapons 82, 218, 224, 226–8, 226–7

armoured car 273

Armoured Corps Training Organisation 84, 92

Armoured Fighting Vehicles (AFV) School 85, 90, 92, 119–21, 120, 126

Armoured Force see Experimental Mechanical Force (EMF)

armoured vehicle Royal Engineers (AVRE) 266, 266

Arnold, Lieutenant C.D. 18

Arnott, Major Ken 237

Arras 39

assault tanks 78

Atlantic Ocean convoys 174–5

Australia

Canada, assistance from 142–3

Home Defence Forces 154, 163

Japanese attack on 134–6, 135

resources

1939, in 63–4

1942, in 162–6

weapons, ammunition and equipment supply by 94

Australian Airforce 13, 38

human resources 63–4, 76

war material, review of 72

Australian Armoured Corps 84, 92, 154, 156, 160–1, 162, 166, 172, 195–7, 203, 206, 244 see also Australian Tank Corps

1st Armoured Brigade 126, 127, 151, 154, 160, 161, 206

1st Armoured Division 126, 154, 160, 161, 162, 169, 175, 190, 196, 247, 250

1st Armoured Regiment 219, 240–2, 245

1st Army Tank Battalion (Matildas) 187–8, 245

1st Motor Brigade 161

1st Motor Division 161, 162

2nd Armoured Brigade 126, 127, 151, 154, 160, 161

2nd Armoured Division 160–1, 189

2/4th Armoured Regiment 207, 230, 233–4, 237, 238, 245, 262

2/5th Armoured Regiment 127, 160, 169, 207, 245

2/6th Armoured Regiment 127, 145, 169–72, 170, 170, 172, 188, 245

Cavalry (Commando) Regiment 166, 246, 258

C Squadron 169, 213, 214-17, 218, 232, 233, 240

X Squadron 169

2/7th Armoured Regiment 127, 207, 245

Cavalry Regiment 131, 132, 166, 167–8, 203, 246, 258, 259

2/8th Armoured Regiment 127

2/9th Armoured Regiment 127, 188, 207, 209, 240, 240, 245, 262

Cavalry Regiment 167, 168, 203, 246, 250, 258

2/10th Armoured Regiment 127

2nd Motor Brigade 161

2nd Motor Division 160, 161, 162, 188

3rd Armoured Division 161, 162, 190, 196

3rd Army Tank Brigade 161, 162, 190, 195

3rd Motor Brigade 160, 161, 196

4th Armoured Brigade 187–90, 196–8, 206–7, 228–31, 245, 252, 259, 260–1, 267

6th Armoured Brigade 160, 161, 188

cooperation with infantry 222–4, 250, 261–2, 269

creation and training 117–21, 124–7, 124, 160–1, 188–9, 221, 250

engineer assistance 224–5

equipment and personnel 228–31

formations 161, 186, 196–7, 232–3, 244–53

officer and NCO selection 121–7

operations 129–32, 166–72

tank importations 143, 270–4

training with infantry 46–7, 221, 261–2

Australian Army 13, 151

1st Army 161

1st Cavalry Division 151

1st Corps 38, 74, 79

1st Division 190

1st Infantry Brigade 54

1st Infantry Division 151

1st Regiment 58

2nd Army 161

2/8th Commando Squadron 235

2/9th Battalion 131, 247

2/12th Infantry Battalion 170

2/10th Infantry Battalion 169

2/23rd Infantry Battalion 213, 216

2/24th Infantry Battalion 213, 238

2/46th Infantry Battalion 218

2/48th Infantry Battalion 213–14, 216

2nd Cavalry Division 151

2nd Infantry Division 151, 196

3rd Brigade 190

3rd Division 190, 231

3rd Infantry Division 151, 237

4th Anti-tank Regiment 113

4th Infantry Brigade 190, 217, 218

4th Infantry Division 38, 40, 41, 44, 151

5th Division 187, 190, 231, 232

6th Division 130, 158, 160, 187, 190, 231–3, 266, 273

6th Cavalry Regiment 129, 130, 1301, 132, 166, 203

A Squadron 130–1, 218, 219

6th Infantry Brigade 48

6th Infantry Division 54, 93, 151

7th Company/2nd Australian Machine Gun Brigade 51

7th Division 158, 160, 162, 187, 190, 211, 232, 240

7th Infantry Division 151

8th Division 155, 156, 250

9th Division 132, 190, 211, 232, 233, 240, 251

9th Infantry Battalion 169, 235

9th Infantry Division 151, 219

11th Division 190

12th Division 190

13th Australian Infantry Battalion 48

15th Brigade 190

17th Brigade 190

18th Infantry Brigade 131, 241

20th Infantry Brigade 211–12, 218

25th Infantry Battalion 237–8

26th Infantry Brigade 213, 214

27th Infantry Battalion 238

29th Infantry Brigade 190

42nd Infantry Battalion 48

44th Battalion 49

AIF 119, 139, 151, 154–7, 162

Armoured Corps/Division 32–6, 34, 35, 75–6, 78–86, 90, 105, 110, 125, 155, 162

Army Instructional Corps (AIC) 120

cooperation between tank and infantry 222–4, 250, 261–2, 269

distrust of tanks 41–2, 45–6, 51

Field Artillery Regiment 126

human resources 63–4, 76, 86–8

Land Headquarters (LHQ) 161

Light Horse units 126

manpower allocation 86–8, 127–9, 152–3, 160, 163–6, 198–203

Military Districts 151, 161

peacetime planning 58, 269

reorganisation 190–4, 200

School of Mechanisation 68–9

Sudan Contingent 13

tank force see Australian tank force

training 46–7, 221, 261–2

war material, review of 72

Australian cruiser (AC) series tanks (Sentinel) 72, 96, 103, 107, 108, 109, 178–9, 253–8, 274

AC1 96, 103, 107, 108, 109–10, 111, 114, 114, 116, 137, 139, 141, 143, 146, 149, 175, 181–2, 185, 254, 254, 256, 257, 274

AC2 107, 109, 110, 111, 114, 115, 116, 146, 254, 277

AC3 (Thunderbolt) 143, 144, 145, 148, 148, 181, 185, 254, 257, 258, 277, 278

AC4 178, 178, 181, 185

Australian government

Advisory War Council 91, 96, 127, 128, 137, 141, 143, 144, 145, 146, 153, 158, 166, 276, 277

civilian role 154, 163, 165

defence policy 12, 77–8, 152–60, 162, 269

Department of War Organisation of Industry 129

Directorate of AFVs (DAFV) 111–12, 115, 119

Directorate of Manpower 129, 163–4

Manpower Committee 164–5, 199

Manpower Priorities Board 129, 163

War Commitments Committee 201–2

war effort 194–5

Australian Navy 13, 159, 263

human resources 63–4, 76

Australian Tank Corps 58, 59 see also Australian

Armoured Corps

1st Tank Battalion 209, 212, 214, 218

1st Tank Section 59

Australian tank force 13–14, 58, 66–9, 74 see also

Australian tank production

armoured division, formation of 75–6, 78–86, 90, 105, 151–62

armoured fighting vehicles (AFVs), production 72–5, 85, 111–12, 117–18, 269

creation and training 117–21, 124, 124–7, 160

local production see Australian tank production

manpower 86–8, 121

Australian tank production 70–2, 73–4, 81–2, 86–7, 90, 92–108, 138, 139, 141, 143, 146–50, 180–3, 244, 253–5, 268–9, 274

Carriers, machine-gun tanks 85, 92, 127

cessation 181–4, 206

chronology 275–8

contractors 98

costs 105

cruiser tanks 81–2, 85–6, 92–3, 95, 97, 145, 148, 150

delays 105, 141

delivery of first tank 95, 96

design 92–3, 96, 98, 99, 104, 106, 112, 114

evaluation of program 184–8

mechanical components 98

Victorian Barracks meeting 1941, minutes 99–102

B

Balikpapan 232, 240–2, 241, 245, 247

Bardia 54, 93–4, 93, 130, 131, 188, 266, 273

Bataan 134

Bean, Charles 39, 41, 51

The Official History of Australia in the War of 1914 to 1918 39, 251

Beasley, Mr Jack 128, 156

Belgium 13, 64, 72, 81

Bennett, Major-General H. Gordon 251, 266

Berlin 40

Bermicourt 18, 19

BHP 99

Bingham, Lieutenant Colonel John 48

Blamey, General Sir Thomas 43, 44–5, 65, 84, 86, 118, 141, 143, 144, 145, 146, 157, 159, 161, 181, 182, 188, 190, 193, 200, 231, 235–6, 254–5, 266, 277, 288

Blue Flash 35

Boer War 13

Bonga 216, 217, 219

Borneo 206, 232, 233, 240–2, 242, 247, 252, 273

Bougainville 206, 232, 233, 234–8, 239, 245

bridge construction 225, 225

bridge-laying tanks 189, 240, 266

Bridgeford, Major General William 59, 237

Brisbane Line 158

Britain 13, 117

tank supplies to Australia 109, 110, 115, 138, 139, 140–1, 272–3, 275

War Office 20, 21–22, 23, 33, 42, 81–2, 110–11, 155

British Army

British Expeditionary Force (BEF) 66–7

British Field Force 29

British Fourth Army 43

11th Armoured (Charging Bull) Division 35

5th Tank Brigade 17, 44, 44, 46, 50, 56

50th Infantry Division 31

1st Armoured Division 29, 30, 31, 67, 249

1st Army Tank Brigade 31

First British Army 39

4th Royal Tank Regiment 35

Fifth British Army 39, 40, 42

mechanical force, establishment of 22–3

mobile division 29

7th Armoured Division 33

79th Armoured Division 266–7

144th Royal Armoured Corps (RAC) 35

7th Infantry Brigade 23, 27, 251

Tank Board 68

Tank Corps see Royal Tank Corps (RTC)

tank doctrine 14–15, 18–20, 20–9, 30–6

Third British Army 39

22nd Armoured Brigade 272

World War II tank force 67–8, 78

British-Indian force 136

British Ministry of Supply 124

British Navy 12

HMS Prince of Wales 134

HMS Repulse 134

Broad, Charles 22, 24–5, 25

Mechanised and Armoured Formations (‘Purple Primer’) 24–6

Modern Formations 26

Brooke, Field Marshal Lord Alan 29

Brooke-Popham, Air Chief Marshal Sir Robert 113, 127

Bruce, First Viscount Stanley 60, 61–2

Bruce, High Commissioner Stanley 110, 139, 151

Brunei Bay 232, 233, 240–1

Buin 234, 237, 238

Bullecourt, First Battle of 38, 39–42, 51, 57–8, 248, 265

Buna 145, 169–72, 174, 178, 187, 192, 197, 203, 207, 245

Burma 134, 136, 251

Burnett-Smith, General Office Commanding (GOC) John 27

C

Cadillac engines 96, 100, 103, 106, 109, 110, 256, 276

Calais 30

Cambrai, Battle of 16–17, 20, 38, 42, 44

Canada 12, 116, 117, 142, 138

capital tanks 78

carriers machine-gun 70–1, 70, 73–4, 127, 131

Australian production of 85, 92

Bren Gun Carrier 167

No. 2 Mark I 71

LP 1 70, 71

LP 2 70, 71

LP 2A 137

3-inch mortar carrier 71

2-pdr 71, 71, 78

Wasp flame-thrower 71

Carro Armato 11/39 tank 130

Carruthers, Brigadier 43

Casey, Richard G. 65, 139, 140

Cavan, Lord 22

Chamberlain, Alan 82, 106, 110

Chamberlain, Prime Minister Neville 28, 61, 62, 267

Chase, US Major General W. 59

Chifley, Ben 90, 156

China 13, 91

Christie, J. Walter 28

Chuignolles, Battle of 54

Churchill tank 61, 109, 267

Churchill, Winston 61, 62, 64, 134, 154, 210

Coates, John 58

Collins, Colonel Jack 23

Colwell, H.P. 125

Comets 68, 268

communication 14, 25, 26, 222–4, 250, 264

Coote & Jorgensen, Sydney 98

Coral Sea, Battle of 136–7

Corregidor 134, 136

Cory, Major 233

Courage, Brigadier General Anthony 44

Coxen, Brigadier 43

Crouch, Lieutenant Colonel Leslie Pittock ‘Pip’ MC 123

cruiser tanks 28, 67–8, 72, 73, 78, 140, 206 see also Australian cruiser (AC) series

A9 30, 67, 68

A10 67, 68

A13 67, 68, 72

Australian production of 81–2, 85–6, 92–3, 95, 97

Covenanter, the 68, 267

Crusader, the 68, 272, 267

M3 98, 109, 112, 270–2

Curtin, Prime Minister John 90, 91, 96, 128, 140–2, 147, 150, 156, 157, 197

Cyprus 131

D

Darwin, bombing of 134, 135

Denby, Charles 147

Denmark 66

Derrick, Sergeant Tom 216

Deverell, Sir Cyril 27, 29

Diamond T Wrecker 229

Dill, Field Marshal 140

Duncan, Major General Nigel 248

Dunkirk 66

Duntroon 58Duntroon 58

Dutch East Indies 77, 152

E

Eastern Group Supply Council 94–5

Egypt 29, 69, 130, 168

El Alamein 137, 168

Elles, Major General Hugh 18, 22, 44

engineer assistance 224–5

Evatt, Dr Herb V. 90, 142, 156, 182

Experimental Mechanical Force (EMF) 23–4, 25

F

Fadden, Arthur 91, 96, 127, 137

Fairbairn, James 65, 76, 80, 81

Finschhafen 211–12, 212, 218, 245, 260

flame-throwers (Frogs) 71, 189, 189, 241, 242, 266

Flanders 39

Flers-Courcelette 18

Fletcher, David 15–16

Foch, General 43

Foot, Major Stephen 20

Foott, Brigadier 43

Forde, Frank 90, 156, 158, 182

Fortification Point 217, 218

France 13, 16, 18, 31, 38, 64, 72, 81, 85, 249–50, 256, 265, 267, 270

Fraser, Brigadier 43

Frogs see flame-throwers (Frogs)

fuel, replenishment 226

Fuller, Major General J.F.C. (John) ‘Boney’19–20, 19, 22–3, 56

G

Gallipoli 13

General Motors diesel 6-71 95

Germany/German Army 14, 31, 33, 40–1, 48, 66, 91, 137, 143, 144, 168, 248–50, 255, 265, 271, 272, 273

Austria, unification with 60

‘Black Day’ 38

Holland, France and Belgium, invasion of 64, 66

Prague, occupation of 60

Russia, invasion of 90, 137

Spring Offensive of 1918 42, 53

surrender of Sixth Army 174

Gilbert and Marshall Islands 210

Glasgow, Colonel T.W. 142, 143, 218, 228

Gordon, General 13

Gort, Lord 29, 31

Gough, General 39–40

Gowrie, Governor-General Lord 90, 156

Great War see World War I

Green, Colonel G.A. 181–2, 186, 255, 278

Guadalcanal 137

Guiberson engine 95, 96, 103, 256, 270, 276

Gullet, Sir Henry 65

guns and gunnery 143–4

design 144

Lewis 41

17-pdr gun 145–6

training 124, 124–5

25-pdr field gun 143, 145, 146, 148

H

Haig, Field Marshal Douglas 18, 42, 45, 57

Hamel, Battle of 14, 17, 38, 42, 47–53, 54, 57–8, 266

Accroche 52–3

Pear Trench, capture of 48

plan for 42–7

Hartnett, Mr 99–102, 104, 105, 106, 276, 277

heavy tanks 78

Hendecourt 40

Hindenburg line 39, 40, 94

Hinton, Brigadier F.B. 126

Hitler, Adolf 60, 61, 62, 87, 90 see also Germany/Germany Army; Nazi

Hobart, Percy 22, 26, 29, 33, 248

Holland 13, 64

Holt, Harold 128

Hopkins, Lieutenant Colonel Ronald 59–60, 59, 76–7, 83, 93, 114, 118–19, 120, 121, 126, 143, 247, 250, 265

Hordern, Major Sam 213, 215

Hore-Belisha, Leslie 28, 29

Horner, David 63

horses 137–8

Hughes, Billy 65

Huntingdon, Private Sydney 51

Huon Peninsula 206, 210–20, 220, 224

I

India/Indian Army 12, 94, 130

Indonesia 232

infantry tanks 78, 109

analysis 172

Churchill tank 61, 109, 267–8

Infantry Tank Mark II (Matilda) see Matilda tanks

Infantry Tank Mark III (Valentine) 95, 109, 110, 168

instruction manuals see training documents

Italy/Italian Army 33, 34, 62, 69, 91, 130, 130, 131, 174

Ives, Captain Cecil 120

J

Jackson, General Sir Louis 57

Japan/Japanese Army 13, 30, 59, 62, 91, 137, 154, 158, 163, 165, 186, 271

anti-tank measures 226–8, 226–7

Australia, attack on 134–6, 135

Bougainville 234–5

declaration of war with 90, 157

Ha-Go light tanks 211

Pearl Harbour, bombing of 64, 90, 91, 91, 134, 152

tank forces 66, 113, 143, 251, 252

jeeps 226, 228

Jensen 185, 186

Jivevenang 214

Jolly, Alan 35, 77

Blue Flash 35–6

K

Kavieng 210

Kendall, James 98, 102, 114

Kennedy, Major General John 27

Kiggell, Lieutenant General Launcelot 18

King, Prime Minister William MacKenzie 142, 143

King George V 57

Khartoum 13

Kokoda Track 137, 167

L

Lae 210, 211, 212, 231

Lamperd, Lieutenant E.W. 59

Landing Ship Tank (LST) 212, 213, 263

Langemak Bay 211, 213

Lend-Lease authorities 146, 147, 181, 255

Lewin, Colonel 23

Lewis, Essington 99–102, 99, 104, 105, 106, 111, 144, 146, 181–2, 276, 277

Libya 129

Liddell Hart, Basil 22, 26, 28, 29

Light Aid Detachment (LAD) 196

Light Field Ambulance 196, 208, 208, 209

light tanks 78, 108, 140, 167, 274, 277

British ‘obsolete’ light tanks 137

Light Tank Mark VI 76, 274

M2 A4 270

M3 (Stuart) 103, 103, 109, 110, 111, 112, 137, 140, 143, 144, 145, 169, 170, 172, 175, 177, 179, 187, 188, 198, 207, 245, 270–1

Marmon-Herrington light combat tank 273, 274

Lindsay, George 22, 23, 26

List of Reserved Occupations 87–8, 163, 164

Lloyd, Lieutenant Colonel Hardress 40

Locke, Brigadier W.J.M. 126

Long, Gavin 64

Lyons, Major Russell 235

M

M26 (Pershing) 257

machine-gun carriers see carriers machine-gun

maintenance 230, 230

manufacturers and designers 268

Ansaldo 130

Bradford and Kendall 114

Coote & Jorgensen, Sydney 98

McKay Massey-Harris, Melbourne 98

Marmon-Herrington Company of Indiana 273

Metropolitan Gas Company of Fitzroy, Victoria 71

Military Design Section (AFV) 112

Rock Island Arsenal 270

Sonnerdales, Sydney 98

Victorian Railway Workshops 70

Manus 210

Marmon-Herrington tanks 175, 177–8, 273–4

CTLS-4TA (Two-man Tank) 143, 177, 273

light combat tank 273, 274

Mark III 273

McBride, Senator 99

MacArthur, General 146, 147–8, 150, 183, 183, 197, 210, 231, 255, 257, 278

Macarthur-Onslow, Major Denzil 130, 188

Mackay, Lieutenant General Iven 54, 65, 93–4, 93, 158, 161, 219, 266

McKay Massey-Harris, Melbourne 98

MacLagan, General 44

McLay, Senator George 65

Malay Barrier 10, 64, 135, 153, 172, 175, 178, 197, 202, 250–1, 259

Malaya 113, 113, 134, 151

Manchuria 30, 31

Mark I 40, 41, 249, 276

Mark II (Matilda) see Matilda tanks

Mark IV 42, 272

Mark V 17, 21, 42, 44, 45, 50, 54, 56

Mark VI light tanks 76, 274

Mark VIII 21

Mark IX 21

Marper, Captain 48

Martel, Giffard 28

Matilda tanks 41, 109, 140, 161, 175–7, 176, 207, 214, 215, 217, 224, 228, 230, 232, 234, 237, 238, 241, 249, 260, 267, 272–3, 274

Mechanised and Armoured Formations (‘Purple Primer’) 24–6

medical services 231

medium tanks 78

M2 A1 271

M3 (General Grant) 95, 97, 97, 106, 112, 120, 140, 143, 146, 160, 169, 175, 177, 179–80, 188, 196, 198, 207, 271–2, 277

M3 (General Lee) 97, 179–80, 271–2

Medium C 21

Medium D 21

Menzies, Prime Minister Robert 61–2, 65, 69, 72, 76, 84, 87, 91, 116, 127, 142, 277

Metropolitan Gas Company of Fitzroy, Victoria 71

Middle East 151, 154, 155, 157, 161

Midway, Battle of 136, 137

Milford, General 99

Milne, Sir George ‘Uncle George’ 14, 22–3, 25, 26

Milne Bay 211, 212, 226, 247

Milner, Colonel 98–102, 106

mines 218, 224, 226–8, 227

Modern Formations 26

Monash, Lieutenant General Sir John 14, 17, 38, 43, 43, 44–5, 46–7, 49, 248, 266

Money, Lieutenant 41

Montgomery, Field Marshal ‘Monty’ 34–5, 78, 272

Montgomery-Massingberd, Sir Archibald ‘MM’ 26, 27–8

Morobe 212, 213

Morris, General 136

mortar tanks (Hedgehog) 189

motorcycles 124

Moulders Union 106

Moulds, Major H.L. 120

Murdoch, Captain I.T. 120

Mustang fighter 175

N

National Register 87–8

national security 12, 21, 64, 78, 104

Nazi see also Germany/German Army 62

New Britain 77, 231, 232

New Ireland 77

New Zealand 12, 94

Normandy 34, 35

North Africa 33, 34, 77, 109, 130, 137, 174, 246, 247, 258, 266, 270

Northcott, Major-General 83, 84, 85, 99, 103, 111, 112, 119, 126

Norway 66, 69

O

O’Connor, Lieutenant General Richard 33, 130

Odlum, Major General V. 142

Operation Barbarossa 90

Operation Oboe 240–2

Orpen, Sir William 41

P

Page, Sir Earle 140–1

Palestine 13, 22, 130, 131, 132, 168

Papua New Guinea (PNG) 12, 77, 135–6, 137, 152, 153, 167, 169–72, 171, 174, 187–90, 209–10, 231, 245, 246, 252, 273

Pearl Harbour, bombing of 64, 90, 91, 91, 117, 134, 152

Perkins, Major R.A. 85, 120, 121, 123

Philippines 206, 210, 232

Pino Ridge 216

Poland 31, 60, 62, 72, 249–50, 255–6

Pope, Brigadier Vyvyan 31–2, 32, 68, 265

Prague, occupation of 60

Pratt, Major General Douglas 271

Pratt & Whitney engines 256

Puckapunyal 120, 121, 124, 126, 159

Purple Primer 24–6

Q

Queen Mary 49

R

RAAF Lockheed Hudson 80

Rabaul 134, 135, 152, 153, 210

reconnaissance, importance of 221

Roberts, Major General Pip 35, 272

Robertson, General Horace (Red Robbie) 93, 159, 160

Rommel, General 33, 137, 177, 273

Roosevelt, President 210

Royal Tank Corps (RTC) 22, 23, 38, 42, 56–7, 58, 77, 265

Australian infantry, joint training with 46–7

8th Battalion 44, 47

11 Company of D Battalion 40

flag of 44

J Battalion 17

2nd Battalion 44

7th Royal Tank Regiment 54

13th Battalion 44

Russia 28, 30, 66, 90, 91, 137, 140, 273

Rycroft, Major 18

Ruwolt, Chas 98

S

St Julien 18

Salisbury Plain 25, 27

Salonika 22

Sanananda Track 168–72, 174, 178, 187, 197, 207, 245, 247

Sattelberg 214–16, 260

Scott-Stevenson, Lieutenant 222

SCR 536 walkie-talkie 222, 223

Sentinel see Australian cruiser (AC) series

Shedden, Cabinet Secretary Frederick 65

Sherman (M4) tank 144, 145, 180, 182, 183–4, 272

Sicily 34

Sidi Barrani 130

Singapore 12, 134

Slave Battery Carrier (SBC) 229, 229

Solomon Islands 77, 135, 136, 231, 239, 252

Somme 51

Sonnerdales, Sydney 98

South Africa 12, 13, 94

Spanish Civil War 30

Spender, Percy 85, 92, 99, 103, 123, 138, 138, 141, 144, 179, 200–1, 277

Squires, Lieutenant General E.K. 66, 68, 184, 255–6, 275

SS Neptuna 135

SS Zealandia 135

Street, Geoffrey 65, 65, 72, 76, 80–1, 80, 85–6, 117–18, 185, 249–50, 276

Stuka 14

Sturdee, Lieutenant General V.A.H. 76, 83, 83, 84, 118, 150, 158, 231

Sudan Contingent 13, 13

Sweden 66

Syria 131, 132, 166, 167, 168, 246, 258

T

Tank Corps see Australian Tank Corps; Royal

Tank Corps

tank doctrine 14–15, 18–20, 20–9, 30–6, 77

‘A Mobile Army’ 20

Army Training Instruction No. 3, ‘Handling of an Armoured Division’ 33

1916–1919 18–20

1919–1939 20–9

1939, after 30–6

‘Plan 1919’ 20

preliminary bombardment 19–20

tank-dozers 189, 225, 240

tanks

analysis of utility in battle 172

armament 20, 81–2

assault see assault tanks

armoured formations 24, 25, 26, 33, 34, 93, 244–53

Australian production of see Australian tank production

battle 143

breakdowns 15–16

casualty rate 18, 215, 247

conditions inside 16, 57

crew 56–7

cruisers see cruiser tanks

distrust of 41–2, 45–6, 51, 248, 265

heavy see heavy tanks

importation and supply 137–51, 270–4

infantry see infantry tanks

inventory 117, 143, 270–4

light see light tanks

maintenance 230, 230

medium see medium tanks

mobility 14

petrol supply 16

range of action 20

role of 13–14, 21, 35–6, 77–8, 124

speed 20, 82, 172

supply tanks 49, 49

suspension system 28

tactics, testing of 30

training manual 19

types 28, 78

World War I, in 15–18

Tarakan 232, 233, 240–2

Timor 135

Tobruk 35, 130, 131, 247

Torokina 232, 234, 237

training documents

‘A Mobile Army’ 20

Armoured lessons learned from operations in SWPA 259–64

Army Training Instruction No. 3, ‘Handling of an Armoured Division’ 33

Mechanised and Armoured Formations (‘Purple Primer’) 24–6

Modern Formations 26

‘Plan 1919’ 20

‘The tactical handling of armoured divisions’ 33

T20 149

U

USA see America

USS Tennessee 91

V

Vaire Wood, capture of 44

Valentine Mark III 95, 109, 110, 168

Vaux-en-Amienois 45, 50

Vickers-Armstrong Light Dragon Mark III 70

Vickers Light Tank Mark VI B 131

Vickers machine gun 143–4

Vickers medium Mark II 274

Victorian Railway Workshops 70

Vimy 39

W

Wasp engines 115, 116, 256

Watson, Colonel W.D. 82, 85, 86, 92, 99–102, 104, 106, 112, 185, 253, 256, 276

Watson, Major W.H.L. 40, 41

Watts, Captain Keith 59–60, 120

Wavell, Field Marshal Lord 28, 142

Western Desert 33

Western Front 43, 53

Wewak 206, 210, 224, 225, 232, 233–4, 245

Whippets 17–18, 17, 21, 44, 56

‘Julian’s Baby’ 17

Musical Box 18

White, Lieutenant General Sir Cyril 80, 81

Whitehead, Captain Norman 169, 213

Windeyer 211, 212, 213

Winning, Major N.I. (George) 235–6

Wootten, Major General George 211, 212, 217–19, 219

World War I 14

Armistice of 11 November 1918 56

‘Hundred Days’, the 17, 20, 38, 53–4, 56, 58

tanks in 15–18

World War II 60–3

declaration of 60

Eastern Group Supply Council 94–5

Wright-Continental engine 271

Wurth, Wallace C. 129, 163

THE AUSTRALIAN ARMY HISTORY COLLECTION

Winning with Intelligence

Judy Thomas

Duntroon

Darren Moore

The Warrior Poets

Robert Morrison

The History of the Royal Australian Corps of Transport 1973–2000

Albert Palazzo

Defenders of Australia

Albert Palazzo

The Fight Leaders

D. Butler, A. Argent and J. Shelton

Operation Orders

Pat Beale

Little by Little

Michael Tyquin

Red Coats to Cams

Ian Kuring

Bowler of Gallipoli

Frank Glen

Vets at War

Ian M. Parsonson

Only One River to Cross

A.M. Harris

The Fragile Forts

Peter Oppenheim

Hassett: Australian Leader

John Essex-Clark

Persian Expedition

Alan Stewart

The Chiefs of the Australian Army

James Wood

Never Late

Gordon Dickens

To Villers-Bretonneux

Peter Edgar

Madness and the Military

Michael Tyquin

The Battle of Anzac Ridge 25 April 1915

Peter D. Williams

Doves Over the Pacific

Reuben R.E. Bowd

The Lionheart

David Coombes

Battlefield Korea

Maurie Pears

Chemical Warfare in Australia

Geoff Plunkett

A Most Unusual Regiment

M.J. Ryan

Between Victor and Vanquished

Arthur Page

Country Victoria’s Own

Neil Leckie

Surgeon and General

Ian Howie-Willis

Willingly into the Fray

Catherine McCullagh

Beyond Adversity

William Park

Crumps and Camouflets

Damien Finlayson

More than Bombs and Bandages

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The Last Knight

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Forgotten Men

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Battle Scarred

Craig Deayton

Crossing the Wire

David Coombes

Do Unto Others

Alan H Smith

Copyright

Copyright © Peter Beale 2011

First published 2011

Copyright remains the property of the author and apart from any fair dealing for the purposes of private study, research, criticism or review, as permitted under the Copyright Act, no part may be reproduced by any process without written permission.

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Cover design and typesetting: Think Productions

National Library of Australia Cataloguing-in-Publication entry

Author: Beale, Peter.

Title: Fallen sentinel : Australian tanks in World War II / Peter Beale.

ISBN: 9781921941023 (hbk.)

Notes: Includes bibliographical references and index.

Subjects: World War, 1939-1945--Australia--Tank warfare. Tanks (Military science)--Australia--History. Tank warfare--History.

Dewey Number: 358.180994

Content

Peter Beale
AUSTRALIAN TANKS IN WORLD WAR II

PREFACE

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Map

Chapter 1: NATIONAL SECURITY AND TANKS

Chapter 2: AUSTRALIANS AND TANKS IN WORLD WAR I

Chapter 3: A LONG SLEEP AND TWO WAKE-UP CALLS

Chapter 4: HASTEN SLOWLY — 1941

Chapter 5: TO THE BARRICADES — 1942

Chapter 6: THE STORM RECEDES — 1943

Chapter 7: TO THE ISLANDS — 1944–45

Chapter 8: WASTED EFFORT

APPENDICES

Appendix 1: TANKS IMPORTED FOR USE BY AUSTRALIAN ARMOURED UNITS

Appendix 2: AUSTRALIAN TANK PRODUCTION CHRONOLOGY

ENDNOTES

Chapter 1

Chapter 2

Chapter 3

Chapter 4

Chapter 5

Chapter 6

Chapter 7

Chapter 8

BIBLIOGRAPHY

INDEX

THE AUSTRALIAN ARMY HISTORY COLLECTION

Copyright